EP3323076A1 - Method and arrangement for securely interchanging configuration data for an apparatus - Google Patents
Method and arrangement for securely interchanging configuration data for an apparatusInfo
- Publication number
- EP3323076A1 EP3323076A1 EP16727993.4A EP16727993A EP3323076A1 EP 3323076 A1 EP3323076 A1 EP 3323076A1 EP 16727993 A EP16727993 A EP 16727993A EP 3323076 A1 EP3323076 A1 EP 3323076A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- configuration data
- digital signature
- sigb
- external storage
- storage device
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and an arrangement for the secure exchange of configuration data between a first and a second device, in particular devices in an automation system.
- PLC programmable logic controller
- intelligent field devices in power distribution or element controllers in railway technology usually contain an individual for all devices of a series and version-identical firmware or software , different programming or configuration for each device.
- this programming or configuration data can additionally be stored in separate external, persistent storage such as an SD card or a USB storage medium.
- a service technician removes the defective device, removes the external memory, puts it in a replacement device and connects it to the system.
- the replacement device reads in the data from the external memory, accepts the programming and configuration data stored on it, and is immediately ready for use in the same configuration as the replaced device.
- the storage medium can also be permanently installed in the system, for example in a control cabinet, so that it remains in the system when a device is removed and is automatically connected to this device when a device is plugged in or installed.
- Such an external storage device which can be plugged into a device or into a device has the advantage that the device immediately receives the correct, individual configuration data without administration effort.
- programming and configuration data on an external pluggable memory device which are thus detachably connectable to a device or device, can have the disadvantage that an attacker who has physical access to the removable memory or physical access to the device has this data easier to manipulate.
- the inventive method for the secure exchange of configuration data between a first and a second device comprises the steps:
- the external storage device serves as the transmission medium of this information in the method. This ensures that the data on the external storage device has not been changed. This ensures that the current configuration information is present on the external storage device at all times. This makes it possible in particular for the current configuration of the first device to be transferred to the second device when the device is replaced by a second device. There is thus no additional administration effort, for example by a central configuration server, in which an update of the configuration data must be reported and the correspondingly updated configuration data must be retrieved.
- the configuration data are checked by the second device by means of the signature and the security token of the first device and used in a successful verification.
- the security information is a private key and the security token is a digital certificate.
- the private key and the digital certificate are elements of an asymmetric cryptographic method, for example corresponding to a public key infrastructure.
- the private key is uniquely assigned a public key that is contained in the digital certificate.
- Data is encrypted with the private key and can be decrypted with the public key.
- the digital certificate which is attached as a security token the configuration data
- the authenticity of the configuration data can be checked by the existing certificate of the first device to an already existing in the second device certificate, such as an anchored in the firmware, trusted root Certificate from the manufacturer.
- Such a trustworthy root certificate in particular of the manufacturer, is given in particular with devices from the same manufacturer. Is used as
- Replacement device that is, as a second device, a device from another manufacturer used as the first device, it must be ensured that in the second device, a suitable certificate, for example, the root certificate of the manufacturer of the first device is available.
- a first digital signature already exists for at least a first subset of the configuration data, then in an advantageous embodiment, only for a subset of the configuration data for which no signature is yet present, a second digital signature with security information of the first device is created or it is about all subsets of the configuration data and the already present signatures created a digital signature with security information of the first device.
- the configuration data are stored encrypted on the external storage device.
- a corresponding key must be present, for example, in the firmware of a first and second device, or such a key can be queried by a central component.
- the arrangement according to the invention for the secure exchange of configuration data comprises a device having configuration data of the device, security information for at least one asymmetric cryptographic method, a cryptographic processor and a memory device detachably connected to the device, the cryptographic processor being adapted to provide a digital signature over the device Create configuration data and store the configuration data, the digital signature and a security token of the security information in the external storage device.
- the external storage device may be released, e.g. withdrawn, and connected to a replacement device which thereby assumes the exact same configuration as the replaced device.
- the administration effort is minimized when replacing a device and misconfiguration avoided.
- the digital signature is created with a private key of the security information of the device and the security token exists as a digital certificate with a public key of the device.
- the cryptographic processor is set up to calculate a new digital signature after a change in the configuration data in the device and to save the changed configuration data and the new digital signature to the external memory device.
