EP3439190A1 - Verbesserte nfc-chip-lesevorrichtung - Google Patents

Verbesserte nfc-chip-lesevorrichtung Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP3439190A1
EP3439190A1 EP17184076.2A EP17184076A EP3439190A1 EP 3439190 A1 EP3439190 A1 EP 3439190A1 EP 17184076 A EP17184076 A EP 17184076A EP 3439190 A1 EP3439190 A1 EP 3439190A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
chip
nfc
server
challenge
terminal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP17184076.2A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP3439190B1 (de
Inventor
Martijn Diederik Oostdijk
Tom Nicolaas VAN WIETMARSCHEN
Wilhelmus NOORT
Maarten Wegdam
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Innovalor BV
Original Assignee
Innovalor BV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Innovalor BV filed Critical Innovalor BV
Priority to ES17184076T priority Critical patent/ES2919973T3/es
Priority to DK17184076.2T priority patent/DK3439190T3/da
Priority to EP17184076.2A priority patent/EP3439190B1/de
Priority to PCT/EP2018/070442 priority patent/WO2019025312A1/en
Priority to CA3069264A priority patent/CA3069264A1/en
Priority to US16/629,109 priority patent/US20200169889A1/en
Publication of EP3439190A1 publication Critical patent/EP3439190A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP3439190B1 publication Critical patent/EP3439190B1/de
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B5/00—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems
    • H04B5/70—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems specially adapted for specific purposes
    • H04B5/77—Near-field transmission systems, e.g. inductive or capacitive transmission systems specially adapted for specific purposes for interrogation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/108—Source integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to the field of communication with NFC-chips.
  • the invention further relates to the field of terminals communicating with NFC-chips.
  • the invention further relates to the field of servers communicating with NFC-chips.
  • the invention further relates to the field of computer program products for communicating with NFC-chips.
  • NFC Near field communication
  • Examples of user identification documents containing an NFC-chip are bank cards, credit cards, access cards, driving licences, passports, ID cards.
  • the NFC-chip contains data verifying the identity of the holder.
  • the data on an NFC-chip may be read by an NFC-chip reader, such as a bank terminal, boarder control gate, access controlled gate or hand terminal.
  • the data on the NFC-chip typically contains private information, which should only be accessible to NFC-chip readers having permission to read this information.
  • Several checks could be in place to verify the permission of the NFC-chip reader.
  • One of those checks is that the NFC-chip reader has to be able to acquire a key based on an optical identifier printed on the user identification document such as, for example, the machine-readable zone (MRZ), a Card Access Number (CAN) or a bar- or QR code from the user identification document.
  • MMRZ machine-readable zone
  • CAN Card Access Number
  • bar- or QR code a bar- or QR code
  • the other way around, the user identification document is also checked by the NFC-chip reader.
  • the following sequence typically unfolds:
  • the correctness of the protected data is verified during passive authentication.
  • Part of the protected data contains a digital signature.
  • the digital signature is based on the rest of the protected data and a certificate from a certifying authority.
  • the NFC-chip reader uses this digital signature to verify the correctness of the protected data against a list of trusted certificates of the issuing countries.
  • active or chip authentication verifies that the original NFC-chip is communicating with the NFC-chip reader and not a clone of the NFC-chip. Thus, active or chip authentication prevents cloning of the NFC-chip. Active or chip authentication is based on a public-private key combination on the NFC-chip and a challenge from the NFC-chip reader requiring the correct response to the NFC-chip reader.
  • NFC-chip reader evolves towards a system comprising an online or stand-alone terminal.
  • a smartphone may be used as NFC-chip reader.
  • this terminal may be trusted or untrusted. If the terminal is trusted, the terminal may require a communication link to a certificate server or may store the certificates locally. If the terminal is untrusted, the terminal requires a link to a server performing all the authentication steps. This server in turn may require a link to a certificate server or may store the certificates locally.
  • a disadvantage of the conventional NFC-chips and NFC-chip readers is that it can be challenging to position NFC-chip readers at arbitrary locations, such as a remote location.
  • a known solution may be to use a smartphone as NFC-chip reader. Although this is a solution to the arbitrary location problem, when the smartphone is used as NFC-chip reader, complex local security measures are required to protect the smartphone against hacking or other security threats, making the use of the smartphone as NFC-chip reader complex. Thus, a trusted randomly locatable terminal has the disadvantage of requiring complex security measures.
  • Another known solution is to have an NFC-chip transceiver and a trusted server with a network link in between and located at a distance from the transceiver. It is known that the protocol specification defining the communication between the NFC-chip and NFC-chip reader allows only for small timeouts. As the server is located at a distance from the transceiver, a high speed, low jitter and low round trip time link between the NFC-chip transceiver and the server is required to meet the timeout requirements. Thus, an NFC-chip reader having an NFC-chip transceiver and a trusted server has the disadvantage of requiring a high-quality and thus complex network link between the NFC-chip transceiver and the trusted server.
  • An objective of the invention is to provide a more robust NFC-chip reader.
  • a method for communication with an NFC-chip of a user identification document comprising the steps of: a terminal obtaining protected data from the NFC-chip, wherein obtaining comprises the step of verifying the integrity of the protected data; and a server verifying genuineness of the NFC-chip communicating via the terminal.
  • active authentication and passive authentication may be split to obtain a terminal, which is trusted to do access control and clone-detection protocol execution, but untrusted for active authentication and passive authentication.
