EP3659088A1 - Procédé d'authentification d'une transaction financière dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs, carte à puce intelligente, et infrastructure d'authentification de chaîne de blocs - Google Patents

Procédé d'authentification d'une transaction financière dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs, carte à puce intelligente, et infrastructure d'authentification de chaîne de blocs

Info

Publication number
EP3659088A1
EP3659088A1 EP18752695.9A EP18752695A EP3659088A1 EP 3659088 A1 EP3659088 A1 EP 3659088A1 EP 18752695 A EP18752695 A EP 18752695A EP 3659088 A1 EP3659088 A1 EP 3659088A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
transaction
smart card
private key
blockchain
cryptocurrency
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP18752695.9A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Alexander VASLYCHENKO
Igor RUZANOV
Nikita SCHMIDT
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Sofitto Nv
Original Assignee
Sofitto Nv
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Sofitto Nv filed Critical Sofitto Nv
Publication of EP3659088A1 publication Critical patent/EP3659088A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G06Q20/06—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
    • G06Q20/065—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme using e-cash
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
    • G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication

Definitions

  • the present invention pertains to the field of electronic payment systems, and in particular to cryptocurrency systems using a blockchain infrastructure to store and certify transaction information.
  • WO 2015/183497 Al entitled “Cryptocurrency virtual wallet system and method” describes a method in which an encrypted request to transfer a requested amount of cryptocurrency from a user address to a destination address is received.
  • the request includes a destination address, a requested amount, a user device encryption key, and biometric data.
  • a partially signed transaction to transfer a requested amount of cryptocurrency from the user address to the destination address is also received.
  • the partially signed transaction is cryptographically signed and a multi-signed transaction is broadcast to a cryptocurrency network to transfer the requested amount of cryptocurrency from the user address to the destination address.
  • US patent application publication no. US 2015/0120569 Al entitled “Virtual currency address security” discloses a network device configured to generate a first public-private key pair.
  • the network device is configured to receive, over an electronic network, public keys of two or more second public-private key pairs.
  • the network device is configured to generate a digital currency address using the public keys of the two or more second public-private key pairs and a public key of the first public- private key pair.
  • US patent application publication no. US 2015/332256 Al entitled “System and Method for Converting Cryptocurrency to Virtual Assets Whose Value is Substantiated by a Reserve of Asset” discloses a computer-based system converting cryptocurrency into a virtual asset.
  • the system includes a user account database server
  • the system also includes a cryptocurrency account server configured to receive, from a networked device of a user, a transfer of crypto currency, from an external cryptocurrency account. In response to receipt of such a transfer, the cryptocurrency account server is configured to update the data pertaining to the obligations of the system to the user.
  • the system also includes a user interface server configured to receive a request from the user for
  • the method comprising: connecting the smart card to a smart card terminal so as to allow an exchange of data between the smart card and the smart card terminal; sending a command pertaining to the financial transaction from the smart card terminal to the smart card; using the smart card to obtain cryptographic data indicative of the holder's approval of the transaction; and sending a response comprising the cryptographic data from the smart card to the smart card terminal; using the cryptographic data to authenticate the transaction on the
  • cryptographic data comprises copying a part of the private key; and wherein the using of the cryptographic data comprises:
  • the command pertaining to the financial transaction preferably includes transaction data.
  • the present invention is based inter alia on the insight of the inventors that blockchain-based financial assets, such as Bitcoin, can only be expected to become as common as traditional monetary assets if there is a seamless transition between both worlds in the user's daily experience.
  • the present invention is further based on the insight of the inventors that such a seamless user experience can be obtained by using a smart card - already well known to end users in the form of debit cards or credit cards - as the user's virtual currency store, provided that the terminals and banking infrastructure involved in the transaction can treat the interaction with the cryptocurrency smart card in exactly the same way as they would a transaction with a regular debit card or credit card.
  • the existing infrastructure must not be burdened with the task of interfacing with the blockchain ledger.
  • This can be done by a new intermediary, a blockchain authentication infrastructure, provided that a way can be found to transfer a transaction signature linked to the card to the blockchain authentication infrastructure in a secure manner.
  • the smart card can approve the transaction in a single roundtrip messaging cycle between the backend and the smart card, avoiding the need for a second message exchange. Only a part of the private key stored on the smart card is copied to card reader, as a way for the card to signal the card holder's approval of the transaction. This facilitates the deployment of the method according the present invention on existing POS terminals utilizing a standard EMV transaction flow.
