EP3195223A1 - Method for detecting a risk for the substitution of a terminal, and corresponding device, programme and recording medium - Google Patents
Method for detecting a risk for the substitution of a terminal, and corresponding device, programme and recording mediumInfo
- Publication number
- EP3195223A1 EP3195223A1 EP15762656.5A EP15762656A EP3195223A1 EP 3195223 A1 EP3195223 A1 EP 3195223A1 EP 15762656 A EP15762656 A EP 15762656A EP 3195223 A1 EP3195223 A1 EP 3195223A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- sale
- point
- location information
- electronic payment
- transaction
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4016—Transaction verification involving fraud or risk level assessment in transaction processing
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/20—Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
- G06Q20/202—Interconnection or interaction of plural electronic cash registers [ECR] or to host computer, e.g. network details, transfer of information from host to ECR or from ECR to ECR
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
- G06Q20/3224—Transactions dependent on location of M-devices
Definitions
- the invention relates to the field of payment terminals.
- the technique relates more particularly to the security of payment terminals.
- Payment terminals are the subject of numerous attempts at attack. Indeed, by the nature of the information it contains and the sensitivity of the data it processes, the payment terminal is an object that has a great value for malicious people.
- a certain type of fraud tends to gain momentum: it involves substituting an authentic / valid payment terminal with a fraudulent / counterfeit payment terminal.
- the genuine payment terminal is substituted in a store and immediately replaced by a payment terminal which has a semblance of validity, but which has in fact been modified, for example to read and copy customer card data, so as to ability to perform fraudulent transactions with previously read customer data.
- the unsuspecting merchant can easily be fooled and not realize the substitution for several days.
- One way to solve this replacement problem may be to apply a mark on the terminal.
- Such marking allows the merchant to realize the substitution of his terminal. This technique is effective from the moment the fraudster is not himself able to reproduce this marking. This technique is therefore limited by the fraudster's ability to reproduce the mark.
- a marking for a marking to be effective, it must be visible. If it is visible, this marking is also visible by the fraudster who can easily reproduce it. Thus, this simple solution for applying a marking is actually not really effective.
- the invention relates to a method for detecting a risk of substitution, at a point of sale, of an authentic electronic payment terminal by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal.
- the method comprises a step of generating an alert when a number of transactions geographically associated with the point of sale is greater than a predetermined threshold (Si).
- the invention proposes a new and inventive solution for combating the substitution of electronic payment terminals making it possible to quickly detect whether, at a point of sale, a given electronic payment terminal has been substituted by a payment terminal. fraudulent electronic system, by detecting a suspicious number of transactions because it is greater than an "expected" number of transactions for a given point of sale.
- the invention is based on the fact that most outlets have a feature to know and communicate, for each transaction, location information of the transaction . It is therefore possible to list all transactions made in the same place.
- a fraudulent terminal for a transaction corresponding to a real purchase of a good or a service in a point of sale, via a bank card of a customer, a fraudulent terminal successively implements a plurality of transactions using the the customer's bank card, even if the card is no longer present in the electronic payment terminal.
- the invention thus makes it possible to detect a suspicious number of transactions for a given point of sale, and to generate an alert in this sense.
- the alert indicates that, over a given period (one morning or two hours before the alert), the number of transactions has exceeded a predetermined threshold and that this may be an indication of attempted fraud on the terminal. electronic payment.
- the method comprises the following steps, for at least one transaction performed:
- a transaction is associated with a point of sale, as a function of the location information associated with the place where a transaction is performed, received by the device implementing the invention.
- the step of receiving a location information item comprises a substep of authentication of the location information received.
- the location information is authenticated before associating a transaction geographically to a point of sale, so as to meet a need for security.
- the location of a transaction is involved in the determination of an attempted fraud and should not be questionable.
- this authentication of the location may be based on the use of an identifier or a password, or on a challenge / response exchange between the device providing the location information and the server receiving them. , or any other technique to ensure that the location information is authentic and corresponds to the location of the transaction.
- the point of sale is associated with at least one merchant and the method furthermore comprises a step of issuing the generated alert, intended for at least one entity previously associated with the merchant.