- the cryptographic processor is set up to read in secure configuration data from the external storage device, to check the secure configuration data by means of the digital signature and the security token contained in the secure configuration data and, if successful, to verify the secure configuration data to use in the device.
- the signature can ensure that no manipulated data is transferred to the second device.
- the cryptographic processor is set up in such a way as to provide a digital signature on the saved configuration data with a
- Security information of the device to create and store on the external storage device. This makes it possible to update the configuration data of the device at any time and save them saved on the external storage device.
- the cryptographic processor is set up to calculate a new digital signature after a renewal of the certificate of the device and to save the new digital signature and the renewed certificate to the external memory device.
- a computer program product according to the invention can be loaded directly into a memory of a digital computer and comprises program code parts which are suitable for carrying out the aforementioned method steps. Accordingly, a data carrier according to the invention is claimed, which stores said computer program product.
- Figure 1 shows an embodiment of the method according to the invention as a flowchart
- FIG. 2A shows a first example of configuration data that was created according to the method according to the invention
- FIG. 2B shows a second example of configuration data that has been created according to the method according to the invention
- FIG. 3 shows configuration data that is used when updating
- Configuration data are changed in a schematic representation
- Figure 4 shows configuration data, which are generated for example when a change of the storage device from a first device to a second device, in a schematic representation
- Figure 5 shows an embodiment of an inventive arrangement in block diagram.
- Figure 1 shows a method for the secure exchange of configuration data between a first and a second device, in particular, perform the same task and are identical or very similar devices of a series.
- Such devices are, for example, intelligent field devices that are installed in the same series and version, for example in an automation system, but perform different tasks. Therefore, the individual field devices differ only in part of their configuration data.
- configuration data is placed on an external storage device such as an SD card or a USB storage medium connected to it during normal operation of a device.
- an external storage device such as an SD card or a USB storage medium connected to it during normal operation of a device.
- Such a removable storage device is removed from the device during replacement and connected to the second device replacing the first one.
- security information for an asymmetrical encryption method which is usually present in such a device, is now used for the backup.
- security information of the first device is, for example, a private cryptographic key of the first device.
- a security token is, for example, a digital certificate in that, in addition to an identifier for the device, a public key matching the private key used for signing is also included.
- the external storage device is now released from the first device and connected to a second device and loaded into the second device. The configuration data can thus be checked for authenticity and integrity.
- this checks the configuration data by means of the digital signature and the security token, which was added to the configuration data. This is shown in dashed lines as method step 14.
- the second device uses the configuration data only in a successful check 15. Thus, a change in the configuration data can be checked on the external storage device and the uploading of such manipulated configuration data can be avoided.
- only a part of the configuration data is used by the second device before successfully checking the authenticity and integrity of the configuration data in the second device, for example, to load more data over a network, and the test is later executed or repeated ,
- the authenticity of the data is checked by returning the existing security token, for example an already existing certificate of the first device, to a trusted root certificate anchored in the firmware of the second device.
- a trusted root certificate anchored in the firmware of the second device.
- devices of the same series and the same version of a manufacturer are equipped with a uniform certificate from the manufacturer.
- a root certificate of the manufacturer is suitable for securing the configuration data.
- the second device perform a new signature of the data with its own security information and replace the signature and associated security tokens on the external storage device.
- the first and the second device may preferably use as a security token a signature certificate for signing the data on the external storage device.
- Such a signature certificate can also be used for signing measurement or logging data or also for control commands.
- FIGS. 2A and 2B Various options for the signature of configuration data A, B are shown in FIGS. 2A and 2B.
- the subset A of the configuration data is, for example, configuration data that has been assigned centrally during the configuration of the device.
- the subset B of configuration data are, for example, device-specific calibration data, which were generated individually during the commissioning of the device.
- the subset of the configuration data A are signed both in FIG. 2A and in FIG. 2B by a digital signature of, for example, a project engineer.
- FIG. 2A only the subset B of the configuration data is signed by the security information of the first device B, and a corresponding security token Cert (b), also designated reference 105, is added.
