EP3678872B1 - Dokumentenauthentifizierung unter verwendung eines verteilten kontos - Google Patents

Dokumentenauthentifizierung unter verwendung eines verteilten kontos Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3678872B1
EP3678872B1 EP17842332.3A EP17842332A EP3678872B1 EP 3678872 B1 EP3678872 B1 EP 3678872B1 EP 17842332 A EP17842332 A EP 17842332A EP 3678872 B1 EP3678872 B1 EP 3678872B1
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Prior art keywords
information
chip
certificate
hash
memory
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP3678872A1 (de
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Akkarakwad THITISUD
Mitchell DEYOUNG
Phongsak KAOCHOM
Somchard PHANNAM
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Linxens Holding SAS
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Linxens Holding SAS
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D15/00—Printed matter of special format or style not otherwise provided for
    • B42D15/0033—Owner certificates, insurance policies, guarantees
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/30—Identification or security features, e.g. for preventing forgery
    • B42D25/305—Associated digital information

Definitions

  • the invention relates to document security, and in particular, to authentication of documents.
  • passport documents In order to obtain a passport, one submits, to the passport-issuing agency, other identification documents.
  • An example of such a document is a birth certificate.
  • Such documents often called “breeder documents” because they are used to breed other documents, generally do not have such advanced anti-counterfeiting measures.
  • the wily counterfeiter will simply look for the weak link in the chain of identity that leads to the passport. Instead of attempting to counterfeit a passport, the wily counterfeiter will simply counterfeit something like a birth certificate and apply for a passport in the usual way. Once an identity is established on the basis of an unsecure breeder document the fraud is difficult to detect.
  • a birth certificate is not the only type of document that is easy to counterfeit.
  • Other examples of vulnerable documents include land titles, or university degrees. These documents share certain properties. Among them is a lack of uniformity in format or content, as well as a lack of uniformity in security features.
  • Such documents are not without some basic defenses against counterfeiting. These include watermarks or fibers in the security paper, guilloche background printing, micro-text, UV-visible printing, or combinations thereof. However, a skilled counterfeiter will often be able to duplicate these features well enough to avoid detection.
  • Patent document KR 2011 0052752 A discloses a certificate with an RFID label adhered thereto, for authentication by an external device.
  • the invention provides a simple and secure way to protect a wide variety of documents against counterfeiting. These include university diplomas, teacher certificates, company registration certificates, land titles, social security documents, birth certificates, and other documents that display vital data that can be misused for fraud and/or criminal purposes, and that are often verified by people who are not trained to detect lapses in document security.
  • a suitable verification method begins with enhancing the document with a sticker that includes a chip having memory on which is encoded data that is also possibly displayed on the document to be protected.
  • This data is included in a blockchain.
  • the sticker itself is simple to apply to a document. This results in an easy-to-use system for the reliable verification of the authenticity and integrity of any kind of valuable certificate.
  • the invention features a method comprising authenticating a certificate.
  • Such an authentication method includes obtaining, from a backend server, authorization to issue an adhesive sticker to be placed on the certificate, the adhesive sticker having memory and a transponder integrated therein, reading a form-control number that has been printed onto the certificate, storing particular information that is printed on the certificate in the memory, obtaining, from the chip, information identifying the chip, calculating a first hash (i.e. a message digest) based on the information identifying the chip, information on the certificate, and the form-control number, storing the first hash in a block chain, and placing the sticker on the certificate.
  • a first hash i.e. a message digest
  • Other practices further include receiving a request to authenticate the certificate, reading information from the memory, the information comprising the information identifying the chip, information on the certificate, and the form-control number, calculating a second hash based on the information that has been read from the memory, determining that the second hash matches the first hash stored on the block chain, and providing data indicating that the certificate is authentic.
  • no online connection is available and wherein calculating the second hash comprises calculating the second hash locally at an authenticated slave.
  • calculating the second hash comprises calculating the second hash remotely at a back-end server.
  • storing particular information comprises using a near-field communication protocol to store the information.
  • Yet other practices include pre-personalizing the chip, by hashing the information identifying the chip, thereby generating a hash value, and storing the hash value in a read-only memory block of the chip.
