EP3895400A1 - Kommunikationsvorrichtung, infrastrukturausrüstung, kernnetzwerkausrüstung und verfahren - Google Patents

Kommunikationsvorrichtung, infrastrukturausrüstung, kernnetzwerkausrüstung und verfahren

Info

Publication number
EP3895400A1
EP3895400A1 EP19835245.2A EP19835245A EP3895400A1 EP 3895400 A1 EP3895400 A1 EP 3895400A1 EP 19835245 A EP19835245 A EP 19835245A EP 3895400 A1 EP3895400 A1 EP 3895400A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
communications
communications device
cell
security function
security
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP19835245.2A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Vivek Sharma
Lars Nord
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Sony Group Corp
Sony Europe BV
Original Assignee
Sony Group Corp
Sony Europe BV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Sony Group Corp, Sony Europe BV filed Critical Sony Group Corp
Publication of EP3895400A1 publication Critical patent/EP3895400A1/de
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08Access security
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10Integrity
    • H04W12/106Packet or message integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/08Reselecting an access point
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10Integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/67Risk-dependent, e.g. selecting a security level depending on risk profiles

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to communications devices, infrastructure equipment, core network equipment and methods for the transmission of data by a communications device in a wireless communications network.
  • Third and fourth generation mobile telecommunication systems such as those based on the 3GPP defined UMTS and Long Term Evolution (LTE) architecture, are able to support more sophisticated services than simple voice and messaging services offered by previous generations of mobile telecommunication systems.
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • a user is able to enjoy high data rate applications such as mobile video streaming and mobile video conferencing that would previously only have been available via a fixed line data connection.
  • the demand to deploy such networks is therefore strong and the coverage area of these networks, i.e.
  • Future wireless communications networks will be expected to support communications routinely and efficiently with a wider range of devices associated with a wider range of data traffic profiles and types than current systems are optimised to support. For example it is expected future wireless communications networks will be expected to efficiently support communications with devices including reduced complexity devices, machine type communication (MTC) devices, high resolution video displays, virtual reality headsets and so on. Some of these different types of devices may be deployed in very large numbers, for example low complexity devices for supporting the“The Internet of Things”, and may typically be associated with the transmissions of relatively small amounts of data with relatively high latency tolerance.
  • MTC machine type communication
  • Embodiments of the present technique can provide a method of communicating by a communications device in a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising a core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from the communications device, the method comprising controlling the communicating by the communications device in the wireless communications network, determining whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met, wherein determining whether the one or more predetermined conditions are met comprises determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, transmitting a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Embodiments of the present technique which further relate to infrastructure equipment, core network equipment, methods of operating communications devices, methods of operating infrastructure equipment and methods of operating core network equipment and circuitry for communications devices, infrastructure equipment and core network equipment, can provide arrangements which allow for effective detection and response to a disabling of a security function.
  • Figure 1 schematically represents some aspects of a LTE-type wireless telecommunication system which may be configured to operate in accordance with example embodiments of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 2 schematically represents some example aspects of a new radio access technology (RAT) wireless communications network which may be configured to operate in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure
  • RAT radio access technology
  • Figure 3 illustrates a conventional handover process
  • Figure 4 schematically shows a telecommunications system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
  • Figure 5 is a message sequence chart illustrating techniques in accordance with embodiments of the present technique
  • Figure 6 illustrates an example of a security function disabled indication, in accordance with
  • FIG. 7 is a further message sequence chart illustrating techniques in accordance with embodiments of the present technique.
  • Figure 1 provides a schematic diagram illustrating some basic functionality of a mobile
  • telecommunications network / system 100 operating generally in accordance with LTE principles, but which may also support other radio access technologies, and which may be adapted to implement embodiments of the disclosure as described herein.
  • Various elements of Figure 1 and certain aspects of their respective modes of operation are well-known and defined in the relevant standards administered by the 3GPP (RTM) body, and also described in many books on the subject, for example, Holma H. and Toskala A [2], It will be appreciated that operational aspects of the telecommunications networks discussed herein which are not specifically described (for example in relation to specific communication protocols and physical channels for communicating between different elements) may be implemented in accordance with any known techniques, for example according to the relevant standards and known proposed modifications and additions to the relevant standards.
  • the network 100 includes a plurality of base stations 101 connected to a core network part 102.
  • Each base station provides a coverage area 103 (e.g. a cell) within which data can be communicated to and from communications devices 104, and within which a communications device may obtain service.
  • Data is transmitted from the base stations 101 to the communications devices 104 within their respective coverage areas 103 via a radio downlink.
  • Data is transmitted from the communications devices 104 to the base stations 101 via a radio uplink.
  • the core network part 102 routes data to and from the
  • Communications devices 104 via the respective base stations 101 and provides functions such as authentication, mobility management, charging and so on. Communications devices may also be referred to as mobile stations, user equipment (UE), user terminals, mobile radios, terminal devices, and so forth. Communications devices 104 may operate in accordance with specifications relating to cellular IoT (CIOT). For example, the communications device 104 may operate in accordance with narrowband IoT (NB-IoT),‘cat-NBx’ or‘cat Mx’ (where‘x’ may represent an integer) requirements,
  • the core network 102 may comprise an core network having suitable optimizations.
  • the core network 102 may comprise an enhanced packet core (EPC) that is enhanced with support for Control Plane CIoT optimizations or User Plane CIoT optimizations.
  • the core network 102 may comprise a 5G Core (5GC) network supporting CIoT optimizations in the 5GC.
  • EPC enhanced packet core
  • 5GC 5G Core
  • Base stations which are an example of network infrastructure equipment / network access nodes, may also be referred to as transceiver stations / nodeBs / e-nodeBs, g-nodeBs and so forth.
  • transceiver stations / nodeBs / e-nodeBs, g-nodeBs and so forth.
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating a network architecture for a new RAT wireless
  • the new RAT network 300 represented in Figure 2 comprises a first communication cell 301 and a second communication cell 302.
  • Each communication cell 301, 302 comprises a controlling node (centralised unit) 321, 322 in communication with a core network component 310 over a respective wired or wireless link 331, 332.
  • the respective controlling nodes 321, 322 are also each in communication with a plurality of distributed units (radio access nodes / remote transmission and reception points (TRPs)) 311, 312 m their respective cells. Again, these communications may be over respective wired or wireless links.
  • TRPs remote transmission and reception points
  • the distributed units 311, 312 are responsible for providing the radio access interface for communications devices connected to the network.
  • Each distributed unit 311, 312 has a coverage area (radio access footprint) 341, 342 which together define the coverage of the respective communication cells 301, 302.
