EP3552142A1

EP3552142A1 - Secure storage device

Info

Publication number: EP3552142A1
Application number: EP17809189.8A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Sönke SCHRÖDER; Jens Kulikowski
Original assignee: Secunet Security Networks AG
Current assignee: Secunet Security Networks AG
Priority date: 2016-12-09
Filing date: 2017-11-30
Publication date: 2019-10-16
Also published as: WO2018103883A1; AU2017370818B2; US11443075B2; AU2017370818A1; DE102017011099A1; US20200012823A1

Abstract

The present invention relates to a storage device for secure authentication, comprising a mass data memory and a security element which enables the secure authentication of a storage device in the presence of further hardware components without the need for a large amount of technical expenditure. The present invention further relates to a corresponding method for providing or producing the proposed storage device and to a computer program product comprising control commands which implement the proposed method.

Description

Secure storage arrangement

The present invention is directed to a memory arrangement for secure authentication comprising a mass data memory and a security element, which makes it possible to securely authenticate a memory device in other hardware components, without causing great technical effort. The present invention is further directed to a correspondingly arranged method for providing the proposed memory arrangement and to a

Computer program product with control commands implementing the proposed method.

US 2014 0089196 A shows a secure data memory for a computer terminal. To secure the secure memory, a PIN number is used.

Also known are various cryptographic methods with which it is possible to encrypt contents of a hard disk, for example. For this purpose, the access to the data memory or its contents is regulated by software technology, which however can pose a security risk. Furthermore, a so-called middleware software or a driver software is known, which makes it possible to set corresponding access rights in a rights management.

In addition, a secure boot, even Secure Boot is known, as well as certain mechanisms that hardware or software technology can protect a data storage against unauthorized access or manipulation. An example of a possible security mechanism is the so-called one-time password, one-time password OTP, which makes it possible to gain access to a secure area only once, after which the Password becomes invalid. This avoids so-called man-in-the-middle attacks, which do not allow an attacker to intercept and re-record data communication during an authentication process. If a corresponding authentication process is intercepted and corresponding passwords are provided again for further authentication, no access is granted because the password has already been used up.

According to conventional methods, the so-called Trusted Platform Module TPM is used, which may be present as a chip that adds security functionality to a computer or similar device. However, this chip does not protect the booting process of a corresponding terminal and typically can not be managed such that a new version of control commands can be loaded. In general, hardware devices are known, such as a dongle, which carry a license key with them and are plugged, for example via a USB port to a personal computer. Typically, such dongle are not rewritable and just not firmly connected to the appropriate hardware.

So it is a disadvantage of known methods that either software protection mechanisms are used, which are to be bypassed or manipulated because they are written in a memory that can be addressed by other functions, or there is a hardware protection mechanism which, however, is not directly connected to the corresponding hardware and may possibly be lost.

It is thus known to have a secure element as a USB stick or as a smart card in such a way that it is connected to a personal computer becomes. Thus, this is generally accessible to anyone from outside the PC case and can also be lost or simply stolen. Furthermore, it is particularly disadvantageous that wear of the corresponding hardware device takes place and thus the corresponding safety precaution can be destroyed.

By a possible loss or failure is thus lost the identity of the associated terminal. A one-to-one and secure identification is therefore no longer possible. A professional continuous use is therefore neither timely nor practicable, since some application scenarios, such as environmental conditions in the industrial environment, do not allow such a design.

A smartcard terminal and its secret, which is needed for encryption, is typically only available in software on a PC. Other known methods, such as the already described TPM and TrustZone are not updatable and therefore unmanageable. Longer security keys or new algorithms can be reloaded, but the security level is static. So-called MAC addresses, CPU identities, motherboard identities are generally changeable and therefore not secure.

It is therefore an object of the present invention to propose a corresponding safety mechanism, for example in a memory arrangement which makes it possible to secure a mass data memory with little technical effort or to propose an authentication of a mass data memory with respect to further computational components. Furthermore, it is an object of the present invention to provide a corresponding method, which carries out a production of the proposed safety mechanism or the memory arrangement. Furthermore, it is one It would be an object of the present invention to provide a computer program product with control commands implementing the proposed method. The object is achieved by a memory arrangement having the features according to claim 1. Further advantageous embodiments are specified in the subclaims.