  • the private key is a secret for use in a t out of n secret sharing scheme, with t > 1 and t ⁇ n, the method further comprising:
  • cryptocurrency' s blockchain comprises: using the cryptographic data and the online transaction signatures to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain.
  • the inventors have found that the required security can be obtained by relying on a t out of n secret sharing scheme, whereby the smart card' s private key is used to generate an offline signature that participates in said t out of n secret sharing scheme and the blockchain authentication infrastructure (in particular one or more approval authorities) provide the
  • t ⁇ n, and n-t private keys for use in the secret sharing scheme are kept by a trusted party.
  • the inventors have found that the risks traditionally associated with on-card value stores, namely the risk of loss or theft, leading to a loss of the stored asset (or loss of access thereto) may be alleviated in the case of cryptocurrencies by using t out of n secret sharing schemes, whereby a trusted party has access to one or more additional secrets that allow for the reconstitution of a group of t secrets when the secret stored on the smart card is lost.
  • the one or more additional key may for example be submitted to an application in order to ( co- ) sign a transaction moving assets to a new digital currency address.
  • the transaction data is sent to the smart card in a customized APDU command. It is an advantage of this embodiment that the communication can take place in a way that is backward compatible with the
  • the customized APDU command may for example be a
  • a method for recovering access to an account in a cryptocurrency which is designed to be accessed by means of a smart card
  • the method comprising: retrieving an alternate private key from a different carrier than the smart card, the alternate private key being another secret for use in the t out of n secret sharing scheme; submitting the alternate private key to a recovery application on a server having access to t-1 other keys for use in the secret sharing scheme; at the server, combining the alternate private key and the t-1 other keys, to authenticate a transfer of assets in the account to an alternate account accessible by the holder.
  • the inventors have found that the risks traditionally associated with on-card value stores, namely the risk of loss or theft, leading to a loss of the stored asset (or loss of access thereto) may be alleviated in the case of cryptocurrencies by using t out of n secret sharing schemes with t ⁇ n, whereby the holder is able to retrieve an additional secret from another source than the smart card, which allows for the reconstitution of a group of t secrets when the secret stored on the smart card is lost.
  • a smart card for use in the method as described above, the smart card comprising a non-volatile memory having stored therein a private key and a cardlet configured to manage a store of value, wherein the smart card is adapted to receive a command pertaining to a financial transaction from a smart card terminal and to provide cryptographic data indicative of a card holder' s approval of the transaction; wherein the cryptographic data comprises a part of the private key, adapted to be combinable with a
  • a smart card for use in the method as described above, the smart card comprising a non-volatile memory having stored therein a private key and a cardlet configured to manage a store of value, wherein the smart card is adapted to produce cryptographic transaction signatures over transaction data using the private key and to send a message comprising the transaction signature and blockchain metadata to a reader.
  • a blockchain authentication infrastructure for authenticating a financial transaction in a blockchain-based cryptocurrency, the blockchain authentication infrastructure being configured to:
  • the private key is a secret for use in a t out of n secret sharing scheme
  • the blockchain authentication infrastructure being further configured to:
  • the blockchain authentication infrastructure is further configured to receive the transaction data, the offline transaction signature, and/or the t-1 online transaction signatures as parts of ISO 8583 or ISO 20022 messages.
  • a computer program product comprising code means configured to cause a processor to perform an authentication of a financial transaction in a blockchain-based cryptocurrency, by executing following steps: receiving transaction data pertaining to the financial transaction; obtaining an offline transaction signature over transaction data, generated by means of a private key, the private key being partially transmitted to the processor for recombination with a locally stored complementary part; and using the offline signature to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain.
  • the private key is a secret for use in a t out of n secret sharing scheme, the code means being further
  • a mobile device application comprising code means configured to cause the mobile device to conduct a financial transaction in a blockchain-based cryptocurrency, by executing following steps: connecting with a smart card so as to allow an exchange of data with the smart card; sending a command pertaining to the financial transaction to the smart card; obtaining a response comprising cryptographic data from the smart card; and sending the response to a blockchain authentication infrastructure; wherein the command and the response are formatted as binary APDU commands and comprise blockchain metadata.
  • the command pertaining to the financial transaction preferably includes transaction data.
  • FIG. 1 schematically represents an embodiment of the smart card according to the present invention
