EP3589028B1 - Cryptage et décryptage de trame de gestion - Google Patents

Cryptage et décryptage de trame de gestion Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3589028B1
EP3589028B1 EP19164828.6A EP19164828A EP3589028B1 EP 3589028 B1 EP3589028 B1 EP 3589028B1 EP 19164828 A EP19164828 A EP 19164828A EP 3589028 B1 EP3589028 B1 EP 3589028B1
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European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
management frame
encrypted
response
frame
management
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP3589028A1 (fr
Inventor
Mohd Shahnawaz Siraj
Aidan Doyle
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Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
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Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/12—Setup of transport tunnels
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/16—Discovering, processing access restriction or access information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/20—Selecting an access point
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/08—Access point devices

Definitions

  • Management frames can be used to manage and control wireless links.
  • management frames enable stations (STAs) to establish and maintain communications and support authentication, association, and synchronization.
  • STAs stations
  • US 2011/103232 A1 discloses a method and apparatus to enable the configuration of a management frame priority and security type.
  • the method and the apparatus may set a priority level and a transmission data rate of a management frame.
  • the apparatus includes a memory including a priority queue for each management frame and a transmitter to transmit said management frame according to the priority queue of said frame.
  • US 2008/130538 A1 discloses systems and methodologies that facilitate enhanced aggregation of management frames in a wireless communication system.
  • the systems and methodologies provide for the encapsulation of management frames into respective data frames, thereby allowing management frames to be aggregated with data frames.
  • the aggregated frames can be transmitted to one or more stations using a block acknowledgement scheme.
  • information contained in a management frame can be encrypted prior to transmission.
  • indications can be provided to a receiving station to indicate the presence of an encapsulated management frame and/or encrypted management information within the aggregated frame. Based on these indications, the receiving station can extract and/or decrypt the management information from the aggregated frame.
  • Wireless security protocols have been developed to protect wireless networks.
  • Example wireless security protocols include wired-equivalent privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), WPA version 2 (WPA2), and WPA version 3 (WPA3), among others.
  • the protocols can aid in preventing uninvited guests from connecting to a wireless network and can encrypt private data as it is being transmitted over airwaves.
  • example protocols can include the use of protected management frames (PMFs) such as deauthorization frames, disassociation frames, and specified action frames such as add block acknowledgement (ADDBA).
  • PMFs protected management frames
  • the use of PMFs includes encrypting specified unicast management frames with the same pairwise transient key (PTK) used for data and using an Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) to protect specified broadcast frames.
  • PMFs are used for opportunistic wireless encryption (OWE), personal modes of operation, and enterprise modes of operation.
  • PMFs allow for protection of unicast and multicast management frames. For instance, unicast management action frames may be protected from both eavesdropping and forging, and multicast management action frames may be protected from forging.
  • management frames e.g., ADDBA request management frames
  • These frames cannot be sent from an AC because STA state information used to generate these management frames is coupled with the AP's wireless firmware.
  • STA state information used to generate these management frames is coupled with the AP's wireless firmware.
  • these management frames are encrypted.
  • tunnel forwarding mode is used, meaning encryption keys are not stored in the AP, and the AP cannot encrypt these management frames.
  • An STA is a device that has the capability to use the 802.11 protocol.
  • a STA may be a laptop, a desktop personal computer, personal digital assistant, AP or Wi-Fi phone, among others.
  • An STA may be fixed, mobile, or portable.
  • An AC may have the security keys to decrypt the frames but may not parse contents of the management frames because the AC does not have state information about the STA.
  • Some approaches to using tunneling mode in compliance with the aforementioned example protocols include storing the encryption keys in the AP and using them to encrypt and decrypt management frames on the AP itself. However, this can expose security holes, for instance, if the AP is hacked allowed access to encryption keys in the AP. Further, some approaches partition Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) protocol functions between an AC and an AP, but this does not address management frames generated and processed on the AP.
  • WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
  • Examples of the present disclosure can allow for encryption and/or decryption of management frames in an architecture (e.g., "centralized crypto architecture) that utilizes tunnel forwarding mode to keep encryption keys (e.g., PTK, IGTK, etc.) on the AC.
  • an architecture e.g., "centralized crypto architecture
  • encryption keys e.g., PTK, IGTK, etc.
  • management frames generated and processed on the AP are not terminated at the AC, and data is encrypted end-to-end from STA (e.g., a client device) to core (e.g., the AC) resulting in enhanced security as compared to other approaches.
