EP3465980A1 - Amélioration de la sécurité au moyen de clés éphémères pour une carte virtuelle logicielle sans contact dans un téléphone mobile - Google Patents

Amélioration de la sécurité au moyen de clés éphémères pour une carte virtuelle logicielle sans contact dans un téléphone mobile

Info

Publication number
EP3465980A1
EP3465980A1 EP17805942.4A EP17805942A EP3465980A1 EP 3465980 A1 EP3465980 A1 EP 3465980A1 EP 17805942 A EP17805942 A EP 17805942A EP 3465980 A1 EP3465980 A1 EP 3465980A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
mobile device
transient
identifier
idn
dkn
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP17805942.4A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Mathew Smith
Dayan Nirosha BANDULA
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Silverleap Technology Ltd
Original Assignee
Silverleap Technology Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Silverleap Technology Ltd filed Critical Silverleap Technology Ltd
Publication of EP3465980A1 publication Critical patent/EP3465980A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for providing a mobile device with a derived key (DK), to allow a Trusted Application (TA) on said mobile device to perform a transaction with a reader device provided with a master key (MK), the Trusted Application (TA) and the reader device being adapted to securely communicate using said master key (MK) and said derived key (DK) using an adapted communication protocol, such as Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol.
  • DK derived key
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • the invention can be used to increase the security of software emulations of contactless smartcards in NFC (Near Field Communication) mobile phones.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • HCE Home Card Emulation
  • TEE Trusted Execution Environment
  • white-box cryptography compilers
  • the risk for the transit operator would be the extraction of the keys of the virtual card from the mobile phone. This process would take a non-negligible amount of time due to the physical and logical complexity, and nature of the attack itself. This means that if a key is actually extracted from a phone then it could potentially be used to perform fraudulent transactions on the transport infrastructure. Therefore, a method for easily limiting the valid life of keys in a virtual card would be beneficial, so that even if they were extracted, they could not be used. For such an invention to be useful it needs to be compatible and implementable in existing contactless based environments, with minimal impact in terms of changes to software infrastructures. In addition, the validity needs to be independent of any network connection of the mobile phone, since there is no guarantee that the phone will have access to a network at the start of a contactless transaction.
  • the invention relates to a method for providing a mobile device with a derived key (DK), to allow a Trusted Application (TA) on said mobile device to perform a transaction with a reader device provided with a master key (MK), the Trusted Application (TA) and the reader device being adapted to securely communicate using said master key (MK) and said derived key (DK) using Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol, the method comprising: - obtaining a first transient identifier (IDn) for the mobile device by combining a hardware related component, such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device and a software related component, such as a time stamp,
  • a hardware related component such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device
  • a software related component such as a time stamp
  • the invention relates to a method for allowing a Trusted Application (TA) in a mobile device to securely communicate with a reader device using Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol, wherein the communication is secured by means of symmetric cryptography, the reader device comprising a master key and the mobile device comprising a derived key, wherein the method comprises:
  • IDn a first transient identifier for the mobile device by combining a hardware related component, such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device and a software related component, such as a time stamp,
  • a hardware related component such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device
  • a software related component such as a time stamp
  • the provisioning server comprising the master key (MK)
  • the first transient identifier (IDn) is valid, calculating, in the reader device by means of the master key and the first transient identifier (IDn), the first transient derived key (DKn),
  • the invention relates to a system for allowing a Trusted Application (TA) in a mobile device to securely communicate with a reader device using an adapted communication protocol, wherein the communication is secured by means of symmetric cryptography, the system comprising a reader device comprising a master key and a mobile device comprising an identifier, such as the unique ID (UID) of an Integrated Circuit (IC) used in the mobile device and a provisioning server comprising the master key for providing a derived key for the mobile device, wherein the mobile device in the system comprises:
  • an application adapted to obtain a first transient identifier (IDn) for the mobile device by combining a hardware related component, such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device and a software related component, such as a time stamp,
  • a hardware related component such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device
  • a software related component such as a time stamp
  • provisioning server comprising the master key (MK), wherein the provisioning server comprises:
  • the mobile device further comprising: - means for receiving and storing the first transient derived key (DKn) to allow the mobile device to securely communicate with a reader device using an adapted communication protocol.
