EP3432523B1 - Procédé et système pour connecter un terminal a un réseau privé virtuel - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour connecter un terminal a un réseau privé virtuel Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3432523B1
EP3432523B1 EP17785379.3A EP17785379A EP3432523B1 EP 3432523 B1 EP3432523 B1 EP 3432523B1 EP 17785379 A EP17785379 A EP 17785379A EP 3432523 B1 EP3432523 B1 EP 3432523B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
terminal
vpn
session
gateway
control device
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Application number
EP17785379.3A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP3432523A1 (fr
EP3432523A4 (fr
Inventor
Yancheng YANG
Xiangrong Chen
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Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Publication of EP3432523A4 publication Critical patent/EP3432523A4/fr
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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
    • H04L12/4641—Virtual LANs, VLANs, e.g. virtual private networks [VPN]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/66—Arrangements for connecting between networks having differing types of switching systems, e.g. gateways
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
    • H04L61/50—Address allocation
    • H04L61/5007—Internet protocol [IP] addresses
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0272—Virtual private networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/166—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the transport layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/14—Session management

Definitions

  • This application relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a method and a system used by a terminal to connect to a virtual private network (VPN), and a related device.
  • VPN virtual private network
  • IP camera (IPC) terminals are widespread.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • IPC terminals To prevent a video stream transmitted by an IPC terminal to a network from being maliciously monitored, and to prevent control signaling transmitted by the network to the IPC terminal from being maliciously tampered with in a transmission process, a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN technology is applied to the IPC terminal, so that the video stream and the control signaling are encrypted to be transmitted between the IPC terminal and the network.
  • SSL Secure Sockets Layer
  • the SSL VPN technology means that a remote user is connected to an SSL VPN server by using a web browser.
  • a data packet transmitted between the remote user and the SSL VPN server is encrypted by using the SSL protocol or the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol (a successor of the SSL protocol).
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • Both the SSL protocol and the TLS protocol are referred to as "SSL” or the “SSL protocol” below.
  • a security connection client is disposed in an IPC terminal in advance.
  • An IP address of a VPN gateway is preconfigured in the IPC terminal.
  • the security connection client initiates authentication. After the authentication succeeds, an SSL session is established between the IPC terminal and the VPN gateway.
  • a data stream (for example, a video stream) and a signaling stream may be encrypted by using the SSL session for transmission.
  • An outdoor IPC terminal is unattended, and therefore there is a terminal security problem. After the IPC terminal is maliciously operated, malicious data transmitted to the network is difficult to be found because of encryption protection by a VPN. Therefore, to ensure a secure connection of the IPC to the network, a VPN gateway cannot be deployed around a core network, and the VPN gateway is usually deployed on a router gateway.
  • the VPN gateway is deployed on the router gateway in a bypass mode.
  • the "bypass mode" means that the VPN gateway is directly connected to the router gateway by using a network cable, and the VPN gateway and the router gateway form an independent subnet.
  • the VPN gateway is responsible for access authentication and SSL session establishment of an IPC terminal in an area managed by the VPN gateway, and forwarding a data stream and a signaling stream to a video private network.
  • the video private network is an upper-layer network that includes the router gateway, a video surveillance device, and the like. Different VPN gateways have different IP addresses, and different VPN gateways are responsible for managing different areas.
  • the IPC terminal is not allowed to connect to the network and establish an SSL session without permission of the VPN gateway.
  • the IPC terminal needs to cooperate with a VPN gateway that manages an area in which the IPC terminal is located for normal use.
  • An IP address that is of a VPN gateway and that is configured for the IPC terminal can be only an IP address of a VPN gateway that manages an area in which the IPC terminal is located.
  • US2016/087941 discloses techniques for providing services to multiple tenants via a shared end-point.
  • This application provides a method and a system used by a terminal to connect to a virtual private network, and a related device, so as to resolve a problem that workload is heavy and an error is easy to occur currently during configuration of an IP address of a VPN gateway for a terminal.
  • FIG. 1 shows a system architecture in which a terminal is connected to a VPN.