  • examples of the present disclosure allow for encryption keys to stay at the AC (e.g., the encryption keys are not sent to the AP), with encryption and decryption of management frames happening at the AC. Keeping encryption keys on the AC can prevent a malicious actor with access to the network from obtaining the encryption key while in transit and disrupting management actions using the encryption key.
  • FIG. 1 is an example system 100 for management frame encryption and decryption including an AP 102 and an AC 104 consistent with the present disclosure.
  • APs such as AP 102 may be used to provide devices access to a network.
  • an AP can refer to a networking device that allows a client device to connect to a wired or wireless network.
  • AP can, for example, refer to receiving points for any known or convenient wireless access technology which may later become known.
  • the term AP is not intended to be limited to IEEE 802.11-based APs.
  • APs generally function as an electronic device that is adapted to allow wireless devices to connect to a wired network via various communication standards.
  • An AP can include a processing resource, memory, and/or input/output interfaces, including wired network interfaces such as IEEE 802.3 Ethernet interfaces, as well as wireless network interfaces such as IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi interfaces, although examples of the disclosure are not limited to such interfaces.
  • An AP can include a memory resource, including read-write memory, and a hierarchy of persistent memory such as ROM, EPROM, and Flash memory.
  • the network may be a wireless network, for example, a WLAN.
  • WLAN can, for example, refer to a communications network that links two or more devices using some wireless distribution method (for example, spread-spectrum or orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing radio), and usually providing a connection through an AP to the Internet; and thus, providing users with the mobility to move around within a local coverage area and still stay connected to the network.
  • some wireless distribution method for example, spread-spectrum or orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing radio
  • an AC may generally refer to a network device offering centralized network engineering, Internet Protocol services, security and policy controls, and application-aware platforms.
  • the AC can be also deployed as branch gateways, virtual private network (VPN) concentrators, wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS) or wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS), spectrum monitors, stateful network firewalls with integrated content filtering, etc.
  • VPN virtual private network
  • WIPS wireless intrusion prevention system
  • WIDS wireless intrusion detection system
  • the AC can manage a plurality of APs and/or client devices associated with the APs in the WLAN.
  • AC 104 may be a network controller.
  • a network controller refers to a management device on a computer network.
  • a network controller may manage APs within a WLAN.
  • the terms "network controller” and "AC" are used interchangeably throughout the disclosure.
  • AP 102 can perform management frame processing operations
  • AC 104 can perform management frame encryption and decryption operations. For instance, when a management frame is to be transmitted from AP 102, the management frame is generated based on the state of an associated STA (not illustrated in Figure 1 ). In response to the generation, the management frame can be encrypted. Similarly, when the management frame is received at AP 102, the frame can be decrypted, and a state of the STA can be stored. Some examples of the present disclosure allow for the management frame processing operations to be performed on AP 102, and the encryption and decryption operations can be performed on AC 104.
  • management frame processing operations can include AP 102 storing state information associated with a management frame responsive to receiving a decrypted response management frame from AC 104.
  • Management frame processing operations can include, in some examples, AP 102 generating the management frame based on state information associated with an STA associated with AP 102 and/or storing state information of the STA.
  • Management frame and STA state information can include, for instance, block acknowledgement state information, starting sequence numbers, terminal identification numbers, and aggregated media access control (MAC) service data unit (AMSDU) information (e.g., enabled or disabled), among others.
  • Decryption and encryption operations for instance, can include AC 104 storing an encryption key for encryption and decryption of management frames.
  • Tunnel forwarding mode refers to how management frames are encapsulated and sent between AP 102 and AC 104.
  • tunnel forwarding mode can include, in a downstream direction (e.g., AC 104 to AP 102), an Ethernet frame converted to an 802.11 frame by an AC datapath module.
  • An AC datapath module is a software module inside an AC (e.g., AC 104) responsible for processing management frames including encapsulation (e.g., converting 802.3 management frames to 802.11 management frames) and decapsulation (e.g., converting 802.11 management frames to 802.3 management frames), along with encryption and decryption.
  • AC e.g., AC 104
  • encapsulation e.g., converting 802.3 management frames to 802.11 management frames
  • decapsulation e.g., converting 802.11 management frames to 802.3 management frames
  • the 802.11 frame is also encrypted by the AC datapath module.
  • the resulting 802.11 management frame is encapsulated in a generic routing encapsulation (GRE) packet and sent to the AP.
