EP3552136A1 - Technique for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating device - Google Patents
Technique for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating deviceInfo
- Publication number
- EP3552136A1 EP3552136A1 EP17812029.1A EP17812029A EP3552136A1 EP 3552136 A1 EP3552136 A1 EP 3552136A1 EP 17812029 A EP17812029 A EP 17812029A EP 3552136 A1 EP3552136 A1 EP 3552136A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- security element
- access
- power supply
- supply module
- module
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 31
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 8
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 78
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 claims description 40
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 claims description 9
- 230000037452 priming Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000015654 memory Effects 0.000 description 9
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 6
- QVFWZNCVPCJQOP-UHFFFAOYSA-N chloralodol Chemical compound CC(O)(C)CC(C)OC(O)C(Cl)(Cl)Cl QVFWZNCVPCJQOP-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 6
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012217 deletion Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000037430 deletion Effects 0.000 description 2
- 239000000463 material Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000000779 smoke Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003750 conditioning effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013523 data management Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/81—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer by operating on the power supply, e.g. enabling or disabling power-on, sleep or resume operations
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
- H04W12/35—Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
- H04W8/20—Transfer of user or subscriber data
- H04W8/205—Transfer to or from user equipment or user record carrier
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
- Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security
Definitions
- the invention relates to the general field of telecommunications.
- the invention relates more particularly to a technique for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating device.
- the technique for managing a right of access to a service is in the field of communicating devices with battery or battery power supply.
- communicating or connected device By communicating or connected device is meant a device capable of exchanging information with other devices.
- these devices there are those who exchange information via a communication network administered by a network operator, with, depending on the case, another device, a communication terminal or a computer equipment of the communication network.
- the communication network can rely on mobile cellular network technologies known as 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G as well as LPWA (low power wide area) low power wide area network technologies such as the LoRa network.
- the communication by means of so-called long-range networks differs from that by means of so-called low-range networks (such as Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy, WiFi, Zigbee, Z-Wave, etc.) by the following advantages:
- the communicating device can then connect autonomously and transparently for its user to access points of the communication network compatible with the communication means of the communicating device.
- the subject of the invention is a method for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating device.
- the method comprises:
- the security element of the device once configured having a right of access to a valid service allowing the device to access to the service and said right of access remaining valid as said device is powered by said power supply module.
- the technique of management of right of access to a service originates from a problem noted for a right of access to a communication network. It is however applicable for any service, such as access to a communication network, access to data, access to an application, access to a feature or a combination of these different accesses.
- power supply module is meant a battery or battery intended to be inserted into a communicating device to power the latter.
- the right of access to a service depends on the power supply of the communicating device by the power supply module.
- the latter comprises not only an energy capacity to provide the communicating device but also a right to access a service, for example to the communication network.
- the power supply module thus guarantees the communicating device a right of access to the service as long as it is able to supply electrical energy to the device.
- the power supply module thus integrates a right of access to the service.
- the power supply module thus guarantees the communicating device a right to communicate via a network as long as it is able to provide information. electrical energy to the device.
- the power supply module thus integrates a right to communicate using a communication network.
- the user journey is thus simplified: for access to a communication network, the user must not manage a subscription subscription and then configure his communicating device according to his subscription. It is the same for access to a service. It is sufficient for the user to acquire a power supply module able to implement the actions (or steps) of the method for managing a right of access to a service, to insert it into its communicating device. to access the service. The right of access to a service is renewed as soon as the user inserts a new power supply module. The user should not be careful maintaining his subscription with the network operator or even subscribing to the service.
- This technique of management of a right of access to a service is particularly well adapted to be implemented in communicating devices, because these are very often powered by power supply modules, such as batteries or batteries, so that they can be easily moved.
- power supply modules such as batteries or batteries
- This technique is particularly interesting for telecommunications operators or providers of access to long-range communication networks because it allows the implementation of a distribution model of the right of access to a service using a pre-existing distribution network, that is to say that of batteries or batteries.
- the user journey is known and controlled from start to finish by a large part of consumers and end users: just buy and insert or change a battery within a device.
- the right of access to a service is a right of access to a communication network, also called a network access right
- such a technique is likely to facilitate and encourage the emergence of new communicating devices within a network.
- the Internet of Things industry because of the problems and bottlenecks it suppresses in terms of access to the long-range communications network.
- the security element of the device is configured to be able to perform the authentication of the security element of the power supply module without requiring exchanges with servers accessible via an extended communication network.
- the security element of the device has the means necessary for verifying the authenticity of the security element of the power supply module.