Accordingly, a method is proposed for producing a secure storage network with unique authentication and cryptographic data protection, comprising the steps of providing a mass data storage, providing a security element that is communicatively coupled to the mass data storage, wherein a secure data interface between the mass data storage and the security element is arranged, and the security element provides a safety-critical information regarding the data of the mass data storage. The person skilled in the art recognizes that the abovementioned steps can be carried out in a different order and may optionally have substeps. Optionally or alternatively, the security feature is coupled to the device in which the mass data storage is installed. The coupling can be done via one or more possibly different interfaces.

According to the invention, for example, a conventional mass data storage device can be upgraded in such a way that the security element verifies the data of the mass data memory or executes cryptographic operations on the data of the mass data memory. Such cryptographic operations do not have to be initiated directly by the security element itself. Rather, they can only be initiated by the security element.

The security element is particularly secure, for which structural and logical protection mechanisms are provided which protect the data of the security element. The security element may be a hardware component having a secure data store and an execution environment. A secure execution environment includes, for example, an operating system or hardware components that can execute arithmetic operations. The hardware used can be provided depending on the selection of the security element. Thus, it is possible to arrange a chip of the security element together with a chip of the mass data storage on a single board as a so-called chip stack, or to realize the security element as a secure core in the hard disk controller itself.

Thus, it is particularly vorteilhart according to the invention that a mass data storage with a secure unit, namely the security element, can be scored on and thus data integrity and confidentiality can be maintained. Consequently, the security element provides a possibility to securely authenticate the mass data storage against other components or to cryptographically secure data.

In addition, it is possible to safely identify the hard disk or the device in which it is installed.

According to a feature of the present invention, the security-critical information lies as an access authorization, an identity of the mass data memory, a cryptographic key, a data signature, a time stamp and / or a validity period of data. This has the advantage that access to the mass data storage can be granted or denied based on the security element. It is also possible to sign requested data from the mass data memory in such a way that its data integrity can be determined by another component. The access authorization or the data signature can also be provided with a period of validity, so that it can be specified how long an access authorization should exist or a data signature is valid. In this case, a relative period of validity starting from a time stamp may apply or else an end time may be specified for which the access authorization or the signature should expire.

According to another feature of the present invention, the unique key is used for secure encryption and / or decryption of mass storage data. This has the advantage that the security element per se performs an encryption and / or decryption or at least causes such a. The security element is capable of providing a trusted key that can be used as cryptographic information for encryption / decryption. Thus, a secure cryptographic key can be generated and used independently of the mass data storage data.

According to a further feature of the present invention, the security-critical information is generated by the security element

and / or stored. This has the advantage that the security element provides both a reliable, since secure, memory or even a cryptographic key can be generated at runtime. Thus, the security element can provide at least one arithmetic unit, hand of which a cryptographic algorithm generates safety-critical information. Thus, it is also possible not always to use the same safety-critical information, but at any time to generate new information or key.

According to a further feature of the present invention, the security element provides control commands. This has the advantage that the security element can provide a memory for applications which make it possible to implement additional logic that safeguards the mass data memory or its data. So security operations can be stored and executed on the security element. It is also possible to update or expand the control commands of the security element. The security element can also have an operating system, which can then be updated and expanded.

According to a further feature of the present invention, at least a part of the security element is arranged on a board together with a type of mass data storage. This has the advantage that, for example, a chip of the security element can be arranged in one piece with the chip of the mass data memory on a circuit board in such a way that a so-called chip stack is formed.

According to another part of the present invention, the secure data interface is provided using network components. This has the advantage that even a remote data storage, which are stored in a server, can be hedged according to the invention. Thus, the mass data storage and the security element are not connected directly communicatively, but indirectly through network factory components, such that the mass data storage communicates, for example via the Internet with the security element.

The object is also achieved by a secure memory arrangement with unique authentication with cryptographic data protection, comprising a mass data storage, a security element which is communicatively coupled to the mass data storage, wherein a secure data interface between the mass data storage and the security element is arranged and the security element is set up a to provide safety-critical information regarding the data of the mass data memory.