  • the system architecture mainly includes a terminal 101, a VPN gateway 102, a router gateway 103, a VPN control device 104, and an authentication server 105. Details are as follows:
  • the terminal 101 may be a terminal that supports an IP protocol stack, such as an IPC. Client software is installed on the terminal 101.
  • the terminal initiates authentication.
  • the terminal may be, for example, a mobile phone, a personal computer (such as a notebook computer or a desktop computer), a printer, an IP phone, or a projector.
  • the VPN gateway 102 is configured to establish an SSL session with the terminal.
  • the VPN gateway 102 performs tunnel encapsulation on a service stream and a signaling flow that are sent by using the SSL session, decapsulates a service stream and a signaling flow that are received by using the SSL session, and forwards the service stream to a next hop.
  • the router gateway 103 is disposed between a layer-2 network device and a layer-3 network device, and is configured to perform layer-2 access and layer-2 forwarding with the layer-2 network device.
  • the layer-3 network device is connected to the VPN gateway and the VPN control device, and the router gateway 103 performs routing and forwarding with the layer-3 network device.
  • the VPN control device 104 is an authenticator of all terminals 101 in a system, and communicates with the authentication server 105 to complete authentication on the terminals.
  • the VPN control device 104 sends an authentication result and an address of the VPN gateway to the terminal 101.
  • the VPN control device 104 sends, to the VPN gateway 102, an identifier of a terminal 101 that is authenticated.
  • the authentication server 105 is configured to attempt to authenticate the terminal 101.
  • the VPN control device is a gateway device that works independently, or a function of the VPN control device is completed by multiple gateway devices by means of cooperation.
  • the VPN gateway is a gateway device that works independently, or a function of the VPN gateway is completed by multiple gateway devices by means of cooperation.
  • the system may further include a video surveillance device 106.
  • the video surveillance device 106 is configured to send signaling to the terminal 101 in an area managed by the VPN gateway 102.
  • the video surveillance device 106 may display a video sent by the terminal 101.
  • the video surveillance device 106 may store a video sent by the terminal 101.
  • the VPN control device and the authentication server may be integrated into one device.
  • FIG. 2 shows a specific process in which a terminal is connected to a VPN. Details are as follows: Step 201: A VPN control device receives a first handshake message sent by a router gateway, where the first handshake message is sent by the router gateway after the router gateway receives a second handshake message sent by a terminal, and the second handshake message is used to initiate a negotiation process of a first SSL session to the VPN control device.
  • IP addresses of all VPN gateways in a system are configured in the VPN control device.
  • a direct route entry is configured in the router gateway.
  • the direct route entry includes a subnet prefix of a VPN gateway that is located on the router gateway in a bypass mode, or the direct route entry includes a subnet prefix and a mask that are of a VPN gateway that is located on the router gateway in a bypass mode.
  • the "bypass mode" means that the router gateway is connected to the VPN gateway by using a network cable. The router gateway and the VPN gateway in a bypass mode belong to a same subnet.
  • the IP addresses of all the VPN gateways in the system, or masks and the IP addresses of all the VPN gateways in the system are configured in the VPN control device.
  • the IP addresses that are of all the VPN gateways and that are configured in the VPN control device are different from each other, and subnet prefixes of all the VPN gateways are different from each other, so as to ensure global uniqueness of the VPN gateways.
  • the router gateway After receiving the second handshake message from the terminal, and before sending the first handshake message to the VPN control device, the router gateway adds the direct route entry of the router gateway to the second handshake message, so as to obtain the first handshake message.
  • Step 202 The VPN control device determines, according to the first handshake message, a session parameter of the first SSL session by negotiating with the terminal, and attempts to authenticate the terminal by using the first SSL session.
  • the session parameter of the first SSL session includes a session key, a session identifier, and an encryption algorithm, and the terminal and the VPN control device separately store the session parameter of the first SSL session.
  • the VPN control device receives, by using the first SSL session, an authentication message sent by the terminal.
  • the authentication message carries the session identifier and authentication data, and the authentication data is obtained by encrypting an identifier of the terminal by using the encryption algorithm and the session key.
  • the VPN control device obtains the session identifier and the authentication data that are carried in the authentication message. After determining that the VPN control device stores the session identifier, the VPN control device decrypts the authentication data by using the session key and the encryption algorithm, to obtain the identifier of the terminal, and sends the identifier of the terminal to an authentication server.