  • the method according to the current invention provides the advantage of splitting the NFC-reader in a partially trusted terminal and a fully trusted server.
  • the method according to the invention allows either for a simpler implementation of local security measures or for a simpler link between terminal and server or both.
  • the method or communication with an NFC-chip of a user identification document according to the current invention allows for a simpler system.
  • the terminal may be a hand-held device, such as a smartphone, with minimal or no extra security measures.
  • the step of verifying genuineness is initiated before completing the obtaining step.
  • the method according to this embodiment provides the advantage of minimizing the influence of jitter and/or delay on a network either between the chip and terminal or between the terminal and the server. This in turn prevents any disruptions to occur between the NFC-chip and terminal while communicating. These disruptions may be protocol timeouts or energy source depletion. Hence, the reliability of the communication between the NFC-chip and the terminal is enhanced, without compromising the reliability of the verification for unreliable terminals.
  • the step of obtaining protected data comprises the steps of: the terminal obtaining an access key from the user identification document; and the terminal using the access key for activating the NFC-chip for transferring the protected data to the terminal.
  • the verifying genuineness step comprises the steps of: the terminal receiving a challenge from the server; the terminal transmitting the challenge to the NFC-chip; and the terminal forwarding the challenge response from the NFC-chip to the server; wherein the receiving step is independent in time of the transmitting step.
  • This method allows for the terminal to have a storage, such as a queue, of challenges.
  • This storage may be used to directly transmit a challenge from the terminal and to the NFC-chip when the communication channel between the NFC-chip and the terminal is available. Having the challenges available minimizes the influences of jitter and delays in a network connected to the terminal.
  • the challenge is sent directly after reading the protected data or completing passive authentication communication between NFC-chip and terminal. This type of use of a challenge may be labelled active authentication.
  • each challenge is associated with a time-to-live (TTL) period.
  • TTL time-to-live
  • the TTL period determines how long a challenge is valid, providing the advantage of improved security as the challenge may not be used after a certain time period.
  • each challenge is associated with a session identifier.
  • the session identifier simplifies identification of the challenge, such as in a database, and prevents reuse of the challenge.
  • the verifying genuineness step comprises the steps of: the terminal forwarding a public key from a keypair on the NFC-chip to the server for basing a challenge on the public key; a terminal receiving the challenge and a public key from a server keypair from the server; the terminal transmitting the challenge and that server public key to the NFC-chip; and the terminal forwarding a response (to the challenge) from the NFC-chip to the server, wherein the response (to the challenge) is based on a shared key based on the server public key and a chip private key of the chip's keypair.
  • this sequence of steps requires the use of a public key, these steps may be initiated directly after the terminal receives the chip's public key from the NFC-chip. As the chip's public key is typically received before reading the protected data is completed, any influence of the network between the terminal and server is minimized or even eliminated. This type of use of a challenge may be labelled chip authentication.
  • the challenge is an encrypted command.
  • the command is encrypted by the server with the shared secret shared between the terminal and the NFC-chip.
  • the shared secret is based on the public-private key pair of the chip and the public-private key pair of the server. Typically, this shared secret is based on a Diffie-Hellman or on a ElGamal key exchange scheme.
  • the public-private key pair of the chip is static.
  • the public-private key pair of the server is ephemeral.
  • the command is encrypted, only the NFC-chip may decrypt the command.
  • the NFC-chip encrypts the command response with the shared secret.
  • the encrypted command response can only be decrypted by the server by the server. Further, the server may evaluate the validity of the command response.
  • the terminal and server may be combined in one physical device. This providing the advantage of minimizing the influence of jitter and/or delay on a network either between the terminal and the server or between terminal or server and a certificate server.
  • a method for a terminal communicating with an NFC-chip of a user identification document comprising the steps of: obtaining protected data from the NFC-chip; and forwarding communication between the NFC-chip and a server for verifying genuineness of the NFC-chip.
  • the terminal executing the method does not verify the genuineness of the NFC-chip, the implementation of the terminal becomes simpler.
  • the method according to the current invention provides the advantages as described above.
  • the terminal may receive a signal from the server comprising the result of the genuineness test.
  • the step of forwarding is initiated before completing the obtaining step.
  • obtaining the protected data may comprise the step of reading the protected data and verifying the protected data, such as authenticating the protected data with a digital signature.
  • the method for the terminal minimizes the influence of jitter and/or delay on a network either between the terminal and the server or between terminal or server and a certificate server. The method according to the current invention provides the advantages as described above.
  • the step of obtaining protected data comprises the steps of: obtaining an access key from the user identification document; and using the access key for activating the NFC-chip for transferring the protected data.
  • This provides the advantage of restricting access to protected data on the NFC-chip with an access key.
  • this key is available via a machine-readable zone (MRZ) on the user identification document. More preferably, this MRZ is an inner page of the user identification document.
  • MRZ machine-readable zone
  • the forwarding step comprises the steps of: receiving a challenge from the server; transmitting the challenge to the NFC-chip; and forwarding the challenge response from the NFC-chip to the server; wherein the receiving step is independent in time of the transmitting step.