  • the invention relates to a system for allowing a Trusted Application (TA) in a mobile device to securely communicate with a reader device using Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol, wherein the communication is secured by means of symmetric cryptography, the system comprising a reader device comprising a master key and a mobile device comprising identifier, such as the unique ID (UID) of an Integrated Circuit (IC) used in the mobile device and a provisioning server comprising the master key for providing a derived key for the mobile device, wherein the mobile device in the system comprises:
  • an application adapted to obtain a first transient identifier (IDn) for the mobile device by combining a hardware related component, such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device and a software related component, such as a time stamp,
  • a hardware related component such as an unique identifier (UID) of an integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device
  • a software related component such as a time stamp
  • the provisioning server comprising the master key (MK), wherein the provisioning server comprises:
  • the mobile device further comprising:
  • the reader device comprises:
  • the mobile device comprising:
  • This invention proposes a mechanism for limiting the validity of the keys of a virtual contactless card installed in a mobile phone, as a means of limiting the time window for which a particular key is vulnerable.
  • the implication is that by using this method in conjunction with additional system based security features, such as a TEE or white-box cryptography, an attacker who successfully extracts a key from a phone would not be able to use it because the validity of that key would have expired.
  • communication is possible between a mobile device and a reader device only if the reader device comprises a valid ID and a valid derived key, wherein the reader device comprises a master key and means to check the validity of the ID and the derived key of the mobile device.
  • the time window for which a derived key (on a virtual card) can be used in combination with a master key (on a reader) is limited.
  • the mobile device first receives a first transient derived key (DKn) which is valid for a determined time interval.
  • DKn first transient derived key
  • the mobile device can no longer communicate with the reader device using the first transient derived key (DKn).
  • DKn+1 further transient derived key
  • the further transient derived key (DKn+1 ) can be used until the end of its validity or until it is replaced by yet a further transient derived key (DKn+2).
  • the mobile device In order to allow the mobile device to receive a sequence of derived keys (DKn, DKn+1 , DKn+2, etc.) the mobile device should be able to generate a sequence of unique ID's for the mobile device.
  • the mobile device comprises an application to generate transient identifiers (ID), each transient identifier (ID) having a determined an limited time period wherein the transient identifier (ID) is valid.
  • the application in the mobile device will generate a first transient identifier (IDn) by combining a hardware component for the transient identifier with a software component for the transient identifier.
  • the hardware component of the transient identifier is, for instance, the Unique Identifier (UID) of the integrated circuit (IC) used in the mobile device.
  • the software component is, for instance, a time stamp.
  • the advantage of using both a hardware component and a software component is, that for a single mobile device a sequence of unique transient identifiers (IDn, IDn+1 , IDn+2, etc.) can be generated.
  • the software related part of the transient identifier (ID) can be used to check the validity of the transient identifier (ID). This checking of the validity of the transient identifier (ID) is, for instance, executed in the reader device.
  • the checker in the reader device can, for instance, determine whether the transient identifier (IDx) is valid, for instance, by checking whether the transient identifier (IDx) is in accordance with the other transient identifiers in an array of identifiers (IDx-2, IDx-1 , IDx). If the validity of the transient ID can not be established, the reader device can abort the communication with the mobile device.
  • the invention comprises the following parts:
  • a mobile phone containing one or more security features protecting software for the virtual contactless card execution, including cryptographic keys and other sensitive data;
  • a provisioning server that calculates new transient ID's and derived keys for a virtual card and sends them to the virtual card using one or more additional security features of the mobile phone.
  • the application There is a part of the application that provides user interface and network communication (amongst other functions) and runs in the open Android operating system environment.
  • the other part of the application is protected by one or more additional security features, which protect the execution of the virtual card emulation and store the cryptographic keys and other sensitive data.
  • the invention is based on the creation of a special transient ID for the virtual card, and an associated derived key for the virtual card.
  • This ID structure contains within it the details of the validity of the ID itself.
  • This data is used by a validity checker in the reader terminal that reads the virtual card, extracts the validity data of the transient ID, and assesses the validity of the virtual card prior to processing any financial transaction.
  • the following procedure can be followed to obtain a transient identifier (ID).
  • ID transient identifier
  • the transient identifier is made up of two adjoining parts to form a UID of 7 Bytes:
  • the validity checker in the reader terminal analyses the data encapsulated in the transient identifier (ID) and makes the following checks:
  • the Subscription Account Number is a sequential reference number representing the account of the subscriber owning the particular virtual card, and can verified by using standard account number verification such as black list and white list checking provided by a server to the reader checker, or potentially a separate check digit.
  • the Calculated Timestamp is the number of seconds expired since the 1 st January 2015 until the point at which the transient identifier (ID) for that virtual card was created.