- the security element of the power supply module also authenticates the security element of the device.
- each of the security elements has the means necessary to verify the authenticity of its peer security element.
- an earlier association with another device is suppressed following said start of distribution of electrical energy. Removing earlier associations between a security element of a power supply module and a security element of a communicating device ensures that a user can not continue to benefit from the access right by feeding his communicating device in a standard way. Once inserted into a communicating device, the actions described above are again implemented by the power supply module.
- the management method comprises an invalidation by the security element of the power supply module of the access right available to the security element of the device on detecting a residual electrical energy less than one threshold.
- the power supply module can anticipate its complete discharge and ensure the removal of the right of access in the communicating device.
- said configuration comprises at least one sending of information relating to the validity of the right of access to the security element of the device.
- the configuration comprises sending a piece of information relating to an access profile to the communication network to be downloaded by the security element of the device.
- the security element is an eUICC type card.
- the security element of the device can then download the access profile which will allow it to then access in an unrestricted manner to a communication network.
- the configuration comprises an activation of the access right stored by the security element of the device.
- the configuration comprises a sending by the security element of the power supply module to the security element of the device of at least one security key.
- the invention relates to a power supply module for electrically powering a communicating device.
- This module includes:
- a security element comprising:
- a detection module arranged to detect a start of distribution of electrical energy to said device
- an authentication module arranged to authenticate itself to a security element of the device at the end of which said security elements are associated;
- a configuration module arranged to configure the security element of the device, the security element of the device once configured having a right of access to a device; a valid service enabling the device to access the service and said access right remaining valid as long as said device is powered by said power supply module.
- the invention relates to a communicating device intended to be electrically powered by a power supply module.
- This device comprises:
- a communication module arranged to communicate with devices of a communication network
- a security element comprising:
- a priming module arranged to start said security element following a start of distribution of electrical energy to said device
- an authentication module arranged to implement authentication of a security element of the power supply module after which said security elements are associated;
- a configuration module arranged to be configured by the security element of the power supply module, the security element of the device once configured having a right of access to a valid service enabling the device to access to the service and said right of access remaining valid as said device is powered by said power supply module.
- the invention relates to a program for a power supply module, comprising program code instructions intended to control the execution of those of the actions of the right of access management method to a previously described service. implemented by the power supply module, when this program is executed by this module and a recording medium readable by a power supply module on which is recorded a program for a power supply module.
- the invention relates to a program for a communicating device, comprising program code instructions intended to control the execution of those of the actions of the method of management of right of access to a previously described service implemented. by the communicating device, when this program is executed by this device and a recording medium readable by a device on which is recorded a program for a device.
- the advantages stated for the method of management of right of access to a service according to the first aspect are transferable directly to the program for a communicating device and to the recording medium.
- the technique of managing a right of access to a service of a communicating device will be better understood by means of the following description of particular embodiments, with reference to the appended drawings in which:
- Figure 1 shows a communicating device and a power supply module in a particular embodiment
- FIG. 2a illustrates steps of a method for managing a right of access to a service according to a particular embodiment
- FIG. 2b illustrates steps of a method for managing a right of access to a service according to a particular embodiment
- Figure 3a shows a communicating device according to a particular embodiment
- FIG. 3b represents a security element of a communicating device according to a particular embodiment
- FIG. 3c represents a security element of a power supply module according to a particular embodiment.
- Figure 1 shows a communicating device 20 and a power supply module 10 in a particular embodiment.
- a device or object communicating or connected is an object adapted to exchange information via a communication network, with, depending on the case, another object, a communication terminal or a computer equipment of the communication network.
- a mobile terminal a watch adapted to transmit information to a mobile terminal via an extended communication network such as the Internet
- a smoke detector adapted to communicate with a remote mobile terminal to signal the presence of smoke in a mobile phone. home are examples of connected objects.
- the communicating device 20 is a medical monitoring unit, adapted to measure the physical characteristics of the user who wears it, for example its heart rate and to transmit measurements to a remote computing device by the intermediate of a communication network (not shown in Figure 1).
- the communication network comprises at least one access network to an extended communication network, for example the Internet network.
- the access network may be a mobile cellular network, for example of the 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G type, or a LPWA low power wide area network such as the LoRa network.
- the power supply module 10 comprises, in particular, means 11 arranged to supply electrical energy to a device to be powered and a safety element 12.
- the means 11 correspond, for example, to an electric battery or battery, arranged to transform an energy of a chemical reaction in electrical energy. Such a battery is for single use and can not be recharged.
- the means 11 correspond to a rechargeable battery.