  • This method for the terminal allows for the terminal to have a storage, such as a queue, of challenges, providing the advantages as described above.
  • each challenge is associated with a time-to-live (TTL) period.
  • TTL time-to-live
  • each challenge is associated with a session identifier.
  • the forwarding step comprises the steps of: forwarding a public chip key from a key chip pair on the NFC-chip to the server for basing a challenge on the public chip key; receiving the challenge and a public server key from a key server pair from the server; transmitting the challenge and the public server key to the NFC-chip; and forwarding the challenge response from the NFC-chip to the server, wherein the challenge response is based on a shared key based on the public server key and a private chip key of the chip pair.
  • the challenge is an encrypted command.
  • a method for a server verifying genuineness of a user identification document comprising an NFC-chip comprising the steps of: tracking the challenges provided by the server to a terminal communicating with the NFC-chip; receiving a challenge response to a challenge from the server from the terminal; verifying genuineness of the NFC-chip based on the challenge response and the challenge; and providing newly generated challenges to the terminal based on the tracking step.
  • the providing and tracking steps are independent of the receiving and verifying steps. This provides the advantage of relaxing the requirements for either local security measures or link between terminal and server or both. Due to this relaxing, protocol timeouts and/or energy depletion will happen less frequently. Hence, the reliability of the communication between the NFC-chip and the terminal is enhanced and thus the verification.
  • This type of use of a challenge may be labelled active authentication.
  • a method for a server verifying genuineness of a user identification document comprising an NFC-chip, comprising the steps of: receiving a copy of protected data on the NFC-chip; verifying the protected data with a digital signature comprised in the protected data; receiving a public chip key from a key chip pair on the NFC-chip for basing a challenge on the public chip key; transmitting the challenge and a public server key from a key server pair from the server; and receiving a challenge response from the NFC-chip, wherein the challenge response is based on a shared key based on the public server key and a private chip key of the chip pair, wherein the step of receiving the public chip key is initiated before the step of verifying the protected data.
  • a terminal comprising: a communication unit configured for communicating with a server verifying genuineness of an NFC-chip of a user identification document; a transceiver configured for communicating with the NFC-chip; and processing means configured for obtaining protected data of the NFC-chip and forwarding communication between the NFC-chip and the server, wherein communication is forwarded before obtaining the protected data is completed.
  • a terminal comprises a challenge storage configured for temporarily storing a challenge on the terminal, which challenge is used for determining the genuineness of the NFC-chip.
  • the storage may be a queue.
  • a server comprises a challenge storage configured for tracking challenges associated with a terminal; a verification unit configured for verifying genuineness of an NFC-chip based on a challenge response and the associated challenge from the challenge storage.
  • the storage may be a queue.
  • the challenges may thus be generated before there is a need for during the communication between the NFC-chip and the terminal.
  • the challenge storage may provide challenges independent of the verification unit.
  • the challenge storage may generate challenges, at least upon generation, associated with a terminal, which challenge is not associated with an NFC-chip or communication between an NFC-chip and a terminal.
  • a server comprises a protected data storage configured for storing a received copy of protected data on an NFC-chip of a user identification document; a signature verification unit configured for verifying the protected data using a digital signature comprised in the protected data; a challenge generator configured for generating a challenge based on a public chip key from a key chip pair on the NFC-chip; a verification unit configured for verifying genuineness of the NFC-chip based on a challenge response and the associated challenge.
  • the server according to the current invention provides the advantages as described above.
  • the server may further be configured to execute any of the steps of the methods described above.
  • a computer program product comprises a computer readable medium having computer readable code embodied therein, the computer readable code being configured such that, on execution by a suitable computer or processor, the computer or processor is caused to perform the method of any of the preceding embodiments.
  • This may be a method for a terminal, a server or a combination.
  • Figure 1 schematically shows a sequence diagram 100 according to the prior art.
  • time progresses from top to bottom.
  • the sequence diagram according to the prior art comprises, as actors, an NFC-chip 201 and an NFC-chip reader 101.
  • the NFC-chip and NFC-chip reader initiate communication 110 for reading of the protected data of the NFC-chip.
  • the communication continues up to completion of the communication 112 reading the protected data of the NFC-chip.
  • the prior art NFC-chip reader processes the received protected data, thereby generating a challenge 120.
  • the challenge and response on the challenge are used for genuineness verification or clone detection 130.
  • the generating of the challenge between the completion of the communication 112 and the start of the clone detection communication 130 causes a delay d101.
  • This delay may disrupt the working of or communication to the NFC-chip.
  • the NFC-chip may run out of energy due to the relative long delay.
  • the NFC-chip may time-out, due to the delay being too long, which will cause a protocol time-out on the NFC-chip.
  • Figure 2 schematically shows a sequence diagram 200 according to an embodiment of the current invention.
  • the sequence diagram comprises an NFC-chip 201, a terminal 202 and a server 201 according to the current invention as actors.
  • the terminal and the NFC-chip communicate wirelessly with each other. This communication is labelled NFC-communication.