The present invention overcomes the disadvantage that a so-called Trusted Platform Module TPM often can not be used in industrial small plants, since such PCs have a long life cycle and the so-called Trusted Platform Module is difficult to manage. As an alternative, according to the invention, the integration of an embedded security element, that is to say an em, bedded secure element eSE, is proposed. Such a security element can be found, for example, on the mainboard of a computer. Preferably, however, the security element is arranged on a removable medium of a computer, preferably a solid state disk SSD. Thus, in accordance with one aspect of the present invention, a computer hard disk with integrated security element thus results. Thus, safety-critical operations can be requested directly from the PC and the interface to the mass data storage can be protected. Consequently, certificates, keys and the like can be stored on this secure mass data storage or the proposed storage arrangement. For this purpose, it is proposed to support cryptographic functions, which include a verification of signatures or even a Support authentication. Thus, for example, a licensing of a software can be managed.

Furthermore, according to one aspect of the present invention, a secure authentication memory arrangement is proposed. Here is a

Mass data storage provided, wherein a security element is provided which is communicatively coupled to the mass data storage and the security element provides a unique authentication information, based on which the mass data storage against other computational components is clearly authenticated.

According to the invention, a memory device is any device which comprises a data memory, preferably a mass data memory, and is typically both readable and writable. In such a mass data storage can be a so-called solid-state disk SSD, or even a conventional hard drive HDD. A conventional hard disk is generally a data storage device that provides two or three disks on which data is magnetically backed up. However, the person skilled in the art also knows other mass data stores which can be used according to the invention. This can be, for example, USB sticks or even SD cards of any type. A mass data storage provides a storage capacity of typically at least 64 MB, but typically has storage capacities between 1 GB and 3 TB. Thus, the feature of a master data store is by no means limitative, but rather one of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that this is generally a data store available to consumers. In addition, further developments fall under the concept of a mass data storage, since it is to be expected that the storage capacities will also increase in the future, whereby a large number of TB can be stored.

Secure authentication can take place by means of the memory arrangement in cooperation with an authentication authority. In this case, it is possible that, according to the invention, authentication information or authentication information is provided by means of the security element, and the corresponding information is transmitted to a superordinate location. Thus, it is possible to provide a device identifier by means of the security element, which is unique with respect to the mass data storage. Thus, the mass data store indirectly authenticates itself via the security element to an authentication authority.

In this case, it is possible, for example, for the corresponding location to be installed in a personal computer or else in a network. Thus, the mass data storage can be verified and a boot process of an operating system can only take place if the corresponding mass data storage which stores the control commands of the operating system is also properly authenticated. In accordance with conventional techniques, each computer may be powered up with any hard disk having corresponding boot sectors and other control instructions provided by the operating system. In this case, however, according to conventional methods, it is not ensured that exactly that data medium is also booted, which is also provided for this purpose. Thus, it is an attack scenario that the bootable data carrier is replaced in a computer and control commands load an operating system that are not actually authorized for this purpose. Thus, it is an advantage of the present invention that the mass data storage can be authenticated by means of the security element against further components in a computer or a computer network. Thus, when switching on the computer, the security element can first be checked, and accessed only for a positive check on the mass data storage, for example, to boot.

For example, it is possible for the mass data store, together with the security element, that is to say the memory arrangement, to be connected to a mainboard of a computer. This can already be set in a BIOS, which disk is allowed to operate the appropriate computer. Thus, for example, a whitelist with device identifier can be stored in a data memory of a mainboard, which describes terminals which are permitted according to the invention for operating the computer. Now, if the computer is turned on, for example, this BIOS, which may also be present as a middleware or generally as a driver, are loaded, and this motherboard-side BIOS accesses the security element of the data carrier according to the invention. Subsequently, the memory arrangement according to the invention is authenticated in the BIOS of the mainboard. Only if the appropriate mass data storage is also listed in the whitelist of the motherboard, then appropriate boot sectors are read, and there is a loading of the operating system. In this way, according to the invention, it is ensured that only authorized data carriers execute or provide certain control commands.

In particular, it is advantageous in this case that the security element is arranged with respect to the mass data storage that these two components are inseparable. Thus, it is not possible, the security element nondestructively from the mass data storage to solve. In this case, the person skilled in the art recognizes how he can produce such a compound according to the invention. For example, the two components, ie the mass data memory and the security element, can be formed in one piece or can also be provided as a module. In this case, it is also possible that both the mass data storage and the security element are arranged on a circuit board. This ensures that the security element is never disconnected from the mass data carrier and thus an authentication of the mass data storage is always possible according to the invention. In this case, further locking mechanisms can be provided, which, if the security element is detached or manipulated, cause the mass data memory to be blocked.

