EP3641225A1 - Policy-driven compliance - Google Patents
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- EP3641225A1 EP3641225A1 EP19215055.5A EP19215055A EP3641225A1 EP 3641225 A1 EP3641225 A1 EP 3641225A1 EP 19215055 A EP19215055 A EP 19215055A EP 3641225 A1 EP3641225 A1 EP 3641225A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
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Definitions
- the present technology pertains to compliance and more specifically pertains to effecting compliance via network policies.
- HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
- SOX Sarbanes Oxley
- PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
- Compliance can be a state of comporting with governmental regulations, industry standards, and similar guidelines, or the process toward this state.
- Conventional approaches for compliance may be inadequate to the challenges facing networks today.
- Many solutions tend to focus on the network edge (i.e., north-south traffic).
- networks using these solutions may be especially vulnerable to attacks occurring within the network (i.e., east-west traffic) and are likely to be non-compliant.
- Conventional techniques are also typically reactive and cannot resolve security breaches in real time or substantially real time.
- conventional networks often fail to gather all relevant information for preventing, diagnosing, and remedying malicious network activity.
- a network can achieve compliance by defining and enforcing a set of network policies to secure electronic information subject to a governmental regulation or an industry standard (i.e., protected electronic information).
- the network can monitor network information, host and/or endpoint information, process information, and user information for traffic passing through the network using a sensor network that provides multiple perspectives for the traffic.
- the sensor network can include sensors for networking devices, physical servers, hypervisors or shared kernels, and virtual partitions (e.g., virtual machines (VMs) or containers), and other network elements.
- the network can analyze the network information, host and/or endpoint information, process information, and user information to determine one or more policies for each flow.
- the network can determine an expected network action based on the policies for the flow.
- These network actions can include forwarding traffic, dropping traffic, marking traffic for a particular quality of service (QoS), redirecting traffic using a specific route, and selecting a service graph for traffic (e.g., forwarding traffic through a set of network service functions, such as a firewall, load balancer, wide area network (WAN) optimizer, among other network services).
- QoS quality of service
- the network can update policy information based on comparisons between expected network actions to be performed on the traffic and actual network actions performed on the traffic.
- the policy information can be utilized for compliance reporting or investigating policy non-conformance.
- Systems and approaches in accordance with various embodiments of the present technology may overcome the foregoing and other limitations with conventional techniques by collecting, from multiple perspectives, a more thorough data set for analyzing compliance; designing dynamic network policies that account for the current states of hosts and/or endpoints, processes, and users; and tracking both conformance and non-conformance of network policies.
- networks can be configured with sensors at multiple points, including on networking devices (e.g., switches, routers, gateways, firewalls, deep packet inspectors, traffic monitors, load balancers, etc.), physical servers, hypervisors or shared kernels, virtual partitions (e.g., VMs or containers), and other network elements.
- networking devices e.g., switches, routers, gateways, firewalls, deep packet inspectors, traffic monitors, load balancers, etc.
- physical servers e.g., hypervisors or shared kernels, virtual partitions (e.g., VMs or containers), and other network elements.
- network traffic data can be associated with host and/or endpoint data (e.g., host/endpoint name, operating system, CPU usage, network usage, disk space, logged users, scheduled jobs, open files, information regarding files stored on a host/endpoint, etc.), process data (e.g., process name, ID, parent process ID, path, CPU utilization, memory utilization, etc.), user data (e.g., user name, ID, login time, etc.), and other collectible data to provide more insight into network activity.
- endpoint data e.g., host/endpoint name, operating system, CPU usage, network usage, disk space, logged users, scheduled jobs, open files, information regarding files stored on a host/endpoint, etc.
- process data e.g., process name, ID, parent process ID, path, CPU utilization, memory utilization, etc.
- user data e.g., user name, ID, login time, etc.
- networks can employ dynamic policies based on the state of a host and/or endpoint, process, and/or user associated with a flow. Networks can initially associate traffic with a first endpoint group (EPG) and then reassign traffic to one or more second EPGs if a host and/or endpoint state, process state, or user state changes.
- EPG endpoint group
- Compliance addresses the areas of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and auditability. Confidentiality tackles the challenges of protecting data as it traverses the network, limiting interception of data, and-in the event of interception-limiting usability of data by unauthorized persons. Integrity pertains to protection of data against improper alteration or destruction, and ensures that data is accurate and complete, and that accuracy and completeness are maintained. Availability is directed toward providing access to data by authorized persons at specified times. Auditability concerns providing proof that a network conforms to regulations, standards, and similar guidelines. Conventional compliance solutions often fail to address one or more of these aspects of compliance. For example, to the extent conventional networks are capable of monitoring security threats, these networks are incapable of verifying no security threat occurred. In various example embodiments, networks can monitor, log, and report compliance and non-compliance.
- FIG. 1 is an illustration of a network traffic monitoring system 100 in accordance with an example embodiment.
- the network traffic monitoring system 100 can include a configuration manager 102, sensors 104, a collector module 106, a data mover module 108, an analytics engine 110, and a presentation module 112.
- the analytics engine 110 is also shown in communication with out-of-band data sources 114, third party data sources 116, and a network controller 118.
- the configuration manager 102 can be used to provision and maintain the sensors 104, including installing sensor software or firmware in various nodes of a network, configuring the sensors 104, updating the sensor software or firmware, among other sensor management tasks.
- the sensors 104 can be implemented as virtual partition images (e.g., virtual machine (VM) images or container images), and the configuration manager 102 can distribute the images to host machines.
- a virtual partition may be an instance of a VM, container, sandbox, or other isolated software environment.
- the software environment may include an operating system and application software.
- the virtual partition may appear to be, for example, one of many servers or one of many operating systems executed on a single physical server.
- the configuration manager 102 can instantiate a new virtual partition or migrate an existing partition to a different physical server.
- the configuration manager 102 can also be used to configure the new or migrated sensor.
- the configuration manager 102 can monitor the health of the sensors 104. For instance, the configuration manager 102 may request for status updates and/or receive heartbeat messages, initiate performance tests, generate health checks, and perform other health monitoring tasks. In an example embodiment, the configuration manager 102 can also authenticate the sensors 104. For example, the sensors 104 can be assigned a unique identifier, such as by using a one-way hash function of a sensor's basic input/out system (BIOS) universally unique identifier (UUID) and a secret key stored by the configuration image manager 102. The UUID can be a large number that may be difficult for a malicious sensor or other device or component to guess. In an example embodiment, the configuration manager 102 can keep the sensors 104 up to date by installing the latest versions of sensor software and/or applying patches. The configuration manager 102 can obtain these updates automatically from a local source or the Internet.
- BIOS basic input/out system
- the sensors 104 can reside on various nodes of a network, such as a virtual partition (e.g., VM or container) 120; a hypervisor or shared kernel managing one or more virtual partitions and/or physical servers 122, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 124 of a switch, router, gateway, or other networking device, or a packet capture (pcap) 126 appliance (e.g., a standalone packet monitor, a device connected to a network devices monitoring port, a device connected in series along a main trunk of a datacenter, or similar device) or other component of a network operating system.
- a virtual partition e.g., VM or container
- hypervisor or shared kernel managing one or more virtual partitions and/or physical servers 122
- ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
- pcap packet capture
- the sensors 104 can monitor network traffic between nodes, and send network traffic data and corresponding data (e.g., host data, process data, user data, etc.) to the collectors 108 for storage.
- network traffic data and corresponding data e.g., host data, process data, user data, etc.
- the sensors 104 can sniff packets being sent over its hosts' physical or virtual network interface card (NIC), or individual processes can be configured to report network traffic and corresponding data to the sensors 104.
- NIC physical or virtual network interface card
- Incorporating the sensors 104 on multiple nodes and within multiple partitions of some nodes of the network can provide for robust capture of network traffic and corresponding data.
- each node of the network (e.g., VM, container, or other virtual partition 120, hypervisor, shared kernel, or physical server 122, ASIC 124, pcap 126, etc.) includes a respective sensor 104.
- VM virtual partition
- hypervisor hypervisor
- shared kernel shared kernel
- physical server 122 ASIC 124, pcap 126, etc.
- various software and hardware configurations can be used to implement the sensor network 104.
- the network traffic data can include metadata relating to a packet, a collection of packets, a flow, a group of flows, etc. That is, the network traffic data can generally include any information describing communication on all layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.
- OSI Open Systems Interconnection
- the network traffic data can include source/destination MAC address, source/destination IP address, protocol, port number, etc.
- the network traffic data can also include summaries of network activity or other network statistics such as number of packets, number of bytes, number of flows, bandwidth usage, response time, latency, packet loss, jitter, and other network statistics.
- the sensors 104 can also determine additional data for each session, bidirectional flow, flow, packet, or other more granular or less granular network communication.
- the additional data can include host and/or endpoint information, virtual partition information, sensor information, process information, user information, tenant information, application information, network topology, application dependency mapping, cluster information, or other information corresponding to each flow.
- the sensors 104 can perform some preprocessing of the network traffic and corresponding data before sending the data to the collectors 108. For example, the sensors 104 can remove extraneous or duplicative data or they can create summaries of the data (e.g., latency, number of packets per flow, number of bytes per flow, number of flows, etc.). In some example embodiments, the sensors 104 can be configured to only capture certain types of connection information and disregard the rest. In some example embodiments, the sensors 104 can be configured to capture only a representative sample of packets (e.g., every 1,000th packet or other suitable sample rate) and corresponding data.
- a representative sample of packets e.g., every 1,000th packet or other suitable sample rate
- network traffic and corresponding data can be collected from multiple vantage points or multiple perspectives in the network to provide a more comprehensive view of network behavior.
- the capture of network traffic and corresponding data from multiple perspectives rather than just at a single sensor located in the data path or in communication with a component in the data path, allows data to be correlated from the various data sources, which may be used as additional data points the analytics engine 110. Further, collecting network traffic and corresponding data from multiple points of view ensures more accurate data is captured.
- a conventional sensor network may be limited to sensors running on external-facing network devices (e.g., routers, switches, network appliances, etc.) such that east-west traffic, including VM-to-VM or container-to-container traffic on a same host, may not be monitored.
- east-west traffic including VM-to-VM or container-to-container traffic on a same host
- packets that are dropped before traversing a network device or packets containing errors may not be accurately monitored by the conventional sensor network.
- the sensor network 104 of various example embodiments substantially mitigates or eliminates these issues altogether by locating sensors at multiple points of potential failure.
- the network traffic monitoring system 100 can verify multiple instances of data for a flow (e.g., source endpoint flow data, network device flow data, and endpoint flow data) against one another.
- the network traffic monitoring system 100 can assess a degree of accuracy of flow data sets from multiple sensors and utilize a flow data set from a single sensor determined to be the most accurate and/or complete.
- the degree of accuracy can be based on factors such as network topology (e.g., a sensor closer to the source may be more likely to be more accurate than a sensor closer to the destination), a state of a sensor or a node hosting the sensor (e.g., a compromised sensor/node may have less accurate flow data than an uncompromised sensor/node), or flow data volume (e.g., a sensor capturing a greater number of packets for a flow may be more accurate than a sensor capturing a smaller number of packets).
- network topology e.g., a sensor closer to the source may be more likely to be more accurate than a sensor closer to the destination
- a state of a sensor or a node hosting the sensor e.g., a compromised sensor/node may have less accurate flow data than an
- the network traffic monitoring system 100 can assemble the most accurate flow data set and corresponding from multiple sensors. For instance, a first sensor along a data path may capture data for a first packet of a flow but may be missing data for a second packet of the flow while the situation is reversed for a second sensor along the data path. The network traffic monitoring system 100 can assemble data for the flow from the first packet captured by the first sensor and the second packet captured by the second sensor.
- the sensors 104 can send network traffic data to the collectors 106.
- each sensor can be assigned to a primary collector and a secondary collector as part of a high availability scheme. If the primary collector fails or communications between the sensor and the primary collector are not otherwise possible, a sensor can send its network traffic and corresponding data to the secondary collector.
- the sensors 104 are not assigned specific collectors but the network traffic monitoring system can determine an optimal collector for receiving the network traffic and corresponding data through a discovery process. For example, a sensor can change where it sends it network traffic data if its environments changes, such as if a default collector fails or if the sensor is migrated to a new location and it would be optimal for the sensor to send its data to a different collector.
- a sensor can send different types of network traffic and corresponding data to different collectors. For example, the sensor can send network traffic data and corresponding related to one type of process to one collector and network traffic and corresponding data related to another type of process to another collector.
- the collectors 106 can be any type of storage medium that can serve as a repository for the network traffic and corresponding data recorded by the sensors 104.
- data storage for the collectors 106 is located in an in-memory database, such as dashDB from IBM®, although it should be appreciated that the data storage for the collectors 106 can be any software and/or hardware capable of providing rapid random access speeds typically used for analytics software.
- the collectors 106 can utilize solid state drives, disk drives, magnetic tape drives, or a combination of the foregoing according to cost, responsiveness, and size requirements. Further, the collectors 106 can utilize various database structures such as a normalized relational database or a NoSQL database, among others.
- the collectors 106 may only serve as network storage for the network traffic monitoring system 100.
- the network traffic monitoring system 100 can include a data mover module 108 for retrieving data from the collectors 106 and making the data available to network clients, such as the components of the analytics engine 110.
- the data mover module 108 can serve as a gateway for presenting network-attached storage to the network clients.
- the collectors 106 can perform additional functions, such as organizing, summarizing, and preprocessing data. For example, the collectors 106 can tabulate how often packets of certain sizes or types are transmitted from different nodes of the network. The collectors 106 can also characterize the traffic flows going to and from various nodes.
- the collectors 106 can match packets based on sequence numbers, thus identifying traffic flows and connection links. As it may be inefficient to retain all data indefinitely in certain circumstances, in some example embodiments, the collectors 106 can periodically replace detailed network traffic and corresponding data with consolidated summaries. In this manner, the collectors 106 can retain a complete dataset describing one period (e.g., the past minute or other suitable period of time), with a smaller dataset of another period (e.g., the previous 2-10 minutes or other suitable period of time), and progressively consolidate network traffic data of other periods of time (e.g., day, week, month, year, etc.).
- one period e.g., the past minute or other suitable period of time
- another period e.g., the previous 2-10 minutes or other suitable period of time
- progressively consolidate network traffic data of other periods of time e.g., day, week, month, year, etc.
- network traffic and corresponding data for a set of flows identified as normal or routine can be winnowed at an earlier period of time while a more complete data set may be retained for a lengthier period of time for another set of flows identified as anomalous or as an attack.
- Computer networks may be exposed to a variety of different attacks that expose vulnerabilities of computer systems in order to compromise their security.
- Some network traffic may be associated with malicious programs or devices.
- the analytics engine 110 may be provided with examples of network states corresponding to an attack and network states corresponding to normal operation. The analytics engine 110 can then analyze network traffic and corresponding data to recognize when the network is under attack.
- the network may operate within a trusted environment for a period of time so that the analytics engine 110 can establish a baseline of normal operation. Since malware is constantly evolving and changing, machine learning may be used to dynamically update models that are used to identify malicious traffic patterns. Machine learning algorithms may be used to provide for the identification of anomalies within the network traffic based on dynamic modeling of network behavior.
- the analytics engine 110 may be used to identify observations which differ from other examples in a dataset. For example, if a training set of example data with known outlier labels exists, supervised anomaly detection techniques may be used. Supervised anomaly detection techniques utilize data sets that have been labeled as normal and abnormal and train a classifier. In a case in which it is unknown whether examples in the training data are outliers, unsupervised anomaly techniques may be used. Unsupervised anomaly detection techniques may be used to detect anomalies in an unlabeled test data set under the assumption that the majority of instances in the data set are normal by looking for instances that seem to fit to the remainder of the data set.
- the analytics engine 110 can include a data lake 130, an application dependency mapping (ADM) module 140, and elastic processing engines 150.
- the data lake 130 is a large-scale storage repository that provides massive storage for various types of data, enormous processing power, and the ability to handle nearly limitless concurrent tasks or jobs.
- the data lake 130 is implemented using the Hadoop® Distributed File System (HDFSTM) from Apache® Software Foundation of Forest Hill, Maryland.
- HDFSTM is a highly scalable and distributed file system that can scale to thousands of cluster nodes, millions of files, and petabytes of data.