  • the terminal initiates 210 reading of the protected data from the NFC-chip.
  • the terminal completes 212 reading of the protected data from the NFC-chip after some time.
  • Clone detection communication 230 between the terminal and the server starts before the reading of the protected data completes 212.
  • the terminal may already start clone detection communication 230 with the server. This communication may comprise information from the partially received protected data.
  • the server After the communication 230 for clone detection between the terminal and the server, the server communicates 240 with the NFC-chip via the terminal completing the clone detection protocol.
  • This sequence diagram splits the functionality of the server according to the prior art in a terminal and server according to the invention.
  • the terminal is close to the NFC-chip as required by the NFC-communication.
  • the server may be arranged at a distance from the terminal.
  • the network between the server and the terminal may comprise several network hobs and several types of network.
  • the server may be placed at a location allowing the server to be trusted in a simpler way.
  • the server may be located in a server-room under controlled conditions.
  • the server may further be shared serving multiple terminals preventing the need for a trusted server per terminal.
  • the terminal, close to the NFC-chip may be untrusted or partially trusted hence requiring minimal security measures.
  • the sequence diagram provides the advantage of simplified communication, such as a simpler sequence of communication, with an NFC-chip.
  • a first delay d201 is defined between the completion of the protected data communication 212 and the server communicating with the NFC-chip 240.
  • a second delay d202 is defined between the clone detection communication 230 between terminal and the server and the clone detection communication 240 between the NFC-chip and the server via the terminal.
  • the server may process the communication from the terminal parallel to the terminal communicating with the NFC-chip.
  • the first delay d201 is shortened as the second delay d202 in the clone protection protocol runs parallel to the first delay. As these delays run parallel, this sequence diagram, defining the behaviour of the terminal and server according to the current invention provide the advantage of minimizing or even preventing the chance on a protocol time-out or the NFC-chip running out of energy.
  • the network between may introduce jitter, delays, round-trip-delays and loss of data requiring retransmissions.
  • This sequence diagram minimizes these influence by shortening the first delay d201.
  • communication according to this sequence diagram provides the advantage of increasing the reliability of the NFC-communication between the NFC-chip and the terminal.
  • Access to the data may be protected by an access control.
  • the NFC-communication may conform to a version of the ICAO Doc 9303 or ISO18013 protocol.
  • the access control mechanism may conform to a version of the BAC or PACE protocol.
  • Figure 3 schematically shows a sequence diagram 300 according to an embodiment of the current invention.
  • the sequence diagram 300 is a further detailing of the sequence diagram 200 in figure 2 .
  • the sequence diagram comprises an NFC-chip 201, a terminal 202 and a server 201 according to the current invention as actors.
  • the server generates challenges used as seed or start for the clone detection protocol. Challenges are generated independent of the NFC-chip. Hence, the challenge may be used by any terminal communicating to any NFC-chip. Therefore, the challenges may already be transferred to the terminal before or during that the NFC-communication with the NFC-chip starts. Hence, the second delay d302 is independent of any NFC-communication.
  • the server may request 330 the amount of challenges present on the terminal.
  • the terminal may reply 331 with the amount of challenges present on the terminal from that particular server.
  • the terminal may have multiple challenges stored for future NFC-communication.
  • the terminal may have multiple challenges from multiple servers for future NFC-communication.
  • the terminal may indicate the amount of challenges stored, without a request from the server.
  • the terminal may request 332 for a new challenge or multiple new challenges from the server.
  • the server generates a challenge or challenges and provides 333 this challenge or these challenges to the terminal. This providing 333 may be done without the server keeping track of the challenges present on the terminal or with one of the previous mentioned exchanges for managing the amount of challenges on the terminal.
  • a challenge present on the terminal and not used before a certain time-out may become obsolete. Multiple combinations of messages are foreseeable by the skilled person.
  • the one or more challenges on the terminal may be stored in a storage, such as a stack or pipe.
  • the challenges may be transmitted from the terminal to the NFC-chip with a first delay d301, which may be minimal.
  • the second delay d302 has no influence on this delay.
  • This embodiment provides the advantage of reducing or preventing influence of the second delay d302.
  • the terminal is simplified and the server may be in a controlled environment, as discussed throughout this application.
  • Figure 4 schematically shows a sequence diagram 400 according to an embodiment of the current invention.
  • the sequence diagram 400 is a further detailing of the sequence diagram 200 in figure 2 .
  • the sequence diagram comprises an NFC-chip 201, a terminal 202 and a server 201 according to the current invention as actors.
  • the server generates challenges used as seed or start for the clone detection protocol.
  • the protected data is transferred from the NFC-chip to the terminal during the NFC-communication.
  • the NFC-chip comprises a chip key pair.
  • This chip key pair comprises a public chip key and a private chip key.
  • the public chip key is part of the protected data and is thus transferred 411 during this communication.
  • the communication 430 of the public chip key to the server may be seen as the start of the clone detection. This communication may take place before the completion 212 of reading protected data, as indicated with the second delay d402.
  • the server comprises a server key pair.
  • This server key pair comprises a public server key and a private server key.
  • the server communicates 431 the public server key and a challenge to the terminal before the completion of reading protected data.
