EP3764499A1 - Symmetrische fehlererkennung während des leistungspendelzustands mit einseitigen messungen - Google Patents

Symmetrische fehlererkennung während des leistungspendelzustands mit einseitigen messungen Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3764499A1
EP3764499A1 EP19193614.5A EP19193614A EP3764499A1 EP 3764499 A1 EP3764499 A1 EP 3764499A1 EP 19193614 A EP19193614 A EP 19193614A EP 3764499 A1 EP3764499 A1 EP 3764499A1
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Prior art keywords
phasor
detrended
fault
magnitudes
value
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EP19193614.5A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP3764499B1 (de
Inventor
Vedanta PRADHAN
Obbalareddi Demudu NAIDU
Sachin Srivastava
Suresh Maturu
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Hitachi Energy Ltd
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ABB Schweiz AG
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02H—EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS
    • H02H7/00—Emergency protective circuit arrangements specially adapted for specific types of electric machines or apparatus or for sectionalised protection of cable or line systems, and effecting automatic switching in the event of an undesired change from normal working conditions
    • H02H7/26—Sectionalised protection of cable or line systems, e.g. for disconnecting a section on which a short-circuit, earth fault, or arc discharge has occured
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
    • G01R19/00—Arrangements for measuring currents or voltages or for indicating presence or sign thereof
    • G01R19/25—Arrangements for measuring currents or voltages or for indicating presence or sign thereof using digital measurement techniques
    • G01R19/2513—Arrangements for monitoring electric power systems, e.g. power lines or loads; Logging

Definitions

  • the present subject matter relates, in general, to power transmission systems. More specifically, the present subject matter relates to approaches for detection of faults during power swing condition occurring in an electrical network.
  • the electrical networks may experience disturbances or faults in the transmission lines of the electrical network.
  • the transmission lines may be provided with one or more Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). IEDS can detect the fault based on comparison of the calculated impedance with reference values. Accordingly, circuit breakers provided on the transmission lines may be tripped in order to secure and isolate the portion of the electrical network experiencing the fault.
  • IEDs Intelligent Electronic Devices
  • faults may be broadly categorized asymmetric and symmetric faults. Symmetrical faults or balanced faults, may be considered as such faults which impacts each of the three-phases of the electrical network equally and at the same time. Examples of such symmetric faults include, but are not limited to, line to line to line (L-L-L) and line to line to line to ground (L-L-L-G).
  • symmetric faults may occur during a condition commonly referred to as a power swing condition.
  • the electrical network may tend to deviate from its otherwise steady-state operating condition.
  • inter-area power swings may result in large fluctuations of voltage, current and power between two areas of a power system, for example, areas that may be connected via tie lines.
  • System disturbances such as transmission line faults, loss of generator units, or switching operation of heavy loaded transmission lines, and such, may cause power swings.
  • a power swing can lead to undesired trip of the distance relay, which may aggravate system instability.
  • an Intelligent Electronic Device on detecting the occurrence of a power swing may block or prevent the tripping and may allow the power swing conditions to be resolved in the desired manner. It may be noted that detection and decision for tripping or blocking the tripping is done by the IED in short time windows, which may be in the order of a few milliseconds.
  • Asymmetric faults occurring during a power swing may be detected by the presence of a negative sequence current and a zero-sequence current.
  • An IED on detecting the presence of such currents may isolate the portion of electrical network experiencing such faults to prevent any damage to the electrical components.
  • a symmetric fault owing to the symmetrical nature of the symmetrical faults, it is possible that such fault may go undetected during the occurrence of a power swing. Since the distance relays may be blocked from tripping during a power swing condition, if symmetrical faults occur during a power swing, it is likely that such a fault may go undetected and may result in high sustained currents through the various components and systems of electrical network.
  • occurrence of such symmetric faults is detected and appropriate action be taken to avoid any damage to components within the electrical network.
  • the manner of detection of such symmetric faults has typically involved determination of phasor magnitudes of current measurements corresponding to each phase of a three-phase electric current.
  • occurrence of faults during power swing conditions have been determined based on defining 'blinder' zones within an impedance.
  • Such approaches require careful and precise configuration of the blinder positions with respect to the existing characteristics of the circuit within the electrical network.
  • Other examples have also been relied on which involve determining rates of change of impedances within an electrical network, to ascertain the occurrence of a fault. In such other approaches, impedance may be continuously monitored.