  • practices that transmitting information to a secure database for storage therein, the information comprising the hash value and information related to the chip.
  • context information in the chip.
  • the context comprises image data and biometric data.
  • the context information includes information that can only be read by an authorized reader and information that can be read by any reader.
  • the invention features a system for authenticating a certificate, the system comprising a chip having a memory and a sticker having an obverse and a reverse, one of which has a location (e.g. a recess) in which the chip and the transponder are placed.
  • the memory has, stored therein a first hash representative of a unique identifier of the chip, particular information associated with a certificate to which the sticker adheres, and an inventory control number identifying the sticker. This first hash matches a second hash stored in a block chain.
  • the memory is a read-only memory block.
  • the memory comprises context information stored therein.
  • the context information comprising one of image data and biometric data
  • the context information comprising information that can only be read by an authorized reader and information that can be read by any reader.
  • the chip implements the IS014443-4 standard.
  • Embodiments further include those in which the side that has a chip (e.g. in a recess) is the obverse and those in which the side that has a chip (e.g. in a recess) is the reverse.
  • a significant advantage is that the sticker can be applied to any existing certificate or document. There is generally no need to change the document's design. The existing security features on the document will continue to function in the usual way. This permits seamless integration into existing systems.
  • FIG. 1 shows a distributed-ledger authentication system 10 for permitting a user 12 to authenticate a certificate 14 that is to be protected.
  • the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 features a host 16 that is connected to a reader 18. Readers 18 are registered to keep control of the issuance process. As such, both the host 16 and reader 18 will require authentication to ensure that neither is in a list of revoked devices.
  • the host 16 is typically a general-purpose digital computer that may lack certain security features. It is therefore useful to also include, within the reader 18, a slave 20 that carries out secure communication with a backend server 22.
  • a secure database 23 connected to the backend server 22 provides storage for certain sensitive data to be described below.
  • the host 16, reader 18, and its slave 20 define one of many nodes 24 that are connected to the backend server 22.
  • the slave 20 is implemented as a smart card that is configured for securely-storing sensitive data, including keys, both asymmetric and symmetric.
  • a card often called a "secure-application module,” includes countermeasures that prevent inadvertent leakage of data via electromagnetic radiation, through observation of timing, and other side channels. All security-related operations, for example ISO 14443-4 protocol handling and the cryptographic handling, are delegated to the slave 20.
  • All security-related operations for example ISO 14443-4 protocol handling and the cryptographic handling, are delegated to the slave 20.
  • Such an implementation is particularly useful if connection to the cloud is expected to be intermittent.
  • the slave 20 can be implemented on the cloud rather than as a smart card.
  • the backend server 22 is a central entity that is responsible for managing operation of the slaves 20. In some cases, the backend server 22 causes data that is processed by the slaves 20 to be backed up on a blockchain 25 , or distributed ledger. The use of such slaves 20 in cooperation with the backend server 22 promotes security even in cases in which the hosts of the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 are managed by different parties and/or manufactured by different vendors.
  • a slave 20 is configured to activate only when the backend server 22 provides the slave 20 with an activation key 26 in response to a request from that slave 20 .
  • the backend server 22 maintains a master key 28 that it uses in the process of generating an activation key 26 for a particular slave 20. This results in a significant impediment to a counterfeiter who wishes to use an unauthorized reader 18 to counterfeit a certificate 14.
  • the certificate 14 has a preprinted form-control number 30, which is typically printed in a machine-readable form.
  • Known machine-readable forms include a bar code and a QR code.
  • This form-control number 30 is used to maintain inventory control over certificates 14, including both blank and authenticated certificates 14.
  • the certificate 14 also includes a blank area 32 that is large enough to accommodate a sticker 34.
  • the blank area 14 is circular and has a diameter of about four centimeters.
  • the sticker 34 is one of a set of stickers provided on a backing paper 36 with a silicon liner on a roll 38. They can easily be detached from the roll 38 and placed on the certificate 14.
  • each sticker 34 has an obverse 40 and a reverse 42.
  • the obverse 40 is available for placement of a custom design together with optional security features such as guilloches, UV-visible print, micro-text, and a latent image. Also placed on the obverse 40 is a unique inventory-control number 44, either in plaintext or in the form of a bar code or QR code.