  • the terminal may transfer 440 the challenge and the public server key to the NFC-chip as part of the NFC-communication after the completion 212 of the transfer of the protected data with a first delay d401.
  • the second delay d402 is preferably completely before the completion 212 of the transfer, the second delay does not increase the first delay d401. Thus, the first delay is decreased or minimized.
  • the NFC-chip responds 441 with a challenge response to the terminal.
  • the terminal in response communicates 445 the challenge response to the server.
  • the server may now verify the genuineness of the NFC-chip based on a shared secret.
  • the shared secret at the server is based on the private server key and the public chip key.
  • the shared secret at the NFC-chip is based on the private chip key and the public server key.
  • the shared secret may be derived with the use of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or a Diffie-Hellman key exchange variation.
  • Figure 5 schematically shows a method 500 for a terminal according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • the method starts with the step of obtaining 510 protected data from the NFC-chip.
  • the method continues with the step of forwarding 520 communication between the NFC-chip and a server for verifying genuineness of the NFC-chip.
  • This method may be implemented by a terminal conforming to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 , 3 or 4 .
  • Figure 6a schematically shows a method for a server 600 according to a first embodiment of the invention.
  • the method starts with the step of tracking 610 the amount of challenges provided by the server to a terminal communicating with the NFC-chip.
  • the method continues with the step of receiving 615 a challenge response to a challenge from the server from the terminal.
  • the method continues with the step of verifying 620 genuineness of the NFC-chip based on the challenge response and the challenge.
  • the method continues with the step of providing 625 a newly generated challenge to the terminal based on the tracking step.
  • This method may be implemented by a server conforming to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 or 3 .
  • Figure 6b schematically shows a method for a server 650 according to a second embodiment of the invention.
  • the method starts with the step of receiving 660 a copy of protected data on the NFC-chip.
  • the method continues with the step of verifying 665 the protected data with a digital signature comprised in the protected data.
  • the method continues with the step of receiving 670 a public chip key from a key chip pair on the NFC-chip for basing a challenge on the public chip key.
  • the method continues with the step of transmitting 675 the challenge and a public server key from a key server pair from the server.
  • the method continues with the step of receiving 680 a challenge response from the NFC-chip, wherein the challenge response is based on a shared key based on the public server key and a private chip key of the chip pair, wherein the step of receiving the public chip key is initiated before the step of verifying the protected data.
  • This method may be implemented by a server conforming to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 or 4 .
  • the method schematically shown in figure 6b may be executed in an alternative order or split in more sub-steps.
  • the method may start with the step of partially receiving protected data on the NFC-chip.
  • the protected data may be received up to and including the public chip key 670.
  • the method continues with the step of transmitting 675 the challenge and a public server key from a key server pair from the server.
  • the method continues with the step of receiving 680 a challenge response from the NFC-chip, wherein the challenge response is based on a shared key based on the public server key and a private chip key of the chip pair, wherein the step of receiving the public chip key is initiated before the step of verifying the protected data.
  • the method continues with the step of receiving 660 the rest of the protected data on the NFC-chip.
  • the method continues with the step of verifying 665 the protected data with a digital signature comprised in the protected data.
  • This method may be implemented by a server conforming or partly conforming to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 or 4 .
  • FIG. 7 schematically shows a terminal 202 according to an embodiment of the invention.
  • the terminal comprises a communication unit 730, a transceiver 710 and processing means 720.
  • the communication unit is configured for communicating 760 with a server verifying genuineness of an NFC-chip of a user identification document.
  • the transceiver is configured for communicating 750 with the NFC-chip. This communication may be labelled NFC-communication.
  • the processing means are configured for obtaining protected data of the NFC-chip via the transceiver. Processing means are configured for obtaining protected data of the NFC-chip and forwarding communication between the NFC-chip and the server, wherein communication is forwarded before the protected data is obtained.
  • This terminal may conform to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 , 3 or 4 or in the method of figure 5 .
  • FIG. 8a schematically shows a server 203 according to a first embodiment of the invention.
  • the server comprises a communication unit 810, a challenge storage 820 and a verification unit 830.
  • the communication unit is configured for communicating 760 with a terminal providing data for verifying genuineness of an NFC-chip of a user identification document.
  • the challenge storage is configured for tracking challenges associated with a terminal.
  • the challenge storage communicates 815 information concerning the challenges with the communication unit. This communication may comprise data necessary for messages between terminal and server as specified in figure 3 .
  • the challenge storage may comprise a challenge generator and challenge management unit, which are not shown in the figure.
  • the verification unit is configured for verifying genuineness of an NFC-chip based on a challenge response 825 from the communication unit and the associated challenge 835 from the challenge storage.
  • This server may conform to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 or 3 or in the method of figure 6a .
  • FIG. 8b schematically shows a server 203 according to a second embodiment of the invention.
  • the server comprises a communication unit 810, a protected data storage 865, a signature verification unit 870, a challenge generator 875 and a verification unit 830.