- a corresponding security token Cert also designated reference 105
- a signature Sigb (A, Siga (A), B) or a signature Sigb (A, Siga (A), B) or over the subset A and the subset B is transmitted over the entire available quantity of configuration data 103, here subset A, of a signature Siga (A) Sigb (103) and in turn attached the security token Cert (b) of the device.
- FIG. 3 shows configuration data 201 which are generated by a first device and stored in the external storage device as configuration data 201. If at least parts of the configuration data change, see changed configuration data B ", these are updated, as shown here by the arrow, and we also calculate a signature Sigb (B") via the changed configuration data B " In this case, the changed configuration data 203 changed compared to the configuration data 201. These are, in particular, the updated subset B 'of the configuration data and an updated digital signature Sigb (B').
- FIG. 4 shows how the configuration data 201 of a first device changes when the first device receives a new security token, in particular a new certificate Cert (c). This may for example be the case after the expiration of the previous certificate Cert (b).
- the security token is then replaced by the new security token Cert (c) and a digital signature over the subset B of the configuration data with security information corresponding to the security token
- the same configuration data 203 results when the external storage device is connected to a second device and after checking the signature and the
- FIG. 5 now shows an arrangement with a first device 100 that is connected to an external memory device 200.
- the storage device 200 may be detachably connected to the first device 100 via a USB interface.
- secure digital memory cards also called SD card for short, can be used as an external storage device. Such a card can also be inserted or removed, for example, into a corresponding slot in the first device 100.
- the first device comprises an internal memory 102, on which the memory data 103, in particular the subsets A, B from FIGS.
- Such a first device 100 typically includes security information for at least one asymmetric cryptographic method, for example a signature method, in particular a private key 104 and a security token 105, which, for example, as a digital certificate one for private
- asymmetric cryptographic method for example a signature method, in particular a private key 104 and a security token 105, which, for example, as a digital certificate one for private
- Key 104 belonging public key, as well as a device identifier of the device 100 includes and is signed by a credible body. This credible job is represented by a root certificate.
- the internal memory 102 is connected to a cryptographic processor 101.
- the cryptographic computing unit 101 signs the configuration data 103 with the private key 104, that is, a digital signature is formed. Subsequently, the configuration data 103, the digital signature and the security token 105 are stored on the external storage device as configuration data 201. If configuration data of the first device 100 changes, as already described, the changed configuration data are re-signed and updated on the external memory device 200. If the device 100 is replaced by a second device 300, the external storage device 200 is detached from the first device and connected to the second device 300, see dashed connection.
- a second device Device 300 differs from the first device in particular by a device-specific private key 104 'of the second device and a correspondingly different security token 105' or digital certificate 105 '.
- the second device 300 now reads the configuration data 201 from the external storage device 200, and verifies the digital signature with the supplied, in the certificate located public key. The authenticity of the configuration data is checked by returning the digital certificate 105 to a common root certificate. If both the authenticity and the integrity of the configuration data are confirmed, the second device 300 loads the configuration data into the internal memory 102 and thus has the exact same configuration 103 as the first device 100. The cryptographic computing device 101 then sends a digital signature of the configuration data 103 with the private key 104 ', the second device 300 generated and stored together with the certificate 105' of the second device 300 to the external storage device. Thus, the second device may in turn update its own configuration at any time on the external storage device 200.