- the battery is recharged with a charging device that also manages a recharging of the right of access to the service in the battery.
- the power supply module 10 When the power supply module 10 is inserted or connected to a device to be powered, it discharges by supplying energy to this device.
- the format of the power supply module may be based on an existing battery or battery standard, such as LR6, LR3, LR14, 6LR61, CR2032, CR2016, CR2012, CR1220, etc.
- the format of the power supply module can be based on a battery format specific to the communicating device, adapted to its use, particularly the format, power consumption and connectivity needs thereof.
- the security element 12 is a dedicated inviolable platform, including hardware and software, able to securely host an application and its security data.
- the security element 12 is a system on a SoC chip (for "System on Chip"), a secure hardware element type SE (for "Secure Element”), an integrated circuit IC (for "Integrated Circuit”).
- the security element further provides a trusted application execution environment ("Trusted Execution Environment”).
- Trusted Execution Environment Alternatively, other elements or security mechanisms may be provided, to ensure the security of the management process according to the right of access concerned.
- FIG. 3c schematically illustrates the security element 12 in a particular embodiment.
- the security element 12 includes in particular:
- a processor 120 for executing code instructions of software modules
- a communication module 121 forming a communication interface with another security element
- a memory zone 122 arranged for storing a program that includes code instructions for implementing the steps of the management method
- a storage memory 123 arranged to store data used during the implementation of the management method
- a detection module 124 arranged to detect a start of distribution of electrical energy to said device
- an authentication module 125 arranged to authenticate with a security element of a powered device, the two security elements being associated once the security element 12 has been authenticated;
- a configuration module 126 arranged to configure the security element of the device, the security element of the device once configured having a right of access to a valid service allowing the device to access this service and this right of access remaining valid as long as the device is powered.
- the authentication module 125 is also arranged to implement an authentication of the security element 22 of the device.
- the communicating device 20 as shown in FIG. 1, comprises in particular a receptacle 21, designed to receive a power supply module 10, a security element 22, a block denoted B grouping together all the processing modules of the device communicating.
- the receptacle 21 is for example molded and accessible by removing a shell from the communicating device 20.
- the hardware architecture of the communicating device 20 is more specifically described later in connection with FIG. 3a.
- the security element 22 is a dedicated inviolable platform, including hardware and software, capable of securely hosting applications and their confidential and cryptographic data and providing a secure application execution environment, for example a security card.
- UICC type Alternatively, other elements or security mechanisms can be provided, to ensure the security of the access right management process.
- FIG. 3b schematically illustrates the security element 22 in a particular embodiment.
- the security element 22 comprises in particular:
- a processor 220 for executing code instructions of software modules
- a memory zone 222 arranged for storing a program that includes code instructions for implementing steps of the management method
- a priming module 224 arranged to start said security element following a start of distribution of electrical energy to the device
- an authentication module 225 arranged to implement an authentication of a security element of the power supply module at the end of which the security elements are associated;
- the authentication module 225 is also arranged to authenticate with the security element of the power supply module.
- the security element 22 is of the eUICC ("embedded universal integrated circuit card") type, also called “eSIM” (of the “embedded Subscriber Identity Module”), or on-board or immovable SIM card, such as in the course of a technical specification within the framework of the GSMA association.
- the two security elements 12, 22 can be in different forms.
- a "access right to a service" or access data which once made valid by the security element 12 to the security element 22, will enable the communicating device 20 to access a service.
- This or these access data depend on the service to which the communicating device must access.
- the service may correspond to access to data available in the communicating device, to a remote server or to another communicating device, access to an application available in the communicating device, on a remote server or on another communicating device, access to a feature or access to a communication network. It is possible to combine several access rights to a service.
- this or these access data depends on the access technology of the communication network to which the communicating device 20 must access.
- the security element 22 may correspond to a conventional SIM card which has been previously configured with a network operator.
- the validation of the access right corresponds, for example, to a sending of a signal or an activation message of the security element 22 or else to an activation of a communication module of the communicating device 20.
- the security element 22 may correspond to a remotely programmable SIM card, that is to say configurable remotely or "over the air”. This technique is known as remote post-allocation of an access profile of a security element.
- the access right corresponds in this case to an access profile to be downloaded by the security element 22.
- This access right is sent by the security element 12 to the security element 22.
- the security element 22 comprises a limited access profile (known as a boot profile or "bootstrap”) to the network of an operator, allowing only access to a network to download an access profile network, identified by the access right provided by the security element 12. More specifically, an access profile was generated by a subscription data management server, not shown in Figure 1, linked to the operator.