  • the reverse 42 includes integrated security hardware 46 and an adhesive that firmly sticks to the certificate 14. As a result of this adhesive, attempts to remove the sticker 34 from the certificate 14 will likely destroy the sticker 34, the certificate 14, or both.
  • the security hardware 46 includes an antenna 48, a radio-frequency identification transponder 50, and a chip 52 that is placed using the SMARTRAC BULLSEYE TM wet inlay.
  • the antenna 48 enables contact-free communication between the chip 52 and the reader 18 via the radio-frequency identification transponder 50.
  • a suitable reader 18 is a radio-frequency identification reader that communicates using the ISO 14443-4 protocol. This permits reuse of existing infrastructure for electronic identification cards and passports. Additionally, this configuration also permits the chip 52 to be read by a mobile device that has a suitable near-field communication interface.
  • the chip 52 includes a memory 54 that stores certain data. Referring now to FIG. 5 , this data includes the inventory-control number 44 and particular information 56 that is printed on the certificate 14. Particular information 56 is the personal information that changes from one certificate 14 to the next.
  • a relatively small memory 54 has been found to be suitable for most purposes. For example, in some embodiments, between one and four kilobytes of memory 54 are adequate. Other embodiments have as much as 64 kilobytes of memory 54.
  • the details of the chip 52 can be varied to suit a customer during a pre-personalization phase that occurs at the production site for producing the stickers 34.
  • the chip 52 will be supplied in Security Level 3 with all Advanced Encryption Standard ("AES”) access keys pre-personalized. This makes it essentially impossible to personalize the chip 52 without having knowledge of the AES access keys.
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard
  • Pre-personalization also includes hashing certain data to form a hash value 58.
  • the data to be hashed includes the inventory-control number 44 and the chip's universal identifier, which is provided by the chip's manufacturer.
  • a preferred embodiment features hashing using the SHA256 message authentication code (sometimes referred to as CMAC1).
  • the memory 54 includes a read-only memory block 60 that cannot later be manipulated or changed. It is in this read-only memory block 60 that the hash value is stored.
  • the hash value 58 is also transmitted to the secure database 23 and stored as part of the profile data there, together with the inventory-control number 44 and other information related to the chip, such as manufacturing metadata and quality-assurance data associated with the radio-frequency identification transponder 50.
  • the chip 52 is one that implements the IS014443-4 standard.
  • the chip 52 is implemented using the NXP MIFARE Plus S platform with lkB, 2kB or 4kB of EEPROM that is rated for up to 20,0000 single write operations, that uses Advanced Encryption Standard 128 for authentication, data integrity and encryption, that has freely-configurable access conditions, that uses common criteria (CC) EAL 4+ certified (BSI-DSZ-CC-0620-2010-MA-01), that features an anti-tearing mechanism for writing AES keys, that supports ISO/IEC 14443-3 universal identifiers, including in particular a seven-byte universal identifier, that communicates up to 848 kilobits per second, that supports all commands of the ISO/IEC 14443-3 Protocol (all commands) in Security Level 3, and that is rated to retain data for at least a decade. Also among these are embodiments in which the chip is implemented using the NXP MIFARE EV1 platform and those in which
  • a chip 52 offers numerous advantages. For example, when enough memory 54 is available, such a chip 52 can collect context information, such as image, or biometric data. Such context information can be partitioned between private data, which can be read only by an authorized reader 18, and public data, which can be read by any reader 18, including a suitably-equipped smartphone.
  • context information such as image, or biometric data.
  • context information can be partitioned between private data, which can be read only by an authorized reader 18, and public data, which can be read by any reader 18, including a suitably-equipped smartphone.
  • the chip 52 is able to exchange relevant information with other computer systems in correct and ready to use format and to permit automated document tracking, thus improving document-handling, and increasing document security.
  • the use of the chip 52 permits the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 to leverage off existing infrastructure for reading electronic identification cards and passports.
  • Yet another advantage arises from the ability to function even without a network connection using on-board data to provide a basic level of security.
  • FIG. 6 shows an example of the pre-personalization process 62.