  • Figure 2 schematically represents elements of an embodiment of the transaction authentication method according to the present invention
  • Figure 3 presents a flow chart of a general embodiment of the transaction authentication method according to the present invention .
  • FIG. 5 presents a flow chart of a second variant of the transaction authentication method of Figure 3 (according to the invention) ;
  • Figure 1 schematically represents an embodiment of the smart card according to the present invention.
  • the smart card preferably has a credit card form factor (ID-1) . It may have the look and be provided with the functionality of a typical modern banking card (e.g. a debit card or a credit card, optionally with an electronic wallet function) . Thus, the smart card may be provided with, for example, one or more of a magnetic stripe, a signature panel, embossed text (e.g., indicating the card number, cardholder name, expiry date, and the like) , printed text (e.g. a Card Verification Code), printed images (e.g. service logos, such as "VISA” , “VISA electron”, “MasterCard”, “Maestro”, and the like; a photograph of the cardholder; ... ) , anti- counterfeiting elements (e.g. a hologram, security printing, fluorescence, ... )
  • ID-1 credit card form factor
  • the card comprises a Secure Element (SE) , which is typically implemented as an integrated circuit that communicates with a card reader via externally exposed electrodes (such as those
  • additional cryptocurrency-related functions that characterize the present invention may be implemented in an additional integrated circuit (the "cryptocurrency IC") , connected to the Secure
  • the cryptocurrency IC has access to the exposed
  • the smart card is adapted for use in the transaction
  • the smart card comprises, as part of the cryptocurrency IC, a non-volatile memory having stored therein a private key and a cardlet configured to manage a store of value.
  • the smart card is adapted to receive a command pertaining to a financial transaction from a smart card terminal and to provide cryptographic data indicative of a card holder's approval of the transaction; wherein the cryptographic data comprises a part of the private key, adapted to be combinable with a separately stored complementary part of the private key to obtain the private key.
  • the smart card is adapted to produce
  • cryptographic transaction signatures over transaction data using the private key and to send a message comprising blockchain metadata (in particular, the transaction signature) to a reader.
  • FIG. 1 schematically represents elements of an embodiment of the transaction authentication method according to the present invention.
  • the smart card according to the present invention cooperates, as an offline signing device, with an online
  • the online hot wallet is "online” in the sense that it resides on a computing platform that is connected to a network such as the Internet, whereas the offline signing device can only communicate with the remaining infrastructure by means of a card reader as described above.
  • the online hot wat wallet is “online” in the sense that it resides on a computing platform that is connected to a network such as the Internet, whereas the offline signing device can only communicate with the remaining infrastructure by means of a card reader as described above.
  • the online hot wat wallet is “online” in the sense that it resides on a computing platform that is connected to a network such as the Internet, whereas the offline signing device can only communicate with the remaining infrastructure by means of a card reader as described above.
  • the online hot wat wallet is “online” in the sense that it resides on a computing platform that is connected to a network such as the Internet
  • a third key is stored in an offline backup wallet. Examples of a
  • FIG 3 presents a flow chart of a general embodiment of the transaction authentication method according to the present invention.
  • the method authenticates a financial transaction in a blockchain-based cryptocurrency by means of a smart card.
  • the smart card comprises a private key, which is a secret for use in a t out of n secret sharing scheme, with t > 1 and t ⁇ n, for authenticating a holder of an account in the cryptocurrency.
  • the method comprises connecting 1010 the smart card to a smart card terminal so as to allow an exchange of data between the smart card and the smart card terminal.
  • the smart card terminal may be a traditional point-of-sale terminal (POS terminal) , an automated teller machine (ATM) , an end user PC equipped with a smart card reader (with a contact-based or contactless card interface) and appropriate software, an end user mobile device (e.g., a smart phone) with a smart card reader (typically a contactless card interface, such as NFC) and an appropriate app, or any other type of equipment configured to exchange information with a smart card.
  • POS terminal point-of-sale terminal
  • ATM automated teller machine
  • ATM automated teller machine
  • an end user PC equipped with a smart card reader (with a contact-based or contactless card interface) and appropriate software an end user mobile device (e.g., a smart phone) with a smart card reader (typically a contactless card interface, such as NFC) and an appropriate app, or
  • a command (e.g. a customized 'SIGN' command) , optionally comprising transaction data pertaining to the financial transaction, is sent 1020 from the smart card terminal to the smart card.
  • the transaction data is sent to the smart card in an ISO-8583 'Generate AC command.
  • the smart card is used to obtain 1030 cryptographic data
  • a response comprising the cryptographic data is sent 1040 from the smart card to the smart card terminal, whence it can be relayed to the banking infrastructure for further processing.
  • the transaction signature is preferably sent from the smart card to the smart card terminal as a response to a proprietary APDU command ( ⁇ SIGN' ) .