  • Each distributed unit 311, 312 includes transceiver circuitry for transmission and reception of wireless signals and processor circuitry configured to control the respective distributed units 311, 312.
  • the core network component 310 of the new RAT In terms of broad top-level functionality, the core network component 310 of the new RAT
  • communications network represented in Figure 2 may be broadly considered to correspond with the core network 102 represented in Figure 1, and the respective controlling nodes 321, 322 and their associated distributed units / TRPs 311, 312 may be broadly considered to provide functionality corresponding to the base stations 101 of Figure 1.
  • the term network infrastructure equipment / access node may be used to encompass these elements and more conventional base station type elements of wireless communications systems.
  • the responsibility for scheduling transmissions which are scheduled on the radio interface between the respective distributed units and the communications devices may lie with the controlling node / centralised unit and / or the distributed units / TRPs.
  • a communications device 400 is represented in Figure 2 within the coverage area of the first
  • This communications device 400 may thus exchange signalling with the first controlling node 321 in the first communication cell via one of the distributed units 311 associated with the first communication cell 301.
  • communications for a given communications device are routed through only one of the distributed units, but it will be appreciated in some other implementations communications associated with a given communications device may be routed through more than one distributed unit, for example in a data duplication scenario and other scenarios.
  • the particular distributed unit(s) through which a communications device is currently connected through to the associated controlling node may be referred to as active distributed units for the communications device.
  • the active subset of distributed units for a communications device may comprise one or more than one distributed unit (TRP).
  • the controlling node 321 is responsible for determining which of the distributed units 311 spanning the first communication cell 301 is responsible for radio
  • communications with the communications device 400 at any given time i.e. which of the distributed units are currently active distributed units for the communications device.
  • this will be based on measurements of radio channel conditions between the communications device 400 and respective ones of the distributed units 311.
  • the subset of the distributed units in a cell which are currently active for a communications device will depend, at least in part, on the location of the communications device within the cell (since this contributes significantly to the radio channel conditions that exist between the communications device and respective ones of the distributed units).
  • the involvement of the distributed units in routing communications from the communications device to a controlling node is transparent to the communications device 400. That is to say, in some cases the communications device may not be aware of which distributed unit is responsible for routing communications between the communications device 400 and the controlling node 321 of the communication cell 301 in which the communications device is currently operating, or even if any distributed units 311 are connected to the controlling node 321 and involved in the routing of communications at all. In such cases, as far as the communications device is concerned, it simply transmits uplink data to the controlling node 321 and receives downlink data from the controlling node 321 and the communications device has no awareness of the involvement of the distributed units 311, though may be aware of radio configurations transmitted by distributed units 311.
  • a communications device may be aware of which distributed unit(s) are involved in its communications. Switching and scheduling of the one or more distributed units may be done at the network controlling node based on measurements by the distributed units of the communications device uplink signal or measurements taken by the communications device and reported to the controlling node via one or more distributed units.
  • two communication cells 301, 302 and one communications device 400 are shown for simplicity, but it will of course be appreciated that in practice the system may comprise a larger number of communication cells (each supported by a respective controlling node and plurality of distributed units) serving a larger number of communications devices.
  • Figure 2 represents merely one example of a proposed architecture for a new RAT communications system in which approaches in accordance with the principles described herein may be adopted, and the functionality disclosed herein may also be applied in respect of wireless communications systems having different architectures.
  • example embodiments of the disclosure as discussed herein may be implemented in wireless telecommunication systems / networks according to various different architectures, such as the example architectures shown in Figures 1 and 2. It will thus be appreciated the specific wireless communications architecture in any given implementation is not of primary significance to the principles described herein. In this regard, example embodiments of the disclosure may be described generally in the context of communications between network infrastructure equipment / access nodes and a communications device, wherein the specific nature of the network infrastructure equipment / access node and the
  • the network infrastructure equipment / access node may comprise a base station, such as an LTE-type base station 101 as shown in Figure 1 which is adapted to provide functionality in accordance with the principles described herein, and in other examples the network infrastructure equipment / access node may comprise a control unit / controlling node 321, 322 and / or a TRP 311, 312 of the kind shown in Figure 2 which is adapted to provide functionality in accordance with the principles described herein.
  • the embodiments of the present invention can find application with advanced wireless communications systems such as those referred to as 5G or New Radio (NR) Access Technology.
  • Systems incorporating NR technology are expected to support different services (or types of services), which may be characterised by different requirements for latency, data rate and/or reliability.
  • eMBB Enhanced Mobile Broadband
  • eMBB Enhanced Mobile Broadband
  • Ultra Reliable & Low Latency Communications [1] services are for a reliability of 1 - 10 5 (99.999 %) for one transmission of a 32 byte packet with a user plane latency of 1 ms [3] Massive Machine Type Communications (mMTC) is another example of a service which may be supported by NR-based communications networks.
  • URLLC Ultra Reliable & Low Latency Communications
  • the elements of the wireless access network shown in Figure 1 may be equally applied to a 5G new RAT configuration, except that a change in terminology may be applied as mentioned above.
  • one or more security functions may be in operation to protect the confidentiality and/or the integrity of data transmitted to or from the communications device 104, via the infrastructure equipment 101.
  • Different security functions may be in operation in respect of different types of data, depending on, for example, network operator policies.
  • radio resource control (RRC) signalling may be subject to both confidentiality (e.g. encryption) and integrity protection functions, while user plane data (such as data originating at an application layer) may be subject to only confidentiality protection and integrity protection of user plane data may be disabled.
  • RRC signalling which may be transmitted via a signalling radio bearer (SRB) may be required to always be subject to confidentiality and integrity protection.
  • SRB signalling radio bearer
  • the integrity protection function may comprise the addition of a message authentication code (MAC) to a message, by which a recipient can confirm the identity of the sender of the message.
  • MAC message authentication code
  • the confidentiality protection function may comprise the encryption of data, such that only an intended recipient can decrypt the encrypted data to obtain the original unencrypted data.
  • the security functions may depend on one or more parameters.
  • parameters which are used by security functions within an access stratum portion of the wireless communications network may form all or part of a security context, for example a 5G access stratum (AS) security context for 3GPP access (see [4]).
  • AS 5G access stratum
  • the parameters used for security functions within the access stratum may be determined by the core network 102, in accordance with stored parameters (such as one or more keys) associated with the communications device 104 or a subscription associated with the communications device 104.
  • a current serving cell of a communications device may become less suitable than an alternative cell. This may be because the communications device 104 has moved, because of congestion within the serving cell, because of an inability of an infrastructure equipment associated with the serving cell to support a traffic load and/or quality of service requirement associated with the communications device, or for any other reason.