  • a discontinuity of the impedance trajectory is used to detect the occurrence of the fault.
  • such examples are susceptible to errors owing to inaccurate impedance calculations which may arise due to phasor estimation errors that, in turn, may occur during power swing conditions.
  • a fault during power swing may go undetected when the impedance trajectory has crossed the blinders into one of the zones of operation due to swing (in case when implemented as per approaches described above). It is also important to note that the impedance calculations for a fault during power swing may not be reliable as phasor estimates during swing may tend to be poor. In such circumstances, a sustained fault may lead to high sustained currents through the transmission equipment (line, transformers, breakers, insulation, etc.) which is not desirable from the point of view of equipment health. It may also be the case that sustained faults may cause out-of-step/loss of synchronism condition as the angular separation between bus voltages widens. As would be evident from the prior approaches discussed in the preceding paragraphs, identification of a symmetrical fault during power swing is challenging. To this end, a dedicated mechanism is necessary for detection of faults during power swing when the relay is in blocked condition.
  • an unblock signal may be generated to release the block on an Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) to prevent damaging various components within the electrical network.
  • IED Intelligent Electronic Device
  • local measurements and their phasor estimates are utilized to detect occurrence of symmetrical fault.
  • the detrended sum of phasor magnitudes of the three-phase electric supply are utilized for determining whether a symmetric fault has occurred.
  • the approaches are computationally less extensive as compared to prior implementations, are fast and reliable.
  • measurements corresponding to each phase of a three-phase electric current are received.
  • the measurements are obtained using a measurement device, such as a current transformer (CT) or a voltage transformer (VT) associated with a terminal of a power transmission line.
  • CT current transformer
  • VT voltage transformer
  • the measurements are sampled and for each sampling instant, a phasor magnitude for each phase of the three-phase electric current is calculated. In one example, about 20 samples may be obtained within each measurement window.
  • the phasor magnitudes is detrended to obtain a plurality of detrended phasor values. Based on the plurality of detrended phasor values, a value of a fault indicator is determined. The value of the fault indicator is then utilized for determining whether the symmetric fault in the power transmission line has occurred. To detect the occurrence of the symmetric fault, the fault indicator is compared with a reference value. Once the occurrence of the symmetric fault has been ascertained, an unblock signal may be generated to release the block on an IED.
  • the present approaches enable detection of symmetric faults during the occurrence of a power swing condition. Furthermore, the present approaches are implemented periodically and within short time intervals, thereby limiting the computational time involved in determining whether symmetric faults have occurred during the power swing conditions.
  • FIG. 1 provides a block diagram of a two-source equivalent electrical network 100, as per an example.
  • the electrical network 100 comprises transmission lines 102, 104 and two-electrical sources, namely sources 106, 108.
  • the transmission lines 102, 104 are further provided with one or more circuit breaker(s) 110-1, 2, 3, ..., N (collectively referred to as circuit breaker(s) 110).
  • the circuit breaker(s) 110 allow opening of the circuit to restrict the flow of current in the electrical network.
  • the electrical network 100 as depicted is only illustrative.
  • the electrical network 100 may include further components without deviating from the scope of the present subject matter.
  • the electrical network 100 is further installed with an intelligent electronic device 112 (referred to as the IED 112).
  • the IED 112 may be in electrical communication with the transmission lines 102, 104, either directly or through other connecting means.
  • the IED 112, during operation, may receive and monitor measurements from one or more measurement devices. Examples of such measurement devices include, but are not limited to, current transformers and voltage transformers. Based on the measurements data received, the IED 112 may generate one or more signals to control the circuit breaker(s) 110, as explained in the following paragraphs.
  • the IED 112 further includes a fault detection module 114.
  • the fault detection module 114 may be implemented as either software installed within the IED 112, or as hardware in the form of electronic circuitry integrated with the circuitry of the IED 112.
  • the present example is described considering that the electrical network 100 is experiencing a power swing. As mentioned previously, disturbances in the steady-state of the electrical network 100 may result in the occurrence of a power swing, which may tend to vary otherwise stable parameters pertaining to the three-phase electric current. It may be possible that that such variations may occur due to symmetric faults.
  • the present subject matter is capable of detecting symmetric faults that may occur during the power swing. It may be noted that the IED 112 may also be adapted to determine the occurrence of a power swing without deviating from the scope of the present subject matter.