- a point of sale is associated with a merchant, which is the case most of the time (except in the case of a multi-merchant point of sale) and the alert generated. following the detection of a suspicious number of transactions associated with this point of sale is transmitted for example to the merchant's mobile terminal, or his cash computer ...
- the merchant can first wonder about the number of transactions actually made over the period and validate whether or not a higher number of transactions than usual has been made (for example, in period of sales or marketing or promotional actions and punctual, the number of transactions can actually be higher than normal).
- the merchant can verify that the electronic payment terminal he uses for transactions with his customers is authentic or that he has actually been substituted by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal.
- the merchant may check the serial number or other distinguishing marks that would allow him to recognize the authentic electronic payment terminal, or he may decide to stop using the electronic payment terminal if he has doubts about his authenticity without being able to verify it by itself.
- the location information corresponds to the GPS coordinates of the place where the transaction is performed.
- the method comprises a step of determining a point of sale location information and the association step implements a comparison between the location information of the transaction and the point of sale. sale.
- the method is implemented by a remote server corresponding to a server of at least one banking institution of the merchant.
- the location information corresponding to the location of each transaction performed is transmitted, via a device of the point of sale, to the bank server of at least one bank account of the merchant, previously identified and adapted to implement the invention.
- This remote server can therefore implement the invention for a plurality of points of sale, or merchants. In this case, it receives corresponding location information potentially to a plurality of previously identified points of sale and compares, for a given transaction, the location information received with the locations of these different outlets so as to associate the transaction to the corresponding point of sale.
- the invention also relates to a device for detecting a risk of substitution, at a point of sale, of an authentic electronic payment terminal by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal, comprising means for generating an alert when a number of transactions geographically associated with the point of sale is greater than a predetermined threshold (Si).
- a predetermined threshold Si
- Such a device is particularly suitable for implementing the method described above.
- Such a device can of course include the various features relating to the method according to the invention, which can be combined or taken separately. Thus, the features and advantages of this device are the same as those of the optimization method and are not detailed further.
- the invention also relates to one or more computer programs comprising instructions for implementing a method for detecting a risk of substitution as described above when the program or these programs are executed by a processor.
- the method of detecting a risk of substitution of the invention can therefore be implemented in various ways, in particular in hard-wired form or in software form.
- This or these programs can use any programming language, and be in the form of source code, object code, or intermediate code between source code and object code, such as in a partially compiled form, or in n any other desirable form.
- the invention finally relates to a computer-readable recording medium on which a computer program is recorded comprising instructions for executing the steps of the method for detecting a substitution risk as described above. 4.
- Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the proposed technique, according to a particular embodiment
- FIG. 2 shows a system in which the proposed technique can be implemented, according to a particular embodiment
- Figures 3 and 4 show two examples of a detection device according to the proposed technique, according to a particular embodiment.
- the general principle of the proposed technique consists in detecting, for a given point of sale, a number of suspicious transactions for generating a risk warning of substitution of an authentic electronic payment terminal. by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal.
- the detection of a number of transactions Nb-transaction-POSi suspect allows to generate an alert, during a step 10, risk of substitution of the authentic electronic payment terminal by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal in this point of sale.
- the merchant's cash computer can communicate the point-of-sale geolocation (the position of the cash desk, or other point in the point of sale) and know the geolocation of the electronic payment terminal (s) used in this point of sale.
- the electronic payment terminal itself that benefits from this feature enabling it to know its own location, within the point of sale, and to communicate it to another point of sale entity. (the cash register computer or a merchant terminal), or to a remote server.
- the cash register computer or a merchant terminal or to a remote server.
- the location of a place corresponds to the GPS coordinates of that place.
- the location of a place can also be obtained by using an IP address (of an electronic payment terminal, a computer ...), the unique identifier (U UID for "Universally Unique Identifier” in English) d 'a sensor (beacon type), the mobile network coordinates, the calling number in the case of a fixed telephone ...
- the invention provides, according to one embodiment, to authenticate the location information received before associating a transaction geographically to a given point of sale.
- this authentication may be based on an identifier or a password, transmitted with the location information, by the entity providing this location information.
- the authentication may also be based on a challenge / response exchange between the device transmitting the location information and the device receiving it.
- the location information may also be transmitted by a sensor generating encrypted information, or a sensor located in an encrypted enclosure, thus allowing authentication of the transmitted location information.