  • the‘source’ infrastructure equipment associated with the serving cell may initiate a handover of the communications device, so that it can select as its serving cell a different cell, which may be associated with a different‘target’ infrastructure equipment.
  • the source infrastructure equipment and target infrastructure equipment are communicatively connected, by means of an interface that (at least logically) does not traverse the core network 102 such as an X2 or Xn type interface, aspect of the handover process may be facilitated by means of messages transmitted and received via this interface. This may reduce a latency associated with a handover, and may reduce a processing load for the core network 102.
  • the communications device 104 is being served in a first cell 103a associated with a source infrastructure equipment 101a which may be a first infrastructure equipment.
  • Data 402 is transmitted to or from the core network 102 from or to the communications device 104, via the source infrastructure equipment 101a.
  • Access stratum security functions may be in operation at the communications device 104 and the source infrastructure equipment 101a to ensure confidentiality and/or integrity of data transmitted between the source infrastructure equipment 101a and the communications device 104.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a may have stored a security context associated with the
  • communications device 104 which provides parameters (such as keys, etc.) for use in implementing the security functions.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a may initiate a handover procedure with the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a and the target infrastructure equipment 101b are connected by an X2 or Xn (inter-infrastructure equipment) connection.
  • the handover preparation may thus occur without specific interaction with the core network 102.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a transmits a handover request 406 to the target infrastructure equipment 101b to allocate communications resources in the new cell for the communications device 104.
  • the handover request 406 may include a security context which has been used in the source cell by the source infrastructure equipment 101a.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b transmits to the source infrastructure equipment 101a a handover request acknowledge message 410, containing parameters for the use of the communications device 104 in the new cell.
  • the parameters may include a new security context to be used in the target cell.
  • the parameters are forwarded to the communications device 104, in an RRC reconfiguration message 412.
  • the RRC reconfiguration message 412 may indicate which security function(s), if any, are to be applied in respect of which data transmissions in the new cell.
  • the indication may be explicit, or may be implicit (e.g. based on the presence or absence of corresponding security parameters in the new security context).
  • the SRB security status (that is, which security function(s) is/are to be applied to data transmitted via the SRB) is kept unchanged.
  • the communications device 104 accesses the new cell, for example using a random access procedure 414.
  • entities in the core network 102 are not aware that the serving cell of the communications device 104 has changed, and data 416 received from the core network 102 for onward transmission to the communications device 104 by the source infrastructure is forwarded to the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b sends a Path Switch Request message 418 to the core network 102, in response to which, the core network 102 subsequently transmits data 420 for the communications device 104 to the target infrastructure equipment 101b instead of the source infrastructure equipment 101a.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a may transfer the security context 408 via the X2 or Xn interface, for example as part of the handover request 406.
  • Such modifications to the conventional principles may reflect the provision of certain security functions at a higher protocol layer, such as at the application layer, and/or a desire to avoid unnecessary processing associated with security functions in communications devices which have limited processing capability and/or have stringent power consumption requirements.
  • a security function may be considered as optional, in the sense that it may be permitted, according to standards specifications, for that security function to be not enabled (in other words, disabled).
  • Restrictions on when an optional security function may be disabled may be set by one or more of standards specifications, user preferences, application requirements, core network policy and wireless network operator policy and configuration.
  • a reduction in security functions may be in principle permitted for at least some communications devices, even if not in fact applied in respect of a particular communications device.
  • data associated with a data radio bearer (DRB) in an NR radio access network may be optionally subject to both integrity protection and confidentiality protection.
  • DRB data radio bearer
  • a method of communicating by a communications device in a wireless communications network comprising a core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from the communications device, the method comprising controlling the communicating by the communications device in the wireless communications network, determining whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met, wherein determining whether the one or more predetermined conditions are met comprises determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, transmitting a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Figure 4 schematically shows a telecommunications system 500 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the telecommunications system 500 comprises a core network part 102 coupled to a radio network part.
  • the radio network part comprises source infrastructure equipment 101a and target infrastructure equipment 101b, each of which may be examples of infrastructure equipment such as an evolved-nodeB (eNB) providing an LTE wireless access interface, a next generation eNB (ng-eNB) for connection to a 5G core network, or a gNB 101 (providing an NR wireless access interface) .
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a may be coupled, via a wireless access interface illustrated generally by arrow 358, to a communications device 104 (which may also be referred to as a terminal device).
  • the wireless access interface 358 may be broadly compliant with LTE- or NR-based standards. It will of course be appreciated that in practice the radio network part may comprise a plurality of infrastructure equipment serving a larger number of communications devices across various communication cells. However, only two infrastructure equipment and a single communications device are shown in Figure 4 in the interests of simplicity.
  • the radio network part may be, for example, an Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E- UTRAN) or a NR radio access network
  • the core network may be a 5G core network or an enhanced packet core (EPC).
  • E- UTRAN Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • EPC enhanced packet core
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a provides service in the first cell 103a which may be a source cell.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a is connected to the core network 102 via an interface 360 to a controller 356.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a includes a receiver 354 connected to an antenna 368 and a transmitter 352 connected to the antenna 368.
  • the receiver 354 and the transmitter 352 are both connected to the controller 356.
  • the controller 356 is configured to control the infrastructure equipment infrastructure equipment 101a and may comprise processor circuitry which may in turn comprise various sub-units / sub-circuits for providing functionality as explained further herein. These sub-units may be implemented as discrete hardware elements or as appropriately configured functions of the processor circuitry.
  • controller 356 may comprise circuitry which is suitably configured / programmed to provide the desired functionality using conventional programming / configuration techniques for equipment in wireless telecommunications systems.
  • the transmitter 352, receiver 354 and controller 356 are schematically shown in Figure 4 as separate elements for ease of representation.
  • the functionality of these elements can be provided in various different ways, for example using one or more suitably programmed programmable computer (s), or one or more suitably configured application-specific integrated circuit(s) / circuitry / chip(s) / chipset(s).
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a will in general comprise various other elements associated with its operating functionality.
  • the communications device 104 includes a controller 366 connected to a receiver 364 which receives signals from an antenna 370.
  • the controller 366 is also connected to a transmitter 362 which is also connected to the antenna 370.
  • the controller 366 is configured to control the
  • communications device 104 may comprise processor circuitry which may in turn comprise various sub-units / sub-circuits for providing functionality as explained further herein. These sub-units may be implemented as discrete hardware elements or as appropriately configured functions of the processor circuitry.
  • controller 516 may comprise circuitry which is suitably configured / programmed to provide the desired functionality using conventional programming / configuration techniques for equipment in wireless telecommunications systems.
  • the transmitter 512, receiver 514 and controller 516 are schematically shown in Figure 4 as separate elements for ease of representation.