  • the process begins with reading the inventory-control number 44 off the label (i.e. the sticker) (step 64), for example using a bar-code scanner, and reading the universal identifier off the chip 52 (step 66).
  • the combination of the universal identifier and the inventory-control number 44 is then digitally signed (step 67), formatted into a near-field communications message (step 68) and encoded into the chip 52 (step 70) for later use during an authorization procedure 72 shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the procedure for authorizing 72 includes reading the inventory-control number 44 off the label (step 74), for example using a bar-code scanner, and reading the universal identifier off the chip 52 (step 76). The combination of the universal identifier and the inventory-control number 44 is then digitally signed (step 78).
  • Authorization 48 then proceeds with the decoding of the near-field communications message (step 80) that was stored in the encoding step (step 70). The near-field communications message is then extracted (step 84) and compared (step 86) with the outcome of the signing step (step 78).
  • FIG. 8 shows an activation procedure 88 through which a user 12 who is using a host 16 activates a slave-controlled reader 18 that stands between the host 16 and the backend server 22 so that the reader 18 can validate a certificate 14.
  • the activation procedure 88 begins with the user 12 logging into the host 16 (step 90) and the host 16 sending a message to the backend server 22 requesting authorization to validate a certificate 14 (step 92). To obtain access, it is preferable to have the user 12 complete a two-factor authentication procedure by presenting both a user password and either a one-time password token or an actual fingerprint from the user's finger. It is also preferable to log the user's interaction with the backend server 22.
  • the host then communicates with the reader to obtain relevant unique identifiers (step 94). These would include an identifier for the reader 18 and for the slave 20 that controls the reader 18.
  • the host 16 then receives the relevant identifiers together with a random number that will be valid for only the transaction that is being initiated (step 96). Upon doing so, the host 16 transmits the pertinent information to the backend server 22 to permit the backend server 22 to activate the slave 20 and validate the reader 18 (step 96). This information includes, for example, the reader's identifier.
  • the backend server 22 proceeds to determine whether or not the slave 20 is an unexpired valid slave 20 that is in possession of an updated key (step 98). It also verifies that the relationship between the user and the reader 18 is valid (step 100).
  • the backend server 22 Upon determining that the foregoing preliminary requirements are met, the backend server 22 proceeds to calculate an activation key 26 (step 102). In doing so, it uses its own master key 28, which is provided by its own hardware security module. This activation key 26 is then sent to the host 16 (step 104). The host 16 then sends, to the reader 18, the activation key 26 (step 106). Finally, the reader 18 will perform the necessary read and write operations and deliver the result of this operation to the host 16 (step 108).
  • the slave 20 provide a unique activation key 26 for each chip 52. This ensures that if an attacker somehow obtains a key for one chip 52, only that chip 52 will be compromised so long as the master key 28 remains safe.
  • the slave 20 uses three inputs to generate such a diversified key: the chip's unique identifier, a master key stored in the slave 20, and diversification input data.
  • the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 includes interfaces to existing databases and is thus configured for operating with existing systems. This minimizes interference with existing systems. The only additional components needed are a radio-frequency identification transponder 50 and a bar code scanner or some other device for reading a printed code.
  • the host 16 interacts with the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 using a web application on a standard browser. Preferably, communication between the host 16 and the backend server 22 is via a secure socket layer with all operations being recorded. This permits audits to be carried out.
  • the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 provides an integrated monitoring system to provide a complete chain of custody for the stickers 34. During pre-production, when the inventory-control number 44 is written to the chip 52 , the stickers 34 will be registered in the secure database 23. As a result, only registered stickers 34 can be issued.
  • Registration includes the use of an encrypted file that has been logged on the blockchain 25. This encrypted file can be decoded and validated through the activation key 26. This allows the use of only those stickers 34 that have been provided by the distributed-ledger authentication system 10.
  • the physical distribution of the stickers 34 is likewise traced and logged. When a site that is to issue stickers 34 receives such stickers 34 , the receipt of those stickers 34 is recorded. This permits the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 to cancel stickers 34 that have encountered problems while being issued as well as stickers 34 that have been physically damaged.