- HDFSTM is optimized for batch processing where data locations are exposed to allow computations to take place where the data resides.
- HDFSTM provides a single namespace for an entire cluster to allow for data coherency in a write-once, read-many access model. That is, clients can only append to existing files in the node.
- files are separated into blocks, which are typically 64 MB in size and are replicated in multiple data nodes. Clients access data directly from data nodes.
- the data mover 108 receives raw network traffic and corresponding data from the collectors 106 and distributes or pushes the data to the data lake 130.
- the data lake 130 can also receive and store out-of-band data 114, such as statuses on power levels, network availability, server performance, temperature conditions, cage door positions, and other data from internal sources, and third party data 116, such as security reports (e.g., provided by Cisco® Systems, Inc. of San Jose, California, Arbor Networks® of Burlington, Massachusetts, Symantec® Corp. of Sunnyvale, California, Sophos® Group plc of Abingdon, England, Microsoft® Corp. of Seattle, Washington, Verizon® Communications, Inc.
- security reports e.g., provided by Cisco® Systems, Inc. of San Jose, California, Arbor Networks® of Burlington, Massachusetts, Symantec® Corp. of Sunnyvale, California, Sophos® Group plc of Abingdon, England, Microsoft® Corp. of Seattle, Washington, Verizon® Communications, Inc.
- the data lake 130 may instead fetch or pull raw traffic and corresponding data from the collectors 106 and relevant data from the out-of-band data sources 114 and the third party data sources 116.
- the functionality of the collectors 106, the data mover 108, the out-of-band data sources 114, the third party data sources 116, and the data lake 130 can be combined. Various combinations and configurations are possible as would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art.
- Each component of the data lake 130 can perform certain processing of the raw network traffic data and/or other data (e.g., host data, process data, user data, out-of-band data, third party data, etc.) to transform the raw data to a form useable by the elastic processing engines 150.
- the data lake 130 can include repositories for flow attributes 132, host and/or endpoint attributes 134, process attributes 136, and policy attributes 138.
- the data lake 130 can also include repositories for VM or container attributes, application attributes, tenant attributes, network topology, application dependency maps, cluster attributes, etc.
- the flow attributes 132 relate to information about flows traversing the network.
- a flow is generally one or more packets sharing certain attributes that are sent within a network within a specified period of time.
- the flow attributes 132 can include packet header fields such as a source address (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) address, Media Access Control (MAC) address, Domain Name System (DNS) name, or other network address), source port, destination address, destination port, protocol type, class of service, among other fields.
- IP Internet Protocol
- MAC Media Access Control
- DNS Domain Name System
- the source address may correspond to a first endpoint (e.g., network device, physical server, virtual partition, etc.) of the network
- the destination address may correspond to a second endpoint, a multicast group, or a broadcast domain.
- the flow attributes 132 can also include aggregate packet data such as flow start time, flow end time, number of packets for a flow, number of bytes for a flow, the union of TCP flags for a flow, among other flow data.
- the host and/or endpoint attributes 134 describe host and/or endpoint data for each flow, and can include host and/or endpoint name, network address, operating system, CPU usage, network usage, disk space, ports, logged users, scheduled jobs, open files, and information regarding files and/or directories stored on a host and/or endpoint (e.g., presence, absence, or modifications of log files, configuration files, device special files, or protected electronic information).
- the host and/or endpoints attributes 134 can also include the out-of-band data 114 regarding hosts such as power level, temperature, and physical location (e.g., room, row, rack, cage door position, etc.) or the third party data 116 such as whether a host and/or endpoint is on an IP watch list or otherwise associated with a security threat, Whois data, or geocoordinates.
- the out-of-band data 114 and the third party data 116 may be associated by process, user, flow, or other more granular or less granular network element or network communication.
- the process attributes 136 relate to process data corresponding to each flow, and can include process name (e.g., bash, httpd, netstat, etc.), ID, parent process ID, path (e.g., /usr2/username/bin/, /usr/local/bin, /usr/bin, etc.), CPU utilization, memory utilization, memory address, scheduling information, nice value, flags, priority, status, start time, terminal type, CPU time taken by the process, the command that started the process, and information regarding a process owner (e.g., user name, ID, user's real name, e-mail address, user's groups, terminal information, login time, expiration date of login, idle time, and information regarding files and/or directories of the user).
- process name e.g., bash, httpd, netstat, etc.
- ID e.g., bash, httpd, netstat, etc.
- path e.g., /usr2/username/bin/, /usr/local/
- the policy attributes 138 contain information relating to network policies. Policies establish whether a particular flow is allowed or denied by the network as well as a specific route by which a packet traverses the network. For example, policies can be used to mark packets so that certain kinds of traffic receive differentiated service when used in combination with queuing techniques such as those based on priority, fairness, weighted fairness, token bucket, random early detection, round robin, among others.
- the policy attributes 138 can include policy statistics such as a number of times a policy was enforced or a number of times a policy was not enforced.
- the policy attributes 138 can also include associations with network traffic data. For example, flows found to be non-conformant can be linked or tagged with corresponding policies to assist in the investigation of non-conformance.
- the analytics engine 110 may include any number of engines 150, including for example, a flow engine 152 for identifying flows (e.g., flow engine 152) or an attacks engine 154 for identify attacks to the network.
- the analytics engine can include a separate distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack engine 155 for specifically detecting DDoS attacks.
- a DDoS attack engine may be a component or a sub-engine of a general attacks engine.
- the attacks engine 154 and/or the DDoS engine 155 can use machine learning techniques to identify security threats to a network.
- the attacks engine 154 and/or the DDoS engine 155 can be provided with examples of network states corresponding to an attack and network states corresponding to normal operation.
- the attacks engine 154 and/or the DDoS engine 155 can then analyze network traffic data to recognize when the network is under attack.
- the network can operate within a trusted environment for a time to establish a baseline for normal network operation for the attacks engine 154 and/or the DDoS.
- the analytics engine 110 may further include a search engine 156.
- the search engine 156 may be configured, for example to perform a structured search, an NLP (Natural Language Processing) search, or a visual search. Data may be provided to the engines from one or more processing components.
- NLP Natural Language Processing
- the analytics engine 110 can also include a policy engine 158 that manages network policy, including creating and/or importing policies, monitoring policy conformance and non-conformance, enforcing policy, simulating changes to policy or network elements affecting policy, among other policy-related tasks.
- a policy engine 158 that manages network policy, including creating and/or importing policies, monitoring policy conformance and non-conformance, enforcing policy, simulating changes to policy or network elements affecting policy, among other policy-related tasks.
- the ADM module 140 can determine dependencies of applications of the network. That is, particular patterns of traffic may correspond to an application, and the interconnectivity or dependencies of the application can be mapped to generate a graph for the application (i.e., an application dependency mapping).
- an application refers to a set of networking components that provides connectivity for a given set of workloads. For example, in a conventional three-tier architecture for a web application, first endpoints of the web tier, second endpoints of the application tier, and third endpoints of the data tier make up the web application.
- the ADM module 140 can receive input data from various repositories of the data lake 130 (e.g., the flow attributes 132, the host and/or endpoint attributes 134, the process attributes 136, etc.).
- the ADM module 140 may analyze the input data to determine there is first traffic flowing between external endpoints on port 80 of the first endpoints corresponding to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests and responses.
- HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
- the input data may also indicate second traffic between first ports of the first endpoints and second ports of the second endpoints corresponding to application server requests and responses and third traffic flowing between third ports of the second endpoints and fourth ports of the third endpoints corresponding to database requests and responses.
- the ADM module 140 may define an ADM for the web application as a three-tier application including a first EPG comprising the first endpoints, a second EPG comprising the second endpoints, and a third EPG comprising the third endpoints.
- the presentation module 116 can include an application programming interface (API) or command line interface (CLI) 160, a security information and event management (SIEM) system interface 162, and a web front-end 164.
- API application programming interface
- CLI command line interface
- SIEM security information and event management
- the presentation module 116 can take the analytics data generated by analytics engine 110 and further summarize, filter, and organize the analytics data as well as create intuitive presentations of the analytics data.
- the API or CLI 160 is implemented using Hadoop® Hive from Apache® for the back end, and Java® Database Connectivity (JDBC) from Oracle® Corporation of Redwood Shores, California, as an API layer.
- Hive is a data warehouse infrastructure that provides data summarization and ad hoc querying. Hive provides a mechanism to query data using a variation of structured query language (SQL) that is called HiveQL.
- SQL structured query language
- JDBC is an application programming interface (API) for the programming language Java®, which defines how a client may access a database.
- the SIEM interface 162 can be implemented using Hadoop® Kafka for the back end, and software provided by Splunk®, Inc. of San Francisco, California as the SIEM platform.
- Kafka is a distributed messaging system that is partitioned and replicated. Kafka uses the concept of topics. Topics are feeds of messages in specific categories.
- Kafka can take raw packet captures and telemetry information from the data mover 108 as input, and output messages to a SIEM platform, such as Splunk®.
- the Splunk® platform is utilized for searching, monitoring, and analyzing machine-generated data.
- the web front-end 164 can be implemented using software provided by MongoDB®, Inc. of New York, New York and Hadoop® ElasticSearch from Apache® for the back-end, and Ruby on RailsTM as the web application framework.
- MongoDB® is a document-oriented NoSQL database based on documents in the form of JavaScript® Object Notation (JSON) with dynamic schemas.
- ElasticSearch is a scalable and real-time search and analytics engine that provides domain-specific language (DSL) full querying based on JSON.
- Ruby on RailsTM is model-view-controller (MVC) framework that provides default structures for a database, a web service, and web pages. Ruby on RailsTM relies on web standards such as JSON or extensible markup language (XML) for data transfer, and hypertext markup language (HTML), cascading style sheets, (CSS), and JavaScript® for display and user interfacing.
- JSON JavaScript® Object Notation
- ElasticSearch is a scalable and real-
- FIG. 1 illustrates an example configuration of the various components of a network traffic monitoring system
- the components of the network traffic monitoring system 100 or any system described herein can be configured in a number of different ways and can include any other type and number of components.
- the sensors 104, the collectors 106, the data mover 108, and the data lake 130 can belong to one hardware and/or software module or multiple separate modules.
- Other modules can also be combined into fewer components and/or further divided into more components.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a policy engine 200, such as the policy engine 138 of FIG. 1 , in accordance with an example embodiment.
- the policy engine 200 can include a policy builder module 202, a policy importer module 204, a policy simulation module 206, a policy utilization module 208, a conditional policies module 210, and a compliance module 212.
- a network traffic monitoring system such as the network traffic monitoring system 100 of FIG. 1 , can automatically determine network topology. Using network traffic data captured by sensors, such as the sensors 104 of FIG.
- the network traffic monitoring system can determine the type of devices existing in the network (e.g., brand and model of switches, gateways, machines, etc.), physical locations (e.g., latitude and longitude, building, datacenter, room, row, rack, machine, etc.), interconnection type (e.g., 10Gb Ethernet, fiber-optic, etc.), and network characteristics (e.g., bandwidth, latency, etc.).
- the network traffic monitoring system 110 can automatically detect changes to the network topology without the need for further configuration.
- the network topology and changes to the network topology can be configured by a network administrator.
- the policy builder module 202 can receive the network topology (whether automatically generated, manually configured, or some combination thereof) and application dependency mappings, such as generated by the application dependency mapping (ADM) module 140 of FIG. 1 , and the policy builder module 202 can automatically determine policies for the network.
- the policies can be based on whitelist rules or blacklist rules.
- a network defined by whitelist rules allows a communication between a source and a destination or otherwise defaults to denial of the communication system while a network defined by blacklist rules denies a communication between a source and a destination or otherwise defaults to allowing the communication.
- whitelist rule generation suppose there is an edge of an application dependency mapping between a first endpoint or EPG E1 and a second endpoint or EPG E2. Permissible traffic flows on a set of ports of E1 to one or more ports of E2.
- a policy can be defined to reflect the permissible traffic from the set of ports of E1 to the one or more ports of E2.
- the policy importer module 204 imports a preexisting set of network policies to the policy engine 138.
- the preexisting set of policies may be based on blacklist rules, and the policy importer module 204 can translate the set of blacklist rules to a set of whitelist rules.
- the policy importer module 204 can receive ADMs for each application running in the network and the blacklist rules.
- the policy importer module 204 can utilize the ADMs to define policies limiting communication between endpoints and EPGs corresponding to edges of the ADMs.
- the policy engine 200 can also verify that the generated policies based on whitelist rules prevent any traffic that was explicitly denied by the preexisting set of policies based on the blacklist rules. To that end, the policy simulation module 206 can be used to validate that changes to policy will not result in network misconfiguration and vulnerability to attacks.
- the policy simulation module 206 provides what if analysis, i.e., analyzing what would happen to network traffic upon adding one or more new policies, removing one or more existing policies, or changing membership of one or more EPGs (e.g., adding one or more new endpoints to an EPG, removing one or more endpoints from an EPG, or moving one or more endpoints from one EPG to another).
- the policy simulation module 206 utilizes historical ground truth flows for simulating network traffic based on what if experiments. That is, the policy simulation module 206 may apply the addition or removal of policies and/or changes to EPGs to a simulated network environment that mirrors the actual network to evaluate the effects of the addition or removal of policies and/or EPG changes.
- the policy simulation module 206 can determine whether the policy changes break or misconfigure networking operations of any applications in the simulated network environment or allow any attacks to the simulated network environment that were previously thwarted by the actual network with the original set of policies.
- the policy simulation module 206 can also determine whether the policy changes correct misconfigurations and prevent attacks that occurred in the actual network.
- the policy simulation module 206 can evaluate real time flows in a simulated network environment configured to operate with an experimental policy set or experimental set of EPGs to understand how changes to particular policies or EPGs affect network traffic in the actual network.
- the policy utilization module 208 evaluates network traffic for conformance or non-conformance with policies of the network.
- the policy utilization module 208 analyzes each flow in the network over a specified period of time (e.g., time of day, day of week or month, month(s) in a year, etc.) to determine which policies are being enforced and the extent (e.g., number of packets, number of bytes, number of flows , etc.) to which those policies are being enforced within the network.
- These policy utilization statistics can be used for smart ordering of policies, i.e., optimize ordering of policies in a policy table or garbage collection, i.e., removing unused policies from the policy table.
- Smart ordering reorders the sequence of policies such that those policies that are utilized more often are placed in a position where they will be checked faster. For example, policies with higher utilization can be cached for longer periods of time than policies with lower utilization and/or higher utilization policies can be sequenced higher than lower utilization policies for policy schemes that apply the first policy matching a flow. Garbage collection removes policies with zero (or effectively zero) utilization which can save memory usage on a network device and/or reduce processing for policy schemes that apply all policies matching a flow.
- policies may be more than just a set of access control lists (ACLs), and policies can include a collection of inbound/outbound filters, traffic quality settings, marking rules/redirection rules, and Layers 4-7 service device graphs.
- a network can be configured to operate with dynamic policies using the conditional policies module 210.
- the conditional policies module 210 allows policies to take into account the behavior or the state of an endpoint.
- endpoints in the network can be assigned a reputation, vulnerability index, or similar security measure that changes over time based on the security state of each endpoint. Each endpoint can also be grouped according to reputational EPGs depending on the value of the security measurement of each endpoint.
- endpoints with high security scores can be assigned to a first EPG
- endpoints with moderate security score can be assigned to a second EPG
- endpoints with a low security score can be assigned to a third EPG.
- the network can be configured to enforce a policy that denies all communications from endpoints in the third EPG but allow the endpoints in the third EPG access to image update servers or other remediation servers. Under this policy, an endpoint in the third EPG can make no communication in the network except to the image update or remediation servers.
- the endpoint may be assigned to the first or second EPGs and be allowed to communicate according to the policies applicable to one of those EPGs.
- policies for the endpoint do not need to be manually updated to account for the changes to the security state of the endpoint.
- groupings can be utilized in other example embodiments, including binary groupings, groupings based on a scale between -1 to 1 or from 0 to 100, and semantic groupings (e.g., "Good,” “OK,” “Bad”), among other possibilities.
- the compliance module 212 provides for design, implementation, management, monitoring, and auditing/reporting of regulatory compliance matters.