  • the functionality of these elements can be provided in various different ways, for example using one or more suitably programmed programmable computer(s), or one or more suitably configured application-specific integrated circuit(s) / circuitry / chip(s) / chipset(s).
  • the communications device 104 will in general comprise various other elements associated with its operating functionality, for example a power source, user interface, and so forth, but these are not shown in Figure 4 in the interests of simplicity.
  • a target infrastructure equipment 101b, providing service in a second cell 103b may be connected via an inter-infrastructure equipment interface 380 (such as an X2 or Xn interface) to the source infrastructure equipment 101a.
  • an inter-infrastructure equipment interface 380 such as an X2 or Xn interface
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may be substantially similar to the source infrastructure equipment 101a; details have been omitted from Figure 4 for conciseness.
  • source infrastructure equipment 101a and target infrastructure equipment 101b may not operate in compliance with appropriate security requirements, such as those specified in relevant standards specification and/or may operate such that the effective operation of the communications device 104, the wireless communications network, or both is compromised.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a may attempt to cause the communications device 104 to disable a security function. This may be in violation of policies of the wireless communications network, principles of a specification with which the wireless communications network is intended to be compliant, or undesirable for any other reason.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a may attempt to cause the communications device 104 to enable a security function which is not appropriate. Enabling the security function may not be appropriate because the function may not be supported by the communications device 104, requires unnecessary processing resulting in increased power consumption, or may duplicate the functionality of another security function, such as one provided at a different protocol layer, such as by an application. Such enabling may be in violation of policies of the wireless communications network, principles of a specification with which the wireless communications network is intended to be compliant, or undesirable for any other reason.
  • Figure 5 is a message sequence chart illustrating techniques for detecting and/or preventing a change in the status (enabled / disabled) of a security function, where that change of status is in fact not permitted.
  • an RRC connection 502 and associated signalling radio bearer (not shown) is established between the communications device 104 in the first cell 103a and the source infrastructure equipment 101a.
  • One or more radio bearers 504a, 504b may be established between the communications device 104 and the source infrastructure equipment 101a, and corresponding bearers 506a, 506b may be established between the source infrastructure equipment 101a and the core network 102.
  • the RRC connection 502 and the radio bearers 504a, 504b may have been first established in the first cell 103a controlled by the source infrastructure equipment 101a, or may have been established in another cell and been the subject of a handover to the first cell 103a.
  • One or more access stratum security functions are activated in respect of some or all of the transmissions between the communications device 104 and the source infrastructure equipment 101a.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a has a security context associated with the communications device 104, providing parameters associated with the one or more access stratum security functions.
  • the security context may have been obtained from another infrastructure equipment or from the core network 102.
  • the core network 102 may have stored a security context which comprises an indication of which access stratum security functions are active for the transmissions between the source infrastructure equipment 101a and the communications device 104.
  • the source infrastructure equipment 101a subsequently transmits a handover request 506 to the target infrastructure equipment 101b via an Xn interface to initiate a handover of the communications device 104 from the first cell 103a to a second cell 103b controlled by the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • the second cell 103b may be a target cell.
  • the determination to initiate a handover may be in accordance with conventional, well-known techniques.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b determines whether the status of one or more optional security functions, as indicated by the source infrastructure equipment 101a, satisfies predetermined conditions for triggering further action.
  • the predetermined conditions may be those specified in a relevant standard, indicated to the target infrastructure equipment 101b by the core network 102, configured in the target infrastructure equipment 101b by an operator of the wireless communications network, or set in any other way.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b determines whether the status of one or more optional security functions, as indicated by the source infrastructure equipment 101a, satisfies the conditions by making a disabled security function determination 515, based on signalling (or the absence thereof) from the source infrastructure equipment 101a. As part of the disabled security function determination 515, the target infrastructure equipment 101b determines whether one or more optional access stratum security functions is not to be enabled in the second cell 103b.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may evaluate the conditions (for example, in making the disabled security function determination 515) based on one or more of the following:
  • the determination as to whether the conditions are met may be made in response to receiving the handover request 506, or may be made subsequently.
  • the determination as to whether the conditions are met may comprise a disabled security function determination 515 that a security function which may be optionally enabled in respect of a communications device, or in respect of a particular bearer or type of data, is not to be enabled in respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104.
  • the conditions may additionally or alternatively be met for a security function which may be optionally enabled in respect of a communications device, or in respect of a particular bearer or type of data, which is not to enabled in respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104.
  • the conditions are evaluated for each optional security function and/or for each type of data (for example, for data associated with each SRB and each DRB).
  • data types e.g. data associated with an SRB
  • there may be no optional security functions in which case the conditions may not be evaluated in respect of that data.
  • the conditions may be satisfied in respect of security functions which are optional for data associated with one or more DRBs.
  • conditions may differ for different communications devices 104.
  • the conditions may differ because the set of optional security functions for a given type of data is different for different devices.
  • a first set of conditions is used for communications devices supporting one or more cellular IoT capabilities, and a second, different set of conditions is used for communications devices not supporting any IoT capabilities.
  • the second set of conditions do not apply to data associated with an SRB. In some embodiments, the first set of conditions apply to data associated with an SRB.
  • different conditions apply to security functions which provide confidentiality from those applicable to security functions which provide integrity protection.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may not be able to determine which optional security function(s) was/were applied in the first cell 103a. In other words, the target infrastructure equipment 101b may be unable to determine whether the security function(s) which it is requested to enable for the communications device 104 in the second cell 103b are the same as, or are different from, those enabled by the source infrastructure equipment 101a in the first cell 103a.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b then proceeds as for a conventional inbound handover procedure by allocating resources for the communications device 104 and transmitting an indication of these resources to the source infrastructure equipment 101a, for example in a handover request acknowledge message 508.
  • Security functions may be enabled in accordance with the indication received from the source infrastructure equipment 101a, such as the handover request 506.
  • Some or all of the contents of the handover request acknowledge message 508 may be forwarded to the communications device 104, for example, in a RRC Reconfiguration message 510.
  • the communications device 104 In response to receiving the RRC Reconfiguration message 510, the communications device 104 establishes a new RRC connection 512 between the communications device 104 and the target infrastructure equipment 101b. Radio bearers 504a, 504b may also be handed over and established in the new cell 103b as new radio bearers 514a, 514b.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b initiates further action.
  • the further action comprises transmitting, by the target infrastructure equipment 101b, an indication of the security status of one or more optional security functions to the core network 102.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b transmits a security status indication 518 to the core network 102.
  • the action triggered by the determination that the conditions are met may occur prior to the establishment of any connection with the communications device 104 in the second cell 103b, for example, substantially immediately in response to the determination being made.