The security element may be a hardware-technical device, which is designed to be particularly tamper-proof.

Thus, it is advantageous to design the security element such that it shares no memory with other components, so no so-called shared memory is provided. This avoids that unauthorized components have access to the data storage of the security element and thus can write or manipulate data unauthorized. Furthermore, according to a further aspect, the security element is designed in such a way that special software-technical devices are taken so that manipulation can be ruled out. These may in turn be cryptographic algorithms or generally a security software.

Furthermore, it is advantageous to design data lines such that they are used exclusively by the security element and only one specially secured external bus is provided. In general, a security element can be present as a so-called secure element SE.

Other application scenarios include, for example, security features in the form of a UICC or an eUICC. These can also be used according to the invention as a security element in the present data store. Thus, a security element may exist as a secure element, which may be integrated into conventional mobile phones. This protects important data such as PIN code, pictures, SMS and more. They are a component in the development of new technologies such as NFC, since such data are extremely sensitive. For example, such a security element may exist as a MicroSD card or an integrated SIM. However, according to the invention, these devices are adapted such that they are connected in one piece or inseparably with the mass data memory.

The coupling of the security element to the mass data memory can be effected such that a data line is provided between the mass data memory and the security element, which can be part of a bus system. In this case, it is particularly advantageous to protect the corresponding data line in such a way that the unique authentication information can be exchanged unadulterated between the security element and the mass data memory. In an alternative embodiment, it is also possible that mass data storage and the security element are separated from each other such that the transmission of the authentication information between the security element and a component is performed, which is externally arranged the mass data storage. In a preferred embodiment, however, the memory arrangement is designed in such a way that the security element communicates in such a way with the Mass data storage is connected, that control commands can be stored on the mass data storage, which check whether the security element is actually present or the unique authentication information can be read out. In this way, an interface to external components can be provided, by means of which both the mass data storage and the security element can be read out.

The mass data memory can in turn be subdivided in such a way that the mass data memory comprises both memory units and also further control components, such as microcontrollers, which provide a corresponding logic which accesses the memory units. Thus, it is possible to separately implement the data storage of the security element and of the mass data storage and nevertheless to provide a uniform interface by means of which the security element as well as the mass data storage can be read out. The person skilled in the art will recognize further possible embodiments of how the security element and the mass data memory are to be coupled with one another. Authentication takes place with respect to further computation components, which are typically arranged externally with regard to the memory arrangement. Such computational components can be components of a mainboard which check whether the mass data storage used actually corresponds to the expected mass data storage. Thus, the proposed secure authentication memory device may also be referred to as a secure authentication memory device. This is the case since the memory arrangement or the proposed security element only provides the unique authentication information which, although generally intended for authentication, is used. hen, wherein the step of authenticating is carried out only by the security element proposed according to the invention. Thus, the proposed memory arrangement generally has the possibility of authentication, but does itself only one step of authentication, ie providing the authentication information. According to the invention, further authentication units can thus be provided, which in turn are communicatively coupled to the security element such that these authentication points or the authentication point authenticate the mass data store using the security element or the unique authentication information. Overall, the person skilled in the art recognizes that with regard to the proposed memory arrangement, further components, as already known, are to be provided.

According to one aspect of the present invention, the mass data storage and the security element have separate storage areas. This has the advantage that the security element can be particularly secured in such a way that it is not possible to access a particularly security-relevant memory of the security element by means of the mass data memory. Thus, no shared memory is implemented, but rather, each of the two components has their own physical storage devices. However, should a single physical storage device actually be provided for both components, that is to say the mass data storage and the security element, these are at least separated by software technology. This can happen, for example, via own address spaces such that control commands from the mass data memory can not access a data memory of the security element or here

Rights management is implemented. Thus, it is generally possible to design the memory area of the security element in such a way that only read commands can be carried out on the memory. According to a further aspect of the present invention, the mass data memory and the security element have separate arithmetic units or are actuated by separate arithmetic units. This has the advantage that another security mechanism is implemented in such a way that the control logic of the security element is completely separate from the control logic of the mass data memory. This in turn prevents manipulation of the respective units. Furthermore, it is possible to provide different hardware for each of the components involved.