- the compliance module 212 can automatically generate network policies to ensure regulatory compliance.
- the compliance module 212 can analyze network traffic data to ensure the network enforces the network policies.
- the compliance module 212 can generate reports regarding the network's effectiveness with respect to compliance.
- HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
- SOX Sarbanes Oxley
- PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
- GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
- CA SB 1386 California Senate Bill 1386
- Base II International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards
- HIPAA requires covered entities and business associates that create, receive, transmit, or maintain protected health information (PHI) in electronic form must make a good faith effort to protect the corporate computing environment from reasonably anticipated threats and vulnerabilities; and take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and security of such electronic data. Covered entities and business associates must perform an analysis of the potential risks to the electronic PHI for which they are responsible; and to then develop, implement, and maintain appropriate security measures to safeguard the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of that data. HIPAA provides standards and, in some cases, implementation specifications with which covered entities and business associates must comply.
- SOX requires that the annual reports of public companies include an end-of-fiscal-year assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. SOX also requires that companies' independent auditors attest to, and report on, this assessment. The assessment of financial controls has been extended into network environments by the opinion of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a private-sector, non-profit entity created by SOX to oversee the auditors of public companies.
- PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
- GBLA protects the privacy and security of individuals' financial information collected, held, and processed by financial institutions.
- the privacy component requires financial institutions to provide their customers with an annual notice of their privacy practices and to allow customers to choose not to share such information.
- the safeguards component requires that financial institutions establish a comprehensive security program to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the private financial information in their records.
- PCI DSS was developed to ensure safe handling of protected payment information, such as storage and transfer of credit card information.
- PCI DSS is the umbrella program for other credit card security programs, such as the Visa® Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP), MasterCard® Site Data Protection (SDP) program, and other credit card companies' standards for protecting customers' protected electronic information.
- CISP Visa® Cardholder Information Security Program
- SDP MasterCard® Site Data Protection
- CA SB 1386 was promulgated to regulate the privacy of personal information to address the problem of identity theft.
- the bill requires an agency, person, or business that conducts business in California and owns or licenses computerized "personal information" to disclose any breach of security (to any resident whose unencrypted data is believed to have been disclosed).
- Many states and other jurisdictions have also proposed or enacted similar legislation.
- Basel II provides recommendations from bank supervisors and central bankers of member countries of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for ensuring banks are not overleveraged. This agreement was created to promote universal consistency in the way banks and regulators approach risk management.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a mapping 300 of compliance recommendations and requirements 302 to relevant provisions of HIPAA 304, SOX 306, and PCI DSS 308 to network policies to address the compliance categories 302 in accordance with an example embodiment.
- HIPAA 304, SOX 306, and PCI DSS 308 For purposes of conciseness, citation is made only to HIPAA 304, SOX 306, and PCI DSS 308 in FIG. 3 , but the principles disclosed herein are applicable for compliance relating to other regulations and standards.
- Compliance recommendations are safeguards that do not require strong technical controls.
- the compliance recommendations can be thought of as suggested best practices or "should-haves," and network policies are only incidentally implicated or not applicable.
- the compliance recommendations can include risk analysis 312, risk management 314, information system activity review 316, assigned security 318, authorization and/or supervision 320, contingency plan 338, and facility access control and validations 342.
- the risk analysis recommendation 312 advises conducting an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to protected electronic information stored by a network.
- the risk management recommendation 314 suggests implementing security measures to sufficiently reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level.
- the information system activity review recommendation 316 recommends procedures to regularly review records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking.
- the assigned security recommendation 318 advises assigning responsibility for the development and implementation of procedures for protecting protected electronic information stored in the network.
- the authorization and/or supervision recommendation 320 suggests procedures for the authorization and/or supervision of workforce members who work with protected electronic information or in locations where it might be accessed.
- the contingency plan recommendation 338 recommends establishing procedures that allow for facility access in support of restoration of lost data under disaster recovery plan and emergency access mode operations.
- the facility access control and validations recommendation 342 suggests implementing procedures to document repairs and modifications to the physical components of a facility related to security.
- Terminations procedure recommendation 322 advises implementing policies and procedures to prohibit access to protected electronic information to an employee or a business upon termination of the employee or cease of business with the business associate.
- the terminations procedure recommendation 322 falls within the category of a compliance recommendation, network policies can be defined to address this safeguard.
- the compliance module 212 can define a network policy to explicitly deny traffic associated with a terminated user (in a blacklist system) or reassigning the terminated user to an EPG prohibited from accessing the network (in a whitelist system).
- Compliance requirements are "must-haves" for the network.
- compliance requirements such as protection from malicious software 330 and response and reporting 338
- the protection from malicious software requirement 330 requires appropriate protections against malicious software are in effect in the network.
- the response and reporting requirement 338 calls for identifying and responding to suspected or known security incidents; mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to the network; and document security incidents and their outcomes.
- the protection from malicious software requirement 330 and the response and reporting requirement 338 can be handled by an attacks engine, such as the attacks engine 154 or the DDoS engine 155 of FIG. 1 .
- network policies can be defined that deny compromised endpoints general access to the network but allow access to image update, patch management, and other remediation endpoints.
- the compliance module 212 can address compliance requirements directly, such as security management process requirement 310, healthcare clearinghouse isolation requirement 324, access authorization requirement 326, access establishment and modification requirement 328, login monitoring requirement 332, password management requirement 334, evaluation requirement 340, unique user identification requirement 344, emergency access requirement 346, automatic logoff requirement 348, encryption and decryption requirement 350, data integrity requirement 354, person or entity authentication requirement 356, and integrity controls requirement 358.
- compliance requirements directly, such as security management process requirement 310, healthcare clearinghouse isolation requirement 324, access authorization requirement 326, access establishment and modification requirement 328, login monitoring requirement 332, password management requirement 334, evaluation requirement 340, unique user identification requirement 344, emergency access requirement 346, automatic logoff requirement 348, encryption and decryption requirement 350, data integrity requirement 354, person or entity authentication requirement 356, and integrity controls requirement 358.
- the compliance module 212 can define ACL-like policies and EPGs to satisfy compliance requirements, such as for the isolating healthcare clearinghouse requirement 324, the access authorization requirement 326, the access establishment and modification requirement 328, and the person or entity authentication requirement 356.
- the healthcare clearinghouse isolation requirement 324 dictates that if a health clearinghouse is part of a larger organization, the clearinghouse must implement policies and procedures that protect electronic PHI of the clearinghouse from unauthorized access by the larger organization.
- the compliance module 212 can segment the healthcare clearing house from the larger organization utilizing network policies that limit access of electronic PHI to healthcare cleaning house (in a whitelist system) or deny access to the electronic PHI to the larger organize (in a blacklist system).
- the access authorization requirement 326 concerns policies and procedures for granting access to protected electronic information, for example, through access to a workstation, transaction, program, process or mechanism.
- the access establishment and modification requirement 328 relates to policies and procedures that, based upon the network's access authorization policies, establish, document, review, and modify a user's right of access to a workstation, transaction, program, or process.
- the person or entity authentication requirement 356 assures that policies and procedures are in place to identify persons or entities seeking access to protected electronic information.
- the compliance module 212 can satisfy the access authorization 326, the access establishment and modification 328, and the person or entity authentication 356 requirements by defining network policies and EPGs limiting access to protected electronic information to appropriate users, processes, hosts and/or endpoints, etc. For example, the compliance module 212 could create a HIPAA EPG and define policies for this EPG to enforce HIPAA requirements.
- the compliance module 212 can define conditional network policies in which traffic is allowed or denied depending on the state of a host and/or endpoint, process, or user associated with the flow.
- the compliance module 212 can define host/endpoint and/or process state-based network policies and EPGs relating to copying, saving, modifying, and deleting data and encryption of data during transit to protect against improper alteration or destruction of data, and to ensure that the data is accurate and complete.
- These policies can be designed to address the encryption and decryption requirement 350, the data integrity requirement 354, and the integrity controls requirement 358.
- the encryption and decryption requirement 350 concerns implementing a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt protected electronic information.
- the data integrity requirement 354 is directed to policies and procedures to secure protected electronic information from improper alteration or destruction.
- the integrity controls requirement 358 mandates policies and procedures for verifying that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner during transmission.
- the compliance module 212 can assign the host/endpoint or process to a special EPG that enforces data integrity. For example, an endpoint sensor can detect that its endpoint is handling electronic protected information and assign the endpoint to the special EPG.
- the compliance module 212 can define user state-based network policies and EPGs for the login monitoring requirement 332, the password management requirement 334, the unique user identification requirement 344, the emergency access requirement 346, and the automatic logoff requirement 348.
- the login monitoring requirement 332 requires policies and procedures for monitoring login attempts and reporting discrepancies.
- the compliance module 212 can establish a user's reputation to be inversely related to the number of unsuccessful login attempts within a session or assign the user to a restricted EPG based on the number of unsuccessful logins exceeding an unsuccessful login threshold.
- the password management requirement 334 ensures that appropriate policies and procedures are in place to manage passwords for network access and access to protected electronic information and to limit passwords that are strong enough to prevent them from being guessed or exposed to brute force attacks or to otherwise become comprised.
- the compliance module 212 can determine the user's reputation to be related to the strength of the user's password or assign the user to a restricted EPG if the user's password does not meet password requirements.
- the unique user identification requirement 344 dictates that each user who has access to protected electronic information has a unique identifier.
- the compliance module 212 can assign different users with a same identifier to a restricted EPG.
- the emergency access requirement 346 relates to policies and procedures for obtaining necessary protected electronic information during an emergency.
- the compliance module 212 can assign emergency response handlers to a superuser or privileged EPG.
- the automatic logoff requirement 348 requires that policies, procedures, and technical controls are in place to automatically logoff (terminate) a session after a predetermined period of inactivity.
- the compliance module 212 can compute the user's reputation as a function (e.g., linear or exponential declay) of the amount time the user is idle or assign the user to a restricted EPG if the user's idle time exceeds an idle time threshold.
- the compliance module 212 can define comprehensive network policies and periodically audit or validate these policies to satisfy the security management process 310, the evaluation 340, and the audit controls 352 requirements.
- the security management process requirement 310 mandates implementing policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations.
- the evaluation requirement 340 obligates periodic technical evaluations to ensure that protections are still in place and working effectively.
- the audit controls requirement 352 pertains to implementing hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information systems that contain or use protected electronic information.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a network environment 400 in accordance with an example embodiment. It should be understood that, for the network environment 400 and any environment discussed herein, there can be additional or fewer nodes, devices, links, networks, or components in similar or alternative configurations. Example embodiments with different numbers and/or types of clients, networks, nodes, cloud components, servers, software components, devices, virtual or physical resources, configurations, topologies, services, appliances, deployments, or network devices are also contemplated herein. Further, the network environment 400 can include any number or type of resources, which can be accessed and utilized by clients or tenants. The illustrations and examples provided herein are for clarity and simplicity.
- the network environment 400 can include a network fabric 402, a Layer 2 (L2) network 404, a Layer 3 (L3) network 406, and servers 408a, 408b, 408c, 408d, and 408e (collectively, 408).
- the network fabric 402 can include spine switches 410a, 410b, 410c, and 410d (collectively, 410) and leaf switches 412a, 412b, 412c, 412d, and 412e (collectively, 412).
- the spine switches 410 can connect to the leaf switches 412 in the network fabric 402.
- the leaf switches 412 can include access ports (or non-fabric ports) and fabric ports.
- the fabric ports can provide uplinks to the spine switches 410, while the access ports can provide connectivity to endpoints (e.g., the servers 408), internal networks (e.g., the L2 network 404), or external networks (e.g., the L3 network 406).
- endpoints e.g., the servers 408
- internal networks e.g., the L2 network 404
- external networks e.g., the L3 network 406
- the leaf switches 412 can reside at the edge of the network fabric 402, and can thus represent the physical network edge.
- the leaf switches 412d and 412e operate as border leaf switches in communication with edge devices 414 located in the external network 406.
- the border leaf switches 412d and 412e may be used to connect any type of external network device, service (e.g., firewall, deep packet inspector, traffic monitor, load balancer, etc.), or network (e.g., the L3 network 406) to the fabric 402.
- the network fabric 402 is illustrated and described herein as an example leaf-spine architecture, one of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that various embodiments can be implemented based on any network topology, including any data center or cloud network fabric. Indeed, other architectures, designs, infrastructures, and variations are contemplated herein. For example, the principles disclosed herein are applicable to topologies including three-tier (including core, aggregation, and access levels), fat tree, mesh, bus, hub and spoke, etc.
- the leaf switches 412 can be top-of-rack switches configured according to a top-of-rack architecture.
- the leaf switches 412 can be aggregation switches in any particular topology, such as end-of-row or middle-of-row topologies.
- the leaf switches 412 can also be implemented using aggregation switches.
- the topology illustrated in FIG. 4 and described herein is readily scalable and may accommodate a large number of components, as well as more complicated arrangements and configurations.
- the network may include any number of fabrics 402, which may be geographically dispersed or located in the same geographic area.
- network nodes may be used in any suitable network topology, which may include any number of servers, virtual machines or containers, switches, routers, appliances, controllers, gateways, or other nodes interconnected to form a large and complex network. Nodes may be coupled to other nodes or networks through one or more interfaces employing any suitable wired or wireless connection, which provides a viable pathway for electronic communications.
- Network communication in the network fabric 402 can flow through the leaf switches 412.
- the leaf switches 412 can provide endpoints (e.g., the servers 408), internal networks (e.g., the L2 network 404), or external networks (e.g., the L3 network 406) access to the network fabric 402, and can connect the leaf switches 412 to each other.
- the leaf switches 412 can connect endpoint groups (EPGs) to the network fabric 402, internal networks (e.g., the L2 network 404), and/or any external networks (e.g., the L3 network 406).
- EPGs are groupings of applications, or application components, and tiers for implementing forwarding and policy logic.
- EPGs can allow for separation of network policy, security, and forwarding from addressing by using logical application boundaries.
- EPGs can be used in the network environment 400 for mapping applications in the network.
- EPGs can comprise a grouping of endpoints in the network indicating connectivity and policy for applications.
- the servers 408 can connect to the network fabric 402 via the leaf switches 412.
- the servers 408a and 408b can connect directly to the leaf switches 412a and 412b, which can connect the servers 408a and 408b to the network fabric 402 and/or any of the other leaf switches.
- the servers 408c and 408d can connect to the leaf switches 412b and 412c via the L2 network 404.
- the servers 408c and 408d and the L2 network 404 make up a local area network (LAN) LANs can connect nodes over dedicated private communications links located in the same general physical location, such as a building or campus.
- LAN local area network
- the WAN 406 can connect to the leaf switches 412d or 412e via the L3 network 406.
- WANs can connect geographically dispersed nodes over long-distance communications links, such as common carrier telephone lines, optical light paths, synchronous optical networks (SONET), or synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) links.
- LANs and WANs can include L2 and/or L3 networks and endpoints.
- the Internet is an example of a WAN that connects disparate networks throughout the world, providing global communication between nodes on various networks.
- the nodes typically communicate over the network by exchanging discrete frames or packets of data according to predefined protocols, such as the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).
- TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
- a protocol can refer to a set of rules defining how the nodes interact with each other.
- Computer networks may be further interconnected by an intermediate network node, such as a router, to extend the effective size of each network.
- the endpoints 408 can include any communication device or component, such as a computer, server, blade, hypervisor, virtual machine, container, process (e.g., running on a virtual machine), switch, router, gateway, host, device, external network, etc.
- the network environment 400 also includes a network controller running on the host 408a.
- the network controller is implemented using the Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APICTM) from Cisco®.
- APICTM Application Policy Infrastructure Controller
- Cisco® Cisco®
- the APICTM provides a centralized point of automation and management, policy programming, application deployment, and health monitoring for the fabric 402.
- the APICTM is operated as a replicated synchronized clustered controller.
- SDN software-defined networking
- a physical server 408 may have instantiated thereon a hypervisor 416 for creating and running one or more virtual switches (not shown) and one or more virtual machines 418, as shown for the host 408b.
- physical servers may run a shared kernel for hosting containers.
- the physical server 408 can run other software for supporting other virtual partitioning approaches.
- Networks in accordance with various embodiments may include any number of physical servers hosting any number of virtual machines, containers, or other virtual partitions.