- the access profile includes a network access application and associated access data (referred to as "credentials" in English), such as cryptographic keys and algorithms.
- credentials such as cryptographic keys and algorithms.
- the access profile once installed and authorized allows access to an infrastructure of a given mobile network. It notably makes it possible to authenticate the communicating device 20, more precisely the security element 22 during an access to the network of the operator.
- an access data item corresponds to a communication key that enables the communicating device 20 to authenticate with equipment of the communication network.
- the access datum is the LoRa network key, called "Network Key”.
- This network key allows the security element 22 to calculate one or more session keys, called "Network Session Key”.
- This embodiment is suitable when the communicating device 20, more precisely the security element 22, is previously certified by the operator of the communication network.
- the security element 12 is able to authenticate the security element 22 or to verify that the security element 22 is trusted. This ensures that the network key is not provided to an unauthorized security element.
- access data directly corresponds to a network session key to be used.
- This embodiment is suitable when the communicating device 20, more precisely the security element 22, is not previously certified by the operator of the communication network.
- no long-term secret is transmitted by the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 to the security element 22 of the communicating device 20.
- the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 contains the network key and calculates the network session key to use.
- the security element 22 of the communicating device 20 then regularly interrogates the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 in order to obtain a new network session key.
- the access right corresponds to a radio interface configuration authorization ("over the air") of a network key.
- the right of access to a service is validated by the security element 12 with the security element 22 and allows the communicating device 20 to access the service.
- the security element 12 stores a pair of keys: a private key of its own, used to sign data, and an associated public key.
- a public key certificate for example an X509 type certificate, has been issued to certify the public key by a certificate issuer.
- the security element 22 of the communicating device 20 stores the public key certificate of the certificate issuer. This allows the security element 22 to verify locally the certificate of the security element 12.
- each security element 12, 22 stores a pair of keys: a private key of its own, used to sign data, and an associated public key.
- a public key certificate for example an X509 type certificate, has been issued for certify the public key by a certificate issuer. Both public key certificates are signed by the same certificate issuer, to allow mutual authentication locally.
- the certificates presented may be individual certificates, or group certificates to preserve anonymity of the security element (s).
- the authentication is explicit by implementing a zero-disclosure protocol of knowledge.
- Each security element provides evidence of knowledge of a secret without having to disclose it.
- FIG. 3a schematically illustrates a communicating device 20 in a particular embodiment.
- the communicating device 20 comprises in particular:
- a communication module 201 forming a communication interface with a communication network, arranged to communicate with devices of a communication network;
- a communication module 202 forming a communication interface with a security element
- a memory zone 203 arranged to store a program that includes code instructions for implementing steps of the management method
- a storage memory 204 arranged to store data used during the implementation of the management method
- Access to a service for the communicating device depends in particular on a right of access to the service.
- the communication module 201 is operational when a valid access right is configured.
- the communicating device 20 also comprises other processing modules, not shown in Figure 3a, arranged to implement the different communicating device functions.
- the communication module 221 is in particular arranged to communicate with the communication module 121 by means of a physical interface for example wireframe.
- the communication module 121 is in particular arranged to communicate with the communication module 221 by means of this physical interface.
- the communication module 221 is in particular arranged to communicate with the communication module 121 by means of a near-field or short-range wireless communication protocol.
- the communication module 121 is in particular arranged to communicate with the communication module 221 by means of this communication protocol.
- the exchanges between the two security elements 12, 22 are effected via a secure communication channel.
- FIG. 2a illustrates steps of the method for managing a right of access to a service for the communicating device 20 making it possible to configure the security element 22 with the right of access to a service.
- the communicating device 20 In the initial state, the communicating device 20 is not powered.
- the power supply module 10 (more precisely the power supply means 11) does not deliver electrical energy.
- the communicating device 20 can not access the communication network.
- the power supply module 10 is inserted in the communicating device 20 in the zone 21 which is provided for this purpose.
- the communicating device 20 and the security element 22 are then supplied with electrical energy by the power supply module 10.
- the security element 12 is also supplied with electrical energy.
- a step F1 the security element 22 starts a boot program.
- a step E1 the security element 12 detects a start of distribution of electrical energy by the power supply module 10 to the communicating device 20 and to the security element 22. This detection (following the start of distribution of electrical energy) triggers a step E2, in which the security element 12 removes an earlier association with a communicating device. Thus, the security element 12 mates again with each insertion in a communicating device, as long as the power supply module 10 still has electrical energy.