  • the transaction data is also sent 1050 to t-1 approval authorities holding respective private keys for use in the secret sharing scheme.
  • a private key is used to cryptographically produce 1060 an online transaction signature over the transaction data; this approval may be conditional upon successful verification of one or more transaction approval criteria, such as the availability of sufficient funds in the card holder's account.
  • a trusted party keeps the remaining n-t private keys for use in the secret sharing scheme.
  • the trusted party may for example be the card holder, a person or entity designated by the card holder, the card issuer, etc. It is essential that the card holder, and only the card holder, is able to retrieve the remaining private key in case the smart card gets lost or stolen, in order to recover the assets that are represented by the smart card.
  • Figure 4 presents a flow chart of a first variant of the
  • the obtaining 1030 of the cryptographic data comprises using the private key to cryptographically produce an offline transaction signature over the transaction data in the smart card.
  • the offline signature is used to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain.
  • the cryptographic data and the online transaction signatures are used 1070 together by the blockchain authentication infrastructure in that it combines the offline signature and the online signature (s) to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain, in accordance with the t out of n scheme .
  • Figure 5 presents a flow chart of a second variant of the
  • the obtaining 1030 of the cryptographic data comprises copying a part of the private key stored in the smart card, and sending this part back the smart card terminal for further relaying to the blockchain authentication infrastructure.
  • the cryptographic data - i.e., the part of the smart card's private key - is combined by the blockchain authentication infrastructure with a separately stored complementary part of the private key to obtain the private key.
  • the private key thus reconstituted is used to cryptographically produce an offline transaction signature over the transaction data 1045 outside the smart card.
  • the offline signature is used to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain.
  • the offline signature and the online signatures are combined to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain, in accordance with the t out of n scheme.
  • FIG. 6 presents a flow chart of an embodiment of the secret recovery method according to the present invention.
  • the purpose is to recover access to an account in a cryptocurrency which is designed to be accessed by means of a smart card, for example in the event of loss or theft of the smart card.
  • the smart card comprises a private key, which is a secret for use in a t out of n secret sharing scheme, with t > 1 and t ⁇ n, for authenticating the holder of the account.
  • the method comprises retrieving 2010 an alternate private key from a different carrier than the smart card, the alternate private key being another secret for use in the t out of n secret sharing scheme.
  • This alternate key may be under the care of the card holder, the card issuer, or of a trusted third party. It may be stored electronically (e.g. on an optical disc or in a portable semiconductor-based memory, such as a USB stick) as a digital signature file or as a printable image representing the key (for example in pdf or jpg format), or in a "hard-copy" form (e.g.
  • the alternate private key is submitted 2020 to a recovery
  • FIG. 7 presents a flow chart of the method performed by an embodiment of the authentication back-end according to the present invention.
  • the back-end also referred to herein as the blockchain authentication infrastructure, is designed for authenticating a financial transaction in a blockchain-based cryptocurrency .
  • It is configured to receive 3045 transaction data pertaining to the financial transaction and to obtain the necessary
  • cryptographic signatures (the offline signature and t-1 online signatures) which can be combined to authenticate the transaction on the cryptocurrency' s blockchain, in accordance with the t out of n scheme.
  • the blockchain authentication infrastructure has to obtain 3055 an offline transaction signature over transaction data, generated by means of a private key being a secret for use in a t out of n secret sharing scheme, which key is stored in the smart card.
  • the offline signature is either generated by the smart card and subsequently transmitted via the smart card terminal to the blockchain authentication infrastructure, or it is generated by the blockchain
  • the blockchain authentication infrastructure is preferably configured to receive the transaction data 3045 , the offline transaction signature 3055, and/or the t-1 online transaction signatures 3060 as parts of ISO 8583 messages.
  • the blockchain authentication infrastructure may be implemented in dedicated hardware or on a general computing platform programmed with appropriate software.
  • the present invention therefore also pertains to a computer program product comprising code means configured to cause a processor to perform an authentication of a financial transaction in a blockchain-based cryptocurrency, by executing the steps described above with reference to Figure 7.
  • the smart card terminal may take the form of a mobile device, such as a smart a phone, with an appropriate card reading interface, such as an NFC interface.
  • a mobile device application also referred to as an "app" comprising code means configured to cause the mobile device to conduct a financial transaction in a
  • the command and the response are formatted as binary APDU commands and comprise blockchain metadata, which may include as the case may be transaction data, cryptographic signatures and/or shares of the applicable secret private key.