According to another aspect of the present invention, the mass data storage and the security element are inseparably connected. This has the advantage that it is always ensured during an authentication process that the security element actually authenticates the intended mass data storage. Thus, it is avoided, as it is disadvantageous in the prior art that the security element can be removed from the mass data storage or can be replaced. Thus, a user always has the assurance that the security element actually authenticates the mass storage device that is intended for it.

According to another aspect of the present invention, the mass data storage and the security element are arranged on a circuit board. This has the advantage that the mass data storage and the security element are integrally formed in such a way that they are provided as a single module and can also rely on a single bus system. Thus, a particularly hardware-efficient implementation of the proposed memory arrangement takes place. Here, a board is not one rather, a block of the mass data memory can be used to integrate the security element. A board is thus to be understood as merely exemplary, since typically a mass data memory has a corresponding board.

According to a further aspect of the present invention, the mass data memory and the security element are each controllable by means of separate control commands. This has the advantage that different drivers can be installed, which operate either the mass data storage or the security element. However, it is further ensured that a separate functionality can be implemented such that no attacks on the respective other device are possible. Thus, for example, the mass data memory can be implemented by means of conventional control commands, and the security element can be operated with a particularly secure software or control commands. This also has the advantage that conventional mass data storage can be retrofitted without having to re-implement corresponding control commands. According to another aspect of the present invention, the mass data storage and the security element are controlled by separate operating systems. This has the advantage that different operating systems can find reuse and thus different driver versions with respect to the security element and the mass data storage can be used. In particular, there are special operating systems that manage mass data storage so that the operating system of the security element can be implemented separately. Furthermore, it is thus possible to easily load updates of the control commands of the security element, which then in turn make attacks more difficult become. Thus, when adapting the operating system of the security element or the corresponding driver, the corresponding operating system of the mass data storage does not have to be disclosed or adapted. According to another aspect of the present invention, the control commands operating the security element are interchangeable. This has the advantage that the control logic of the security element are not hard-coded deposited, but rather that corresponding updates of the control commands can be recorded. Thus, the proposed security feature differs from known methods that provide hardware security mechanisms that, however, can not be overwritten. In this case, it is particularly advantageous according to the invention that the replacement of the control commands, that is to say an update, can also be carried out by means of an interface of the memory arrangement. Thus, the updating of the control commands can also be carried out by components which are arranged externally of the memory arrangement.

According to another aspect of the present invention, the security element provides a list comprising computational components with respect to which the mass data storage is authenticated. This has the advantage that a so-called whitelist can be provided, indicating a list of trusted external components that can contact the mass data store. This ensures that an authentication with respect to non-trusted terminals, which are therefore not present on the list, is always negative. Thus, untrusted terminals are excluded in such a way that they can not pass through an authentication process with respect to the mass data store in a positive manner and thus also have no access to the mass data storage. received memory. In the other direction, the mass data store can not pass data to such untrusted external components. According to a further aspect of the present invention, access to the mass data storage in dependence on a release by the security element is feasible. This has the advantage that the security element can possibly perform a corresponding authentication with other components, and only with positive authentication data exchange with external components can be done. Thus, the security element can control the access to the mass data storage and, if necessary, implement a rights management.

According to a further aspect of the present invention, the security element is secured against manipulation by means of control commands and / or structural features. This has the advantage that both structural features and control commands can be provided which prevent manipulation of the security element. According to the invention a separate security element is provided, which can be secured with greater technical effort than the mass data storage itself. In this form, the effort is then limited to the security element, and it can be retrofitted, for example, conventional media. According to another aspect of the present invention, the mass data storage is present as a solid state disk and / or a magnetic disk hard disk. Thus, either a solid-state disk or a magnetic disk hard disk, ie a conventional hard disk, can be present. However, it is also possible to use the mass data storage as a hybrid hard disk of to implement a flash memory is provided and also provided structural features of a conventional hard drive. Thus, structural features of both hard disk types of both SSD and HDD are provided. In this case, however, the person skilled in the art also recognizes that he can secure further mass data stores with the security element according to the invention. Thus, it is preferable to store a flash memory by means of the proposed security element.