- This detection of a start of distribution of electrical energy to the communicating device 20 also triggers an authentication of the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 by the security element 22 of the communicating device 20 at the end of which these security elements 12, 22 are associated.
- the security element 22 of the device contacts in a step F2 the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 and authenticates it.
- This authentication is performed for example by means of a public key certificate stored in the security element 12 of the power supply module 10. It is recalled here that this certificate is signed by a certificate issuer.
- the security element 22 of the communicating device 20 has a certificate of public key of the issuer of certificate, in order to implement authentication locally. This authentication allows guarantee that the power supply module 10 is authorized by the network operator to supply and configure a network access right.
- the power supply module 10 stops supplying power to the communicating device 20.
- the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 also authenticates the security element 22 of the communicating device 20.
- the authentication is then mutual. This authentication is carried out for example by means of the public key certificates stored in the security elements 12, 22.
- This mutual authentication makes it possible to guarantee that the power supply module 10 is authorized by the network operator to configure a network. network access right and that the communicating device 20 is authorized by the same network operator to access the communication network. If this mutual authentication fails, the power supply module 10 stops supplying power to the communicating device 20.
- the security element 22 When the security element 22 has authenticated the security element 12, or in the other embodiment, when the two security elements 12, 22 are mutually authenticated, they are then paired or associated.
- the security element 12 stores an identifier of the security element 22 of the communicating device 20 with which it has mated.
- the security element 22 stores an identifier of the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 with which it has mated. This completes the phase ⁇ of pairing or association between the power supply module 10 and the communicating device 20.
- the security element 12 of the power supply module 10 configures the security element 22 of the communicating device 20, so that the latter has a right of access. valid network access allowing access to the communication network.
- a step F4 the security element 22 requests (message M1) a network access right to the security element 12. This request is received by the security element 12 in a step E5. Still in this step E5, the security element 12 returns (message M2) the network access right to the security element 22, which receives it in a step F5.
- the security element 22 stores the right of access received in the memory zone 223.
- the access right remains valid as the communicating device 20 is electrically powered by the power supply module. More precisely, the access right remains valid as long as the two security elements 12, 22 are matched.
- the power supply module 10 is removed, the communicating device 20 is no longer powered and the network access right is removed. It is the same when the power supply module 10 is discharged.
- the validity of the network access right is thus linked to a power supply of the communicating device 20.
- the access right thus gives access access to the network, as long as the communicating device 20 is powered by the power supply module. Indeed, a communicating device 20 which accesses the network significantly will consume more quickly the electrical power of the power supply module 10, which limits the period of validity of its right of access. It is thus advantageous to link an electric power available from a power supply module 10 to a network access right.
- the security element 12 activates a right of access stored by the security element 22 of the device 20. More specifically, the security element 12 sends a signal or an activation message of the security element 22 or else an activation command of a communication module of the communicating device 20.
- the security element 12 sends information relating to an access profile to the communication network to be downloaded by the security element 22 of the device. More specifically, it controls a download of an access profile by the security element 22.
- This access profile to download is identified by an activation code AC.
- an activation code AC corresponds to a string of characters and includes different pieces of information separated by a "$" character.
- the activation code AC includes an address of a server to contact to obtain the access profile, a profile access token and a server identifier.
- the security element 12 sends a security key, more specifically a network key, allowing the security element 22 to calculate one or more session keys.
- the security element 12 sends at least one security key, more specifically a session key.
- the security element 22 then periodically interrogates the security element 12 in order to obtain a new session key.
- the security element 12 sends a radio interface configuration authorization of a network key.
- the security element 12 also sends information relating to the validity of the right of access to the security element 22 of the communicating device 20.
- This information corresponds for example to a period of validity of the right. access.
- the security element 22 again requests a network access right when the precedent is no longer valid. This helps to secure access to the network.
- This information may also correspond to a maximum rate information to which the communicating device 20 is entitled to access the communication network.
- a regular mechanism for verifying the access right is implemented by the security element 22.
- it will thus verify periodically that the network access right is valid by a simple exchange with the security element 12 of the power supply module (step E6).
- This regular check of the network access right may consist of an authentication of the security element 12 of the power supply module by the security element 22 of the communicating device.
- the security element 12 also transmits information relating to the percentage of remaining access rights (corresponding to the percentage of electrical energy already consumed). The user of the communicating device can be notified of this information via a human-machine interface.
- the communicating device 20 is no longer powered and the network access right is no longer valid.
- the communicating device 20 is powered again, a new authentication is implemented, leading to a new pairing and a new network access right.
- the power supply module 10 still contains electrical energy, it is again matched when it is inserted into a communicating device.