  • the action triggered by the determination that the conditions are met may occur after the establishment of a connection with the communications device 104 in the second cell 103b.
  • the security status indication 518 may form a part of a path switch request 516 which requests the core network 102 to associate the target infrastructure equipment 101b with the communications device 104 and to transmit data for the communications device 104 to the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • the path switch request 516 may comprise an indication of security capabilities of the communications device 104.
  • the security status indication 518 may indicate which security function(s) is/are disabled and enabled in respect of the communications device 104 in the second cell 103b.
  • the security status indication 518 further indicates for which data the security function(s) is/are disabled or enabled. For example, in some embodiments, a separate instance of the security status indication 518 may be transmitted for each of one or more protocol data unit (PDU) sessions. An instance of the security status indication 518 may thus indicate that, for example, encryption is not enabled in respect of data associated with a particular protocol data unit (PDU) session.
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • the security status indication 518 indicates which security function(s) is/are enabled (or, if the security status indication 518 is transmitted prior to a connection being established in the new cell, is or are to be enabled) in respect of the communications device 104 in the second cell 103b.
  • the security status indication 518 may comprise a confidentiality indication 610, indicating whether or not a confidentiality security function (e.g. by means of encryption) is to be applied, and an integrity protection indication 612 indicating whether or not an integrity protection security function is to be applied.
  • the core network 102 In response to receiving the security status indication 518, the core network 102 makes a security status permitted determination 520.
  • the security status permitted determination 520 is a disabled security function permitted determination by which the core network 102 determines whether the security function(s) which are optional and which are indicated, by the security status indication 518 as being disabled, are permitted to be disabled.
  • the security status permitted determination 520 may be based on one or more of:
  • policy associated with an application associated with a bearer such policy may itself be based on which, if any, security functions are provided by the application itself;
  • a security status associated with the infrastructure equipment such as the target infrastructure equipment 101b, and
  • the data which would otherwise be subject to a disabled security function is subject to one or more similar or equivalent security functions (e.g. providing the same or better level of protection) at a different protocol layer or by an application, then it may be permitted to disable, at the access stratum, functions providing the corresponding protection.
  • a bearer may be associated with an application which itself implements one or both of integrity protection and confidentiality protection.
  • infrastructure equipment 101 may be associated with a security status which may be indicative of a trust relationship between the core network 102 and the infrastructure equipment 101.
  • the security status may indicate a higher degree of security associated with the infrastructure equipment 101.
  • communications between the infrastructure equipment 101 and the core network 102 are subject to security functions and/or mutual authentication, the security status may indicate a higher degree of security associated with the
  • the core network 102 may determine that an optional access stratum security function may be disabled if the security status associated with the target infrastructure equipment 101b is above a pre-determined threshold.
  • a communications device such as the communications device 104
  • a communications device is known by the core network 102 to be limited in processing capabilities and/or power consumption (e.g. because it is required to operate using a battery for a long period of time without recharging)
  • it may be permitted to disable integrity protection and/or ciphering at the access stratum, either for uplink data, downlink data, or both, in order to reduce the computational and processing requirements on the communications device 104.
  • a communications device is known by the core network 102 to be limited in processing capabilities and/or power consumption, then in some embodiments it may not be permitted to enable integrity protection and/or ciphering at the access stratum, either for uplink data, downlink data, or both, in order to avoid an unnecessary increase to the computational and processing requirements on the communications device 104.
  • the core network 102 may determine the capabilities of the communications device 104 by means of receiving a device capability indication, for example during a NAS procedure.
  • a subscription associated with the communications device 104 (for example, associated with a USIM application running on a UICC or embedded UICC connected to the communications device 104) is associated with a policy which requires the use of one or both of integrity protection and confidentiality protection at the access stratum, then it may not be permitted to disable such protection at the access stratum.
  • Such a policy may instead, or additionally, be associated with the particular communications device 104, for example based on a part or all of a unique identifier associated with the device (such as an international mobile subscriber identity, IMSI, a temporary mobile subscriber identity, TSMI, or an international mobile equipment identity, IMEI).
  • a unique identifier associated with the device such as an international mobile subscriber identity, IMSI, a temporary mobile subscriber identity, TSMI, or an international mobile equipment identity, IMEI).
  • policies for the operation of the wireless communications network may permit a modification of security functions applied at a handover of an ongoing PDU session.
  • the communications device 104 may move from the first cell 103 a in a shared network (i.e. using radio access network, RAN, sharing) having a first policy to the second cell 103b in a non-shared network having a second policy different from the first policy.
  • a shared network i.e. using radio access network, RAN, sharing
  • the determination that a change in security function(s) is not permitted is based on factors other than, or additionally to, a difference in security function(s) being active in the first cell 103a and the second cell 103b.
  • predetermined rules may be used to apply the factors according to corresponding precedence levels, or in a particular order. For example, where the determination may be made based on a policy applicable to the communications device 104 and a policy applicable to a subscription associated with the communications device 104, the
  • determination may be made based on the subscription in precedence to the policy associated with the communications device 104, in accordance with predetermined rules of precedence.
  • a combination of factors may be used in the security status permitted determination 520 whereby the security status of the target infrastructure equipment 101b and the capability of the communications device 104 are jointly taken into consideration, as follows.
  • An optional access stratum security function is permitted to be disabled with respect to data associated with a DRB only if the communications device 104 does not support a cellular IoT capability and the security status of the target infrastructure equipment 101b exceeds a predetermined threshold.
  • the security status permitted determination 520 may be made at one of an access management function (AMF) or a session management function (SMF).
  • AMF access management function
  • SMF session management function
  • the security status indication 518 indicates that encryption is not to be enabled in respect of data associated with the first new bearer 514a (corresponding to bearer 504a in the first cell 103a).
  • the core network 102 has a security context associated with the communications device 104 comprising access stratum encryption parameters applicable to the first bearer 504a in the first cell 103a and thus determines that disabling encryption in respect of the first new bearer 514a in the second cell 103b is not permitted.
  • the core network 102 may indicate to the target infrastructure equipment 101b based on the outcome of the determination.
  • the indication may be an explicit permission indicator 522.
  • the explicit permission indicator 522 may comprise a path switch request acknowledge message to indicate that the application of the security function(s) as indicated in the security status indication 518is permitted, and may comprise a path switch request failure message to indicate that the disabling of the security function(s) is not permitted.
  • the explicit permission indicator 522 may comprise a path switch request failure message with a cause value which indicates that the application of the security function(s) as indicated in the security status indication 518is not permitted, such as a“security compromised” cause value.