  • the AP datapath module receives the GRE packet and extracts the 802.11 management frame.
  • a wireless driver takes the 802.11 management frame and puts it out on the air at an appropriate time.
  • Tunnel forwarding mode in an upstream direction can include an AP receiving an 802.11 management frame from an STA (e.g., client).
  • a WLAN chip does not decrypt the frame because a clear key entry is programmed in the WLAN chip for a client MAC address.
  • the 802.11 management frame is passed as is to the wireless driver.
  • the wireless driver delivers the received management frame to the AP datapath module.
  • the AP datapath module prepends a GRE and internet protocol (IP) header and sends the encapsulated packet to the AC.
  • IP internet protocol
  • the datapath on the AC decrypts the frame and converts it back into 802.3 format.
  • Tunneling forwarding mode can, for example, allow for data encrypted end-to-end from STA (e.g., client) to core (e.g., AC) resulting in enhanced security of the system (e.g., system 100).
  • AP 102 receives an encrypted management frame from an STA and returns an encrypted management frame in response.
  • system 100 can include AP 102 to receive an encrypted management frame from the STA associated with AP 102 and send a response management frame to the STA in response to decryption of the encrypted management frame and encryption of the response management frame by AC 104.
  • a response management frame includes a management frame sent in response to a request for a particular management frame.
  • AC 104 can receive an encrypted management frame from AP 102, decrypt the encrypted management frame, and send the decrypted management frame (e.g., via tunnel forwarding mode) to AP 102, where management frame processing can occur.
  • the encrypted management frame can be received by AC 104 responsive to AP 102 receiving the encrypted management frame from the associated STA in some instances.
  • AC 104 can receive an unencrypted response management frame from AP 102, encrypt the unencrypted response management frame, and send the encrypted response management frame (e.g., via tunnel forwarding mode) to AP 102. From there, AP 102 can send the encrypted response management frame to an associated STA. In some instances, AC 104 can store an encryption key for decryption of the encrypted management frame and/or encryption of the unencrypted response management frame.
  • AP 102 sends an encrypted management frame to an STA and receives an encrypted management frame in response.
  • system 100 can include AP 102 to generate an encrypted management frame, send the encrypted management frame to an STA associated with the AP, and receive an encrypted response management frame from the STA in response.
  • an encrypted management frame and/or an encrypted response management frame can include a protected management frame.
  • a protected management frame can be encrypted with particular encryption keys for particular functions.
  • AP 102 in some instances, can store a pre-encrypted management frame.
  • a pre-encrypted management frame can be constructed and saved at AP 102 for later use. For instance, sending a management frame to AC 104 for encryption can be avoided such that latency is paid for upfront by pre-encrypting, so the management frame can be sent by AP 102 without taking the time to send to AC 104.
  • FIG. 2 is another example system 206 for management frame encryption and decryption consistent with the present disclosure.
  • System 206 includes STA 208 associated with AP 202 and AC 204 associated with AP 202.
  • AP 202 receives an encrypted management frame at 212 from STA 208.
  • the encrypted management frame is relayed to AC 204 at 212 where the management frame is decrypted at 214 and sent back to AP 202 by AC 204 at 216.
  • AP 202 processes the decrypted frame.
  • Processing for instance, can include processing state information associated with the decrypted management frame.
  • Processing state information can include storing the state information and generating a response management frame in response to receipt of the decrypted management frame from AC 204.
  • no response management frame is sent from AP 202 to STA 208.
  • communication between AP 202 and AC 204 including communication of unencrypted management frames, can occur via a secure tunnel.
  • Figure 3 is another example system 306 for management frame encryption and decryption consistent with the present disclosure.
  • System 306 illustrates an example where AP 302 receives an encrypted management frame from STA 308 and returns an encrypted frame in response.
  • the encrypted management frame can be a protected management frame.
  • System 306 includes STA 308 associated with AP 302 and AC 304 associated with AP 302.
  • AP 302 receives an encrypted management frame at 312 from STA 308.
  • the encrypted management frame is relayed to AC 304 at 312 where the management frame is decrypted at 314 and sent back to AP 302 at 316.
  • AC 304 can store an encryption key in some examples for decryption of the encrypted management frame.
  • AP 302 processes the decrypted frame and constructs a response management frame which is sent at 320 to AC 304 for encryption at 322.
  • the encrypted response management frame is sent back to AP 302 at 324, and AP 302 sends the encrypted response management frame back to STA 308.