  • the communication unit is configured for communicating 760 with a terminal providing data for verifying genuineness of an NFC-chip of a user identification document.
  • the protected data storage is configured for storing a received 861 copy of protected data on an NFC-chip of a user identification document.
  • the signature verification unit is configured for verifying the protected data using a digital signature comprised in the protected data.
  • the verification unit receives the protected data from the protected data storage.
  • the verification unit may receive the digital signature from an external certificate server. This certificate server may be connected to the network also carrying the terminal-server communication 760 or may be connected to the server via a separate communication network.
  • the digital signatures may also be kept local to the server.
  • the server generates challenges used as seed or start for the clone detection protocol.
  • the protected data is transferred from the NFC-chip to the terminal during the NFC-communication.
  • the NFC-chip comprises a chip key pair.
  • This chip key pair comprises a public chip key and a private chip key.
  • the public chip key is part of the protected data and is thus transferred 861 during this communication.
  • the communication 430 of the public chip key to the server may be seen as the start of the clone detection. This communication may take place before the completion 212 of reading protected data, as indicated with the second delay d402.
  • the server comprises a server key pair.
  • This server key pair comprises a public server key and a private server key.
  • the server communicates 431 the public server key and a challenge to the terminal before the completion of reading protected data.
  • the public chip key is provided 871 to the challenge generator by the signature verification unit or alternatively by the protected data storage. Wherein, in the latter case, the verification unit has to signal the protected data comprises a correct signature or not.
  • the challenge generator is configured for generating a challenge based on a public chip key from a key chip pair on the NFC-chip. The challenge is transmitted 876 to communication unit for transmission to the NFC-chip.
  • the verification unit is configured for verifying genuineness of the NFC-chip based on a challenge response and the associated challenge.
  • the verification unit receives a challenge response 825 from the communication unit.
  • the verification unit further receives 835 an associated challenge from the challenge generator.
  • the challenge generator may comprise a storage for storing the separate challenges.
  • the challenges may be associated via a session ID also present in the challenge response.
  • This server may conform to the communication as specified in the sequence diagram of figure 2 or 4 or in the method of figure 6b .
  • the invention also applies to computer programs, particularly computer programs on or in a carrier, adapted to put the invention into practice.
  • the program may be in the form of a source code, an object code, a code intermediate source and an object code such as in a partially compiled form, or in any other form suitable for use in the implementation of the method according to the invention.
  • a program may have many different architectural designs.
  • a program code implementing the functionality of the method or system according to the invention may be sub-divided into one or more sub-routines. Many different ways of distributing the functionality among these sub-routines will be apparent to the skilled person.
  • the sub-routines may be stored together in one executable file to form a self-contained program.
  • Such an executable file may comprise computer-executable instructions, for example, processor instructions and/or interpreter instructions (e.g. Java interpreter instructions).
  • one or more or all of the sub-routines may be stored in at least one external library file and linked with a main program either statically or dynamically, e.g. at run-time.
  • the main program contains at least one call to at least one of the sub-routines.
  • the sub-routines may also comprise function calls to each other.
  • An embodiment relating to a computer program product comprises computer-executable instructions corresponding to each processing stage of at least one of the methods set forth herein. These instructions may be sub-divided into sub-routines and/or stored in one or more files that may be linked statically or dynamically.
  • Another embodiment relating to a computer program product comprises computer-executable instructions corresponding to each means of at least one of the systems and/or products set forth herein. These instructions may be sub-divided into sub-routines and/or stored in one or more files that may be linked statically or dynamically.
  • the carrier of a computer program may be any entity or device capable of carrying the program.
  • the carrier may include a data storage, such as a ROM, for example, a CD ROM or a semiconductor ROM, or a magnetic recording medium, for example, a hard disk.
  • the carrier may be a transmissible carrier such as an electric or optical signal, which may be conveyed via electric or optical cable or by radio or other means.
  • the carrier may be constituted by such a cable or other device or means.
  • the carrier may be an integrated circuit in which the program is embedded, the integrated circuit being adapted to perform, or used in the performance of, the relevant method.
  • Figure 9 schematically shows an embodiment of a computer program product, computer readable medium and/or non-transitory computer readable storage medium 900 having a writable part 910 including a computer program 920, the computer program including instructions for causing a processor system to perform a method according to the invention.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
  • Semiconductor Lasers (AREA)
  • Structures Or Materials For Encapsulating Or Coating Semiconductor Devices Or Solid State Devices (AREA)
EP17184076.2A 2017-07-31 2017-07-31 Verbesserte nfc-chip-lesevorrichtung Active EP3439190B1 (de)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
ES17184076T ES2919973T3 (es) 2017-07-31 2017-07-31 Lector de chip NFC mejorado
DK17184076.2T DK3439190T3 (da) 2017-07-31 2017-07-31 Forbedret nfc-chiplæser
EP17184076.2A EP3439190B1 (de) 2017-07-31 2017-07-31 Verbesserte nfc-chip-lesevorrichtung
PCT/EP2018/070442 WO2019025312A1 (en) 2017-07-31 2018-07-27 IMPROVED NFC CHIP READER
CA3069264A CA3069264A1 (en) 2017-07-31 2018-07-27 Improved nfc-chip reader
US16/629,109 US20200169889A1 (en) 2017-07-31 2018-07-27 Nfc-chip reader