  • the IED 112 may monitor a three-phase electric current within the electrical network 100. During the monitoring, the measurements corresponding to the three-phase electric current are sampled, and for each sampling instant a phasor magnitude for each phase of the three-phase electric current, is determined. In one example, a first set composed of a number of phasor magnitudes determined over a power cycle, is obtained. Once the first set is obtained, the IED 112 may select at least half the total number of phasor magnitudes from the first, which are in turn collected as a second set.
  • the IED 112 may detrend the values of the second set of the phasor magnitudes. Based on the detrending, a set of detrended phasor magnitudes or values is obtained. It may be noted that the term detrended phasor magnitudes and detrended phasor values have been used interchangeably within the present description. Subsequently, the IED 112 may estimate value of a fault indicator. In one example, the fault indicator may be determined based on a sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • a norm of the sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes is determined by the IED 112 to obtain a normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes (also referred to as the NSDPM).
  • the norm may be obtained by determining a 2-Norm of the detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • the fault detection module 114 compares the fault indicator corresponding to the detrended phasor magnitude with a predefined reference value. If the fault indicator is determined to be greater than the predefined reference value, the fault detection module 114 concludes that a symmetric fault has occurred. Conversely, if the fault indicator is less than the predefined reference value, the fault detection module 114 may conclude that variations in the electrical parameters of the transmission current are due to power swings within the electrical network. Based on its determination, the fault detection module 114 may provide a block release signal to unblock the IED 112. Other examples for detecting the occurrence of symmetric fault are further described in greater detail in conjunction with the other accompanying figures.
  • FIG. 2 provides a block diagram of an intelligent electronic device (IED) 112, as per one example.
  • the IED 112 includes processor(s) 202 and a memory 206.
  • the processor(s) 202 may be a single processing unit or may include a number of units, all of which could include multiple computing units.
  • the processor(s) 202 may be implemented as one or more microprocessor, microcomputers, digital signal processors, central processing units, state machines, logic circuitries, and/or any devices that manipulate signals based on operational instructions.
  • the processor(s) 202 are adapted to fetch and execute processor-readable instructions stored in the memory 206 to implement one or more functionalities.
  • the interface(s) 204 may include a variety of software and hardware enabled interfaces.
  • the interface(s) 204 may enable the communication and connectivity between the IED 112 and other components of the electrical network 100. Examples of such components include, but is not limited to, circuit breaker(s) 110 and sensors.
  • the interface(s) 204 may facilitate multiple communications within a wide variety of protocols and may also enable communication with one or more computer enabled terminals or similar network components.
  • the memory 206 may be coupled to the processor(s) 202.
  • the memory 206 may include any computer-readable medium known in the art including, for example, volatile memory, such as Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) and Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM), and/or non-volatile memory, such as Read Only Memory (ROM), Erasable Programmable ROMs (EPROMs), flash memories, hard disks, optical disks, and magnetic tapes.
  • volatile memory such as Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) and Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM)
  • non-volatile memory such as Read Only Memory (ROM), Erasable Programmable ROMs (EPROMs), flash memories, hard disks, optical disks, and magnetic tapes.
  • the IED 112 may further one or more module(s) 208.
  • the module(s) 208 may be implemented as a combination of hardware and programming (for example, programmable instructions) to implement a variety of functionalities of the module(s) 208.
  • the programming for the module(s) 208 may be executable instructions.
  • Such instructions in turn may be stored on a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium which may be coupled either directly with the IED 112 or indirectly (for example, through networked means).
  • the module(s) 208 may include a processing resource (for example, either a single processor or a combination of multiple processors), to execute such instructions.
  • the processor-readable storage medium may store instructions that, when executed by the processing resource, implement module(s) 208.
  • module(s) 208 may be implemented by electronic circuitry.
  • the data 210 includes data that is either stored or generated as a result of functionalities implemented by any of the module(s) 208.
  • the module(s) 208 include the fault detection module 114.
  • the IED 112 may further include phase current sampling module 212, phasor estimation module 214, detrending module 216, block signal generator 218 and other module(s) 220.
  • the other module(s) 220 may implement functionalities that supplement applications or functions performed by the IED 112 or any of the module(s) 208.
  • the data 210 may include phasor magnitude(s) 222, detrended phasor magnitude(s) 224, SDPM 226, normed SDPM 228 or NSDPM 228, predefined reference value 230 and other data 232.
  • the IED 112 may further include other component(s) 234.