  • communication between AP 302 and AC 304 including communication of unencrypted management frames and unencrypted response management frames, can occur via a secure tunnel.
  • FIG. 4 is another example system 428 for management frame encryption and decryption consistent with the present disclosure.
  • System 428 includes STA 408 associated with AP 402 and AC 404 associated with AP 402.
  • AP 402 generates a management frame that is sent at 432 to AC 404 where it is encrypted at 434.
  • the encrypted management frame is sent back to AP 402 at 436, and AP 402 sends the encrypted management frame to STA 408 at 438.
  • no response management frame is sent from STA 408.
  • communication between AP 402 and AC 404 including communication of unencrypted management frames, can occur via a secure tunnel.
  • FIG. 5 is another example system 528 for management frame encryption and decryption consistent with the present disclosure.
  • System 528 illustrates an example in which AP 502 sends an encrypted management frame to STA 508 and receives an encrypted management frame in response.
  • system 528 includes STA 508 associated with AP 502 and AC 504 associated with AP 502.
  • AP 402 generates a management frame at 530 that is sent at 532 to AC 504 where it is encrypted at 534.
  • the encrypted management frame is sent back to AP 502 at 536, and AP 502 sends the encrypted management frame to STA 508 at 538.
  • the encrypted response management frame is relayed at 542 to AC 504 where the encrypted response management frame is decrypted at 544 and sent back to AP 502 at 546.
  • state information of the decrypted response management frame and/or of STA 508 is stored on AP 502.
  • communication between AP 402 and AC 404, including communication of unencrypted management frames and unencrypted response management frames, can occur via a secure tunnel.
  • Figure 6 is an example method 650 for management frame encryption and decryption consistent with the present disclosure. Similar to Figures 4 and 5 , Figure 6 illustrates an example method 650 in which an encrypted management frame, such as a protected management frame is sent to an STA from an AP.
  • an encrypted management frame such as a protected management frame
  • method 650 can include receiving, at an AC, an unencrypted management frame.
  • an associated AP can send the unencrypted management frame to the AC in a tunnel forwarding mode.
  • the AP can generate a request for an encrypted management frame from the AC.
  • the AC encrypts the management frame using an encryption key, and the AP can receive an encrypted management frame from the AC.
  • method 650 can include the AC sending the encrypted management frame to the AP in a tunnel forwarding mode, and the AP can send the encrypted management frame to an STA associated with the AP in a tunnel forwarding mode.
  • the AC can receive the encrypted response management frame from the AP responsive to a STA associated with the AP sending the encrypted response management frame to the AP.
  • the AP can receive the encrypted response management frame from the STA responsive to the STA receiving the encrypted management frame from the AP.
  • the encrypted response management frame can be sent by the AP to the AC for decryption.
  • method 650 can include receiving, at the AC, an encrypted response management frame from the AP.
  • the encrypted response management frame can be received by the AC responsive to the AP generating a request for the encrypted management data frame from the AC.
  • the request can be for a protected management frame from the AC.
  • method 650 can include decrypting the encrypted response management frame.
  • Method 650 at 662, can include sending the decrypted response management frame to the AP.
  • the AP can store state information associated with the decrypted response management frame.
  • Some examples of the present disclosure can be more secure as compared to other approaches because encryption keys are neither sent to nor stored on APs. By doing so, a tunnel forwarding mode, which supports a centralized crypto architecture (e.g., where encryption and decryption occur at the AC) can be utilized.
  • a tunnel forwarding mode which supports a centralized crypto architecture (e.g., where encryption and decryption occur at the AC) can be utilized.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Claims (15)

  1. Contrôleur d'accès, AC, (304) configuré pour :
    recevoir (312) une trame de gestion chiffrée en provenance d'un point d'accès, AP, (302) associé à l'AC (304) ;
    déchiffrer (314) la trame de gestion chiffrée ;
    envoyer (316) la trame de gestion déchiffrée à l'AP (302) ;
    recevoir une trame de gestion de réponse non chiffrée de l'AP (302) ;
    chiffrer (322) la trame de gestion de réponse non chiffrée ; et
    envoyer (324) la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée à l'AP (302).
  2. AC selon la revendication 1, dans lequel l'AC est configuré pour stocker une clé de chiffrement pour le déchiffrement de la trame de gestion chiffrée, et, éventuellement, pour utiliser un mode de transfert de tunnel pour envoyer la trame de gestion déchiffrée à l'AP.