- FIG. 2b illustrates steps of the method for managing a network access right according to a particular embodiment.
- the security element 12 detects that the residual electric power of the power supply module is below a threshold.
- the security element 12 controls (message M10) an invalidation of the network access right available to the security element 22 of the communicating device 20.
- the element security 22 receives this command and erases in a step Fi l the right network access he had previously stored.
- the security element 22 acknowledges by a Mi l message the deletion of the network access right.
- the user of the communicating device can be informed of this deletion via a human-machine interface.
- the security element 22 transmits to a server of the operator a notification indicating that the network access right has been used by the communicating device 20 and must be revoked.
- the energy combination is performed in a manner similar to that performed for standard modules.
- the security element 22 mates with each of the security elements 12 of the power supply modules.
- the security element 22 then has the network access right when it has received a secondary network access right of each of the security elements 12 (for each of the power supply modules).
- the device communicating 20 accesses the communication network only when the sufficient number of modules 10 is inserted and therefore the corresponding number of security elements 12 is matched.
- the network access right is determined by combining the secondary access rights obtained from each of the security elements 12.
- a network key used by the communicating device 20 is calculated according to the network keys received from the various security elements 12.
- the regular mechanism for verifying the network access right is then implemented by the security element 22 for all the paired security elements 12.
- Embodiments have been described in a particular case where the right of access to a service is a network access right, allowing the communicating device to access a communication network.
- module may correspond in this document to both a software component, a hardware component or a set of hardware and / or software components, capable of implementing a function or a set of functions, as described above for the module concerned.
- a software component corresponds to one or more computer programs, one or more subroutines of a program, or more generally to any element of a program or software.
- Such a software component is stored in memory then loaded and executed by a data processor of a physical entity and is able to access the hardware resources of this physical entity (memories, recording media, communication buses, input / output electronic boards, user interfaces, etc.).
- a material component corresponds to any element of a material set (or hardware). It may be a programmable hardware component or not, with or without an integrated processor for running software. This is for example an integrated circuit, a smart card, an electronic card for executing a firmware, etc.
- the modules 124, 125, 126 are arranged to implement those steps of the previously described access rights management method, implemented by the power supply module.
- These are preferably software modules comprising software instructions for executing those of the steps (or actions) of the previously described management method, implemented by a power supply module.
- the invention therefore also relates to:
- a program for a power supply module comprising program code instructions intended to control the execution of the steps (or actions) of the previously described management method, when said program is executed by this power supply module;
- the modules 224, 225, 226 are arranged to implement those of the steps of the previously described access right management method, implemented by the communicating device.
- These are preferably software modules comprising software instructions for executing those of the steps (or actions) of the previously described management method, implemented by a communicating device.
- the invention therefore also relates to:
- a program for a communicating device comprising program code instructions intended to control the execution of those of the steps (or actions) of the previously described management method, when said program is executed by this communicating device;
- the software modules can be stored in or transmitted by a data carrier.
- a data carrier This may be a hardware storage medium, for example a CD-ROM, a magnetic diskette or a hard disk, or a transmission medium such as an electrical signal, optical or radio, or a telecommunications network.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1662161A FR3060161A1 (en) | 2016-12-08 | 2016-12-08 | TECHNIQUE FOR MANAGING A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A SERVICE FOR A COMMUNICATOR DEVICE |
PCT/FR2017/053261 WO2018104610A1 (en) | 2016-12-08 | 2017-11-27 | Technique for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating device |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3552136A1 true EP3552136A1 (en) | 2019-10-16 |
EP3552136B1 EP3552136B1 (en) | 2023-10-11 |
Family
ID=58347549
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP17812029.1A Active EP3552136B1 (en) | 2016-12-08 | 2017-11-27 | Technique for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating device |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US11210386B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3552136B1 (en) |
FR (1) | FR3060161A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2018104610A1 (en) |
Family Cites Families (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6298447B1 (en) * | 1997-06-06 | 2001-10-02 | Winbond Electronics Corporation | Security control for computer power supply system |
JPH1165937A (en) * | 1997-08-25 | 1999-03-09 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Ic memory card |