  • Such other component(s) 234 may include a variety of other electrical components that enable functionalities of managing and controlling the operation of the electrical network 100. Examples of such other component(s) 234 include, but is not limited to, relays, controllers, switches and voltage regulators.
  • the IED 112 detects symmetric faults during the occurrence of power swing conditions within the electrical network, such as electrical network 100.
  • the operation of the IED 112 is further described in conjunction with FIGS. 3-4 .
  • FIG. 3A-3C provides a series of illustrative graphs depicting the three-phase electric current waveforms, their corresponding phasor magnitudes and the variation in the normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes, i.e, the NSDPM 228.
  • FIG. 4A-4B depicts variation in the phasor magnitudes of each phase of the three-phase electric current, during the occurrence of a symmetric fault.
  • the IED 112 may be connected with one or more measurement devices installed within the electrical network 100 through interface(s) 204.
  • measurement devices include a current transformer or a voltage transformer.
  • the phase current sampling module 212 monitors the current measurements corresponding to the three-phase electric current that is being transmitted within the electrical network 100. It may be noted that although the explanation is provided with respect current measurements, in a similar manner, voltage measurements may also be monitored without deviating from the scope of the present subject matter.
  • the phasor estimation module 214 (referred to as estimation module 214) determines phasor magnitudes corresponding for each phase of the three-phase electric current.
  • the estimation module 214 is to determine the phasor magnitudes at multiple instants during a power cycle of the three-phase electric current. (Herein, the wordings "to”, “is to” and the like may be understood in the sense that the module is configured to perform the corresponding function, and in particular that the module has respective hardware and software for performing the corresponding function). The phasor magnitudes determined by the estimation module 214 are then collectively stored in phasor magnitude(s) 222 as a first set.
  • FIG. 3A is illustrative graphs depicting the three-phase electric current waveforms, as per one example, with FIG. 3B depicting the corresponding phasor magnitudes, such as the phasor magnitude(s) 222 as determined by the sampling module 212.
  • the graph as depicted in FIG. 3A may be generated based on the current measurements received by the IED 112. It may also be noted that the graph thus depicted is only indicative and should be not be construed as a limitation.
  • the three-phase electric current thus depicted is composed of three wave-forms, namely, wave-forms 308-A, 310-A and 312-A.
  • the wave-form 308-A depicts the three-phase electric current in an instance when electrical system (e.g., the electrical network 100) is in a steady state.
  • the detrending module 216 detrends the second set of the phasor magnitudes to obtain the detrended phasor magnitude(s) 224.
  • three-phase electric current at any point of the power swing envelope tends to have a monotonic variation with sinusoidal symmetry maintained across the phases.
  • the monotonic variation may be that of increasing nature or decreasing depending upon the point in time of the swing envelope.
  • FIG. 4A depicts the variation in the magnitudes of each phase of the three-phase electric current. As may be observed, the variation of each phase of the three-phase electric current is about a curve which is increasing.
  • the detrending module 216 is to effectively separate the variations in the mean-values of the three-phase electric current and determine whether the current magnitudes, post such detrending depicts the presence of a symmetric fault.
  • the detrending module 216 may implement the ' detrended ' function by determining a difference between the value of each of the phasor magnitudes from a value corresponding to a point lying on a curve representing the mean or the best-fit line corresponding to the phasor magnitudes of the second set. It may be noted that the detrending module 216 may detrend the second set based on any other mechanism or function without deviating from the scope of the present subject matter.
  • the detrending module 216 may determine a sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes, which are subsequently stored within the IED 112 as SDPM.
  • the SDPM 226 thus obtained may be an array of real values with the array having a dimension of [1xN/2].
  • the detrending module 216 may further determine the norm of the values within the SDPM 226.
  • the NSDPM 228 may then be relied on as a fault indicator to determine whether a symmetric fault has occurred during a power swing.
  • the fault detection module 114 determines the occurrence of a symmetric fault based on the comparison of the NSDPM 228 and a predefined reference value 230. If the NSDPM 228 is less than the predefined reference value 230 (referred to as the value 230), the fault detection module 114 may determine that any variations in the three-phase electric current may be due to power swing conditions in the electrical network 100. On the other hand, if the NSDPM is greater than the value 230, the fault detection module 114 may conclude that a symmetric fault has occurred within the electrical network 100.
  • the value 230 may be selected based on the desired sensitivity for detecting the occurrence of symmetric faults. In one example, the value 230 may be selected from a range of about 0.03 to about 0.1.