- Hosts may also comprise blade/physical servers without virtual machines, containers, or other virtual partitions, such as the servers 408a, 408c, 408d, and 408e.
- the network environment 400 can also integrate a network traffic monitoring system, such as the network traffic monitoring system 100 shown in FIG. 1 .
- the network traffic monitoring system of FIG. 4 includes sensors 420a, 420b, 420c, and 420d (collectively, 420), collectors 422, and an analytics engine, such as the analytics engine 110 of FIG. 1 , executing on the server 408e.
- the analytics engine 408e can receive and process network traffic data collected by the collectors 422 and detected by the sensors 420 placed on nodes located throughout the network environment 400.
- the analytics engine 408e is shown to be a standalone network appliance in FIG.
- the analytics engine 408e can also be implemented as a virtual partition (e.g., VM or container) that can be distributed onto a host or cluster of hosts, a software as a service (SaaS), or other suitable method of distribution.
- the sensors 420 are run on the leaf switches 412 (e.g., the sensor 420a), the hosts 408 (e.g., the sensor 420b), the hypervisor 416 (e.g., the sensor 420c), and the VMs 418 (e.g., the sensor 420d).
- the sensors 420 can also run on the spine switches 410, virtual switches, service appliances (e.g., firewall, deep packet inspector, traffic monitor, load balancer, etc.) and in between network elements.
- the sensors 420 can be located at each (or nearly every) network component to capture granular packet statistics and corresponding data at each hop of data transmission.
- the sensors 420 may not be installed in all components or portions of the network (e.g., shared hosting environment in which customers have exclusive control of some virtual machines).
- a host may include multiple sensors 420 running on the host (e.g., the host sensor 420b) and various components of the host (e.g., the hypervisor sensor 420c and the VM sensor 420d) so that all (or substantially all) packets traversing the network environment 400 may be monitored. For example, if one of the VMs 418 running on the host 408b receives a first packet from the WAN 406, the first packet may pass through the border leaf switch 412d, the spine switch 410b, the leaf switch 412b, the host 408b, the hypervisor 416, and the VM. Since all or nearly all of these components contain a respective sensor, the first packet will likely be identified and reported to one of the collectors 422.
- a second packet is transmitted from one of the VMs 418 running on the host 408b to the host 408d
- sensors installed along the data path such as at the VM 418, the hypervisor 416, the host 408b, the leaf switch 412b, and the host 408d will likely result in capture of metadata from the second packet.
- FIG. 5 illustrates an example process 500 for providing compliance via network policies in accordance with an example embodiment.
- the process 500 can be performed by a network, and particularly, a network traffic monitoring system (e.g., the network traffic monitoring system 100 of FIG. 1 ), a network controller (e.g., the network controller 118 of FIG. 1 ), a policy engine (e.g., the policy engine 200 of FIG. 2 ), a compliance module (e.g., the compliance module 212 of FIG. 2 ), a network operating system, a virtualization manager, a network virtualization manager, or a similar system.
- a network traffic monitoring system e.g., the network traffic monitoring system 100 of FIG. 1
- a network controller e.g., the network controller 118 of FIG. 1
- a policy engine e.g., the policy engine 200 of FIG. 2
- a compliance module e.g., the compliance module 212 of FIG. 2
- a network operating system e.g., a virtualization manager
- the process 500 can begin at step 502 in which protected electronic information is sent and/or received to a first endpoint of a network.
- a second endpoint receiving and/or sending the protected electronic information can also be a part of the same network or may be external to the network.
- Protected electronic information can refer to electronic data that is subject to a governmental regulation, industry standard, or similar guideline.
- the process can continue at step 504 with the collection of network traffic data (e.g., metadata for sessions, flows, packets, etc.) and host data (e.g., network usage, CPU usage, information regarding files of the host, etc.), process data (process name, ID, parent process ID, path, CPU utilization, memory utilization, start-up command, etc.), and user data (e.g., user name, ID, information regarding files of the user, etc.) associated with the traffic.
- the traffic data can also be associated with out of band data (e.g., power level, temperature, and physical location) and third party data (e.g., security reports, IP watchlists, Whois, etc.).
- traffic can also be associated with application data (e.g., tenant information, application dependency mapping, application policies, etc.).
- a sensor network can capture the collected data from multiple perspectives to provide a comprehensive view of network behavior.
- the sensor network may include sensors at multiple nodes of a data path (e.g., network devices, physical servers) and within multiple partitions of a node (e.g., hypervisor, shared kernel, VM, container, etc.).
- the network can determine the policies applicable to the network traffic.
- the network can determine one or more policies that are applicable for individual flows but it will be appreciated that other granularities are also possible (e.g., session, bidirectional flow, packet, etc.).
- the policies may be mapped to specific provisions of regulations or standards (e.g., FIG. 3 ), and the policies can be applicable to an endpoint or a collection of endpoints (i.e., an EPG).
- the network can determine applicable policies for traffic by determining a source EPG and destination EPG and retrieving the applicable policies based on the source EPG and destination EPG.
- the network can dynamically determine an EPG associated with traffic based on a state of a host and/or endpoint, process, or user corresponding to the traffic.
- an endpoint associated with a flow may be a part of different EPGs over a period of time depending on a reputation or other security metric of the endpoint or a condition relating to the endpoint (e.g., the endpoint transacts with protected electronic information, a user of the endpoint has been idle for a period of time over an idle time threshold, the user has root access, etc.).
- the network can determine whether the applicable policies were enforced for traffic.
- the network can determine an expected network action for each flow and compare it to the actual or ground truth network action for each flow.
- Network actions can include allowing or forwarding a flow, denying or dropping the flow, marking the flow for quality of service (QoS), logging the flow, redirecting the flow, or selecting a service graph for the flow.
- QoS quality of service
- the network can trigger an alert or otherwise report non-conformance to escalate a response.
- the process 500 can conclude at step 510 in which policy attributes can be updated based on conformance or non-conformance, and instances of policy non-conformance can be linked to corresponding network traffic.
- the policy attributes can be utilized to facilitate investigations regarding policy non-conformance.
- the policy attributes can be analyzed for both policy conformance and non-conformance, and compliance reports can be generated based on a mapping of a policy to a provision of a regulation, standard, or similar guideline.
- FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B illustrate systems in accordance with various example embodiments. The more appropriate system will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art when practicing the various embodiments. Persons of ordinary skill in the art will also readily appreciate that other systems are possible.
- FIG. 6A illustrates an example architecture for a conventional bus computing system 600 wherein the components of the system are in electrical communication with each other using a bus 605.
- the computing system 600 can include a processing unit (CPU or processor) 610 and a system bus 605 that may couple various system components including the system memory 615, such as read only memory (ROM) in a storage device 670 and random access memory (RAM) 675, to the processor 610.
- the computing system 600 can include a cache 612 of high-speed memory connected directly with, in close proximity to, or integrated as part of the processor 610.
- the computing system 600 can copy data from the memory 615 and/or the storage device 630 to the cache 612 for quick access by the processor 610.
- the cache 612 can provide a performance boost that avoids processor delays while waiting for data.
- These and other modules can control or be configured to control the processor 610 to perform various actions.
- Other system memory 615 may be available for use as well.
- the memory 615 can include multiple different types of memory with different performance characteristics.
- the processor 610 can include any general purpose processor and a hardware module or software module, such as module 1 632, module 2 634, and module 3 636 stored in storage device 630, configured to control the processor 610 as well as a special-purpose processor where software instructions are incorporated into the actual processor design.
- the processor 610 may essentially be a completely self-contained computing system, containing multiple cores or processors, a bus, memory controller, cache, etc.
- a multi-core processor may be symmetric or asymmetric.
- an input device 645 can represent any number of input mechanisms, such as a microphone for speech, a touch-protected screen for gesture or graphical input, keyboard, mouse, motion input, speech and so forth.
- An output device 635 can also be one or more of a number of output mechanisms known to those of skill in the art.
- multimodal systems can enable a user to provide multiple types of input to communicate with the computing system 600.
- the communications interface 640 can govern and manage the user input and system output. There may be no restriction on operating on any particular hardware arrangement and therefore the basic features here may easily be substituted for improved hardware or firmware arrangements as they are developed.
- Storage device 630 can be a non-volatile memory and can be a hard disk or other types of computer readable media which can store data that are accessible by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, solid state memory devices, digital versatile disks, cartridges, random access memories (RAMs) 625, read only memory (ROM) 620, and hybrids thereof.
- RAMs random access memories
- ROM read only memory
- the storage device 630 can include software modules 632, 634, 636 for controlling the processor 610. Other hardware or software modules are contemplated.
- the storage device 630 can be connected to the system bus 605.
- a hardware module that performs a particular function can include the software component stored in a computer-readable medium in connection with the necessary hardware components, such as the processor 610, bus 605, output device 635, and so forth, to carry out the function.
- FIG. 6B illustrates an example architecture for a conventional chipset computing system 650 that can be used in accordance with an example embodiment.
- the computing system 650 can include a processor 655, representative of any number of physically and/or logically distinct resources capable of executing software, firmware, and hardware configured to perform identified computations.
- the processor 655 can communicate with a chipset 660 that can control input to and output from the processor 655.
- the chipset 660 can output information to an output device 665, such as a display, and can read and write information to storage device 670, which can include magnetic media, and solid state media, for example.
- the chipset 660 can also read data from and write data to RAM 675.
- a bridge 680 for interfacing with a variety of user interface components 685 can be provided for interfacing with the chipset 660.
- the user interface components 685 can include a keyboard, a microphone, touch detection and processing circuitry, a pointing device, such as a mouse, and so on.
- Inputs to the computing system 650 can come from any of a variety of sources, machine generated and/or human generated.
- the chipset 660 can also interface with one or more communication interfaces 690 that can have different physical interfaces.
- the communication interfaces 690 can include interfaces for wired and wireless LANs, for broadband wireless networks, as well as personal area networks.
- Some applications of the methods for generating, displaying, and using the GUI disclosed herein can include receiving ordered datasets over the physical interface or be generated by the machine itself by processor 655 analyzing data stored in the storage device 670 or the RAM 675.
- the computing system 600 can receive inputs from a user via the user interface components 685 and execute appropriate functions, such as browsing functions by interpreting these inputs using the processor 655.
- computing systems 600 and 650 can have more than one processor 610 and 655, respectively, or be part of a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability.
- the present technology may be presented as including individual functional blocks including functional blocks comprising devices, device components, steps or routines in a method embodied in software, or combinations of hardware and software.
- the computer-readable storage devices, mediums, and memories can include a cable or wireless signal containing a bit stream and the like.
- non-transitory computer-readable storage media expressly exclude media such as energy, carrier signals, electromagnetic waves, and signals per se.
- Such instructions can comprise, for example, instructions and data which cause or otherwise configure a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or special purpose processing device to perform a certain function or group of functions. Portions of computer resources used can be accessible over a network.
- the computer executable instructions may be, for example, binaries, intermediate format instructions such as assembly language, firmware, or source code. Examples of computer-readable media that may be used to store instructions, information used, and/or information created during methods according to described examples include magnetic or optical disks, flash memory, USB devices provided with non-volatile memory, networked storage devices, and so on.
- Devices implementing methods according to these disclosures can comprise hardware, firmware and/or software, and can take any of a variety of form factors. Typical examples of such form factors include laptops, smart phones, small form factor personal computers, personal digital assistants, rackmount devices, standalone devices, and so on. Functionality described herein also can be embodied in peripherals or add-in cards. Such functionality can also be implemented on a circuit board among different chips or different processes executing in a single device, by way of further example.
- the instructions, media for conveying such instructions, computing resources for executing them, and other structures for supporting such computing resources are means for providing the functions described in these disclosures.
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Abstract
Description
- This application claims priority to
U.S. Provisional Application 62/171,899 - The present technology pertains to compliance and more specifically pertains to effecting compliance via network policies.
- Network attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated and malicious, and the risk of data breaches and their consequences grows. Failure to thwart attacks can damage a business's reputation and result in loss of revenue. In addition, governments and other authoritative bodies are taking on a more active role in protecting individual's sensitive electronic information. For example, in the United States and abroad, statutes and standards such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) have been put in place for enterprises to take appropriate steps to ensure the proper use and protection of both corporate and personal communications and information. These regulations and standards are often backed by financial penalties for public or private organizations that fail to comply or where personal data is actually breached.
- Compliance can be a state of comporting with governmental regulations, industry standards, and similar guidelines, or the process toward this state. Conventional approaches for compliance may be inadequate to the challenges facing networks today. Many solutions tend to focus on the network edge (i.e., north-south traffic). Thus, networks using these solutions may be especially vulnerable to attacks occurring within the network (i.e., east-west traffic) and are likely to be non-compliant. Conventional techniques are also typically reactive and cannot resolve security breaches in real time or substantially real time. In addition, conventional networks often fail to gather all relevant information for preventing, diagnosing, and remedying malicious network activity.
- In order to describe the manner in which the above-recited and other advantages and features of the disclosure can be obtained, a more particular description of the principles briefly described above will be rendered by reference to specific embodiments that are illustrated in the appended drawings. Understanding that these drawings depict only example embodiments of the disclosure and are not therefore to be considered to be limiting of its scope, the principles herein are described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the use of the accompanying drawings in which:
-
FIG. 1 illustrates a network traffic monitoring system in accordance with an example embodiment; -
FIG. 2 illustrates a policy engine in accordance with an example embodiment; -
FIG. 3A-3C illustrates a compliance mapping in accordance with an example embodiment; -
FIG. 4 illustrates a network environment in accordance with an example embodiment; -
FIG. 5 shows an example process for providing compliance via network policies in accordance with an example embodiment; and -
FIGS. 6A and 6B show systems in accordance with some example embodiments. - The detailed description set forth below is intended as a description of various configurations of example embodiments and is not intended to represent the only configurations in which the subject matter of this disclosure can be practiced. The appended drawings are incorporated herein and constitute a part of the detailed description. The detailed description includes specific details for the purpose of providing a more thorough understanding of the subject matter of this disclosure. However, it will be clear and apparent that the subject matter of this disclosure is not limited to the specific details set forth herein and may be practiced without these details. In some instances, structures and components are shown in block diagram form in order to avoid obscuring the concepts of the subject matter of this disclosure.
- A network can achieve compliance by defining and enforcing a set of network policies to secure electronic information subject to a governmental regulation or an industry standard (i.e., protected electronic information). The network can monitor network information, host and/or endpoint information, process information, and user information for traffic passing through the network using a sensor network that provides multiple perspectives for the traffic. The sensor network can include sensors for networking devices, physical servers, hypervisors or shared kernels, and virtual partitions (e.g., virtual machines (VMs) or containers), and other network elements. The network can analyze the network information, host and/or endpoint information, process information, and user information to determine one or more policies for each flow. The network can determine an expected network action based on the policies for the flow. These network actions can include forwarding traffic, dropping traffic, marking traffic for a particular quality of service (QoS), redirecting traffic using a specific route, and selecting a service graph for traffic (e.g., forwarding traffic through a set of network service functions, such as a firewall, load balancer, wide area network (WAN) optimizer, among other network services). The network can update policy information based on comparisons between expected network actions to be performed on the traffic and actual network actions performed on the traffic. The policy information can be utilized for compliance reporting or investigating policy non-conformance.
- Various embodiments of the disclosure are discussed in detail below. While specific implementations are discussed, it should be understood that this is done for illustrative purposes only. A person skilled in the relevant art will recognize that other components and configurations may be used without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure.
- Systems and approaches in accordance with various embodiments of the present technology may overcome the foregoing and other limitations with conventional techniques by collecting, from multiple perspectives, a more thorough data set for analyzing compliance; designing dynamic network policies that account for the current states of hosts and/or endpoints, processes, and users; and tracking both conformance and non-conformance of network policies.
- Conventional compliance solutions are traditionally limited to packet data captured by networking devices. In some example embodiments, networks can be configured with sensors at multiple points, including on networking devices (e.g., switches, routers, gateways, firewalls, deep packet inspectors, traffic monitors, load balancers, etc.), physical servers, hypervisors or shared kernels, virtual partitions (e.g., VMs or containers), and other network elements. This can provide a more comprehensive view of the network. Further, network traffic data (e.g., flows) can be associated with host and/or endpoint data (e.g., host/endpoint name, operating system, CPU usage, network usage, disk space, logged users, scheduled jobs, open files, information regarding files stored on a host/endpoint, etc.), process data (e.g., process name, ID, parent process ID, path, CPU utilization, memory utilization, etc.), user data (e.g., user name, ID, login time, etc.), and other collectible data to provide more insight into network activity.