  • the VPN control device determines that authentication on the terminal succeeds. If receiving an authentication failure message returned by the authentication server, the VPN control device determines that authentication on the terminal fails.
  • the VPN control device tears down the first SSL session.
  • Step 203 After the terminal is authenticated, the VPN control device determines an IP address of a first VPN gateway to which the terminal is allowed to connect.
  • the VPN control device determines, according to the direct route entry of the router gateway that sends the first handshake message, the first VPN gateway to which the terminal is allowed to connect.
  • the terminal initiates the negotiation process of the first SSL session to the VPN control device according to the configured IP address of the VPN control device. That is, the terminal sends the second handshake message, that is, a ClientHello message by using the IP address of the VPN control device as a destination address.
  • the router gateway receives the ClientHello message sent by the terminal, and adds the direct route entry of the router gateway to an unoccupied extension option of the ClientHello message, so as to obtain the first handshake message.
  • FIG. 3 shows a structure of the extension option of the ClientHello message, and an option field corresponding to a type 60 carries the direct route entry of the router gateway.
  • An extension type of the extension option of the ClientHello message may be any unused value in a range from 36 to 65280.
  • FIG. 4 shows a process in which the VPN control device determines the IP address of the first VPN gateway.
  • the VPN control device obtains, from a list of the configured IP addresses of all the VPN gateways in the system, an IP address of a VPN gateway that belongs to the subnet prefix, of the VPN gateway, included in the direct route entry carried in the first handshake message, and determines the obtained IP address of the VPN gateway as the IP address of the first VPN gateway. If more than one IP address of VPN gateways that belongs to the subnet prefix, of the VPN gateway, included in the direct route entry carried in the first handshake message is obtained, one IP address is randomly selected from the obtained eligible IP addresses as the IP address of the first VPN gateway.
  • the IP address of the first VPN gateway is determined in the following steps.
  • Step a The VPN control device obtains a subnet prefix M and a mask N that are of a VPN gateway and that are in the direct route entry carried in the first handshake message, and performs an AND operation on the subnet prefix M and the mask N that are of the VPN gateway to obtain X.
  • Step b For an IP address A that is of a VPN gateway and that is configured in the VPN control device and a mask B corresponding to the IP address A, perform an AND operation on the IP address A and the mask B to obtain Y.
  • Step c Determine whether X is equal to Y, and if X is equal to Y, determine that the IP address A is the IP address of the first VPN gateway; or if X is not equal to Y, obtain an IP address that is of a next VPN gateway and that is configured in the VPN control device and a corresponding mask, and repeatedly perform step b and step c until the list of the IP addresses that are of all the VPN gateways in the system and that are configured in the VPN control device is traversed.
  • the VPN control device searches the list of the IP addresses of all the VPN gateways in the system according to the direct route entry. For example, if each entry in the direct route entry represents a subnet prefix of a VPN gateway, the subnet prefix of the VPN gateway is used to search the list of the IP addresses of all the VPN gateways in the system, and an IP address of a VPN gateway that belongs to the subnet prefix of the VPN gateway is determined as the IP address of the first VPN gateway to which the terminal needs to connect.
  • Step 204 The VPN control device notifies the terminal of the IP address of the first VPN gateway.
  • the VPN control device notifies the first VPN gateway of an IP address of the terminal and the session parameter of the first SSL session, and the first VPN gateway stores the IP address of the terminal and the session parameter of the first SSL session.
  • the terminal and the first VPN gateway reuse the session parameter of the first SSL session to establish a second SSL session.
  • a process in which the terminal establishes the second SSL session with the first VPN gateway is as follows: The terminal encrypts the IP address of the terminal by using the session key and the encryption algorithm of the first SSL session, to generate a ciphertext, and adds the session identifier of the first SSL session and the ciphertext to a third handshake message, and sends the third handshake message to the first VPN gateway.
  • the third handshake message is used to initiate a negotiation process of the second SSL session to the first VPN gateway.
  • the third handshake message is a ClientHello message.