- the location information can also be entered manually and associated with a physical link between the electronic payment terminal implementing the transaction and the given point of sale. Any other method / technique for authenticating the location information, at the time of its generation or when it is transmitted, can also be implemented, in order to secure the geographic association of a transaction at a given point of sale. .
- the invention makes it possible to count, over a given period, or in real time, the number of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale, and to compare this number with a predetermined threshold, associated at a given point of sale, in order to generate or not an alert, according to this comparison.
- the number of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale is incremented in real time, with each new transaction made, and this number is compared, at each increment, with the predetermined threshold associated with the given point of sale.
- an alert can be generated as soon as the number of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale exceeds the predetermined threshold.
- the number of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale is incremented in real time, with each new transaction made, but this number is compared with the predetermined threshold associated with the given point of sale only periodically, for example every two hours, or at the end of the morning and at the end of the day ... Thus, an alert can be generated periodically.
- the generated alert is then transmitted preferably to the merchant, so that he can check if the substitution of terminals is proven and act accordingly.
- the alert is transmitted to the merchant via a message on a previously identified communication terminal, such as the fixed phone of the point of sale, or the mobile phone of the merchant, or his computer.
- a previously identified communication terminal such as the fixed phone of the point of sale, or the mobile phone of the merchant, or his computer.
- the merchant can then check whether the electronic payment terminal used has been substituted by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal, and if so, no longer use it.
- the merchant may also ignore the alert, in cases of exceptional use of the electronic payment terminal, for example if exceptionally a large number of customers actually made purchases over the period.
- the alert can be transmitted to a person previously identified as being in charge of the security of the terminal park electronic payment system, which will then carry out the verifications necessary to confirm or cancel the substitution or the substitution of electronic payment terminals by one or more fraudulent electronic payment terminals.
- the invention can be implemented by an entity located in the given point of sale, or by a remote entity, called remote server for example.
- the invention can be implemented at a central electronic payment terminal management entity, at the even within the supermarket.
- this central entity is connected to a local network, to which are also connected all the boxes.
- the latter transmit to the central entity, via the local network, precise location information associated with each transaction made by a body.
- the central entity can geographically associate each transaction with the supermarket (given point of sale), based on this location information and the known geolocation of the supermarket. It is then also the central entity that generates the alert when the number of transactions geographically associated with the point of sale exceeds a predetermined threshold.
- an entity 20 remote from any point of sale implements the invention, according to its different embodiments.
- this remote entity corresponds to a remote server of a banking organization, and more particularly to a banking organization managing one or more bank accounts for one or more POS1, POS2, POSi.
- each of the POSI, POS2, ... POSI retailers has subscribed, via its banking organization, to a management service for the security of the electronic payment terminals, the service being notably implemented by the customer.
- remote server 20 According to this embodiment of the invention, for each transaction carried out in a given point of sale, LocPOSi location information is transmitted to this remote server 20. The latter internally performs several steps enabling it, if necessary, to generate an alert to one or more points of sale.
- the remote server geographically associates each transaction with the corresponding point of sale, based on the LocPOSi location information received and the location information of the various points of sale, previously received via each of the points of sale. sale. For example, this location information associated with a given point of sale is transmitted to the remote server 20 at the time of subscription, by the merchant of the given point of sale, of the management service of the security of electronic payment terminals mentioned above. The remote server 20 then stores each of the locations of the sales outlets concerned, to then perform the geographical associations of transactions.
- the remote server 20 compares the number of transactions geographically associated with a point of sale with a predetermined threshold for this point of sale.
- This predetermined threshold can be provided to the server at the same time as the location of the point of sale information, for example at the time of subscription, by the merchant of the given point of sale, the terminal security management service. aforementioned electronic payment.
- the comparison of the number of transactions geographically associated with a point of sale with a predetermined threshold for this point of sale can be carried out as and when, or periodically.
- the predetermined threshold associated with a given point of sale may be static or variable, for example as a function of time.
- thresholds can be defined, according to particular time periods. Thus, only one can be defined for the days of the week, and a different threshold for the Saturday (activity day potentially more important), or different thresholds can be defined according to the time of the day, with only one it is specific for the mid i time zone. Special periods of sales or ad hoc promotional transactions may also be taken into account to define a specific threshold. Such a variable threshold makes it possible to free oneself, or at least to limit the generation of "false" alerts.