  • the waveforms pertaining to the three-phase electric current and its corresponding phasor magnitudes during a power swing and a symmetric fault are depicted as sections 310-A and 310-B, respectively.
  • the three-phase electric current is subject to oscillations, with the phasor magnitudes clearly undergoing a sinusoidal variation.
  • the sections 312-A and 312-B depict the instances when a symmetric fault has occurred within the electrical network.
  • the variations in the three-phase electric current (depicted by section 312-A) and the change in the phasor magnitudes (depicted by section 312-B) vary drastically when considered with the respect to the variations during the power swing (i.e., depicted by section 310-A and 310-B).
  • FIG. 3C depicts the variation 312-C, which is the normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • the portion of the variation 312-C is zero till the occurrence of the symmetric fault within the electrical network.
  • the variation 312-C increases as the symmetric fault occurs. This sudden increase in the value of the normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes is utilized for ascertaining the presence of a symmetric fault.
  • FIG. 4B illustrates a graphical representation 402 of a phasor current magnitude during occurrence of a three-phase fault, in accordance with one implementation of the present subject matter.
  • the graphical representation 402 includes a first portion 404 and a second portion 406.
  • the graphical representation 402 shown is within a time duration of about 1.98 seconds to about 2.04 seconds.
  • the first portion 404 may be within a time duration of about 1.98 seconds to about 2 seconds.
  • the second portion 406 may be within a time interval of about 20 milliseconds.
  • the third portion 408 may be within a time duration of about 2.02 seconds to about 2.04 seconds.
  • a power swing condition is occurring and in which the three phase currents oscillates at a swing-modulated frequency.
  • the second portion 406 i.e., within the fault window between 1.99 s - 2.03 s
  • a transient post-fault is present.
  • FIG. 4A there are two aspects to the phasor magnitude estimates. Firstly, there is a monotonic trend, which is representative of the rising magnitudes of the currents due to swing (as depicted in FIG. 4A ). Secondly, the amplitude estimates across the three phases have an oscillatory behavior with three phase sinusoidal symmetry.
  • the oscillatory nature of the amplitudes may be an estimation error which is attributable to the frequency response of the estimation filters which try to fit the modulated waveforms during swing to a fundamental phasor rotating at nominal (50 Hz in this case) electrical frequency.
  • this behavior is lost due to the transients in the current waveform
  • FIGS 5-7 depict the variations in the example windows labelled as W1290 and W2010. These are to be considered with the illustrative graphs depicted in the preceding figures.
  • FIG. 3A depicts the three-phase current waveforms when the system undergoes power swing (waveform 308-A) from steady state condition and then a three-phase fault occurs during the swing (waveform 310-A).
  • FIG. 5 provides a magnified view to depict granular variations which may not be discernible from FIG. 3A .
  • FIG. 5A provides a magnified view of 5-cycle zoom-in into a swing timeframe, while FIG.
  • FIGS 5B is a 5-cycle zoom-in into a "fault-during-a-swing" timeframe within the time window W1290.
  • a reference to the term 'cycle' may be considered, only for the present example, 20 ms of time with the fundamental frequency of the current sine waves being 50 Hz.
  • the FIGS 5A-5B represent on an analysis "window" of half cycle length, i.e., 10 ms.
  • the swing timeframe has been considered to be the time spanning from 1.281 s - 1.290 s (labelled as W1290), while for the fault occurring during power swing, the time period considered is 2.001 s - 2.010 s (labelled as W2010).
  • FIGS. 6A-6B depict the phasor magnitudes computed in the windows W1290 and W2010 respectively by using phasor estimation mechanisms as described in the context of phasor estimation module 214.
  • the corresponding values are shown in the first three columns of Table 1 and Table 2, respectively, depicted in the paragraphs that follow. As would be understood for a window, each of these columns consists of 10 values which correspond to the set ⁇
  • ⁇ ( p a, b, c ) as depicted in equation (1).
  • Columns 4-6 of the aforementioned tables depict the values of the phasor magnitudes after they have been detrended as per equation (2).
  • the values exemplified in column 4 are obtained by applying detrending operation on Column 1, so on and so forth.
  • the same are plotted in FIG. 7A-7B in which each of the curves represent the detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • Column 7 in each of these tables shows the Sum of Detrended Phasor Magnitudes or SDPM 226 obtained by adding up the corresponding entries in columns 4, 5 and 6 as per equation (3).