  • a ciphertext A is generated by encrypting the IP address of the terminal by using the session key and the encryption algorithm, and the ciphertext A is carried to an extension option of the ClientHello message.
  • a type of the extension option of the ClientHello message may be any unused value in a range from 36 to 65280, and a type 61 represents that an option field of the extension option carries the ciphertext A.
  • the first VPN gateway receives the third handshake message, and obtains the session identifier and the ciphertext that are carried in the third handshake message. If determining that the first VPN gateway locally stores the session identifier, and that a result obtained by decrypting the ciphertext by using the locally stored session key and encryption algorithm is the IP address of the terminal, the first VPN gateway establishes the second SSL session with the terminal, and uses the session parameter of the first SSL session as a session parameter of the second SSL session.
  • FIG. 5 shows a process in which the first VPN gateway establishes the second SSL session with the terminal according to the session identifier and the ciphertext that is carried in the third handshake message. Details are as follows: The first VPN gateway locally stores the IP address of the terminal that is allowed to connect to the first VPN gateway, and stores the session identifier, the session key, and the encryption algorithm of the first SSL session. The first VPN gateway parses the ClientHello message sent by the terminal, to obtain the session identifier carried in the ClientHello message, and extracts the ciphertext A according to the extension option 61 of the ClientHello message. The first VPN gateway determines whether the session identifier carried in the ClientHello message is the same as the locally cached session identifier.
  • the first VPN gateway refuses to establish the second SSL session. If the session identifier carried in the ClientHello message is the same as the locally cached session identifier, the first VPN gateway decrypts the ciphertext A by using the locally stored encryption algorithm and session key of the first SSL session, so as to obtain a value X. The first VPN gateway determines whether the value X is the same as an IP address of a terminal that initiates a request. If the value X is different from the IP address of the terminal that initiates the request, the first VPN gateway refuses to establish the second SSL session.
  • the first VPN gateway further determines whether the IP address of the terminal that initiates the request is the locally stored IP address of the terminal that is allowed to connect to the first VPN gateway. If the IP address of the terminal that initiates the request is not the locally stored IP address of the terminal that is allowed to connect to the first VPN gateway, the first VPN gateway refuses to establish the second SSL session; or if the IP address of the terminal that initiates the request is the locally stored IP address of the terminal that is allowed to connect to the first VPN gateway, the first VPN gateway successfully establishes the second SSL session with the terminal, and reuses the session identifier, the session key, and the encryption algorithm of the first SSL session.
  • the following uses a specific embodiment to describe in detail a process of attempting to authenticate terminal access and establishing an SSL session used for service stream transmission.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of functional logic of terminal access authentication and SSL session establishment according to the specific embodiment.
  • FIG. 7A , FIG. 7B , and FIG. 7C are a schematic flowchart of a method for terminal access authentication and SSL session establishment according to the specific embodiment.
  • FIG. 8A , FIG. 8B , FIG. 8C , and FIG. 8D are a schematic diagram of a working time sequence of terminal access authentication and SSL session establishment according to the specific embodiment.
  • the VPN control device mainly includes a processor 901 and a communications interface 902. Specifically, the processor 901 performs the following processes:
  • the router gateway includes a processor 1001 and a communications interface 1002.
  • the processor 1001 performs the following processes according to the program:
  • the terminal includes a processor 1101 and a communications interface 1102. Specifically, the processor 1101 performs the following processes:
  • the terminal further includes a video collection module.
  • the VPN control device includes:
  • functions of the receiving module 1201 and the notification module 1204 may be implemented by the communications interface 902 of the VPN control device, and functions of the authentication module 1202 and the determining module 1203 may be implemented by the processor 901 of the VPN control device.
  • the router gateway includes:
  • functions of the receiving module 1301 and the sending module 1303 are implemented by the communications interface 1002 of the router gateway, and a function of the processing module 1302 is implemented by the processor 1001 of the router gateway.
  • the terminal includes:
  • functions of the sending module 1401 and the receiving module 1403 are implemented by the communications interface 1102 of the terminal, and a function of the processing module 1402 is implemented by the processor 1101 of the terminal.