- Conventional approaches to compliance are also limited to static policies or rules such as access control lists (ACLs). For example, conventional network policies are an "Allow" rule for forwarding incoming traffic corresponding to a source address or a "Deny" rule for dropping incoming traffic. When the state of the endpoint changes and the traffic is to be permitted or denied, there can be a delay because conventional networks typically require manual intervention to change the appropriate policies. Further, propagating new policies throughout the network can compound the delay. In various example embodiments, networks can employ dynamic policies based on the state of a host and/or endpoint, process, and/or user associated with a flow. Networks can initially associate traffic with a first endpoint group (EPG) and then reassign traffic to one or more second EPGs if a host and/or endpoint state, process state, or user state changes.
- Compliance addresses the areas of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and auditability. Confidentiality tackles the challenges of protecting data as it traverses the network, limiting interception of data, and-in the event of interception-limiting usability of data by unauthorized persons. Integrity pertains to protection of data against improper alteration or destruction, and ensures that data is accurate and complete, and that accuracy and completeness are maintained. Availability is directed toward providing access to data by authorized persons at specified times. Auditability concerns providing proof that a network conforms to regulations, standards, and similar guidelines. Conventional compliance solutions often fail to address one or more of these aspects of compliance. For example, to the extent conventional networks are capable of monitoring security threats, these networks are incapable of verifying no security threat occurred. In various example embodiments, networks can monitor, log, and report compliance and non-compliance.
- Referring now to the drawings,
FIG. 1 is an illustration of a networktraffic monitoring system 100 in accordance with an example embodiment. The networktraffic monitoring system 100 can include a configuration manager 102,sensors 104, acollector module 106, adata mover module 108, ananalytics engine 110, and apresentation module 112. In an example embodiment ofFIG. 1 , theanalytics engine 110 is also shown in communication with out-of-band data sources 114, thirdparty data sources 116, and anetwork controller 118. - The configuration manager 102 can be used to provision and maintain the
sensors 104, including installing sensor software or firmware in various nodes of a network, configuring thesensors 104, updating the sensor software or firmware, among other sensor management tasks. For example, thesensors 104 can be implemented as virtual partition images (e.g., virtual machine (VM) images or container images), and the configuration manager 102 can distribute the images to host machines. In general, a virtual partition may be an instance of a VM, container, sandbox, or other isolated software environment. The software environment may include an operating system and application software. For software running within a virtual partition, the virtual partition may appear to be, for example, one of many servers or one of many operating systems executed on a single physical server. The configuration manager 102 can instantiate a new virtual partition or migrate an existing partition to a different physical server. The configuration manager 102 can also be used to configure the new or migrated sensor. - The configuration manager 102 can monitor the health of the
sensors 104. For instance, the configuration manager 102 may request for status updates and/or receive heartbeat messages, initiate performance tests, generate health checks, and perform other health monitoring tasks. In an example embodiment, the configuration manager 102 can also authenticate thesensors 104. For example, thesensors 104 can be assigned a unique identifier, such as by using a one-way hash function of a sensor's basic input/out system (BIOS) universally unique identifier (UUID) and a secret key stored by the configuration image manager 102. The UUID can be a large number that may be difficult for a malicious sensor or other device or component to guess. In an example embodiment, the configuration manager 102 can keep thesensors 104 up to date by installing the latest versions of sensor software and/or applying patches. The configuration manager 102 can obtain these updates automatically from a local source or the Internet. - The
sensors 104 can reside on various nodes of a network, such as a virtual partition (e.g., VM or container) 120; a hypervisor or shared kernel managing one or more virtual partitions and/orphysical servers 122, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 124 of a switch, router, gateway, or other networking device, or a packet capture (pcap) 126 appliance (e.g., a standalone packet monitor, a device connected to a network devices monitoring port, a device connected in series along a main trunk of a datacenter, or similar device) or other component of a network operating system. Thesensors 104 can monitor network traffic between nodes, and send network traffic data and corresponding data (e.g., host data, process data, user data, etc.) to thecollectors 108 for storage. For example, thesensors 104 can sniff packets being sent over its hosts' physical or virtual network interface card (NIC), or individual processes can be configured to report network traffic and corresponding data to thesensors 104. Incorporating thesensors 104 on multiple nodes and within multiple partitions of some nodes of the network can provide for robust capture of network traffic and corresponding data. In an example embodiment, each node of the network (e.g., VM, container, or othervirtual partition 120, hypervisor, shared kernel, orphysical server 122, ASIC 124,pcap 126, etc.) includes arespective sensor 104. However, it should be understood that various software and hardware configurations can be used to implement thesensor network 104. - As the
sensors 104 capture communications and corresponding data, they may continuously send network traffic and corresponding data to thecollectors 108. The network traffic data can include metadata relating to a packet, a collection of packets, a flow, a group of flows, etc. That is, the network traffic data can generally include any information describing communication on all layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. For example, the network traffic data can include source/destination MAC address, source/destination IP address, protocol, port number, etc. In some example embodiments, the network traffic data can also include summaries of network activity or other network statistics such as number of packets, number of bytes, number of flows, bandwidth usage, response time, latency, packet loss, jitter, and other network statistics. - The
sensors 104 can also determine additional data for each session, bidirectional flow, flow, packet, or other more granular or less granular network communication. The additional data can include host and/or endpoint information, virtual partition information, sensor information, process information, user information, tenant information, application information, network topology, application dependency mapping, cluster information, or other information corresponding to each flow. - In some example embodiments, the
sensors 104 can perform some preprocessing of the network traffic and corresponding data before sending the data to thecollectors 108. For example, thesensors 104 can remove extraneous or duplicative data or they can create summaries of the data (e.g., latency, number of packets per flow, number of bytes per flow, number of flows, etc.). In some example embodiments, thesensors 104 can be configured to only capture certain types of connection information and disregard the rest. In some example embodiments, thesensors 104 can be configured to capture only a representative sample of packets (e.g., every 1,000th packet or other suitable sample rate) and corresponding data. - Since the
sensors 104 may be located throughout the network, network traffic and corresponding data can be collected from multiple vantage points or multiple perspectives in the network to provide a more comprehensive view of network behavior. The capture of network traffic and corresponding data from multiple perspectives rather than just at a single sensor located in the data path or in communication with a component in the data path, allows data to be correlated from the various data sources, which may be used as additional data points theanalytics engine 110. Further, collecting network traffic and corresponding data from multiple points of view ensures more accurate data is captured. For example, a conventional sensor network may be limited to sensors running on external-facing network devices (e.g., routers, switches, network appliances, etc.) such that east-west traffic, including VM-to-VM or container-to-container traffic on a same host, may not be monitored. In addition, packets that are dropped before traversing a network device or packets containing errors may not be accurately monitored by the conventional sensor network. Thesensor network 104 of various example embodiments substantially mitigates or eliminates these issues altogether by locating sensors at multiple points of potential failure. Moreover, the networktraffic monitoring system 100 can verify multiple instances of data for a flow (e.g., source endpoint flow data, network device flow data, and endpoint flow data) against one another. - In some example embodiments, the network
traffic monitoring system 100 can assess a degree of accuracy of flow data sets from multiple sensors and utilize a flow data set from a single sensor determined to be the most accurate and/or complete. The degree of accuracy can be based on factors such as network topology (e.g., a sensor closer to the source may be more likely to be more accurate than a sensor closer to the destination), a state of a sensor or a node hosting the sensor (e.g., a compromised sensor/node may have less accurate flow data than an uncompromised sensor/node), or flow data volume (e.g., a sensor capturing a greater number of packets for a flow may be more accurate than a sensor capturing a smaller number of packets). - In some example embodiments, the network
traffic monitoring system 100 can assemble the most accurate flow data set and corresponding from multiple sensors. For instance, a first sensor along a data path may capture data for a first packet of a flow but may be missing data for a second packet of the flow while the situation is reversed for a second sensor along the data path. The networktraffic monitoring system 100 can assemble data for the flow from the first packet captured by the first sensor and the second packet captured by the second sensor. - As discussed, the
sensors 104 can send network traffic data to thecollectors 106. In an example embodiment, each sensor can be assigned to a primary collector and a secondary collector as part of a high availability scheme. If the primary collector fails or communications between the sensor and the primary collector are not otherwise possible, a sensor can send its network traffic and corresponding data to the secondary collector. In another example embodiment, thesensors 104 are not assigned specific collectors but the network traffic monitoring system can determine an optimal collector for receiving the network traffic and corresponding data through a discovery process. For example, a sensor can change where it sends it network traffic data if its environments changes, such as if a default collector fails or if the sensor is migrated to a new location and it would be optimal for the sensor to send its data to a different collector. For instance, it may be preferable for the sensor to send its network traffic and corresponding data on a particular path and/or to a particular collector based on latency, shortest path, monetary cost (e.g., using private resources versus a public resources provided by a public cloud provider), error rate, or some combination of these factors. In another example embodiment, a sensor can send different types of network traffic and corresponding data to different collectors. For example, the sensor can send network traffic data and corresponding related to one type of process to one collector and network traffic and corresponding data related to another type of process to another collector. - The
collectors 106 can be any type of storage medium that can serve as a repository for the network traffic and corresponding data recorded by thesensors 104. In an example embodiment, data storage for thecollectors 106 is located in an in-memory database, such as dashDB from IBM®, although it should be appreciated that the data storage for thecollectors 106 can be any software and/or hardware capable of providing rapid random access speeds typically used for analytics software. In various example embodiments, thecollectors 106 can utilize solid state drives, disk drives, magnetic tape drives, or a combination of the foregoing according to cost, responsiveness, and size requirements. Further, thecollectors 106 can utilize various database structures such as a normalized relational database or a NoSQL database, among others. - In some example embodiments, the
collectors 106 may only serve as network storage for the networktraffic monitoring system 100. In such example embodiments, the networktraffic monitoring system 100 can include adata mover module 108 for retrieving data from thecollectors 106 and making the data available to network clients, such as the components of theanalytics engine 110. In effect, thedata mover module 108 can serve as a gateway for presenting network-attached storage to the network clients. In other example embodiments, thecollectors 106 can perform additional functions, such as organizing, summarizing, and preprocessing data. For example, thecollectors 106 can tabulate how often packets of certain sizes or types are transmitted from different nodes of the network. Thecollectors 106 can also characterize the traffic flows going to and from various nodes. In some example embodiments, thecollectors 106 can match packets based on sequence numbers, thus identifying traffic flows and connection links. As it may be inefficient to retain all data indefinitely in certain circumstances, in some example embodiments, thecollectors 106 can periodically replace detailed network traffic and corresponding data with consolidated summaries. In this manner, thecollectors 106 can retain a complete dataset describing one period (e.g., the past minute or other suitable period of time), with a smaller dataset of another period (e.g., the previous 2-10 minutes or other suitable period of time), and progressively consolidate network traffic data of other periods of time (e.g., day, week, month, year, etc.). In some example embodiments, network traffic and corresponding data for a set of flows identified as normal or routine can be winnowed at an earlier period of time while a more complete data set may be retained for a lengthier period of time for another set of flows identified as anomalous or as an attack. - Computer networks may be exposed to a variety of different attacks that expose vulnerabilities of computer systems in order to compromise their security. Some network traffic may be associated with malicious programs or devices. The
analytics engine 110 may be provided with examples of network states corresponding to an attack and network states corresponding to normal operation. Theanalytics engine 110 can then analyze network traffic and corresponding data to recognize when the network is under attack. In some example embodiments, the network may operate within a trusted environment for a period of time so that theanalytics engine 110 can establish a baseline of normal operation. Since malware is constantly evolving and changing, machine learning may be used to dynamically update models that are used to identify malicious traffic patterns. Machine learning algorithms may be used to provide for the identification of anomalies within the network traffic based on dynamic modeling of network behavior. - In some example embodiments, the
analytics engine 110 may be used to identify observations which differ from other examples in a dataset. For example, if a training set of example data with known outlier labels exists, supervised anomaly detection techniques may be used. Supervised anomaly detection techniques utilize data sets that have been labeled as normal and abnormal and train a classifier. In a case in which it is unknown whether examples in the training data are outliers, unsupervised anomaly techniques may be used. Unsupervised anomaly detection techniques may be used to detect anomalies in an unlabeled test data set under the assumption that the majority of instances in the data set are normal by looking for instances that seem to fit to the remainder of the data set. - In an example embodiment, the
analytics engine 110 can include adata lake 130, an application dependency mapping (ADM)module 140, andelastic processing engines 150. Thedata lake 130 is a large-scale storage repository that provides massive storage for various types of data, enormous processing power, and the ability to handle nearly limitless concurrent tasks or jobs. In an example embodiment, thedata lake 130 is implemented using the Hadoop® Distributed File System (HDFS™) from Apache® Software Foundation of Forest Hill, Maryland. HDFS™ is a highly scalable and distributed file system that can scale to thousands of cluster nodes, millions of files, and petabytes of data. HDFS™ is optimized for batch processing where data locations are exposed to allow computations to take place where the data resides. HDFS™ provides a single namespace for an entire cluster to allow for data coherency in a write-once, read-many access model. That is, clients can only append to existing files in the node. In HDFS™, files are separated into blocks, which are typically 64 MB in size and are replicated in multiple data nodes. Clients access data directly from data nodes. - In an example embodiment, the
data mover 108 receives raw network traffic and corresponding data from thecollectors 106 and distributes or pushes the data to thedata lake 130. Thedata lake 130 can also receive and store out-of-band data 114, such as statuses on power levels, network availability, server performance, temperature conditions, cage door positions, and other data from internal sources, andthird party data 116, such as security reports (e.g., provided by Cisco® Systems, Inc. of San Jose, California, Arbor Networks® of Burlington, Massachusetts, Symantec® Corp. of Sunnyvale, California, Sophos® Group plc of Abingdon, England, Microsoft® Corp. of Seattle, Washington, Verizon® Communications, Inc. of New York, New York, among others), geolocation data, IP watch lists, Whois data, configuration management database (CMDB) or configuration management system (CMS) as a service, and other data from external sources. In another example embodiment, thedata lake 130 may instead fetch or pull raw traffic and corresponding data from thecollectors 106 and relevant data from the out-of-band data sources 114 and the third party data sources 116. In yet another example embodiment, the functionality of thecollectors 106, thedata mover 108, the out-of-band data sources 114, the thirdparty data sources 116, and thedata lake 130 can be combined. Various combinations and configurations are possible as would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art. - Each component of the
data lake 130 can perform certain processing of the raw network traffic data and/or other data (e.g., host data, process data, user data, out-of-band data, third party data, etc.) to transform the raw data to a form useable by theelastic processing engines 150. In an example embodiment, thedata lake 130 can include repositories for flow attributes 132, host and/or endpoint attributes 134, process attributes 136, and policy attributes 138. In some embodiments, thedata lake 130 can also include repositories for VM or container attributes, application attributes, tenant attributes, network topology, application dependency maps, cluster attributes, etc. - The flow attributes 132 relate to information about flows traversing the network. A flow is generally one or more packets sharing certain attributes that are sent within a network within a specified period of time. The flow attributes 132 can include packet header fields such as a source address (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) address, Media Access Control (MAC) address, Domain Name System (DNS) name, or other network address), source port, destination address, destination port, protocol type, class of service, among other fields. The source address may correspond to a first endpoint (e.g., network device, physical server, virtual partition, etc.) of the network, and the destination address may correspond to a second endpoint, a multicast group, or a broadcast domain. The flow attributes 132 can also include aggregate packet data such as flow start time, flow end time, number of packets for a flow, number of bytes for a flow, the union of TCP flags for a flow, among other flow data.