Landscapes

  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé d'authentification d'une transaction dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs à l'aide d'une carte à puce intelligente comprenant une clé privée, qui constitue un secret destiné à être utilisé dans un système de partage de secret, pour authentifier un détenteur d'un compte dans la cryptomonnaie. Il consiste : à connecter la carte à puce intelligente à un terminal afin d'échanger des données; à envoyer une commande à la carte à puce intelligente; à utiliser la carte à puce intelligente afin d'obtenir des données cryptographiques indiquant l'approbation du détenteur de la transaction; et à envoyer une réponse comprenant les données cryptographiques au terminal; et à utiliser les données cryptographiques afin d'authentifier la transaction sur la chaîne de blocs de la cryptomonnaie. L'obtention desdites données cryptographiques consiste à copier une partie de ladite clé privée, devant être combinée à une partie complémentaire stockée séparément de la clé privée afin de produire une signature de transaction hors ligne sur les données de transaction à l'extérieur de la carte à puce intelligente.
EP18752695.9A 2017-07-27 2018-07-27 Procédé d'authentification d'une transaction financière dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs, carte à puce intelligente, et infrastructure d'authentification de chaîne de blocs Pending EP3659088A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
BE2017/5532A BE1025438B1 (nl) 2017-07-27 2017-07-27 Werkwijze voor het authenticeren van een financiële transactie in een blockchain‐gebaseerde cryptocurrency, smartcard en blockchain‐authenticatieinfrastructuur
PCT/EP2018/070517 WO2019020824A1 (fr) 2017-07-27 2018-07-27 Procédé d'authentification d'une transaction financière dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs, carte à puce intelligente, et infrastructure d'authentification de chaîne de blocs

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3659088A1 true EP3659088A1 (fr) 2020-06-03

Family

ID=60164529

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP18752695.9A Pending EP3659088A1 (fr) 2017-07-27 2018-07-27 Procédé d'authentification d'une transaction financière dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs, carte à puce intelligente, et infrastructure d'authentification de chaîne de blocs

Country Status (3)

Country Link
EP (1) EP3659088A1 (fr)
BE (1) BE1025438B1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2019020824A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (15)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP7424294B2 (ja) * 2018-09-04 2024-01-30 ソニーグループ株式会社 Ｉｃカード、処理方法、および情報処理システム
DE202018005686U1 (de) 2018-11-30 2019-01-24 Winrich Hoseit Elektronischer PIN-Safe
CN109886662A (zh) * 2019-02-18 2019-06-14 北京正合链通科技有限公司 区块链钱包应用方法及系统、终端和计算机可读存储介质
CN110213058A (zh) * 2019-06-05 2019-09-06 北京清大智信科技有限公司 一种实现数据上链的区块链一体机
CN110287739B (zh) * 2019-06-17 2020-12-29 西安纸贵互联网科技有限公司 基于硬件私钥存储技术的数据安全管理方法及系统
CN110417557B (zh) * 2019-08-02 2022-06-10 中国工商银行股份有限公司 智能终端外设数据安全控制方法及装置
CN110401534A (zh) * 2019-09-04 2019-11-01 朱子腾 基于无币区块链的账号体系
GB201914950D0 (en) * 2019-10-16 2019-11-27 Centbee Pty Ltd Computer-implemented systems and methods
JP7075917B2 (ja) * 2019-10-18 2022-05-26 真敬 森下 管理装置、管理プログラム、管理方法、端末装置、及び管理システム
CN111523879B (zh) * 2019-12-23 2023-06-06 杜晓楠 一种数字资产安全隔离托管系统和方法
CN111127016B (zh) * 2019-12-26 2022-08-02 卓尔智联(武汉)研究院有限公司 离线通证分配方法、装置、计算机设备和存储介质
US20210312431A1 (en) * 2020-04-06 2021-10-07 Mastercard Asia/Pacific Pte. Ltd. Method and system for use of an emv card in a multi-signature wallet for cryptocurrency transactions
CN112200550B (zh) * 2020-09-23 2021-05-11 北京联银通科技有限公司 基于数字金融的离线支付验证方法及区块链平台
WO2022253424A1 (fr) * 2021-06-02 2022-12-08 FATIH, Selahattin Système de transaction pour des actifs financiers cryptographiques stockés de manière décentralisée dans un réseau informatique
CN115175170B (zh) * 2022-06-30 2023-06-02 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 Usim数据自主上链实现方法、终端、usim及系统