  • the embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, a system, or a computer program product. Therefore, the present invention may use a form of hardware only embodiments, software only embodiments, or embodiments with a combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may use a form of a computer program product that is implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to a disk memory, a CD-ROM, an optical memory, and the like) that include computer-usable program code.
  • computer-usable storage media including but not limited to a disk memory, a CD-ROM, an optical memory, and the like
  • These computer program instructions may be provided for a general-purpose computer or a processor of any other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by a computer or a processor of any other programmable data processing device generate an apparatus for implementing a specific function in one or more processes in the flowcharts and/or in one or more blocks in the block diagrams.
  • These computer program instructions may be loaded onto a computer or another programmable data processing device, so that a series of operations and steps are performed on the computer or the another programmable device, thereby generating computer-implemented processing. Therefore, the instructions executed on the computer or the another programmable device provide steps for implementing a specific function in one or more processes in the flowcharts and/or in one or more blocks in the block diagrams.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Claims (10)

  1. Procédé utilisé par un terminal pour se connecter à un réseau privé virtuel (VPN), comprenant les étapes consistant à :
    recevoir (201), par un dispositif de contrôle de VPN, un premier message d'établissement de liaison envoyé par une passerelle de routage, le premier message d'établissement de liaison étant envoyé par la passerelle de routage après la réception, par la passerelle de routage, d'un deuxième message d'établissement de liaison envoyé par un terminal, le deuxième message d'établissement de liaison étant utilisé pour amorcer un processus de négociation d'une première session sur couche de socket sécurisée (SSL) avec le dispositif de contrôle de VPN ;
    déterminer (202), par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN selon le premier message d'établissement de liaison, un paramètre de session de la première session SSL en négociant avec le terminal, et tenter d'authentifier le terminal au moyen de la première session SSL ;
    une fois le terminal authentifié, déterminer (203), par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, une adresse sur protocole Internet (IP) d'une première passerelle VPN à laquelle le terminal est autorisé à se connecter ; et
    notifier (204), par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN au terminal, l'adresse IP de la première passerelle VPN, le premier message d'établissement de liaison transportant une entrée de route directe de la passerelle de routage et l'entrée de route directe comprenant un préfixe de sous-réseau d'une passerelle VPN qui est située sur la passerelle de routage dans un mode de contournement ; et
    la détermination, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, d'une adresse IP d'une première passerelle VPN comprenant l'étape consistant à :
    obtenir, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN à partir d'une liste d'adresses IP configurées de toutes les passerelles VPN, une adresse IP d'une passerelle VPN qui appartient au préfixe de sous-réseau, de la passerelle VPN, comprise dans l'entrée de route directe, et déterminer que l'adresse IP obtenue de la passerelle VPN est l'adresse IP de la première passerelle VPN.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, le procédé comprenant en outre l'étape consistant à :
    notifier, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN à la première passerelle VPN, une adresse IP du terminal et le paramètre de session de la première session SSL, la première passerelle VPN stockant l'adresse IP du terminal et le paramètre de session de la première session SSL, et le paramètre de session comprenant une clé de session, un identifiant de session et un algorithme de cryptage.
  3. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 et 2, le procédé comprenant en outre l'étape consistant à :
    envoyer, par le terminal, un troisième message d'établissement de liaison à la première passerelle VPN, le troisième message d'établissement de liaison étant utilisé pour amorcer un processus de négociation d'une seconde session SSL avec la première passerelle VPN, le troisième message d'établissement de liaison transportant l'identifiant de session et un texte chiffré, et le texte chiffré étant généré en cryptant l'adresse IP du terminal au moyen de la clé de session et de l'algorithme de cryptage.