- The host and/or endpoint attributes 134 describe host and/or endpoint data for each flow, and can include host and/or endpoint name, network address, operating system, CPU usage, network usage, disk space, ports, logged users, scheduled jobs, open files, and information regarding files and/or directories stored on a host and/or endpoint (e.g., presence, absence, or modifications of log files, configuration files, device special files, or protected electronic information). As discussed, in some embodiments, the host and/or endpoints attributes 134 can also include the out-of-
band data 114 regarding hosts such as power level, temperature, and physical location (e.g., room, row, rack, cage door position, etc.) or thethird party data 116 such as whether a host and/or endpoint is on an IP watch list or otherwise associated with a security threat, Whois data, or geocoordinates. In some embodiments, the out-of-band data 114 and thethird party data 116 may be associated by process, user, flow, or other more granular or less granular network element or network communication. - The process attributes 136 relate to process data corresponding to each flow, and can include process name (e.g., bash, httpd, netstat, etc.), ID, parent process ID, path (e.g., /usr2/username/bin/, /usr/local/bin, /usr/bin, etc.), CPU utilization, memory utilization, memory address, scheduling information, nice value, flags, priority, status, start time, terminal type, CPU time taken by the process, the command that started the process, and information regarding a process owner (e.g., user name, ID, user's real name, e-mail address, user's groups, terminal information, login time, expiration date of login, idle time, and information regarding files and/or directories of the user).
- The policy attributes 138 contain information relating to network policies. Policies establish whether a particular flow is allowed or denied by the network as well as a specific route by which a packet traverses the network. For example, policies can be used to mark packets so that certain kinds of traffic receive differentiated service when used in combination with queuing techniques such as those based on priority, fairness, weighted fairness, token bucket, random early detection, round robin, among others. The policy attributes 138 can include policy statistics such as a number of times a policy was enforced or a number of times a policy was not enforced. The policy attributes 138 can also include associations with network traffic data. For example, flows found to be non-conformant can be linked or tagged with corresponding policies to assist in the investigation of non-conformance.
- The
analytics engine 110 may include any number ofengines 150, including for example, aflow engine 152 for identifying flows (e.g., flow engine 152) or anattacks engine 154 for identify attacks to the network. In an example embodiment, the analytics engine can include a separate distributed denial of service (DDoS)attack engine 155 for specifically detecting DDoS attacks. In other example embodiments, a DDoS attack engine may be a component or a sub-engine of a general attacks engine. In some example embodiments, theattacks engine 154 and/or theDDoS engine 155 can use machine learning techniques to identify security threats to a network. For example, theattacks engine 154 and/or theDDoS engine 155 can be provided with examples of network states corresponding to an attack and network states corresponding to normal operation. Theattacks engine 154 and/or theDDoS engine 155 can then analyze network traffic data to recognize when the network is under attack. In some example embodiments, the network can operate within a trusted environment for a time to establish a baseline for normal network operation for theattacks engine 154 and/or the DDoS. - The
analytics engine 110 may further include asearch engine 156. Thesearch engine 156 may be configured, for example to perform a structured search, an NLP (Natural Language Processing) search, or a visual search. Data may be provided to the engines from one or more processing components. - The
analytics engine 110 can also include apolicy engine 158 that manages network policy, including creating and/or importing policies, monitoring policy conformance and non-conformance, enforcing policy, simulating changes to policy or network elements affecting policy, among other policy-related tasks. - The
ADM module 140 can determine dependencies of applications of the network. That is, particular patterns of traffic may correspond to an application, and the interconnectivity or dependencies of the application can be mapped to generate a graph for the application (i.e., an application dependency mapping). In this context, an application refers to a set of networking components that provides connectivity for a given set of workloads. For example, in a conventional three-tier architecture for a web application, first endpoints of the web tier, second endpoints of the application tier, and third endpoints of the data tier make up the web application. TheADM module 140 can receive input data from various repositories of the data lake 130 (e.g., the flow attributes 132, the host and/or endpoint attributes 134, the process attributes 136, etc.). TheADM module 140 may analyze the input data to determine there is first traffic flowing between external endpoints on port 80 of the first endpoints corresponding to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests and responses. The input data may also indicate second traffic between first ports of the first endpoints and second ports of the second endpoints corresponding to application server requests and responses and third traffic flowing between third ports of the second endpoints and fourth ports of the third endpoints corresponding to database requests and responses. TheADM module 140 may define an ADM for the web application as a three-tier application including a first EPG comprising the first endpoints, a second EPG comprising the second endpoints, and a third EPG comprising the third endpoints. - The
presentation module 116 can include an application programming interface (API) or command line interface (CLI) 160, a security information and event management (SIEM)system interface 162, and a web front-end 164. As theanalytics engine 110 processes network traffic and corresponding data and generates analytics data, the analytics data may not be in a human-readable form or it may be too large for a user to navigate. Thepresentation module 116 can take the analytics data generated byanalytics engine 110 and further summarize, filter, and organize the analytics data as well as create intuitive presentations of the analytics data. - In an example embodiment, the API or
CLI 160 is implemented using Hadoop® Hive from Apache® for the back end, and Java® Database Connectivity (JDBC) from Oracle® Corporation of Redwood Shores, California, as an API layer. Hive is a data warehouse infrastructure that provides data summarization and ad hoc querying. Hive provides a mechanism to query data using a variation of structured query language (SQL) that is called HiveQL. JDBC is an application programming interface (API) for the programming language Java®, which defines how a client may access a database. - In an example embodiment, the
SIEM interface 162 can be implemented using Hadoop® Kafka for the back end, and software provided by Splunk®, Inc. of San Francisco, California as the SIEM platform. Kafka is a distributed messaging system that is partitioned and replicated. Kafka uses the concept of topics. Topics are feeds of messages in specific categories. For example, Kafka can take raw packet captures and telemetry information from thedata mover 108 as input, and output messages to a SIEM platform, such as Splunk®. The Splunk® platform is utilized for searching, monitoring, and analyzing machine-generated data. - In an example embodiment, the web front-
end 164 can be implemented using software provided by MongoDB®, Inc. of New York, New York and Hadoop® ElasticSearch from Apache® for the back-end, and Ruby on Rails™ as the web application framework. MongoDB® is a document-oriented NoSQL database based on documents in the form of JavaScript® Object Notation (JSON) with dynamic schemas. ElasticSearch is a scalable and real-time search and analytics engine that provides domain-specific language (DSL) full querying based on JSON. Ruby on Rails™ is model-view-controller (MVC) framework that provides default structures for a database, a web service, and web pages. Ruby on Rails™ relies on web standards such as JSON or extensible markup language (XML) for data transfer, and hypertext markup language (HTML), cascading style sheets, (CSS), and JavaScript® for display and user interfacing. - Although
FIG. 1 illustrates an example configuration of the various components of a network traffic monitoring system, those of skill in the art will understand that the components of the networktraffic monitoring system 100 or any system described herein can be configured in a number of different ways and can include any other type and number of components. For example, thesensors 104, thecollectors 106, thedata mover 108, and thedata lake 130 can belong to one hardware and/or software module or multiple separate modules. Other modules can also be combined into fewer components and/or further divided into more components. -
FIG. 2 illustrates apolicy engine 200, such as thepolicy engine 138 ofFIG. 1 , in accordance with an example embodiment. Thepolicy engine 200 can include apolicy builder module 202, apolicy importer module 204, apolicy simulation module 206, apolicy utilization module 208, aconditional policies module 210, and acompliance module 212. In some example embodiments, a network traffic monitoring system, such as the networktraffic monitoring system 100 ofFIG. 1 , can automatically determine network topology. Using network traffic data captured by sensors, such as thesensors 104 ofFIG. 1 , the network traffic monitoring system can determine the type of devices existing in the network (e.g., brand and model of switches, gateways, machines, etc.), physical locations (e.g., latitude and longitude, building, datacenter, room, row, rack, machine, etc.), interconnection type (e.g., 10Gb Ethernet, fiber-optic, etc.), and network characteristics (e.g., bandwidth, latency, etc.). In addition, the networktraffic monitoring system 110 can automatically detect changes to the network topology without the need for further configuration. In other example embodiments, the network topology and changes to the network topology can be configured by a network administrator. - In some example embodiments, the
policy builder module 202 can receive the network topology (whether automatically generated, manually configured, or some combination thereof) and application dependency mappings, such as generated by the application dependency mapping (ADM)module 140 ofFIG. 1 , and thepolicy builder module 202 can automatically determine policies for the network. The policies can be based on whitelist rules or blacklist rules. A network defined by whitelist rules allows a communication between a source and a destination or otherwise defaults to denial of the communication system while a network defined by blacklist rules denies a communication between a source and a destination or otherwise defaults to allowing the communication. As an example of whitelist rule generation, suppose there is an edge of an application dependency mapping between a first endpoint or EPG E1 and a second endpoint or EPG E2. Permissible traffic flows on a set of ports of E1 to one or more ports of E2. A policy can be defined to reflect the permissible traffic from the set of ports of E1 to the one or more ports of E2. - The
policy importer module 204 imports a preexisting set of network policies to thepolicy engine 138. In some example embodiments, the preexisting set of policies may be based on blacklist rules, and thepolicy importer module 204 can translate the set of blacklist rules to a set of whitelist rules. For example, thepolicy importer module 204 can receive ADMs for each application running in the network and the blacklist rules. Thepolicy importer module 204 can utilize the ADMs to define policies limiting communication between endpoints and EPGs corresponding to edges of the ADMs. - The
policy engine 200 can also verify that the generated policies based on whitelist rules prevent any traffic that was explicitly denied by the preexisting set of policies based on the blacklist rules. To that end, thepolicy simulation module 206 can be used to validate that changes to policy will not result in network misconfiguration and vulnerability to attacks. Thepolicy simulation module 206 provides what if analysis, i.e., analyzing what would happen to network traffic upon adding one or more new policies, removing one or more existing policies, or changing membership of one or more EPGs (e.g., adding one or more new endpoints to an EPG, removing one or more endpoints from an EPG, or moving one or more endpoints from one EPG to another). In some example embodiments, thepolicy simulation module 206 utilizes historical ground truth flows for simulating network traffic based on what if experiments. That is, thepolicy simulation module 206 may apply the addition or removal of policies and/or changes to EPGs to a simulated network environment that mirrors the actual network to evaluate the effects of the addition or removal of policies and/or EPG changes. Thepolicy simulation module 206 can determine whether the policy changes break or misconfigure networking operations of any applications in the simulated network environment or allow any attacks to the simulated network environment that were previously thwarted by the actual network with the original set of policies. Thepolicy simulation module 206 can also determine whether the policy changes correct misconfigurations and prevent attacks that occurred in the actual network. In some example embodiments, thepolicy simulation module 206 can evaluate real time flows in a simulated network environment configured to operate with an experimental policy set or experimental set of EPGs to understand how changes to particular policies or EPGs affect network traffic in the actual network. - The
policy utilization module 208 evaluates network traffic for conformance or non-conformance with policies of the network. Thepolicy utilization module 208 analyzes each flow in the network over a specified period of time (e.g., time of day, day of week or month, month(s) in a year, etc.) to determine which policies are being enforced and the extent (e.g., number of packets, number of bytes, number of flows , etc.) to which those policies are being enforced within the network. These policy utilization statistics can be used for smart ordering of policies, i.e., optimize ordering of policies in a policy table or garbage collection, i.e., removing unused policies from the policy table. Smart ordering reorders the sequence of policies such that those policies that are utilized more often are placed in a position where they will be checked faster. For example, policies with higher utilization can be cached for longer periods of time than policies with lower utilization and/or higher utilization policies can be sequenced higher than lower utilization policies for policy schemes that apply the first policy matching a flow. Garbage collection removes policies with zero (or effectively zero) utilization which can save memory usage on a network device and/or reduce processing for policy schemes that apply all policies matching a flow. - In some example embodiments, policies may be more than just a set of access control lists (ACLs), and policies can include a collection of inbound/outbound filters, traffic quality settings, marking rules/redirection rules, and Layers 4-7 service device graphs. In some example embodiments, a network can be configured to operate with dynamic policies using the
conditional policies module 210. Theconditional policies module 210, for example, allows policies to take into account the behavior or the state of an endpoint. In some example embodiments, endpoints in the network can be assigned a reputation, vulnerability index, or similar security measure that changes over time based on the security state of each endpoint. Each endpoint can also be grouped according to reputational EPGs depending on the value of the security measurement of each endpoint. For example, endpoints with high security scores can be assigned to a first EPG, endpoints with moderate security score can be assigned to a second EPG, and endpoints with a low security score can be assigned to a third EPG. The network can be configured to enforce a policy that denies all communications from endpoints in the third EPG but allow the endpoints in the third EPG access to image update servers or other remediation servers. Under this policy, an endpoint in the third EPG can make no communication in the network except to the image update or remediation servers. Upon the endpoint updating its image or otherwise becoming remediated, the endpoint may be assigned to the first or second EPGs and be allowed to communicate according to the policies applicable to one of those EPGs. Thus, the policies for the endpoint do not need to be manually updated to account for the changes to the security state of the endpoint. A variety of groupings can be utilized in other example embodiments, including binary groupings, groupings based on a scale between -1 to 1 or from 0 to 100, and semantic groupings (e.g., "Good," "OK," "Bad"), among other possibilities. - The
compliance module 212 provides for design, implementation, management, monitoring, and auditing/reporting of regulatory compliance matters. In some example embodiments, thecompliance module 212 can automatically generate network policies to ensure regulatory compliance. In some example embodiments, thecompliance module 212 can analyze network traffic data to ensure the network enforces the network policies. In some example embodiments, thecompliance module 212 can generate reports regarding the network's effectiveness with respect to compliance. - As discussed, all around the world, regulators and standards bodies are tightening compliance through expanded powers, higher penalties, and harsh enforcement actions. Some of these regulations and standards include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), California Senate Bill 1386 (CA SB 1386), and the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II).
- HIPAA requires covered entities and business associates that create, receive, transmit, or maintain protected health information (PHI) in electronic form must make a good faith effort to protect the corporate computing environment from reasonably anticipated threats and vulnerabilities; and take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and security of such electronic data. Covered entities and business associates must perform an analysis of the potential risks to the electronic PHI for which they are responsible; and to then develop, implement, and maintain appropriate security measures to safeguard the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of that data. HIPAA provides standards and, in some cases, implementation specifications with which covered entities and business associates must comply.
- SOX requires that the annual reports of public companies include an end-of-fiscal-year assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. SOX also requires that companies' independent auditors attest to, and report on, this assessment. The assessment of financial controls has been extended into network environments by the opinion of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a private-sector, non-profit entity created by SOX to oversee the auditors of public companies.
- GBLA protects the privacy and security of individuals' financial information collected, held, and processed by financial institutions. The privacy component requires financial institutions to provide their customers with an annual notice of their privacy practices and to allow customers to choose not to share such information. The safeguards component requires that financial institutions establish a comprehensive security program to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the private financial information in their records.
- PCI DSS was developed to ensure safe handling of protected payment information, such as storage and transfer of credit card information. PCI DSS is the umbrella program for other credit card security programs, such as the Visa® Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP), MasterCard® Site Data Protection (SDP) program, and other credit card companies' standards for protecting customers' protected electronic information.
- CA SB 1386 was promulgated to regulate the privacy of personal information to address the problem of identity theft. The bill requires an agency, person, or business that conducts business in California and owns or licenses computerized "personal information" to disclose any breach of security (to any resident whose unencrypted data is believed to have been disclosed). Many states and other jurisdictions have also proposed or enacted similar legislation.
- Basel II provides recommendations from bank supervisors and central bankers of member countries of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for ensuring banks are not overleveraged. This agreement was created to promote universal consistency in the way banks and regulators approach risk management.
- Although some vital differences exist among the various regulations and standards, there is a substantial amount of overlap in their areas of concern.