  • the check for whether the Calculated Timestamp is in the correct range uses a 'time to live' value stored in the reader. This time to live value defines the validity period of a transient identifier (ID) from the moment it is created. A typical value for a time to live parameter is one day.
  • the reader checker then calculates the 'Current Timestamp' as the number of seconds since 1 st January 2015 until that moment.
  • the transient identifier (ID) is deemed valid. If the Subscriber Account Number and the transient identifier (ID) are both valid, the checker hands the virtual card processing to the next stage of the reader terminal acceptance software. Otherwise the virtual card is rejected and the processing stops.
  • the transient identifier (ID) is provided by the mobile phone when it is placed in the NFC field of the reader terminal. When this occurs, the phone behaves according to the ISO 14443 protocol standard. As part of this standard the phone must provide a transient identifier (ID) to the reader during the 'anti-collision' phase so that the reader can correctly continue the transaction.
  • the standard suggests that the reader assumes that the transient identifier (ID) provided by the phone in this phase is random and should not be used for additional processing. This means that the reader must first request the real transient identifier (ID) of the virtual card or that the transient identifier (ID) is passed some other way.
  • the virtual card application will provide the unique identifier (UID) together with some other control data such as:
  • This data together with the transient identifier (ID) for the virtual card is passed to the reader in response to the 'Select AID' command, which is sent by the reader terminal in the form of an ISO 7816 compliant APDU (application packet data unit).
  • This response which is a Status response APDU, can then be used as the input for the check process in the reader terminal.
  • the transient identifier (ID) and derived key are provided by a provisioning sever to the mobile phone based application protected by one or more additional security features.
  • a typical key diversification scheme for a general symmetric key based contactless system works along the follows lines, although other methods are available and the present invention also functions with such other methods.
  • Each card has a Unique Identification number (UID).
  • UID Unique Identification number
  • This UID is encrypted using a master key, to generate a new key - diversified key. This is done in a secure location.
  • the derived key is then injected into the contactless card and used to encrypt the contents of the card.
  • the reader uses a locally stored master key and the provided UID from the card to recreate the derived key of the card.
  • step 1 the server calculates a transient identifier (ID) for the virtual card based on the structure described above.
  • ID transient identifier
  • Step 2 is the same in that the transient derived key for the virtual card is generated using the diversification algorithm for the card scheme and the calculated transient identifier (ID). This is performed on the provisioning server in a secure environment, such as an HSM.
  • Step 3 the transient identifier (ID) and the derived key are passed securely to the virtual card in the TEE of the mobile phone, using standard secure transmission methods. This occurs each time the transient identifier (ID) validity lifetime of a particular virtual card expires.
  • the lifetime of the transient identifier (ID)s in the virtual cards can either be tracked by the server or by the mobile phone. If it is tracked by the server, a new transient identifier (ID) is generated and sent to the phone. If it is tracked by the phone, the phone requests a new transient identifier (ID) key combination from the provisional server.
  • the transient identifier (ID) checker installed in the contactless reader, as described above, performs the validity checks between steps 4 and 5.
  • This transient identifier (ID) checker requires a small amount of software code to implement, and is independent of any other business logic implemented in the reader. In this way, the reader can check the validity of the virtual card very easily at the beginning of the acceptance process, and stop if the transient identifier (ID) of the virtual card has expired.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé et un système qui fournissent une clé dérivée (DK) à un dispositif mobile afin de permettre à une application de confiance (TA) dudit dispositif mobile d'exécuter une transaction avec un dispositif lecteur comprenant une clé maîtresse (MK). L'application de confiance (TA) et le dispositif lecteur sont adaptés pour communiquer de manière sécurisée à l'aide de ladite clé maîtresse (MK) et de ladite clé dérivée (DK) selon un protocole de communication adapté.
EP17805942.4A 2016-05-30 2017-05-29 Amélioration de la sécurité au moyen de clés éphémères pour une carte virtuelle logicielle sans contact dans un téléphone mobile Withdrawn EP3465980A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GBGB1609460.9A GB201609460D0 (en) 2016-05-30 2016-05-30 Increased security through ephemeral keys for software virtual contactless card in a mobile phone
PCT/IB2017/000646 WO2017208063A1 (fr) 2016-05-30 2017-05-29 Amélioration de la sécurité au moyen de clés éphémères pour une carte virtuelle logicielle sans contact dans un téléphone mobile

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3465980A1 true EP3465980A1 (fr) 2019-04-10

Family

ID=56410729

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP17805942.4A Withdrawn EP3465980A1 (fr) 2016-05-30 2017-05-29 Amélioration de la sécurité au moyen de clés éphémères pour une carte virtuelle logicielle sans contact dans un téléphone mobile

Country Status (5)

Country Link
EP (1) EP3465980A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN109417481A (fr)
GB (2) GB201609460D0 (fr)
PH (1) PH12018502545A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2017208063A1 (fr)

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GB201609460D0 (en) 2016-07-13
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