  • the cause value may be a conventional cause value such as“Encryption and/or integrity protection algorithms not supported” or“UP integrity protection not possible”, or“UP confidentiality protection not possible”.
  • the indication may be implicit.
  • an absence of an explicit permission indicator 522 may indicate that the application of the security function(s) as indicated in the security status indication 518is permitted.
  • the explicit permission indicator 522 may be received by the target infrastructure equipment 101b after one or more connections (such as the new radio bearers 514a, 514b and RRC connection 512) have been established in accordance with the security functions as indicated in the security status indication 518.
  • connections such as the new radio bearers 514a, 514b and RRC connection 512
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may proceed with no further action if the indication 522 is that the disabling of the security function(s) is permitted.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may receive data from the core network 102 for the communications device 104, apply security function(s), if any, in accordance with those determined above, based on indications received from the source infrastructure equipment 101a such as in the handover request 506, and transmit the data to the communications device 104. Similarly, the target infrastructure equipment 101b may receive data transmitted by the communications device 104, apply the applicable security function(s), if any, before forwarding the data directly to the core network 102.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may release any connections with the communications device 104 in the second cell 103b. This may be by means of transmitting to the communications device 104 an RRC connection release message 524 as shown in Figure 5.
  • the core network 102 may release any connections (e.g. bearers) with the communications device 104.
  • the core network 102 may trigger an alarm, for example by transmitting an alarm message to a network operations and monitoring system associated with the wireless communications network 500.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b in response to determining (e.g. based on the explicit permission indicator 522) that the security function(s) may not be disabled in the second cell 103b, the target infrastructure equipment 101b initiates an authentication procedure or other suitable procedure with the
  • the procedure may be in accordance with conventional procedures used prior to or as part of connection (or bearer) establishment.
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may transmit an RRC Security Mode command or RRC Reconfiguration message to the communications device 104 in order to enable the use of the security function(s).
  • the target infrastructure equipment 101b may, in response to determining that the security function(s) may not be disabled in the second cell 103b, trigger an alarm, for example by transmitting an alarm message to a network operations and monitoring system.
  • the alarm message may trigger a human-perceptible alert, such as a visual or audible alert to alert an operator of the wireless communications network that a procedure has been attempted in which a security feature has been disabled, contrary to requirements and/or policy.
  • the alarm message may comprise an identity of the source infrastructure equipment 101a, and/or an identity of the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • the alarm procedure may be substantially based on a conventional alarm procedure for notifying the operator that an integrity protection failure has occurred.
  • the core network 102 may initiate a non-access stratum (NAS) procedure to establish security parameters for use by the communications device 104 and the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • the core network 102 may initiate a re-authentication procedure with the communications device 104, such as an authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure.
  • AKA authentication and key agreement
  • the core network 102 may provide the target infrastructure equipment 101b with a security context comprising the security parameters for use by the target infrastructure equipment 101b in apply the required security function(s) in respect of data transmitted to and by the communications device 104.
  • a determination as to whether conditions are satisfied in respect of optional access stratum security functions may be performed by the communications device 104 and an indication broadly similar to the security status indication 518 described above may be transmitted to the core network 102 by the communications device 104 if the conditions are met.
  • the disabled security function determination 515 described above may be carried out by either or both of the communications device 104 and the target infrastructure equipment 101b.
  • Figure 7 is a message sequence chart illustrating a determination 715 being carried out by the communications device 104, in accordance with embodiments of the present technique.
  • the RRC Reconfiguration message 510 includes an indication of which (if any) security functions are to be enabled in respect of the communications device 104, or in respect of specific data (such as that associated with each of the bearers 504a, 504b) in the second cell 103b.
  • the indication may be in the form of a set of parameters for use in security functions in the second cell 103b, such that security functions for which no parameters are indicated are implicitly indicated as being disabled in the second cell 103b.
  • the communications device 104 In response to receiving the RRC Reconfiguration message 510 then, in the example of Figure 7, the communications device 104 carries out a determination step 715, whereby it determines whether the status of one or more optional security functions, as indicated by the RRC Reconfiguration message 510, satisfies conditions for triggering further action.
  • the determination step may be substantially similar to the evaluation of conditions by the target infrastructure equipment 101b, such as by means of the disabled security function determination 515 described above.
  • the communications device 104 in carrying out the determination step 715 is aware of which security function(s) is/are enabled in respect of each of the bearers 504a, 504b and RRC signalling 502 in the first cell 103a.
  • the determination step 715 may comprise a determination as to whether or not a security function which is enabled in the first cell 103a in respect of the communications device 104, or in respect of a particular bearer or type of data associated with the communications device 104, is not to be enabled in the second cell 103b in respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104 or vice versa (i.e. a security function is to be newly enabled).
  • the determination step 715 may comprise a determination as to whether or not a security function is not to be enabled in respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104, irrespective of whether or not the security function was enabled respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104 in the first cell 103 a.
  • the determination step 715 may be based on the indication of which (if any) security functions are to be enabled in respect of the communications device 104, or in respect of specific data (such as that associated with each of the bearers 504a, 504b) in the second cell 103b, included in the RRC
  • the communications device 104 may transmit a security status indication 718 to the core network 102 indicating an outcome of the determination 715.
  • the security status indication 718 may be substantially similar to the security status indication 518 illustrated in Figure 6 and described above.
  • the conditions evaluated in the determination 715 may include those described above in respect of the evaluation of conditions by the target infrastructure equipment in the example illustrated in Figure 5.
  • the conditions may additionally or alternatively be satisfied if a security function which is enabled in the first cell 103a in respect of the communications device 104, or in respect of a particular bearer or type of data associated with the communications device 104, is not to be enabled in the second cell 103b in respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104.
  • the conditions may additionally or alternatively be satisfied if a security function which is not enabled in the first cell 103a in respect of the communications device 104, or in respect of a particular bearer or type of data associated with the communications device 104, is to be enabled in the second cell 103b in respect of the communications device 104 or a bearer or type of data for the communications device 104.
  • the communications device 104 may proceed with the handover and, if the conditions evaluated in determination 715 are satisfied, send the security status indication 718 in the second cell 103b.
  • the security status indication 718 may be transmitted in the first cell 103a, as shown in the example of Figure 7.
  • the communications device 104 may stop execution of the configuration received in the RRC
  • Reconfiguration message 510 having the effect of aborting the handover and may additionally send the security status indication 718 in the first cell.
  • the communications device 104 determines whether it is configured to perform the determination 715. For example, the communications device 104 may determine that it is configured to perform the determination 715 only if it has received an indication from the infrastructure equipment 101a (and/or, in some embodiments, from the core network 102) indicating that it is to perform the determination 715 and, depending on the outcome, to transmit the security status indication 718.