  • the values of SDPM 226 are depicted in FIG. 7A-7B with the curve 702, 704.
  • the scalar index Norm of SDPM or NSDPM by taking the 2-Norm of SDPM (i.e. column 7) as per equation (5).
  • the block signal generator 218 may be activated. For example, in the event of the fault detection module 114 determining that no symmetric fault as occurred, the IED 112 may be allowed to operate wherein the IED 112 will block tripping of the circuit breaker(s) 110 within the electrical network 100. On the other hand, if the fault detection module 114 detects the occurrence of a symmetric fault within the electrical network 100, the block signal generator 218 generate an unblock signal to release the block on the IED 112. Once the block on the IED 112 is released, the IED 112 will trip the circuit breaker(s) 110 to isolate the electric components from the prevailing faults.
  • the block signal generator 218 may also generate one or more signals for controlling the operation of other electrical components within the electrical network 100 for isolating one or more components, if a symmetric fault occurs.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates a flowchart of a method 500 for detecting a symmetric fault, in accordance with one implementation of the present subject matter.
  • the order in which the methods are described is not intended to be construed as a limitation, and any number of the described method blocks may be combined in any order to implement the methods, or an alternative method.
  • method 500 may be implemented by processing resource through any suitable hardware, non-transitory machine-readable instructions, or combination thereof.
  • a first set of phasor magnitudes of a three-phase electric current are determined.
  • the phase current sampling module 212 of the IED 112 obtains a first set based on the current measurements corresponding to the three-phase electric current, received by the IED 112.
  • the first set includes a plurality of phasor magnitudes of a three-phase electric current.
  • the phasor magnitudes are determined over a power cycle of the three-phase electric current.
  • a second set of phasor magnitudes of the three-phase electric current are determined.
  • the phase current sampling module 212 of the IED 112 obtains a second set.
  • the second set includes at least half of the number of phasor magnitudes for each phase, amongst the first set.
  • the second set includes a predefined number (ex. N/2) recent phasor magnitude estimates for each phase of the three-phase electric current.
  • the first set and second set as obtained may then be stored in the phasor magnitude(s) 222 of the data 210 of the IED 112.
  • the second set of phasor magnitudes are detrended to obtain a set of detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • the detrending module 216 of the IED 112 obtains a set of detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • the set of detrended phasor magnitudes may be obtained, for example, by subtracting the mean or best fit line corresponding to the values of the second set.
  • the elements of the set of detrended phasor magnitudes are summed to obtain a sum of detrended phasor magnitudes.
  • the detrending module 216 of the IED 112 sums elements of the set of detrended phasor magnitudes to obtain a sum of detrended phasor magnitudes, i.e., SDPM 226.
  • a norm based on the sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes is obtained to provide a normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes (referred to as the NSDPM).
  • the fault detection module 114 of the IED 112 determines the norm of the SDPM 226 obtained at block 508, to obtain the normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes (NSDPM 228).
  • the normed detrended phasor magnitudes is obtained when the sum of detrended phasor magnitudes obtained at block 508 is semi normed or 2-normed.
  • the normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes obtained may be stored as NSDPM 228 in the data 210 of the IED 112.
  • an occurrence of a symmetric fault is detected.
  • the fault detection module 114 detects the occurrence of the symmetric fault within the electrical network.
  • the fault detection module 114 compares the normed sum of the detrended phasor magnitudes (i.e., the NSDPM 228) with the predefined reference value 230. This comparison determines whether the intelligent electronic device 112 is to be unblocked upon detection of the symmetric fault.
  • the predefined reference value 230 may be within a range of about 0.03 to 0.1.
  • the intelligent electronic device may be unblocked in case a symmetric fault has occurred. For example, if the fault detection module 114 detects the occurrence of a symmetric fault within the electrical network 100, the block signal generator 218 generate a signal to release the block on the IED 112. As a result, the IED 112 will trip the circuit breaker(s) 110 to trip and isolate the electric components from the prevailing faults.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Testing Of Short-Circuits, Discontinuities, Leakage, Or Incorrect Line Connections (AREA)
EP19193614.5A 2019-07-09 2019-08-26 Symmetrische fehlererkennung während des leistungspendelzustands mit einseitigen messungen Active EP3764499B1 (de)

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Cited By (1)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2023087226A1 (en) * 2021-11-18 2023-05-25 Abb Schweiz Ag Method of determining fault of power system

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