  • the distributed-ledger authentication system 10 also allows assigning a certain set of stickers 34 to a specific node 24.
  • a registered host can then personalize and issue a sticker 34 .
  • an issuing process 110 begins with scanning the form-control number 30 on the blank certificate 14 (step 112) and having the backend server 22 verify its authenticity (step 114). Only registered and unused blank certificates 14 are accepted. If no valid blank certificate 14 is presented, it is not possible to personalize either a sticker 34 or the blank certificate 14.
  • a transaction number is assigned (step 116).
  • the user places a sticker 34 on the reader 18 to establish communication with that sticker's chip 52 via its radio-frequency identification transponder (step 118).
  • the inventory-control number is then read from the chip's memory and sent to the backend server 22 (step 120), which proceeds to verify it (step 121). If backend server 22 deems the chip 52 to be valid, it writes the particular information 56 into the chip's memory via the radio-frequency identification transponder (step 122).
  • the backend server 22 authenticates the slave 20 in the background (step 124).
  • step 126 the certificate 14 and the sticker 34 are attached so that both are carrying the same information.
  • step 126 an association is formed between the form-control number 30, the inventory-control number 44, and the transaction number (step 128).
  • a node 24 can also verify or authenticate a sticker 34, and hence a certificate to which it is attached. This includes showing that the sticker 34 was issued by a valid node 24 and that the chip 52 in the sticker 34 is not a fake chip.
  • One approach to authentication is carried out online by connecting to the secure database 23. Data read from the chip 52 at the node 24 can then be compared with corresponding data stored in the secure database 23.
  • Another approach relies on digitally signing the chip's unique identifier and the inventory-control number 44 during the prepersonalization phase. This signature is stored on the chip 52 and can thus be read by an authenticating node 24. It can also be recalculated at the backend server 22 for comparison with the signature that is read by the node 24. A mismatch will indicate a counterfeiting attempt.
  • a node 24 can still authenticate a certificate 14 provided that there is an authenticated slave 20 connected to the host 16. In that case, the procedure is described above but with the slave 20 recalculating the signature instead of the backend server 22.
  • the node 24 can also verify the integrity of the particular information 56. This can be carried out by digitally signing the particular information 56 and then using either the backend server 22 or the slave 20 to recalculate the digital signature for comparison with whatever has been read from the chip 52.

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Claims (17)

  1. Verfahren zum Authentifizieren eines Zertifikats (14), wobei das Authentifizieren des Zertifikats (14) Folgendes umfasst:
    Lesen einer Formularkontrollnummer (30), die auf das Zertifikat (14) gedruckt wurde;
    Erhalten von einem Backend-Server (22) einer Autorisation zum Ausgeben eines Aufklebers (34), indem die Formularkontrollnummer (30) verwendet wird, die auf dem Zertifikat (14) angebracht werden muss, wobei der Aufkleber (34) einen Chip (52), einen Speicher (54) und einen Transponder (50) aufweist, die in den Aufkleber integriert sind;
    Speichern von speziellen Informationen (56), die auf das Zertifikat (14) gedruckt werden, in dem Speicher (54);
    Erhalten, von dem Chip (52), von Informationen, die den Chip (52) identifizieren, und gekennzeichnet durch:
    Berechnen eines ersten Hashs aufgrund der Informationen, die den Chip (52) identifizieren, der speziellen Informationen auf dem Zertifikat (14) und der Formularkontrollnummer (30);
    Speichern des ersten Hashs in einer Blockchain (25) und Anbringen des Aufklebers (34) auf dem Zertifikat (14).
  2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, das außerdem umfasst: Empfangen einer Anforderung zum Authentifizieren (92) des Zertifikats (14); Lesen von Informationen aus dem Speicher (54), wobei die Informationen die Informationen zum Identifizieren des Chips (52), die Informationen auf dem Zertifikat (14) und die Formularkontrollnummer (30) umfassen; Berechnen eines zweiten Hashs aufgrund der Informationen, die aus dem Speicher (54) gelesen wurden; Ermitteln, dass der zweite Hash mit dem ersten Hash übereinstimmt, der in der Blockchain (25) gespeichert ist; und Bereitstellen von Daten, die anzeigen, dass das Zertifikat (14) authentisch ist.