FIG. 3 illustrates a mapping 300 of compliance recommendations andrequirements 302 to relevant provisions ofHIPAA 304,SOX 306, andPCI DSS 308 to network policies to address thecompliance categories 302 in accordance with an example embodiment. For purposes of conciseness, citation is made only toHIPAA 304,SOX 306, andPCI DSS 308 inFIG. 3 , but the principles disclosed herein are applicable for compliance relating to other regulations and standards. Compliance recommendations are safeguards that do not require strong technical controls. The compliance recommendations can be thought of as suggested best practices or "should-haves," and network policies are only incidentally implicated or not applicable. The compliance recommendations can includerisk analysis 312,risk management 314, informationsystem activity review 316, assignedsecurity 318, authorization and/orsupervision 320, contingency plan 338, and facility access control andvalidations 342. - The
risk analysis recommendation 312 advises conducting an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to protected electronic information stored by a network. Therisk management recommendation 314 suggests implementing security measures to sufficiently reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level. The information systemactivity review recommendation 316 recommends procedures to regularly review records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking. The assignedsecurity recommendation 318 advises assigning responsibility for the development and implementation of procedures for protecting protected electronic information stored in the network. The authorization and/orsupervision recommendation 320 suggests procedures for the authorization and/or supervision of workforce members who work with protected electronic information or in locations where it might be accessed. The contingency plan recommendation 338 recommends establishing procedures that allow for facility access in support of restoration of lost data under disaster recovery plan and emergency access mode operations. The facility access control andvalidations recommendation 342 suggests implementing procedures to document repairs and modifications to the physical components of a facility related to security. -
Terminations procedure recommendation 322 advises implementing policies and procedures to prohibit access to protected electronic information to an employee or a business upon termination of the employee or cease of business with the business associate. Although theterminations procedure recommendation 322 falls within the category of a compliance recommendation, network policies can be defined to address this safeguard. For example, thecompliance module 212 can define a network policy to explicitly deny traffic associated with a terminated user (in a blacklist system) or reassigning the terminated user to an EPG prohibited from accessing the network (in a whitelist system). - Compliance requirements are "must-haves" for the network. In some example embodiments, compliance requirements, such as protection from malicious software 330 and response and reporting 338, can be fulfilled primarily by other components of a network traffic monitoring system (e.g., the network
traffic monitoring system 100 ofFIG. 1 ). The protection from malicious software requirement 330 requires appropriate protections against malicious software are in effect in the network. The response and reporting requirement 338 calls for identifying and responding to suspected or known security incidents; mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to the network; and document security incidents and their outcomes. The protection from malicious software requirement 330 and the response and reporting requirement 338 can be handled by an attacks engine, such as theattacks engine 154 or theDDoS engine 155 ofFIG. 1 . However, network policies can be defined that deny compromised endpoints general access to the network but allow access to image update, patch management, and other remediation endpoints. - In some example embodiments, the
compliance module 212 can address compliance requirements directly, such as securitymanagement process requirement 310, healthcareclearinghouse isolation requirement 324,access authorization requirement 326, access establishment andmodification requirement 328, loginmonitoring requirement 332,password management requirement 334,evaluation requirement 340, uniqueuser identification requirement 344,emergency access requirement 346,automatic logoff requirement 348, encryption anddecryption requirement 350,data integrity requirement 354, person orentity authentication requirement 356, and integrity controls requirement 358. - In some example embodiments, the
compliance module 212 can define ACL-like policies and EPGs to satisfy compliance requirements, such as for the isolatinghealthcare clearinghouse requirement 324, theaccess authorization requirement 326, the access establishment andmodification requirement 328, and the person orentity authentication requirement 356. The healthcareclearinghouse isolation requirement 324 dictates that if a health clearinghouse is part of a larger organization, the clearinghouse must implement policies and procedures that protect electronic PHI of the clearinghouse from unauthorized access by the larger organization. Thecompliance module 212 can segment the healthcare clearing house from the larger organization utilizing network policies that limit access of electronic PHI to healthcare cleaning house (in a whitelist system) or deny access to the electronic PHI to the larger organize (in a blacklist system). Theaccess authorization requirement 326 concerns policies and procedures for granting access to protected electronic information, for example, through access to a workstation, transaction, program, process or mechanism. The access establishment andmodification requirement 328 relates to policies and procedures that, based upon the network's access authorization policies, establish, document, review, and modify a user's right of access to a workstation, transaction, program, or process. The person orentity authentication requirement 356 assures that policies and procedures are in place to identify persons or entities seeking access to protected electronic information. Thecompliance module 212 can satisfy theaccess authorization 326, the access establishment andmodification 328, and the person orentity authentication 356 requirements by defining network policies and EPGs limiting access to protected electronic information to appropriate users, processes, hosts and/or endpoints, etc. For example, thecompliance module 212 could create a HIPAA EPG and define policies for this EPG to enforce HIPAA requirements. - In some example embodiments, the
compliance module 212 can define conditional network policies in which traffic is allowed or denied depending on the state of a host and/or endpoint, process, or user associated with the flow. In an example embodiment, thecompliance module 212 can define host/endpoint and/or process state-based network policies and EPGs relating to copying, saving, modifying, and deleting data and encryption of data during transit to protect against improper alteration or destruction of data, and to ensure that the data is accurate and complete. These policies can be designed to address the encryption anddecryption requirement 350, thedata integrity requirement 354, and the integrity controls requirement 358. The encryption anddecryption requirement 350 concerns implementing a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt protected electronic information. Thedata integrity requirement 354 is directed to policies and procedures to secure protected electronic information from improper alteration or destruction. The integrity controls requirement 358 mandates policies and procedures for verifying that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner during transmission. When a host/endpoint or a process transacts with protected electronic information, thecompliance module 212 can assign the host/endpoint or process to a special EPG that enforces data integrity. For example, an endpoint sensor can detect that its endpoint is handling electronic protected information and assign the endpoint to the special EPG. - In an example embodiment, the
compliance module 212 can define user state-based network policies and EPGs for thelogin monitoring requirement 332, thepassword management requirement 334, the uniqueuser identification requirement 344, theemergency access requirement 346, and theautomatic logoff requirement 348. Thelogin monitoring requirement 332 requires policies and procedures for monitoring login attempts and reporting discrepancies. In an example embodiment, thecompliance module 212 can establish a user's reputation to be inversely related to the number of unsuccessful login attempts within a session or assign the user to a restricted EPG based on the number of unsuccessful logins exceeding an unsuccessful login threshold. Thepassword management requirement 334 ensures that appropriate policies and procedures are in place to manage passwords for network access and access to protected electronic information and to limit passwords that are strong enough to prevent them from being guessed or exposed to brute force attacks or to otherwise become comprised. In an example embodiment, thecompliance module 212 can determine the user's reputation to be related to the strength of the user's password or assign the user to a restricted EPG if the user's password does not meet password requirements. The uniqueuser identification requirement 344 dictates that each user who has access to protected electronic information has a unique identifier. In an example embodiment, thecompliance module 212 can assign different users with a same identifier to a restricted EPG. Theemergency access requirement 346 relates to policies and procedures for obtaining necessary protected electronic information during an emergency. In an example embodiment, during times of emergency, thecompliance module 212 can assign emergency response handlers to a superuser or privileged EPG. Theautomatic logoff requirement 348 requires that policies, procedures, and technical controls are in place to automatically logoff (terminate) a session after a predetermined period of inactivity. In an example embodiment, thecompliance module 212 can compute the user's reputation as a function (e.g., linear or exponential declay) of the amount time the user is idle or assign the user to a restricted EPG if the user's idle time exceeds an idle time threshold. - In some example embodiments, the
compliance module 212 can define comprehensive network policies and periodically audit or validate these policies to satisfy thesecurity management process 310, theevaluation 340, and the audit controls 352 requirements. The securitymanagement process requirement 310 mandates implementing policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations. Theevaluation requirement 340 obligates periodic technical evaluations to ensure that protections are still in place and working effectively. The audit controlsrequirement 352 pertains to implementing hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information systems that contain or use protected electronic information. -
FIG. 4 illustrates anetwork environment 400 in accordance with an example embodiment. It should be understood that, for thenetwork environment 400 and any environment discussed herein, there can be additional or fewer nodes, devices, links, networks, or components in similar or alternative configurations. Example embodiments with different numbers and/or types of clients, networks, nodes, cloud components, servers, software components, devices, virtual or physical resources, configurations, topologies, services, appliances, deployments, or network devices are also contemplated herein. Further, thenetwork environment 400 can include any number or type of resources, which can be accessed and utilized by clients or tenants. The illustrations and examples provided herein are for clarity and simplicity. - The
network environment 400 can include anetwork fabric 402, a Layer 2 (L2)network 404, a Layer 3 (L3)network 406, andservers network fabric 402 can includespine switches leaf switches network fabric 402. The leaf switches 412 can include access ports (or non-fabric ports) and fabric ports. The fabric ports can provide uplinks to the spine switches 410, while the access ports can provide connectivity to endpoints (e.g., the servers 408), internal networks (e.g., the L2 network 404), or external networks (e.g., the L3 network 406). - The leaf switches 412 can reside at the edge of the
network fabric 402, and can thus represent the physical network edge. For instance, in an example embodiment, the leaf switches 412d and 412e operate as border leaf switches in communication withedge devices 414 located in theexternal network 406. Theborder leaf switches fabric 402. - Although the
network fabric 402 is illustrated and described herein as an example leaf-spine architecture, one of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that various embodiments can be implemented based on any network topology, including any data center or cloud network fabric. Indeed, other architectures, designs, infrastructures, and variations are contemplated herein. For example, the principles disclosed herein are applicable to topologies including three-tier (including core, aggregation, and access levels), fat tree, mesh, bus, hub and spoke, etc. Thus, in some example embodiments, the leaf switches 412 can be top-of-rack switches configured according to a top-of-rack architecture. In other example embodiments, the leaf switches 412 can be aggregation switches in any particular topology, such as end-of-row or middle-of-row topologies. In some example embodiments, the leaf switches 412 can also be implemented using aggregation switches. - Moreover, the topology illustrated in
FIG. 4 and described herein is readily scalable and may accommodate a large number of components, as well as more complicated arrangements and configurations. For example, the network may include any number offabrics 402, which may be geographically dispersed or located in the same geographic area. Thus, network nodes may be used in any suitable network topology, which may include any number of servers, virtual machines or containers, switches, routers, appliances, controllers, gateways, or other nodes interconnected to form a large and complex network. Nodes may be coupled to other nodes or networks through one or more interfaces employing any suitable wired or wireless connection, which provides a viable pathway for electronic communications. - Network communication in the
network fabric 402 can flow through the leaf switches 412. In an example embodiment, the leaf switches 412 can provide endpoints (e.g., the servers 408), internal networks (e.g., the L2 network 404), or external networks (e.g., the L3 network 406) access to thenetwork fabric 402, and can connect the leaf switches 412 to each other. In some example embodiments, the leaf switches 412 can connect endpoint groups (EPGs) to thenetwork fabric 402, internal networks (e.g., the L2 network 404), and/or any external networks (e.g., the L3 network 406). EPGs are groupings of applications, or application components, and tiers for implementing forwarding and policy logic. EPGs can allow for separation of network policy, security, and forwarding from addressing by using logical application boundaries. EPGs can be used in thenetwork environment 400 for mapping applications in the network. For example, EPGs can comprise a grouping of endpoints in the network indicating connectivity and policy for applications. - As discussed, the servers 408 can connect to the
network fabric 402 via the leaf switches 412. For example, theservers leaf switches servers network fabric 402 and/or any of the other leaf switches. Theservers L2 network 404. In an example embodiment, theservers L2 network 404 make up a local area network (LAN) LANs can connect nodes over dedicated private communications links located in the same general physical location, such as a building or campus. - The
WAN 406 can connect to the leaf switches 412d or 412e via theL3 network 406. WANs can connect geographically dispersed nodes over long-distance communications links, such as common carrier telephone lines, optical light paths, synchronous optical networks (SONET), or synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) links. LANs and WANs can include L2 and/or L3 networks and endpoints. - The Internet is an example of a WAN that connects disparate networks throughout the world, providing global communication between nodes on various networks. The nodes typically communicate over the network by exchanging discrete frames or packets of data according to predefined protocols, such as the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). In this context, a protocol can refer to a set of rules defining how the nodes interact with each other. Computer networks may be further interconnected by an intermediate network node, such as a router, to extend the effective size of each network. The endpoints 408 can include any communication device or component, such as a computer, server, blade, hypervisor, virtual machine, container, process (e.g., running on a virtual machine), switch, router, gateway, host, device, external network, etc.
- In an example embodiment, the
network environment 400 also includes a network controller running on thehost 408a. The network controller is implemented using the Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC™) from Cisco®. The APIC™ provides a centralized point of automation and management, policy programming, application deployment, and health monitoring for thefabric 402. In an example embodiment, the APIC™ is operated as a replicated synchronized clustered controller. In other example embodiments, other configurations or software-defined networking (SDN) platforms can be utilized for managing thefabric 402. - In some example embodiments, a physical server 408 may have instantiated thereon a
hypervisor 416 for creating and running one or more virtual switches (not shown) and one or morevirtual machines 418, as shown for thehost 408b. In other example embodiments, physical servers may run a shared kernel for hosting containers. In yet other embodiments, the physical server 408 can run other software for supporting other virtual partitioning approaches. Networks in accordance with various embodiments may include any number of physical servers hosting any number of virtual machines, containers, or other virtual partitions. Hosts may also comprise blade/physical servers without virtual machines, containers, or other virtual partitions, such as theservers - The
network environment 400 can also integrate a network traffic monitoring system, such as the networktraffic monitoring system 100 shown inFIG. 1 . For example, the network traffic monitoring system ofFIG. 4 includessensors collectors 422, and an analytics engine, such as theanalytics engine 110 ofFIG. 1 , executing on theserver 408e. Theanalytics engine 408e can receive and process network traffic data collected by thecollectors 422 and detected by the sensors 420 placed on nodes located throughout thenetwork environment 400. Although theanalytics engine 408e is shown to be a standalone network appliance inFIG. 4 , it will be appreciated that theanalytics engine 408e can also be implemented as a virtual partition (e.g., VM or container) that can be distributed onto a host or cluster of hosts, a software as a service (SaaS), or other suitable method of distribution. In an example embodiment, the sensors 420 are run on the leaf switches 412 (e.g., thesensor 420a), the hosts 408 (e.g., thesensor 420b), the hypervisor 416 (e.g., thesensor 420c), and the VMs 418 (e.g., thesensor 420d). In other example embodiments, the sensors 420 can also run on the spine switches 410, virtual switches, service appliances (e.g., firewall, deep packet inspector, traffic monitor, load balancer, etc.) and in between network elements. In some example embodiments, the sensors 420 can be located at each (or nearly every) network component to capture granular packet statistics and corresponding data at each hop of data transmission. In other example embodiments, the sensors 420 may not be installed in all components or portions of the network (e.g., shared hosting environment in which customers have exclusive control of some virtual machines). - As shown in
FIG. 4 , a host may include multiple sensors 420 running on the host (e.g., thehost sensor 420b) and various components of the host (e.g., thehypervisor sensor 420c and theVM sensor 420d) so that all (or substantially all) packets traversing thenetwork environment 400 may be monitored. For example, if one of theVMs 418 running on thehost 408b receives a first packet from theWAN 406, the first packet may pass through theborder leaf switch 412d, thespine switch 410b, theleaf switch 412b, thehost 408b, thehypervisor 416, and the VM. Since all or nearly all of these components contain a respective sensor, the first packet will likely be identified and reported to one of thecollectors 422. As another example, if a second packet is transmitted from one of theVMs 418 running on thehost 408b to thehost 408d, sensors installed along the data path, such as at theVM 418, thehypervisor 416, thehost 408b, theleaf switch 412b, and thehost 408d will likely result in capture of metadata from the second packet. -
FIG. 5 illustrates anexample process 500 for providing compliance via network policies in accordance with an example embodiment. It should be understood that, for any process discussed herein, there can be additional, fewer, or alternative steps performed in similar or alternative orders, or in parallel, within the scope of the various example embodiments unless otherwise stated. Theprocess 500 can be performed by a network, and particularly, a network traffic monitoring system (e.g., the networktraffic monitoring system 100 ofFIG. 1 ), a network controller (e.g., thenetwork controller 118 ofFIG. 1 ), a policy engine (e.g., thepolicy engine 200 ofFIG. 2 ), a compliance module (e.g., thecompliance module 212 ofFIG. 2 ), a network operating system, a virtualization manager, a network virtualization manager, or a similar system. - In the example embodiment of
FIG. 5 , theprocess 500 can begin atstep 502 in which protected electronic information is sent and/or received to a first endpoint of a network. A second endpoint receiving and/or sending the protected electronic information can also be a part of the same network or may be external to the network. Protected electronic information can refer to electronic data that is subject to a governmental regulation, industry standard, or similar guideline. Although there is an expectation of security for most if not all data traversing a network, there are situations in which some types of data can be classified as having a higher security priority than other types of data, certain types of data require encryption and others do not, breaches to particular types of data must be disclosed and other types of data have no such requirement, availability of some data is guaranteed while there is no guarantee for other types of data, and transactions relating to certain types of data must be monitored while other types of data do not require monitoring. Compliance concerns each of the former characteristics of data. - The process can continue at
step 504 with the collection of network traffic data (e.g., metadata for sessions, flows, packets, etc.) and host data (e.g., network usage, CPU usage, information regarding files of the host, etc.), process data (process name, ID, parent process ID, path, CPU utilization, memory utilization, start-up command, etc.), and user data (e.g., user name, ID, information regarding files of the user, etc.) associated with the traffic. In some example embodiments, the traffic data can also be associated with out of band data (e.g., power level, temperature, and physical location) and third party data (e.g., security reports, IP watchlists, Whois, etc.). In some example embodiments, traffic can also be associated with application data (e.g., tenant information, application dependency mapping, application policies, etc.). - A sensor network can capture the collected data from multiple perspectives to provide a comprehensive view of network behavior. The sensor network may include sensors at multiple nodes of a data path (e.g., network devices, physical servers) and within multiple partitions of a node (e.g., hypervisor, shared kernel, VM, container, etc.).