According to another aspect of the present invention, the mass data storage comprises at least one interface of a group of interfaces, comprising: M.2, SATA, mSATA, PCI, PCIe and USB. This has the advantage that conventional interfaces with respect to the mass data storage can find reuse. Thus, it is possible to upgrade conventional mass data storage according to the invention or to provide a mass data storage that can be addressed with common interfaces. In this case, the person skilled in the art recognizes that the enumeration is merely an example enumeration. All data memories or interfaces which are compatible with the listed standards are also relevant. In particular, only one family name is used for each standard. Thus, for example, the average expert recognizes that USB, for example, USB 1.0, USB 2.0, USB 3.0 and other versions are called. Overall, the proposed interface refers to all common interfaces, such as those installed in personal computers. Furthermore, the data interface does not have to be wired, but rather an air interface can be used.

In addition, by means of a generated by the security element SE or provided, generated, safely introduced cryptographic key Sels the memory contents of the mass data storage are encrypted or decrypted. Furthermore, further functions or functional extensions and functional changes can be safely added, changed or removed by so-called applets in the SE. In addition, data of the mass memory can be signed or a possibly present signature can be checked.

Other external media (e.g., external media, storage media, virtual media, etc.) are in accordance with one aspect of the present invention, which are then logically connected to the SE.

Also, use of the security element SE for corresponding functions outside the device operating system, e.g. UEFI BIOS, microcontroller firmware, etc. are suggested.

Furthermore, in the case of a file / document management system, the corresponding file should remain encrypted or the opening should be denied by withdrawing or, if the validity of keys for signature or for encryption or decryption is expiring, expiring.

The object is also achieved, according to an aspect of the present invention, by a method for providing a memory arrangement for secure authentication, comprising providing a mass data memory, wherein a provision of a security element is provided, which is communicatively coupled to the mass data memory, and the security element a unique authentication information provides, based on which the mass data storage is clearly authenticated against other computational components. The object is also achieved according to one aspect of the present invention by a computer program product with control commands which implement the proposed method or operate the proposed memory arrangement.

According to the invention, it is particularly advantageous that the structural features of the memory arrangement can also be implemented as corresponding method steps. Furthermore, the proposed method is suitable for operating the memory arrangement, for which purpose the proposed control commands can be used, for example.

Further advantageous embodiments will be explained in more detail with reference to the accompanying figures. 1 shows a memory arrangement according to one aspect of the present invention

Invention; and

2 shows a schematic flow chart of a method for providing or for operating the memory arrangement according to the invention.

Fig. 1 shows a schematic diagram in which the mass data memory is formed as a so-called solid-state disk SSD. Here, the security element SE is arranged on a board with the mass data storage. The data communication takes place via a bus system, for which purpose corresponding feet are arranged on the security element. Depending on the embodiment of the memory arrangement, the card shown in FIG. 1 may be referred to as a mass data memory or else as a memory arrangement. So it is possible that the card shown completely acts as a mass storage, with only the security element is put on. It is further possible to refer to the large, essentially central block as mass data storage. In this case, the person skilled in the art recognizes that it is essential to the invention that with regard to a mass data memory, however it is configured, only one security element has to be arranged. Furthermore, the person skilled in the art recognizes that further typical components of a mass data memory are to be provided.

The combination of mass data storage SSD with a secure element, also referred to as cryptotoken, is shown by way of example on an M.2 SATA plug-in module. By installing in a PC, a loss of identification or the manipulation of these is prevented or significantly more difficult. Thus, it is possible according to the invention to perform a secure identification of a device in a network. Furthermore, secure authentication / authentication between built-in secure element and customary authentication / authentication measures such as user name and password, smart card and password, OTP and password or even OTP can be implemented. Two synchronized OTP mechanisms can also be implemented, for example as an internal security element and external device (smartphone with OTP function, embedded security element) or the like. Furthermore, validation of the device may be done during a process. Furthermore, a software license anchor, ie a memory with license information, can be implemented. A key generation in the device for data signing and secure product identification according to the keyword Industry 4.0 is also possible. Furthermore, identities of IoT sensors or devices can be coded. It is also possible to sign system changes, such as in an update. The encryption of data and data carriers or partitions and storage of the secret in the security element is also advantageous. Furthermore, a whitelist of permitted external devices can be be attached, which, for example, a USB stick, a cell phone, a keyboard, a mouse, a display or the like, which may be connected to the PC. Thus, a backup against a "bad USB device" such as keyloggers can be done.