  3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, wobei keine Online-Verbindung zur Verfügung steht und wobei das Berechnen des zweiten Hashs ein lokales Berechnen des zweiten Hashs in einem authentifizierten Slave (20) umfasst.
  4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, wobei das Berechnen des zweiten Hashs ein fernes Berechnen des zweiten Hashs in einem Backend-Server (22) umfasst.
  5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei das Speichern der speziellen Informationen (56) ein Verwenden eines Nahfeldkommunikationsprotokolls zum Speichern der Informationen umfasst.
  6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, das außerdem ein Vorpersonalisieren des Chips (52) umfasst, wobei das Vorpersonalisieren umfasst: Hashen der Informationen, die den Chip (52) identifizieren, wodurch ein Hashwert (58) erzeugt wird, und Speichern des Hashwerts (58) in einem Festwertspeicherblock (60) des Chips (52).
  7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 6, das außerdem ein Übertragen von Informationen zu einer sicheren Datenbank (23) umfasst, um sie darin zu speichern, wobei die Informationen den Hashwert (58) und den Chip (52) betreffende Informationen umfassen.
  8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der Chip (52) den IS014443-4-Standard implementiert.
  9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, das außerdem ein Speichern von Kontextinformationen in dem Chip (52) umfasst, wobei die Kontextinformationen aus der Gruppe ausgewählt wird, die aus Bilddaten und biometrischen Daten besteht.
  10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, das außerdem ein Speichern von Kontextinformationen in dem Chip (52) umfasst, wobei die Kontextinformationen Informationen, die nur von einem autorisierten Leser (18) gelesen werden können, und Informationen umfassen, die von jedem Leser (18) gelesen werden können.
  11. System zum Authentifizieren eines Zertifikats (14), indem das Verfahren nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche implementiert wird, wobei das System einen Aufkleber (34), einen Chip (52) und einen Transponder (50) umfasst, wobei der Chip (52) einen Speicher (54) aufweist und wobei der Aufkleber (34) eine Vorderseite (40) und eine Rückseite (42) aufweist, wobei eine Seite, die aus der Gruppe ausgewählt wird, die aus der Vorderseite (40) und der Rückseite (42) besteht, eine Vertiefung umfasst, in welcher der Chip (52) und der Transponder (50) angebracht sind, wobei in dem Speicher (54) ein Hash, der eine eindeutige Kennung des Chips (52) repräsentiert, spezielle Informationen, die mit dem Zertifikat (14) assoziiert sind, an welches der Aufkleber (34) geklebt wird, und eine Bestandskontrollnummer (44) gespeichert sind, die den Aufkleber identifiziert, wobei der Hash mit dem ersten Hash übereinstimmt der in der Blockchain (25) gespeichert ist.
  12. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei der Speicher (54) ein Festwertspeicherblock (60) ist.
  13. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei der Speicher (54) Kontextinformationen umfasst, die darin gespeichert sind, wobei die Kontextinformationen eine von Bilddaten und biometrischen Daten umfasst.
  14. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei der Speicher (54) Kontextinformationen umfasst, die darin gespeichert sind, wobei die Kontextinformationen Informationen, die nur von einem autorisierten Leser (18) gelesen werden können, und Informationen umfassen, die von jedem Leser (18) gelesen werden können.
  15. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei der Chip (52) den IS014443-4-Standard implementiert.
  16. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei die Seite die Rückseite (42) ist.
  17. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei die Seite die Vorderseite (40) ist.
EP17842332.3A 2017-09-05 2017-09-05 Dokumentenauthentifizierung unter verwendung eines verteilten kontos Active EP3678872B1 (de)

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EP1759358A1 (de) * 2004-05-17 2007-03-07 Dexrad (Proprietary) Limited Dokumenterstellungs- und -authentifikationssystem
US20090031135A1 (en) * 2007-07-27 2009-01-29 Raghunathan Kothandaraman Tamper Proof Seal For An Electronic Document
KR20110052752A (ko) * 2009-11-13 2011-05-19 김경중 태그와 함께 철인되는 문서와 문서 철인용 알에프아이디 태그

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