Family Cites Families (10)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5825880A (en) * 1994-01-13 1998-10-20 Sudia; Frank W. Multi-step digital signature method and system
US10102510B2 (en) * 2012-11-28 2018-10-16 Hoverkey Ltd. Method and system of conducting a cryptocurrency payment via a mobile device using a contactless token to store and protect a user's secret key
US20150120569A1 (en) 2013-10-31 2015-04-30 Bitgo, Inc. Virtual currency address security
US9672499B2 (en) * 2014-04-02 2017-06-06 Modernity Financial Holdings, Ltd. Data analytic and security mechanism for implementing a hot wallet service
CA2985040A1 (fr) * 2014-05-06 2015-12-03 Case Wallet, Inc. Systeme et procede de porte-monnaie virtuel de crypto-monnaie
US11164164B2 (en) 2014-05-15 2021-11-02 Uphold Global Foundation System and method for converting cryptocurrency to virtual assets whose value is substantiated by a reserve of assets
US20160335628A1 (en) 2014-05-15 2016-11-17 Adam Mark Weigold System and method for digital currency storage, payment and credit
US20160162897A1 (en) * 2014-12-03 2016-06-09 The Filing Cabinet, LLC System and method for user authentication using crypto-currency transactions as access tokens
WO2016175914A2 (fr) * 2015-02-27 2016-11-03 Visa International Service Association Signature de transaction utilisant la cryptographie asymétrique
SI3073670T1 (sl) * 2015-03-27 2021-07-30 Black Gold Coin, Inc. Sistem in postopek za osebno identifikacijo in verifikacijo

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
BE1025438A1 (nl) 2019-02-20
BE1025438B1 (nl) 2019-02-27
WO2019020824A1 (fr) 2019-01-31

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP3659088A1 (fr) Procédé d'authentification d'une transaction financière dans une cryptomonnaie basée sur une chaîne de blocs, carte à puce intelligente, et infrastructure d'authentification de chaîne de blocs
US11736296B2 (en) Biometric verification process using certification token
JP7442552B2 (ja) 動的オフチェーンデジタル通貨トランザクション処理
CN110612546B (zh) 用于数字资产账户管理的方法和装置
TW591459B (en) Enabling use of smart cards by consumer devices for Internet commerce
US11394721B2 (en) Binding cryptogram with protocol characteristics
US10671988B2 (en) Methods and systems for processing an electronic payment
CN109716373B (zh) 密码认证和令牌化的交易
EP4186205A1 (fr) Système et procédé d'interaction hors ligne
EP3036696A2 (fr) Procédés et systèmes permettant de transférer de l'argent électronique
CN111062717B (zh) 一种数据转移处理方法、装置和计算机可读存储介质
EP2040228A1 (fr) Système, procédé et dispositif pour autoriser une interaction sécurisée et conviviale
US9547960B2 (en) System, method, article of manufacture of mixed reality based, biometrically signed reusable physical financial instrument
CN113015992B (zh) 多个令牌的云令牌预配
AU2023201327B2 (en) Techniques for secure channel communications
CN113196704A (zh) 用于安全执行离线认证的技术
AU2024219590A1 (en) Devices, systems, and methods for public/private key authentication
EP4010865A1 (fr) Intégration d'application mobile
WO2020081788A1 (fr) Procédé et système de traitement de données avec divers protocoles
TWM603166U (zh) 具非接觸式認證的金融交易裝置與系統
CN114793455A (zh) 经由区块链改进资源的电子转移的系统和方法
KR102395870B1 (ko) 블록체인 기반의 암호화 키 분산관리 네트워크를 이용한 결제 서비스를 제공하는 결제 단말 장치, 결제 중계 서버 및 그 동작 방법
CN118830226A (zh) 卡上的密码密钥存储
WO2023172261A1 (fr) Magasin de clés cryptographiques sur carte
WO2024072915A1 (fr) Système de paiement par cryptomonnaie natif

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: UNKNOWN

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE

PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20200227

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Extension state: BA ME

RIN1 Information on inventor provided before grant (corrected)

Inventor name: VASLYCHENKO, OLEKSANDR

Inventor name: SCHMIDT, NIKITA

Inventor name: RUZANOV, IGOR

DAV Request for validation of the european patent (deleted)
DAX Request for extension of the european patent (deleted)
STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20220729