  4. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 3, dans lequel la tentative d'authentification, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, du terminal au moyen de la première session SSL comprend les étapes consistant à :
    recevoir, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN au moyen de la première session SSL, un message d'authentification envoyé par le terminal, le message d'authentification transportant l'identifiant de session et des données d'authentification, et les données d'authentification étant obtenues en cryptant un identifiant du terminal au moyen de l'algorithme de cryptage et de la clé de session ;
    analyser, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, le message d'authentification afin d'obtenir l'identifiant de session et les données d'authentification qui sont transportés dans le message d'authentification ; après la détermination du fait que le dispositif de contrôle de VPN stocke l'identifiant de session, décrypter les données d'authentification au moyen de la clé de session et de l'algorithme de cryptage afin d'obtenir l'identifiant du terminal ; et envoyer l'identifiant du terminal à un serveur d'authentification ; et
    en cas de réception d'un message de succès d'authentification renvoyé par le serveur d'authentification, déterminer, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, qu'un accès du terminal est autorisé, le message de succès d'authentification étant renvoyé par le serveur d'authentification une fois que le serveur d'authentification détermine que l'identifiant du terminal existe ; ou en cas de réception d'un message d'échec d'authentification renvoyé par le serveur d'authentification, déterminer, par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, qu'un accès du terminal n'est pas autorisé.
  5. Système utilisé par un terminal pour se connecter à un réseau privé virtuel (VPN), comprenant :
    un terminal (101), configuré pour envoyer un deuxième message d'établissement de liaison à une passerelle de routage (103), le deuxième message d'établissement de liaison étant utilisé pour amorcer un processus de négociation d'une première session sur couche de socket sécurisée (SSL) avec un dispositif de contrôle de VPN (104) ;
    la passerelle de routage, configurée pour envoyer un premier message d'établissement de liaison au dispositif de contrôle de VPN après la réception du deuxième message d'établissement de liaison envoyé par le terminal ; et
    le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, configuré pour recevoir le premier message d'établissement de liaison envoyé par la passerelle de routage, déterminer, selon le premier message d'établissement de liaison, un paramètre de session de la première session SSL en négociant avec le terminal, et tenter d'authentifier le terminal au moyen de la première session SSL ; une fois le terminal authentifié, déterminer une adresse sur protocole Internet (IP) d'une première passerelle VPN à laquelle le terminal est autorisé à se connecter ; et notifier au terminal l'adresse IP de la première passerelle VPN, la passerelle de routage étant spécifiquement configurée pour :
    ajouter une entrée de route directe au deuxième message d'établissement de liaison afin d'obtenir le premier message d'établissement de liaison, l'entrée de route directe comprenant un préfixe de sous-réseau d'une passerelle VPN qui est située sur la passerelle de routage dans un mode de contournement ; et
    le dispositif de contrôle de VPN étant spécifiquement configuré pour :
    obtenir, à partir d'une liste d'adresses IP configurées de toutes les passerelles VPN, une adresse IP d'une passerelle VPN qui appartient au préfixe de sous-réseau, de la passerelle VPN, comprise dans l'entrée de route directe, et déterminer que l'adresse IP obtenue de la passerelle VPN est l'adresse IP de la première passerelle VPN.
  6. Système selon la revendication 5, dans lequel le dispositif de contrôle de VPN est en outre configuré pour :
    notifier à la première passerelle VPN une adresse IP du terminal et le paramètre de session de la première session SSL ; et
    la première passerelle VPN est spécifiquement configurée pour :
    stocker l'adresse IP du terminal et le paramètre de session de la première session SSL, le paramètre de session comprenant une clé de session, un identifiant de session et un algorithme de cryptage.
  7. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications 5 et 6, dans lequel le terminal est en outre configuré pour :
    envoyer un troisième message d'établissement de liaison à la première passerelle VPN, le troisième message d'établissement de liaison étant utilisé pour amorcer un processus de négociation d'une seconde session SSL avec la première passerelle VPN, le troisième message d'établissement de liaison transportant l'identifiant de session et un texte chiffré, et le texte chiffré étant généré en cryptant l'adresse IP du terminal au moyen de la clé de session et de l'algorithme de cryptage.