- Security tokens or operational certificates 100, 105 for example for a measurement data signature, communication or the like present on the first and second devices 100, 300 can also be used to secure the externally stored configuration data. This achieves protection of the configuration data on the external storage device 200 against physical access manipulation. Furthermore, no additional administration effort is necessary, for example, for a service technician or for a higher-level configuration server in order to require a replacement device with the exact same configuration of the device to be replaced. All described and / or drawn features can be advantageously combined with each other within the scope of the invention. The invention is not limited to the described embodiments.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102015213412.1A DE102015213412A1 (en) | 2015-07-16 | 2015-07-16 | Method and arrangement for the secure exchange of configuration data of a device |
PCT/EP2016/062656 WO2017008953A1 (en) | 2015-07-16 | 2016-06-03 | Method and arrangement for securely interchanging configuration data for an apparatus |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3323076A1 true EP3323076A1 (en) | 2018-05-23 |
Family
ID=56116417
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP16727993.4A Withdrawn EP3323076A1 (en) | 2015-07-16 | 2016-06-03 | Method and arrangement for securely interchanging configuration data for an apparatus |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20180131520A1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3323076A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN107851158A (en) |
DE (1) | DE102015213412A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2017008953A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP3051469A1 (en) | 2015-01-28 | 2016-08-03 | Philip Morris Products S.A. | Method and apparatus for unit and container identification and tracking |
ES2728680T3 (en) * | 2015-01-31 | 2019-10-28 | Inexto Sa | Secure product identification and verification |
US20180205543A1 (en) | 2015-08-13 | 2018-07-19 | Inexto Sa | Enhanced obfuscation or randomization for secure product identification and verification |
WO2017032860A1 (en) | 2015-08-25 | 2017-03-02 | Inexto Sa | Multiple authorization modules for secure production and verification |
US10579889B2 (en) | 2015-08-25 | 2020-03-03 | Inexto Sa | Verification with error tolerance for secure product identifiers |
DE102017102677A1 (en) | 2017-02-10 | 2018-08-16 | Endress+Hauser Conducta Gmbh+Co. Kg | Method for authenticating a field device of automation technology |
DE102018211597A1 (en) * | 2018-07-12 | 2020-01-16 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Procedure for setting up a credential for a first device |
JP6697038B2 (en) * | 2018-07-31 | 2020-05-20 | 日本電信電話株式会社 | Information processing device, verification method, and verification program |
US11469903B2 (en) * | 2019-02-28 | 2022-10-11 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Autonomous signing management operations for a key distribution service |
US10924347B1 (en) | 2019-10-16 | 2021-02-16 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Networking device configuration value persistence |
Family Cites Families (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7027880B2 (en) * | 2003-09-30 | 2006-04-11 | Rockwell Automation Technologies, Inc. | Safety controller providing rapid recovery of safety program data |
GB2413654B (en) * | 2004-04-29 | 2008-02-13 | Symbian Software Ltd | A method of backing up and restoring data in a computing device |
US20050283662A1 (en) * | 2004-06-21 | 2005-12-22 | Li Yi Q | Secure data backup and recovery |
US8117461B2 (en) * | 2006-09-13 | 2012-02-14 | Igt | Method of randomly and dynamically checking configuration integrity of a gaming system |
ATE508568T1 (en) * | 2007-06-15 | 2011-05-15 | Research In Motion Ltd | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR PROVIDING A SECURE DATA BACKUP FROM A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE TO AN EXTERNAL COMPUTING DEVICE |
US8208637B2 (en) * | 2007-12-17 | 2012-06-26 | Microsoft Corporation | Migration of computer secrets |
CN102014008A (en) * | 2010-12-29 | 2011-04-13 | 华为技术有限公司 | Data disaster-tolerant method and system |
DE102011081804B4 (en) * | 2011-08-30 | 2015-02-12 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method and system for providing device-specific operator data, which are bound to an authentication credential, for an automation device of an automation system |
BR112014004858A2 (en) * | 2011-08-31 | 2017-04-04 | Thomson Licensing | method for a secure backup and recovery of configuration data from a user device at one end, and device using the method |
EP2672414A1 (en) * | 2012-06-08 | 2013-12-11 | Sodge IT GmbH | Method for transferring configuration data to controller devices, a system and a computer program product |
CN103916848B (en) * | 2013-01-09 | 2019-06-14 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | A kind of method and system of mobile terminal data backup and recovery |
DE102013205051A1 (en) * | 2013-03-21 | 2014-09-25 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Updating a digital device certificate of an automation device |
-
2015
- 2015-07-16 DE DE102015213412.1A patent/DE102015213412A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2016
- 2016-06-03 WO PCT/EP2016/062656 patent/WO2017008953A1/en active Application Filing
- 2016-06-03 CN CN201680041855.6A patent/CN107851158A/en active Pending
- 2016-06-03 US US15/572,582 patent/US20180131520A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2016-06-03 EP EP16727993.4A patent/EP3323076A1/en not_active Withdrawn
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN107851158A (en) | 2018-03-27 |
US20180131520A1 (en) | 2018-05-10 |
WO2017008953A1 (en) | 2017-01-19 |
DE102015213412A1 (en) | 2017-01-19 |
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