  • the communications device 104 may receive a configuration indication (not shown in Figure 7) transmitted by the infrastructure equipment 101 indicating that the communications device 104 is to perform the determination 715 and, if appropriate, to transmit the security status indication 718.
  • the communications device 104 may determine that it is configured to perform the determination 715 unless it has received a configuration indication from the infrastructure equipment 101a (and/or, in some embodiments, from the core network 102) indicating that it is not to transmit any security status indication 718.
  • the determination 715 may be carried out by the communications device 104 depending on receiving (or not, in some embodiments) a configuration indication from either the core network 102 or the radio access network.
  • the wireless communications network is able to control which (if any) and when the communications devices 104 perform the determination 715.
  • the wireless communications network controls the communications devices 104 so that the determination 715 is carried out only within certain time periods, and/or within certain geographical regions.
  • the wireless communications network (such as the radio access network comprising the infrastructure equipment 101a, or the core network 102) may determine that the communications device 104 is within a pre-determined geographic region, and in response, may transmit the configuration indication to the communications device 104 to indicate that it should carry out determination 715.
  • the wireless communications network may determine that the communications device 104 is outside of a pre-determined geographic region, and in response, may transmit the configuration indication to the communications device 104 to indicate that it should no longer carry out the determination 715.
  • communications devices 104 should carry out the determination 715 is based on an assessment that a rogue (e.g., unlawful or unauthorised) base station is more likely to be in operation.
  • the determination by the wireless communications network that communications device 104 should carry out the determination 715 may be in response to a determination that a rogue base station may be in operation in the vicinity of the communications device 104.
  • the core network 102 may perform a determination 720 which may be substantially the same as the security status permitted determination 520 described above in respect of Figure 5. Based on the determination 720, the core network 102 may transmit an indication 722 to the communications device 104, which may be broadly similar to the permission indicator 522 transmitted to the target infrastructure equipment 101b described in respect of Figure 5.
  • the core network 102 may proceed as described in respect of the example of Figure 5.
  • a handover failure message may be transmitted by the communications device 104 to the source infrastructure equipment 101a to indicate that the communications device 104 is not proceeding with the handover.
  • the handover failure message may comprise an indication that the communications device 104 is not proceeding with the handover because of an impermissible change in security settings.
  • the determination 715 is initiated in response to the receipt of the RRC Reconfiguration message 510 which indicates that a handover is to occur for the communications device 104.
  • the process may start with the communications device 104 receiving an indication that the application of one or more access stratum security functions is to be changed in the first cell 103a. For example, this may be in response to receiving an indication that one or more access stratum security functions is to be disabled in the first cell 103a.
  • the communications device 104 may receive an indication that the application of one or more access stratum security functions is to be changed in the first cell 103a.
  • the communications device 104 may perform the determination 715 in response to determining that the application of the one or more access stratum security functions are to be changed either in the current serving cell (e.g. the first cell 103a) or in any other cell.
  • a method of communicating by a communications device in a wireless communications network comprising a core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from the communications device, the method comprising controlling the communicating by the communications device in the wireless communications network, determining whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met, wherein determining whether the one or more predetermined conditions are met comprises determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, transmitting a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • a method of communicating with a communications device in a wireless communications network comprising a core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from the communications device, the method comprising controlling the communicating by the communications device in the wireless communications network, determining by the infrastructure equipment whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met, wherein determining whether the one or more predetermined conditions are met comprises determining whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, transmitting a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • a method for of controlling communications by a core network of a wireless communications network comprising the core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from a communications device, the method comprising receiving a security status indication, the security status indication indicating whether a security function is to be enabled for the communications with the communications device, and security off indication, the security off indication indicating that the security function is not to be enabled for the communications with the communications device, in response to receiving the security off status indication, determining whether enabling or disabling the security function in accordance with the security status indication is required permitted to be applied to in respect of the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • predetermined / predefined information may in general be established, for example, by definition in an operating standard for the wireless telecommunication system, or in previously exchanged signalling between the base station and communications devices, for example in system information signalling, or in association with radio resource control setup signalling, or in information stored in a SIM application. That is to say, the specific manner in which the relevant predefined information is established and shared between the various elements of the wireless telecommunications system is not of primary significance to the principles of operation described herein.
  • the principles described herein are not applicable only to certain types of communications device, but can be applied more generally in respect of any types of communications device, for example the approaches are not limited to machine type communication devices / IoT devices or other narrowband communications devices, but can be applied more generally, for example in respect of any type communications device operating with a wireless link to the communication network. It will further be appreciated that the principles described herein are not applicable only to LTE-based wireless telecommunications systems, but are applicable for any type of wireless telecommunications system that supports a handover from one cell to another, and the optional use of a security function in respect of communications to or from a communications device.
  • Paragraph 1 A method of communicating by a communications device in a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising a core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from the communications device, the method comprising
  • determining whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met comprises determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, transmitting a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 2 A method according to paragraph 1 , wherein the cell is a target cell, the method comprising receiving from a source infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a source cell a handover indication that the communications device is to change a serving cell from the source cell to the target cell, and the determining whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met is in response to receiving the handover indication.
  • Paragraph 3 A method according to paragraph 2, wherein the one or more predetermined conditions comprises a condition that the security function is enabled for the communications with the
  • Paragraph 4 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 3, wherein determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell comprises determining that the security function is to be disabled for the communications with the communications device in the cell, the method comprising receiving from the core network a security function permission indicator, the security function permission indicator indicating that disabling the security function for the communications with the communications device in the cell is not permitted.
  • Paragraph 5 A method according to paragraph 4, the method comprising in response to receiving the security function permission indicator, terminating a connection between the communications device and the infrastructure equipment.
  • Paragraph 6 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 5, wherein the one or more predetermined conditions comprises a condition that the security function is currently enabled and the security function is to be disabled for the communications with the communications device.
  • Paragraph 7. A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 6, the method comprising receiving a configuration indication transmitted by the infrastructure equipment, the configuration indication indicating that the communications device is to determine whether the one or more predetermined conditions associated with the security function are met, wherein the determining whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met is in response to receiving the configuration indication.
  • Paragraph 8 A method of communicating with a communications device in a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising a core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from the communications device, the method comprising
  • determining whether the one or more predetermined conditions are met comprises determining whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, transmitting a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 9 A method according to paragraph 8, wherein the cell is a target cell, the method comprising receiving a handover request from a source infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a source cell, the handover request indicating that the communications device is to change a serving cell from the source cell to the target cell, and wherein the determining whether the one or more predetermined conditions associated with the security function are met is in response to receiving the handover request indication.