- After collection of the network traffic information, host and/or endpoint information, process information, user information, and other relevant information, at
step 506, the network can determine the policies applicable to the network traffic. In some example embodiments, the network can determine one or more policies that are applicable for individual flows but it will be appreciated that other granularities are also possible (e.g., session, bidirectional flow, packet, etc.). - The policies may be mapped to specific provisions of regulations or standards (e.g.,
FIG. 3 ), and the policies can be applicable to an endpoint or a collection of endpoints (i.e., an EPG). In some example embodiments, the network can determine applicable policies for traffic by determining a source EPG and destination EPG and retrieving the applicable policies based on the source EPG and destination EPG. In some example embodiments, the network can dynamically determine an EPG associated with traffic based on a state of a host and/or endpoint, process, or user corresponding to the traffic. For instance, an endpoint associated with a flow may be a part of different EPGs over a period of time depending on a reputation or other security metric of the endpoint or a condition relating to the endpoint (e.g., the endpoint transacts with protected electronic information, a user of the endpoint has been idle for a period of time over an idle time threshold, the user has root access, etc.). - At
step 508, the network can determine whether the applicable policies were enforced for traffic. In some example embodiments, the network can determine an expected network action for each flow and compare it to the actual or ground truth network action for each flow. Network actions can include allowing or forwarding a flow, denying or dropping the flow, marking the flow for quality of service (QoS), logging the flow, redirecting the flow, or selecting a service graph for the flow. - If the network determines that the applicable policies for a flow was not enforced, at
step 510, the network can trigger an alert or otherwise report non-conformance to escalate a response. Theprocess 500 can conclude atstep 510 in which policy attributes can be updated based on conformance or non-conformance, and instances of policy non-conformance can be linked to corresponding network traffic. In some example embodiments, the policy attributes can be utilized to facilitate investigations regarding policy non-conformance. In some example embodiments, the policy attributes can be analyzed for both policy conformance and non-conformance, and compliance reports can be generated based on a mapping of a policy to a provision of a regulation, standard, or similar guideline. -
FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B illustrate systems in accordance with various example embodiments. The more appropriate system will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art when practicing the various embodiments. Persons of ordinary skill in the art will also readily appreciate that other systems are possible. -
FIG. 6A illustrates an example architecture for a conventionalbus computing system 600 wherein the components of the system are in electrical communication with each other using abus 605. Thecomputing system 600 can include a processing unit (CPU or processor) 610 and asystem bus 605 that may couple various system components including thesystem memory 615, such as read only memory (ROM) in astorage device 670 and random access memory (RAM) 675, to theprocessor 610. Thecomputing system 600 can include acache 612 of high-speed memory connected directly with, in close proximity to, or integrated as part of theprocessor 610. Thecomputing system 600 can copy data from thememory 615 and/or thestorage device 630 to thecache 612 for quick access by theprocessor 610. In this way, thecache 612 can provide a performance boost that avoids processor delays while waiting for data. These and other modules can control or be configured to control theprocessor 610 to perform various actions.Other system memory 615 may be available for use as well. Thememory 615 can include multiple different types of memory with different performance characteristics. Theprocessor 610 can include any general purpose processor and a hardware module or software module, such asmodule 1 632,module 2 634, andmodule 3 636 stored instorage device 630, configured to control theprocessor 610 as well as a special-purpose processor where software instructions are incorporated into the actual processor design. Theprocessor 610 may essentially be a completely self-contained computing system, containing multiple cores or processors, a bus, memory controller, cache, etc. A multi-core processor may be symmetric or asymmetric. - To enable user interaction with the
computing system 600, aninput device 645 can represent any number of input mechanisms, such as a microphone for speech, a touch-protected screen for gesture or graphical input, keyboard, mouse, motion input, speech and so forth. Anoutput device 635 can also be one or more of a number of output mechanisms known to those of skill in the art. In some instances, multimodal systems can enable a user to provide multiple types of input to communicate with thecomputing system 600. Thecommunications interface 640 can govern and manage the user input and system output. There may be no restriction on operating on any particular hardware arrangement and therefore the basic features here may easily be substituted for improved hardware or firmware arrangements as they are developed. -
Storage device 630 can be a non-volatile memory and can be a hard disk or other types of computer readable media which can store data that are accessible by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, solid state memory devices, digital versatile disks, cartridges, random access memories (RAMs) 625, read only memory (ROM) 620, and hybrids thereof. - The
storage device 630 can includesoftware modules processor 610. Other hardware or software modules are contemplated. Thestorage device 630 can be connected to thesystem bus 605. In one aspect, a hardware module that performs a particular function can include the software component stored in a computer-readable medium in connection with the necessary hardware components, such as theprocessor 610,bus 605,output device 635, and so forth, to carry out the function. -
FIG. 6B illustrates an example architecture for a conventionalchipset computing system 650 that can be used in accordance with an example embodiment. Thecomputing system 650 can include aprocessor 655, representative of any number of physically and/or logically distinct resources capable of executing software, firmware, and hardware configured to perform identified computations. Theprocessor 655 can communicate with achipset 660 that can control input to and output from theprocessor 655. In this example, thechipset 660 can output information to anoutput device 665, such as a display, and can read and write information tostorage device 670, which can include magnetic media, and solid state media, for example. Thechipset 660 can also read data from and write data to RAM 675. Abridge 680 for interfacing with a variety ofuser interface components 685 can be provided for interfacing with thechipset 660. Theuser interface components 685 can include a keyboard, a microphone, touch detection and processing circuitry, a pointing device, such as a mouse, and so on. Inputs to thecomputing system 650 can come from any of a variety of sources, machine generated and/or human generated. - The
chipset 660 can also interface with one ormore communication interfaces 690 that can have different physical interfaces. The communication interfaces 690 can include interfaces for wired and wireless LANs, for broadband wireless networks, as well as personal area networks. Some applications of the methods for generating, displaying, and using the GUI disclosed herein can include receiving ordered datasets over the physical interface or be generated by the machine itself byprocessor 655 analyzing data stored in thestorage device 670 or theRAM 675. Further, thecomputing system 600 can receive inputs from a user via theuser interface components 685 and execute appropriate functions, such as browsing functions by interpreting these inputs using theprocessor 655. - It will be appreciated that computing
systems processor - For clarity of explanation, in some instances the present technology may be presented as including individual functional blocks including functional blocks comprising devices, device components, steps or routines in a method embodied in software, or combinations of hardware and software.
- In some embodiments the computer-readable storage devices, mediums, and memories can include a cable or wireless signal containing a bit stream and the like. However, when mentioned, non-transitory computer-readable storage media expressly exclude media such as energy, carrier signals, electromagnetic waves, and signals per se.
- Methods according to the above-described examples can be implemented using computer-executable instructions that are stored or otherwise available from computer readable media. Such instructions can comprise, for example, instructions and data which cause or otherwise configure a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or special purpose processing device to perform a certain function or group of functions. Portions of computer resources used can be accessible over a network. The computer executable instructions may be, for example, binaries, intermediate format instructions such as assembly language, firmware, or source code. Examples of computer-readable media that may be used to store instructions, information used, and/or information created during methods according to described examples include magnetic or optical disks, flash memory, USB devices provided with non-volatile memory, networked storage devices, and so on.
- Devices implementing methods according to these disclosures can comprise hardware, firmware and/or software, and can take any of a variety of form factors. Typical examples of such form factors include laptops, smart phones, small form factor personal computers, personal digital assistants, rackmount devices, standalone devices, and so on. Functionality described herein also can be embodied in peripherals or add-in cards. Such functionality can also be implemented on a circuit board among different chips or different processes executing in a single device, by way of further example.
- The instructions, media for conveying such instructions, computing resources for executing them, and other structures for supporting such computing resources are means for providing the functions described in these disclosures.
- Although a variety of examples and other information was used to explain aspects within the scope of the appended claims, no limitation of the claims should be implied based on particular features or arrangements in such examples, as one of ordinary skill would be able to use these examples to derive a wide variety of implementations. Further and although some subject matter may have been described in language specific to examples of structural features and/or method steps, it is to be understood that the subject matter defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to these described features or acts. For example, such functionality can be distributed differently or performed in components other than those identified herein. Rather, the described features and steps are disclosed as examples of components of systems and methods within the scope of the appended claims.
- Examples are set out in the following list of numbered clauses.
- 1. A method comprising:
- capturing first network data, first host data, first process data, and first user data corresponding to a first flow that includes protected electronic information, the first network data captured by a first sensor of a first endpoint of a network, a second sensor of a second endpoint of the network, and a third sensor of a networking device along a data path corresponding to the first flow;
- analyzing the first network data, the first host data, the first process data, and the first user data to determine a policy applicable to the first flow; and
- updating policy data based on an expected network action for the first flow and an actual network action for the first flow.
- 2. The method of
clause 1, further comprising:- determining a source endpoint group corresponding to the first flow; and
- determining the first flow includes protected electronic information based on the source endpoint group.
- 3. The method of
clause 1, further comprising:- determining a first degree of accuracy of first flow data corresponding to the first flow captured by the first sensor;
- determining a second degree of accuracy of second flow data corresponding to the first flow captured by the second sensor;
- determining a third degree of accuracy of third flow data corresponding to the first flow captured by the third sensor; and
- utilizing flow data having a highest degree of accuracy for the first flow.
- 4. The method of
clause 1, further comprising:
assembling flow data for the first flow using a first packet captured by one of the first sensor, the second sensor, or the third sensor and a second packet captured by another of the first sensor, the second sensor, or the third sensor. - 5. The method of
clause 1, wherein the first endpoint is a virtual partition, and the first network data further includes flow data captured by a fourth sensor of a host of the virtual partition. - 6. The method of
clause 1, wherein the first host data includes information regarding at least one of a name of a host corresponding to the first flow, a network address of the host, an operating system of the host, CPU utilization by the host, network utilization by the host, disk space of the host, ports of the host, users logged into the host, scheduled jobs, or a file or a directory of the host. - 7. The method of
clause 1, further comprising:- determining a state of at least one of a host, a process, or a user corresponding to the first flow based on at least one of the first host data, the first process data, or the first user data; and
- determining a source endpoint group for the first flow based on the state,
- wherein the policy is determined based at least in part on the source endpoint group.
- 8. The method of
clause 1, wherein the policy data comprises statistics regarding conformance and non-conformance of the policy, and the method further comprises:- mapping the policy to a compliance requirement; and
- generating a compliance report based on the mapping and the policy data.
- 9. The method of
clause 1, wherein the policy data comprises associations between flows not conforming to policies of the network, and the method further comprises:- determining the first flow does not conform to the policy;
- associating the first flow with the policy in the policy data; and
- determining a cause of non-conformance of the policy based on the policy data.
- 10. The method of
clause 1, further comprising:- determining a network topology for the network;
- determining an application dependency mapping for an application including the first endpoint as a component of the application; and
- determining, based at least in part on the network topology and the application dependency mapping, a set of policies for the application.
- 11. The method of
clause 1, wherein a first set of policies for the network comprises blacklist rules, and the method further comprises:
generating a second set of policies for the network by translating the first set of policies to whitelist rules. - 12. The method of clause 11, further comprising:
applying the second set of policies to network data traversing the network in a network environment simulating the network. - 13. A system comprising:
- a processor; and
- memory including instructions that, upon being executed by the processor, cause the system to perform a method according to any of
clauses 1 through 12.
- 14. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having computer readable instructions that, upon being executed by a processor of a first endpoint of a network, cause the first endpoint to perform a method according to any of
clauses 1 through 12.
Claims (15)
- A method comprising:capturing (504) data corresponding to a first flow that includes protected electronic information;analyzing the data to determine (506) a policy applicable to the first flow; andupdating (512) policy data (138) based on an expected network action for the first flow and an actual network action for the first flow.
- The method of claim 1, further comprising:determining a source endpoint group corresponding to the first flow; anddetermining the first flow includes protected electronic information based on the source endpoint group.
- The method of claim 1, further comprising:determining a first degree of accuracy of first flow data corresponding to the first flow captured by a first sensor of a first endpoint of a network;determining a second degree of accuracy of second flow data corresponding to the first flow captured by a second sensor of a second endpoint of the network;determining a third degree of accuracy of third flow data corresponding to the first flow captured by a third sensor of a networking device along a data path corresponding to the first flow; andutilizing flow data having a highest degree of accuracy for the first flow.
- The method of claim 1, further comprising:
assembling flow data for the first flow using a first packet captured by one of a first sensor of a first endpoint of a network, a second sensor of a second endpoint of the network, or a third sensor of a networking device along a data path corresponding to the first flow and a second packet captured by another of the first sensor, the second sensor, or the third sensor. - The method of any preceding claim, wherein the data comprises first host data, first process data and/or first user data.
- The method of claim 5, wherein the first host data includes information regarding at least one of a name of a host corresponding to the first flow, a network address of the host, an operating system of the host, CPU utilization by the host, network utilization by the host, disk space of the host, ports of the host, users logged into the host, scheduled jobs, or a file or a directory of the host.
- The method of claim 5, further comprising:determining a state of at least one of a host, a process, or a user corresponding to the first flow based on at least one of the first host data, the first process data, or the first user data; anddetermining a source endpoint group for the first flow based on the state,wherein the policy is determined based at least in part on the source endpoint group.
- The method of claim 1, wherein the policy data comprises statistics regarding conformance and non-conformance of the policy, and the method further comprises:mapping the policy to a compliance requirement; andgenerating a compliance report based on the mapping and the policy data.
- The method of claim 1, wherein the policy data comprises associations between flows not conforming to policies of a network, and the method further comprises:determining the first flow does not conform to the policy;associating the first flow with the policy in the policy data; anddetermining a cause of non-conformance of the policy based on the policy data.
- The method of claim 1, further comprising:determining a network topology for a network;determining an application dependency mapping for an application including the first endpoint as a component of the application; anddetermining, based at least in part on the network topology and the application dependency mapping, a set of policies for the application.
- The method of claim 1, wherein a first set of policies for a network comprises blacklist rules, and the method further comprises:
generating a second set of policies for the network by translating the first set of policies to whitelist rules. - The method of claim 11, further comprising:
applying the second set of policies to network data traversing a network in a network environment simulating the network. - The method of any preceding claim, wherein the data comprises first network data, the first network data captured by a first sensor of a first endpoint of a network, a second sensor of a second endpoint of the network, and a third sensor of a networking device along a data path corresponding to the first flow, and wherein the analyzing comprises analyzing the first network data,
optionally wherein the first endpoint is a virtual partition, and the first network data further includes flow data captured by a fourth sensor of a host of the virtual partition. - A system comprising:a processor; andmemory including instructions that, upon being executed by the processor, cause the system to perform a method according to any of claims 1 to 13.
- A computer-readable medium having computer readable instructions that, upon being executed by a processor of a first endpoint of a network, cause the first endpoint to perform a method according to any of claims 1 to 13.
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US10033766B2 (en) | 2018-07-24 |
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