JP2003124923A (en) * | 2001-10-15 | 2003-04-25 | Nec Infrontia Corp | Method of storing cipher key in battery |
US7613924B2 (en) * | 2005-03-08 | 2009-11-03 | Texas Instruments Incorporated | Encrypted and other keys in public and private battery memories |
US20070072474A1 (en) * | 2005-04-27 | 2007-03-29 | Nigel Beasley | Flexible power adapter systems and methods |
KR100903187B1 (en) * | 2005-06-25 | 2009-06-17 | 주식회사 엘지화학 | System For Identification Of Genuine Battery Product In Mobile Device |
ATE489776T1 (en) * | 2005-10-31 | 2010-12-15 | Research In Motion Ltd | COMBINED BATTERY AND CHIP CARD |
US7917741B2 (en) * | 2007-04-10 | 2011-03-29 | Standard Microsystems Corporation | Enhancing security of a system via access by an embedded controller to a secure storage device |
KR101497456B1 (en) * | 2008-04-29 | 2015-03-02 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Security circuit having an electrical fuse rom and method of programming a security key |
EP2461613A1 (en) * | 2010-12-06 | 2012-06-06 | Gemalto SA | Methods and system for handling UICC data |
US9204398B2 (en) * | 2011-03-21 | 2015-12-01 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Method and apparatus for battery with secure element |
US20120303310A1 (en) * | 2011-05-26 | 2012-11-29 | First Data Corporation | Systems and Methods for Providing Test Keys to Mobile Devices |
CN107547571B (en) * | 2012-11-21 | 2021-06-22 | 苹果公司 | Method for managing access control and access control client provisioning server |
EP2782375A1 (en) * | 2013-03-20 | 2014-09-24 | Eff'Innov Technologies | Smart Power Supply Device and Corresponding Method for Using a Power Supply Device |
KR101768583B1 (en) * | 2013-06-13 | 2017-08-30 | 인텔 코포레이션 | Secure battery authentication |
US9836740B1 (en) * | 2013-07-19 | 2017-12-05 | Geotoll, Inc. | Method and apparatus for dynamically changed identifiers in an RFID tag device |
US10613567B2 (en) * | 2013-08-06 | 2020-04-07 | Bedrock Automation Platforms Inc. | Secure power supply for an industrial control system |
US9100175B2 (en) * | 2013-11-19 | 2015-08-04 | M2M And Iot Technologies, Llc | Embedded universal integrated circuit card supporting two-factor authentication |
JP6494373B2 (en) * | 2015-03-31 | 2019-04-03 | キヤノン株式会社 | Information processing apparatus, information processing apparatus control method, and computer program |
FR3043228B1 (en) * | 2015-11-03 | 2018-03-30 | Proton World International N.V. | STARTING THE CONTROL OF AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT |
FR3043229B1 (en) * | 2015-11-03 | 2018-03-30 | Proton World International N.V. | SECURE STARTING OF AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT |
CN108073830B (en) * | 2016-11-15 | 2021-05-18 | 华为技术有限公司 | Terminal chip integrated with safety component |
US10664620B2 (en) * | 2016-12-20 | 2020-05-26 | Sony Corporation | Modular system for controlling usability of a device |
AU2018228890B2 (en) * | 2017-03-01 | 2020-08-06 | Apple Inc. | System access using a mobile device |
US11017377B2 (en) * | 2018-02-09 | 2021-05-25 | Ka Wai Wayne LEUNG | Apparatus and method for wireless secure payment and data transaction with biometric enrollment and authentication |
US20210036870A1 (en) * | 2019-07-30 | 2021-02-04 | Nxp B.V. | Method and integrated circuit for updating a certificate revocation list in a device |
-
2016
- 2016-12-08 FR FR1662161A patent/FR3060161A1/en active Pending
-
2017
- 2017-11-27 WO PCT/FR2017/053261 patent/WO2018104610A1/en unknown
- 2017-11-27 US US16/467,364 patent/US11210386B2/en active Active
- 2017-11-27 EP EP17812029.1A patent/EP3552136B1/en active Active
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US11210386B2 (en) | 2021-12-28 |
EP3552136B1 (en) | 2023-10-11 |
FR3060161A1 (en) | 2018-06-15 |
WO2018104610A1 (en) | 2018-06-14 |
US20190332761A1 (en) | 2019-10-31 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP1687953B1 (en) | Method for the authentication of applications | |
TWI586196B (en) | Method to provide network communications, and method to access a network | |
CN104618330B (en) | Method for processing business, device and terminal | |
EP2820795B1 (en) | Method for verifying the identity of a user of a communication terminal and associated system | |
EP3117641B1 (en) | Method of controlling access to a reserve zone with control of the validity of an access entitlement installed in the memory of a mobile terminal | |
EP2494489A1 (en) | Method and client agent for monitoring the use of protected content | |
FR2989799A1 (en) | METHOD FOR TRANSFERRING A DEVICE TO ANOTHER RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO A SERVICE | |
WO2002102018A1 (en) | Method for authentication between a portable telecommunication object and a public access terminal | |
EP3014849B1 (en) | Method for changing an authentication key | |
EP2871876A1 (en) | Technique for configuring secure access by a guest terminal to a host network | |
FR3025377A1 (en) | MANAGEMENT OF ELECTRONIC TICKETS | |
EP3552327B1 (en) | Method of personalizing a secure transaction during a radio communication | |
EP3238150B1 (en) | Method for making contactless transactions secure | |
EP3552136B1 (en) | Technique for managing a right of access to a service for a communicating device | |
FR3060160A1 (en) | TECHNIQUE FOR MANAGING A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A SERVICE FOR A COMMUNICATOR DEVICE | |
EP2471237B1 (en) | Mobile electronic device configured to establish secure wireless communication | |
EP3692747B1 (en) | Technique for managing a right of access to a network for a communicating device | |
FR3078222A1 (en) | METHOD OF PAIRING ELECTRONIC TERMINALS, PAIRING DEVICES, TERMINALS AND CORRESPONDING PROGRAM. | |
FR3018021A1 (en) | METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR SECURING TRANSACTIONS PROVIDED BY A PLURALITY OF SERVICES BETWEEN A MOBILE DEVICE OF A USER AND A POINT OF ACCEPTANCE | |