  • Paragraph 10 A method according to paragraph 9, wherein the handover request indication comprises an indication of whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the target cell.
  • Paragraph 11 A method according to paragraph 10, the method comprising establishing a connection with the communications device in the target cell, and before transmitting to the core network the security status indication, enabling or disabling the security function in respect of the connection in accordance with the handover request indication.
  • Paragraph 12 A method according to any of paragraphs 8 to 11, the method comprising receiving from the core network a security function permission indicator, the security function permission indicator indicating that disabling the security function for the communications with the communications device in the cell is not permitted.
  • Paragraph 13 A method according to paragraph 12, the method comprising in response to receiving the security function permission indicator, enabling the security function for the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 14 A method according to paragraph 12, the method comprising in response to receiving the security function permission indicator, terminating a connection between the communications device and the infrastructure equipment.
  • a communications device for use in a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface and a core network, the communications device comprising a transmitter configured to transmit signals via the wireless access interface, a receiver configured to receive signals, and a controller configured to control the transmitter and the receiver so that the communications device is operable: to determine whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met by determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, to transmit a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Circuitry for a communications device for use in a wireless communications network comprising an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface and a core network, the circuitry comprising transmitter circuitry configured to transmit signals via the wireless access interface, receiver circuitry configured to receive signals, and controller circuitry configured to control the transmitter circuitry and the receiver circuitry so that the communications device is operable: to determine whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met by determining whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, to transmit a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Infrastructure equipment for use in a wireless communications network comprising a core network, the infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface, the infrastructure equipment comprising a transmitter configured to transmit signals to a communications device via the wireless access interface in a cell, a receiver configured to receive signals from the communications device, and a controller, configured to control the transmitter and the receiver so that the infrastructure equipment is operable: to determine whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met by determining whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, to transmit a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Circuitry for an infrastructure equipment for use in a wireless communications network comprising a core network, the infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface, the circuitry comprising transmitter circuitry configured to transmit signals to a communications device via the wireless access interface in a cell, receiver circuitry configured to receive signals from the communications device, and controller circuitry, configured to control the transmitter circuitry and the receiver circuitry so that the infrastructure equipment is operable: to determine whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with a security function are met by determining whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell, and if the one or more predetermined conditions are met, to transmit a security status indication to the core network, the security status indication indicating whether or not the security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 19 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 18, wherein the one or more predetermined conditions comprises a condition that the security function is to be enabled for the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 20 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 18, wherein the one or more predetermined conditions comprises a condition that the security function is to be disabled for the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 21 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 20, wherein the one or more predetermined conditions comprises a condition that the communications are associated with a signalling radio bearer.
  • Paragraph 22 A method of controlling communications by a core network of a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising the core network, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from a communications device, the method comprising receiving a security status indication, the security status indication indicating whether a security function is to be enabled for the communications with the communications device, and in response to receiving the security status indication, determining whether enabling or disabling the security function in accordance with the security status indication is permitted in respect of the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 23 A method according to paragraph 22, wherein determining whether enabling or disabling the security function in accordance with the security status indication is permitted in respect of the communications with the communications device in the cell comprises determining whether the communications with the communications device are subject to a second security function provided by an application and if the communications with the communications device are subject to the second security function provided by an application, determining that the security function is not required to be applied to the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • a method wherein the security status indication indicates that the security function is not to be enabled for the communications with the communications device, the method comprising determining that the security function is required to be applied to the communications with the communications device in the cell, and in response to determining that the security function is required to be applied to the communications with the communications device in the cell, performing an authentication procedure with the communications device.
  • Paragraph 25 A method according to paragraph 22 or paragraph 23, wherein receiving the security status indication comprises receiving the security status indication from the communications device.
  • Paragraph 26 A method according to paragraph 22 or paragraph 23, wherein receiving the security status indication comprises receiving the security status indication from the infrastructure equipment.
  • Paragraph 27 A method according to paragraph 26, the method comprising receiving a path switch message indicating that the infrastructure equipment is requesting to be associated with the
  • the path switch message comprising the security status indication.
  • Paragraph 28 A method according to any of paragraphs 22 to 27, the method comprising before receiving a security status indication, transmitting a configuration indication to the communications device, the configuration indication indicating that the communications device is to determine whether one or more predetermined conditions associated with the security function are met.
  • Core network equipment for use in a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising the core network equipment, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from a communications device, the core network equipment comprising a transmitter configured to transmit signals to the infrastructure equipment, a receiver configured to receive signals from the infrastructure equipment, and a controller, configured to control the transmitter and the receiver so that the core network equipment is operable: to receive a security status indication, the security status indication indicating whether a security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device, and in response to receiving the security status indication, to determine whether enabling or disabling the security function in accordance with the security status indication is permitted in respect of the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 30 Circuitry for core network equipment for use in a wireless communications network, the wireless communications network comprising the core network equipment, an infrastructure equipment providing a wireless access interface in a cell for transmitting and receiving data to and from a communications device, the core network equipment comprising transmitter circuitry configured to transmit signals to the infrastructure equipment, a receiver circuitry configured to receive signals from the infrastructure equipment, and controller circuitry configured to control the transmitter circuitry and the receiver circuitry so that the core network equipment is operable: to receive a security status indication, the security status indication indicating whether a security function is to be enabled for communications with the communications device, and in response to receiving the security status indication, to determine whether enabling or disabling the security function in accordance with the security status indication is permitted in respect of the communications with the communications device in the cell.
  • Paragraph 31 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 30, wherein the security function is an access stratum security function which provides one or more of confidentiality and integrity protection for the communications between the communications device and the infrastructure equipment.
  • the security function is an access stratum security function which provides one or more of confidentiality and integrity protection for the communications between the communications device and the infrastructure equipment.
  • Paragraph 32 A method according to any of paragraphs 1 to 31 , wherein it is permitted to disable the security function for at least some communications with one or more communications devices in the wireless communications network.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
EP19835245.2A 2018-12-11 2019-11-28 Kommunikationsvorrichtung, infrastrukturausrüstung, kernnetzwerkausrüstung und verfahren Pending EP3895400A1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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EP18211788 2018-12-11
PCT/EP2019/082941 WO2020120156A1 (en) 2018-12-11 2019-11-28 Communications device, infrastructure equipment, core network equipment and methods

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Publication Number Publication Date
EP3895400A1 true EP3895400A1 (de) 2021-10-20

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US (1) US20220030474A1 (de)
EP (1) EP3895400A1 (de)
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CN113557699B (zh) 2024-04-12
CN113557699A (zh) 2021-10-26
WO2020120156A1 (en) 2020-06-18

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