  3. AC selon la revendication 1, dans lequel l'AC est configuré pour utiliser un mode de transfert de tunnel pour envoyer la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée à l'AP.
  4. AC selon la revendication 3, dans lequel l'AC est configuré pour stocker une clé de chiffrement pour le chiffrement de la trame de gestion de réponse non chiffrée.
  5. AC selon la revendication 1, dans lequel l'AC est configuré pour recevoir la trame de gestion chiffrée de l'AP en réponse à la réception par l'AP de la gestion chiffrée d'une station associée à l'AP.
  6. Système (306) comprenant :
    un point d'accès, AP, (302) ; et
    un contrôleur d'accès, AC, (304) associé à l'AP et configuré pour :
    déchiffrer (314) une trame de gestion chiffrée reçue de l'AP (302) ;
    envoyer (316) la trame de gestion déchiffrée à l'AP (302) ; et
    en réponse aux informations d'état du traitement (318) de l'AP (302) associées à la trame de gestion déchiffrée :
    recevoir une trame de gestion de réponse non chiffrée de l'AP (302) ;
    chiffrer (322) la trame de gestion de réponse non chiffrée ; et
    envoyer (324) la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée à l'AP (302) ; et dans lequel
    l'AP (302) est configuré pour envoyer (326) la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée à une station (308) associée à l'AP (302).
  7. Système selon la revendication 6, dans lequel l'AP en cours de configuration pour traiter les informations d'état comprend l'AP en cours de configuration pour :
    stocker les informations d'état ; et
    générer une trame de gestion de réponse en réponse à la réception de la trame de gestion déchiffrée en provenance de l'AC.
  8. Système selon la revendication 6, dans lequel :
    l'AP est configuré pour générer une trame de gestion sur la base d'informations d'état associées à la station associée à l'AP ; ou
    l'AP est configuré pour stocker une trame de gestion pré-chiffrée.
  9. Système selon la revendication 6, comprenant en outre une station associée à l'AP, dans lequel la station est configurée pour :
    envoyer la trame de gestion chiffrée à l'AP ; et, éventuellement,
    recevoir la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée en provenance de l'AP.
  10. Système selon la revendication 6, dans lequel la trame de gestion chiffrée est une trame de gestion protégée.
  11. Système selon la revendication 6, dans lequel l'AC est configuré pour stocker une clé de chiffrement pour déchiffrer la trame de gestion chiffrée.
  12. Procédé, comprenant :
    la réception (652), au niveau d'un contrôleur d'accès, AC, d'une trame de gestion non chiffrée en provenance d'un point d'accès, AP, associé à l'AC ;
    le chiffrement (654), au niveau de l'AC, de la trame de gestion non chiffrée ;
    l'envoi (656), par l'AC, de la trame de gestion chiffrée au point d'accès associé, AP ;
    la réception (658), au niveau de l'AC, d'une trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée de l'AP ;
    le déchiffrement (660), au niveau de l'AC, de la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée ; et
    l'envoi (662), par l'AC, de la trame de gestion de réponse déchiffrée à l'AP.
  13. Procédé selon la revendication 12, comprenant en outre la réception, au niveau de l'AC, de la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée de l'AP en réponse à une station associée à l'AP envoyant la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée à l'AP.
  14. Procédé selon la revendication 12, comprenant en outre l'envoi, par l'AC, de la trame de gestion chiffrée et de la trame de réponse de gestion déchiffrée dans un mode d'acheminement de tunnel.
  15. Procédé selon la revendication 12, comprenant en outre :
    la réception, par l'AC, de la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée de l'AP en réponse à l'AP générant une demande pour la trame de gestion chiffrée provenant de l'AC ; ou
    la réception, par l'AC, de la trame de gestion de réponse chiffrée de l'AP en réponse à l'AP générant une demande de trame de gestion protégée provenant de l'AC.
EP19164828.6A 2018-06-27 2019-03-25 Cryptage et décryptage de trame de gestion Active EP3589028B1 (fr)

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US16/019,806 US10271215B1 (en) 2018-06-27 2018-06-27 Management frame encryption and decryption

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EP3589028B1 true EP3589028B1 (fr) 2021-10-06

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CN110650476A (zh) 2020-01-03
US10271215B1 (en) 2019-04-23
CN110650476B (zh) 2023-04-07

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