  8. Système selon l'une quelconque des revendications 5 à 7, dans lequel le terminal est spécifiquement configuré pour :
    envoyer un message d'authentification au dispositif de contrôle de VPN au moyen de la première session SSL, le message d'authentification transportant l'identifiant de session et des données d'authentification, et les données d'authentification étant obtenues en cryptant un identifiant du terminal au moyen de l'algorithme de cryptage et de la clé de session ; le dispositif de contrôle de VPN étant spécifiquement configuré pour :
    recevoir, au moyen de la première session SSL, le message d'authentification envoyé par le terminal ; analyser le message d'authentification afin d'obtenir l'identifiant de session et les données d'authentification qui sont transportés dans le message d'authentification ; après la détermination du fait que le dispositif de contrôle de VPN stocke l'identifiant de session, décrypter les données d'authentification au moyen de la clé de session et de l'algorithme de cryptage afin d'obtenir l'identifiant du terminal ;
    et envoyer l'identifiant du terminal à un serveur d'authentification ;
    le serveur d'authentification étant spécifiquement configuré pour :
    recevoir l'identifiant du terminal envoyé par le dispositif de contrôle de VPN, et s'il est déterminé que le serveur d'authentification stocke l'identifiant du terminal, renvoyer un message de succès d'authentification au dispositif de contrôle de VPN ;
    ou s'il est déterminé que le serveur d'authentification ne stocke pas l'identifiant du terminal, renvoyer un message d'échec d'authentification au dispositif de contrôle de VPN; et
    le dispositif de contrôle de VPN étant spécifiquement configuré pour :
    en cas de réception du message de succès d'authentification renvoyé par le serveur d'authentification, déterminer qu'un accès du terminal est autorisé ; ou en cas de réception du message d'échec d'authentification renvoyé par le serveur d'authentification, déterminer qu'un accès du terminal n'est pas autorisé.
  9. Dispositif de contrôle de réseau privé virtuel (VPN), comprenant :
    un module de réception (1201), configuré pour recevoir un premier message d'établissement de liaison envoyé par une passerelle de routage, le premier message d'établissement de liaison étant envoyé par la passerelle de routage après la réception, par la passerelle de routage, d'un deuxième message d'établissement de liaison envoyé par un terminal, le deuxième message d'établissement de liaison étant utilisé pour amorcer un processus de négociation d'une première session sur couche de socket sécurisée (SSL) avec le dispositif de contrôle de VPN ;
    un module d'authentification (1202), configuré pour : déterminer, selon le premier message d'établissement de liaison, un paramètre de session de la première session SSL en négociant avec le terminal, et tenter d'authentifier le terminal au moyen de la première session SSL ;
    un module de détermination (1203), configuré pour : une fois le terminal authentifié, déterminer une adresse sur protocole Internet (IP) d'une première passerelle VPN à laquelle le terminal est autorisé à se connecter ; et
    un module de notification (1204), configuré pour notifier au terminal l'adresse IP de la première passerelle VPN, le premier message d'établissement de liaison transportant une entrée de route directe de la passerelle de routage et l'entrée de route directe comprenant un préfixe de sous-réseau d'une passerelle VPN qui est située sur la passerelle de routage dans un mode de contournement ; et
    le module de détermination étant spécifiquement configuré pour :
    obtenir, à partir d'une liste d'adresses IP configurées de toutes les passerelles VPN, une adresse IP d'une passerelle VPN qui appartient au préfixe de sous-réseau, de la passerelle VPN, comprise dans l'entrée de route directe, et déterminer que l'adresse IP obtenue de la passerelle VPN est l'adresse IP de la première passerelle VPN.
  10. Dispositif de contrôle de VPN selon la revendication 9, dans lequel le module de notification est en outre configuré pour :
    notifier à la première passerelle VPN une adresse IP du terminal et le paramètre de session de la première session SSL, la première passerelle VPN stockant l'adresse IP du terminal et le paramètre de session de la première session SSL, et le paramètre de session comprenant une clé de session, un identifiant de session et un algorithme de cryptage.
EP17785379.3A 2016-04-18 2017-04-12 Procédé et système pour connecter un terminal a un réseau privé virtuel Active EP3432523B1 (fr)

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CN201610242556.0A CN107306214B (zh) 2016-04-18 2016-04-18 终端连接虚拟专用网的方法、系统及相关设备
PCT/CN2017/080310 WO2017181894A1 (fr) 2016-04-18 2017-04-12 Procédé et système de connexion d'un réseau privé virtuel par un terminal, et dispositif associé

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CN107306214B (zh) 2020-04-03
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CN107306214A (zh) 2017-10-31
EP3432523A4 (fr) 2019-01-23
US11165604B2 (en) 2021-11-02

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