- the server 20 when the remote server 20 has detected that a number of transactions geographically associated with a point of sale is greater than the threshold associated with this point of sale, the server 20 generates an alert and transmits it, according to the different embodiments already described above, to a previously identified entity (mobile terminal of the merchant or a person in charge of the security of a terminal park ).
- the proposed solution makes it possible to detect a risk of substitution of an authentic electronic payment terminal by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal and to alert, in the event of detection of such a risk, the person previously identified as being able to validate or not this substitution and to implement appropriate actions if necessary.
- FIGS. 3 and 4 an example of a device for detecting a substitution risk, in a point of sale, of an authentic electronic payment terminal by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal comprising means of payment, is described. execution of the previously described method.
- such a device 20 for example a remote server as described above in connection with FIG. 2, or even a point of sale entity, comprises means (for example in the form one or more modules) for comparing a number Nb-transaction-POSi of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale, with a predetermined threshold Si for this point of sale.
- the device 20 also comprises generating means (for example in the form of one or more modules) of an alert 31 when the comparison means have delivered a positive result.
- This device 20 is now described in relation to FIG. 4.
- the device comprises a memory 41 consisting of a buffer memory, a processing unit 42, equipped for example with a microprocessor, and driven by the computer program 43, implementing an authenticity verification method .
- the code instructions of the computer program 43 are for example loaded into a memory before being executed by the processor of the processing unit 42.
- the processing unit 42 receives as input for example a number Nb-transactions-POSi of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale.
- the microprocessor of the processing unit 42 implements the steps of the method for detecting a risk of substitution, at a point of sale, of an authentic electronic payment terminal by a fraudulent electronic payment terminal, according to the instructions of the computer program 43, to generate an alert.
- the device comprises, in addition to the buffer memory 41, means 30 for comparing a number Nb-transactions-POSi of transactions geographically associated with a given point of sale, with a predetermined threshold Si for this point of sale and means for generating an alert 31 (for example in the form of one or more modules), when the comparison means have delivered a positive result.
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- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1458749A FR3025912B1 (en) | 2014-09-16 | 2014-09-16 | METHOD FOR DETECTING A SUBSTITUTION RISK OF A TERMINAL, CORRESPONDING DEVICE, PROGRAM, AND RECORDING MEDIUM |
PCT/EP2015/071129 WO2016041985A1 (en) | 2014-09-16 | 2015-09-15 | Method for detecting a risk for the substitution of a terminal, and corresponding device, programme and recording medium |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3195223A1 true EP3195223A1 (en) | 2017-07-26 |
Family
ID=52469090
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP15762656.5A Ceased EP3195223A1 (en) | 2014-09-16 | 2015-09-15 | Method for detecting a risk for the substitution of a terminal, and corresponding device, programme and recording medium |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US10650381B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3195223A1 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2960914C (en) |
FR (1) | FR3025912B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2016041985A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR3028981B1 (en) | 2014-11-21 | 2017-01-06 | Cie Ind Et Financiere D'ingenierie Ingenico | METHOD FOR DETECTING A SUBSTITUTION RISK OF A TERMINAL, CORRESPONDING DEVICE, PROGRAM, AND RECORDING MEDIUM |
US11558407B2 (en) * | 2016-02-05 | 2023-01-17 | Defensestorm, Inc. | Enterprise policy tracking with security incident integration |
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-
2015
- 2015-09-15 WO PCT/EP2015/071129 patent/WO2016041985A1/en active Application Filing
- 2015-09-15 CA CA2960914A patent/CA2960914C/en active Active
- 2015-09-15 EP EP15762656.5A patent/EP3195223A1/en not_active Ceased
- 2015-09-15 US US15/511,141 patent/US10650381B2/en active Active
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20170255939A1 (en) | 2017-09-07 |
CA2960914C (en) | 2023-09-26 |
FR3025912B1 (en) | 2016-12-09 |
FR3025912A1 (en) | 2016-03-18 |
US10650381B2 (en) | 2020-05-12 |
CA2960914A1 (en) | 2016-03-24 |
WO2016041985A1 (en) | 2016-03-24 |
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