FR3093572A1 (en) | PORTABLE, AUTONOMOUS AND SECURE MICRO SERVER FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT USERS | |
FR3074462A1 (en) | DEVICE FOR IDENTIFYING THE POSITION OF AN IDENTIFIER IN RELATION TO A MOTOR VEHICLE | |
FR3074463A1 (en) | DEVICE FOR IDENTIFYING THE POSITION OF AN IDENTIFIER IN RELATION TO A MOTOR VEHICLE | |
FR2980072A1 (en) | Method for association of cell phone with multi-media local server for providing e.g. video access service, involves transferring authentication information and information of connection of portable device from storage unit |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: UNKNOWN |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE |
|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20190628 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: BA ME |
|
DAV | Request for validation of the european patent (deleted) | ||
DAX | Request for extension of the european patent (deleted) | ||
RAP1 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: ORANGE |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20210428 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS |
|
RAP3 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: ORANGE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref document number: 602017075262 Country of ref document: DE Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R079 Free format text: PREVIOUS MAIN CLASS: G06F0021440000 Ipc: H04L0009400000 |
|
RIC1 | Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant |
Ipc: H04W 12/30 20210101ALI20230330BHEP Ipc: H04W 8/20 20090101ALI20230330BHEP Ipc: G06F 21/44 20130101ALI20230330BHEP Ipc: H04W 12/06 20090101ALI20230330BHEP Ipc: H04L 9/40 20220101AFI20230330BHEP |
|
GRAP | Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: GRANT OF PATENT IS INTENDED |
|
INTG | Intention to grant announced |
Effective date: 20230511 |
|
GRAS | Grant fee paid |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3 |
|
GRAA | (expected) grant |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE PATENT HAS BEEN GRANTED |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: B1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: GB Ref legal event code: FG4D Free format text: NOT ENGLISH |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: EP |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R096 Ref document number: 602017075262 Country of ref document: DE |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: FG4D Free format text: LANGUAGE OF EP DOCUMENT: FRENCH |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: GB Payment date: 20231121 Year of fee payment: 7 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: FR Payment date: 20231121 Year of fee payment: 7 Ref country code: DE Payment date: 20231019 Year of fee payment: 7 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: LT Ref legal event code: MG9D |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: NL Ref legal event code: MP Effective date: 20231011 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: AT Ref legal event code: MK05 Ref document number: 1621343 Country of ref document: AT Kind code of ref document: T Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: NL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: GR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240112 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IS Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240211 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: AT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: ES Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: IS Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240211 Ref country code: GR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240112 Ref country code: ES Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: BG Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240111 Ref country code: AT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: PT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240212 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: RS Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: PL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: NO Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20240111 Ref country code: LV Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: HR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: PL |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: R097 Ref document number: 602017075262 Country of ref document: DE |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20231127 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CH Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20231130 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CZ Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SM Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: SK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: RO Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: LU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20231127 Ref country code: IT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: EE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: DK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: CZ Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 Ref country code: CH Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20231130 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: BE Ref legal event code: MM Effective date: 20231130 |
|
PLBE | No opposition filed within time limit |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MC Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MC Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20231011 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: MM4A |
|
26N | No opposition filed |
Effective date: 20240712 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20231127 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: BE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20231130 |