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP17184076.2A EP3439190B1 (de) 2017-07-31 2017-07-31 Verbesserte nfc-chip-lesevorrichtung

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3439190A1 true EP3439190A1 (de) 2019-02-06
EP3439190B1 EP3439190B1 (de) 2022-04-20

Family

ID=59506115

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP17184076.2A Active EP3439190B1 (de) 2017-07-31 2017-07-31 Verbesserte nfc-chip-lesevorrichtung

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US20200169889A1 (de)
EP (1) EP3439190B1 (de)
CA (1) CA3069264A1 (de)
DK (1) DK3439190T3 (de)
ES (1) ES2919973T3 (de)
WO (1) WO2019025312A1 (de)

Families Citing this family (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11726923B2 (en) * 2019-06-18 2023-08-15 Micron Technology, Inc. Memory device with cryptographic kill switch
CN112118110B (zh) * 2020-09-04 2023-11-03 中国科学院大学 一种基于nfc的证件防伪方法及系统
CN113485875B (zh) * 2021-05-20 2024-07-19 新华三半导体技术有限公司 一种芯片验证系统及验证方法
US11799667B1 (en) * 2022-12-05 2023-10-24 Microgroove, LLC Systems and methods to identify a physical object as a digital asset

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2016019127A1 (en) * 2014-07-31 2016-02-04 Nok Nok Labs, Inc. System and method for implementing a one-time-password using asymmetric cryptography

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20150193870A1 (en) * 2014-01-03 2015-07-09 NewComLink, Inc. Generating electronic documents (edocs) for transactions
US9730072B2 (en) * 2014-05-23 2017-08-08 Apple Inc. Electronic subscriber identity module provisioning
US10877531B2 (en) * 2015-08-03 2020-12-29 Texas Instruments Incorporated Methods and apparatus to create a physically unclonable function
US10659955B2 (en) * 2016-12-01 2020-05-19 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Apparatus and method for installing and managing eSIM profiles
DE102017212994B3 (de) * 2017-05-31 2018-11-29 Apple Inc. INSTALLATION UND TESTEN EINES ELEKTRONISCHEN TEILNEHMERIDENTITÄTSMODULS (eSIM)

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2016019127A1 (en) * 2014-07-31 2016-02-04 Nok Nok Labs, Inc. System and method for implementing a one-time-password using asymmetric cryptography

Non-Patent Citations (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
"Machine Readable Travel Documents", 2015
BSI: "German eID based on Extended Access Control v2 - Overview", 20 February 2017 (2017-02-20), XP055362859, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/EIDAS/German_eID_Whitepaper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5> [retrieved on 20170407] *
BUNDESAMT FÜR SICHERHEIT IN DER INFORMATIONSTECHNIK: "Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token -", 26 February 2015 (2015-02-26), XP055405723, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/TechGuidelines/TR03110/BSI_TR-03110_Part-1_V2-2.pdf;jsessionid=FF42AA8C4919811DCD1B35A930658BE6.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1> [retrieved on 20170912] *
DAGDELEN ÖZGÜR ET AL: "Security Analysis of the Extended Access Control Protocol for Machine Readable Travel Documents", 25 October 2010, NETWORK AND PARALLEL COMPUTING; [LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE; LECT.NOTES COMPUTER], SPRINGER INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING, CHAM, PAGE(S) 54 - 68, ISBN: 978-3-642-01969-2, ISSN: 0302-9743, XP047428854 *
FORESTI ET AL.: "WISTP 2016, LNCS 9895", 2016, article MORGNER ET AL.: "Securing Transactions with the eIDAS Protocols", pages: 3 - 18, XP047562145
ICAO: "Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 11: Security Mechanisms for MRTDs", DOC 9303, 7TH ED., 2015, XP055651858
TR-03110-1 ADVANCED SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND E DAS TOKEN, 26 February 2015 (2015-02-26)