Depending on the loaded applet in the security element, various applications can be realized. As is usual with a smartcard, it can be managed remotely. The PC applications, including the operating system, can be securely integrated via a middleware software and / or a driver with the security element. The device boot process can be secured through interaction between the signed UEFI / EFI BIOS and the security element. Both identify each other. Only then does the system start including the operating system. Thus, according to the invention, the problem is solved that conventional mass data storage devices have no secure elements SE and thus unambiguous, secure identification is not possible if a security mechanism that is implemented in terms of hardware technology is lost. The secret of a smart card terminal is typically implemented in software only and not as hardware. Other known methods such as TPM, TrustZone are not updatable and unmanageable.

This is inventively achieved in that a combination of mass data storage, z. B. SSD, with a security element, for. B. a cryptotoken on a module, eg. BM2 SATA cartridge is provided. Thus, there is the advantage that when installed in the PC, a loss of identification or manipulation is significantly more difficult. The applications loaded in the security element can be managed remotely. and the device boot process is safeguarded by interaction between the signed BIOS and the security element.

2 shows a schematic flowchart of a method for providing a memory arrangement for secure authentication, comprising providing 100 of a mass data storage SSD, wherein providing 101 a security element SE is provided, which is communicatively coupled to the mass data storage SSD 102, and Security element SE provides a unique authentication information, provides 103, based on which the mass data storage SSD is compared with other computing components clearly authenticated 104. The skilled artisan will recognize that the above process steps iteratively and / or can be performed in a different order.

Not shown in the present case is a computer program product with control commands which implement the method or operate the proposed memory arrangement.

Claims

P a n t a n s p r e c h e

A method of fabricating a secure storage device having unique authentication and cryptographic data protection, comprising the steps of:

Providing a mass data storage (SSD);

Providing a security element (SE) which is communicatively coupled to the mass data storage (SSD), characterized in that

a secure data interface between the mass data storage (SSD) and the security element (SE) is arranged, and the security element (SE) provides a safety-critical information regarding the data of the mass data storage (SSD).

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the security-critical information as an access authorization, an identity of the mass data storage (SSD), a cryptographic key, a data signature, a time stamp and / or a validity period of data is present.

Method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the security element (SE) provides a unique key, by means of which the mass data memory (SSD) is uniquely authenticated against other computational components and / or based on which a cryptographic operation is carried out. no data is stored, which are stored on the mass data storage (SSD).

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that the unique key for use in a secure encrypting and / or decrypting the data of the mass data storage (SSD) is used.

5. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the safety-critical information generated by the security element (SE) and / or stored.

6. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that access to the mass data storage (SSD) only in response to a release by the security element (SE) is feasible.

7. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the security element (SE) provides control commands.

8. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the security element (SE) data of the mass data storage (SSD) signed, encrypted and / or decrypted.

9. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the mass data memory (SSD) and the security element (SE) have separate memory areas and / or separate computing units.

10. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the mass data storage (SSD) and the security element (SE) are inseparably connected to each other.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that at least part of the security element (SE) is arranged on a board together with a chip of the mass data storage (SSD).

12. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that the secure data interface is provided using network components.

13. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the mass data storage (SSD) as a flash memory, an FRAM, an MRAM, a PRAM, a magnetic tape, an opto-magnetic memory, an optical memory, a bio-electrical Memory, a solid-state disk and / or a magnetic disc hard disk is present.

14. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the mass data storage (SSD) comprises at least one interface of a group of interfaces, the group comprising: an interface according to the ISO / IEC 7816 specification, I2C, SPI, M.2, SATA, mSATA, PCI, PCIe and USB.

15. Secure memory arrangement with clear authentication and cryptographic data protection, comprising: a mass data storage (SSD);

a security element (SE) which is communicatively coupled to the mass data storage (SSD), characterized in that

a secure data interface is arranged between the mass data memory (SSD) and the security element (SE), and the security element (SE) is set up to provide security-critical information regarding the data of the mass data memory (SSD).