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA3069264A1 (en) 2019-02-07
WO2019025312A1 (en) 2019-02-07
ES2919973T3 (es) 2022-07-29
US20200169889A1 (en) 2020-05-28
DK3439190T3 (da) 2022-07-04
EP3439190B1 (de) 2022-04-20

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US11184343B2 (en) Method for carrying out an authentication
US11588637B2 (en) Methods for secure cryptogram generation
US10491384B2 (en) Device for secure multi-party cryptographic authorization
EP3280090B1 (de) Benutzerauthentifizierungsverfahren und -vorrichtung
US9325708B2 (en) Secure access to data in a device
US20200169889A1 (en) Nfc-chip reader
JP5601729B2 (ja) 移動無線機の移動無線網へのログイン方法
WO2020176870A1 (en) System and method for endorsing a new authenticator
CN106612180A (zh) 实现会话标识同步的方法及装置
CA2766491A1 (en) A method and system for securely and automatically downloading a master key in a bank card payment system
US9398024B2 (en) System and method for reliably authenticating an appliance
CN113711560A (zh) 用于有效质询-响应验证的系统和方法
JP2024099827A (ja) 安全なメッセージングのための非接触カードを介して資格情報を提供する多要素認証
KR20170066607A (ko) 보안 체크 방법, 장치, 단말기 및 서버
US8898462B2 (en) Method and device for authenticating components within an automatic teller machine
CN117121007A (zh) 通过非接触式卡认证的经认证的消息传递会话
KR20180024389A (ko) 키 관리 장치 및 방법
JP6167667B2 (ja) 認証システム、認証方法、認証プログラムおよび認証装置
JP2011253226A (ja) Ｉｃチップ発行システム、ｉｃチップ発行方法およびｉｃチップ発行プログラム
JP2009060528A (ja) 鍵設定方法および鍵設定システム
EP2991014A1 (de) Verteilung von Token für tokenbasierte Transaktionen
CN115310976A (zh) 非接触式交易处理方法、装置及系统

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN PUBLISHED

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Extension state: BA ME

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20190625

RBV Designated contracting states (corrected)

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20190909

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS

TPAC Observations filed by third parties

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNTIPA

GRAP Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: GRANT OF PATENT IS INTENDED

INTG Intention to grant announced

Effective date: 20211223

GRAS Grant fee paid

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE PATENT HAS BEEN GRANTED

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: EP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: FG4D

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R096

Ref document number: 602017056162

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: REF

Ref document number: 1486001

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20220515

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DK

Ref legal event code: T3

Effective date: 20220629

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: NL

Ref legal event code: FP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: SE

Ref legal event code: TRGR

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: ES

Ref legal event code: FG2A

Ref document number: 2919973

Country of ref document: ES

Kind code of ref document: T3

Effective date: 20220729

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: LT

Ref legal event code: MG9D

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: EE

Ref legal event code: FG4A

Ref document number: E022469

Country of ref document: EE

Effective date: 20220628

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: NO

Ref legal event code: T2

Effective date: 20220420

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: MK05

Ref document number: 1486001

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20220420

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: PT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220822

Ref country code: LT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: HR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: GR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220721

Ref country code: FI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: BG

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220720

Ref country code: AT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: RS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: PL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: LV

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: IS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220820

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R097

Ref document number: 602017056162

Country of ref document: DE

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SM

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: SK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: RO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: CZ

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MC

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: PL

26N No opposition filed

Effective date: 20230123

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: AL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: LU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20220731

Ref country code: LI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20220731

Ref country code: FR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20220731

Ref country code: CH

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20220731

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

P01 Opt-out of the competence of the unified patent court (upc) registered

Effective date: 20230504

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20220731

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: NO

Payment date: 20230726

Year of fee payment: 7

Ref country code: IT

Payment date: 20230731

Year of fee payment: 7

Ref country code: ES

Payment date: 20230808

Year of fee payment: 7

Ref country code: EE

Payment date: 20230811

Year of fee payment: 7

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: HU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT; INVALID AB INITIO

Effective date: 20170731

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

Ref country code: CY

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: TR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20240619

Year of fee payment: 8

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DK

Payment date: 20240625

Year of fee payment: 8

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: NL

Payment date: 20240619

Year of fee payment: 8

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SE

Payment date: 20240619

Year of fee payment: 8

Ref country code: BE

Payment date: 20240619

Year of fee payment: 8

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20220420

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20240619

Year of fee payment: 8