EP2969176A1

EP2969176A1 - Method for handling solids capable of deflagration

Info

Publication number: EP2969176A1
Application number: EP14708284.6A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Heinrich Morhenn; Steffen SALG
Original assignee: Bayer Technology Services GmbH
Current assignee: Bayer AG
Priority date: 2013-03-12
Filing date: 2014-03-07
Publication date: 2016-01-20
Also published as: US20160023178A1; CA2904814A1; JP2016515089A; US9731265B2; EP2777808A1; CN105008038A; WO2014139876A1; CA2904814C

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for processing and handling solids and mixtures capable of deflagration, especially for processing substances capable of deflagration in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, wherein the processing and handling is effected in an environment under reduced pressure of ≤ 500 mbara, wherein the processing and/or handling comprises one or more process steps selected from a group comprising filtration, grinding, sieving, mixing, homogenizing, granulating, compacting, dispensing, drying, storing and transporting in a transport vessel, and other steps in apparatuses having mechanical internals.

Description

Method of handling deflagratable solids

The invention relates to a method for processing and handling of deflagratable solids and mixtures, in particular for processing deflagrationsfähiger substances in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, wherein the processing and handling takes place in an environment under reduced pressure.

The technical rule for plant safety (TRAS) No. 410 defines a deflagration as follows: "A deflagration is a reaction that can be triggered locally at a given amount of substance and from there propagates independently through the entire amount of substance in the form of a reaction front. The propagation velocity of the reaction front is lower than the speed of sound in the substance. Deflagration can release large amounts of hot gases that may also be flammable. The deflagration velocity increases with the temperature and, as a rule, also with the pressure ".

Deflagratable solids decompose after local action of a sufficiently strong ignition source (initiation) even without the presence of atmospheric oxygen. In contrast to a fire or an explosion deflagration can not be prevented by exclusion of oxygen. The known from the explosion protection measure of inerting with nitrogen or other inert gases offers no protection against deflagration. Vacuum processing has not previously been considered as a protective measure for the processing and handling of substances capable of deflagration. Explosions are fast deflagrations with sudden increases in pressure and temperature. When the speed of sound is exceeded, a deflagration becomes a detonation.

The substances capable of deflagration are mostly organic or inorganic compounds in solid form. In particular, organic compounds having functional groups such as carbon-carbon double and triple bonds, such as acetylenes, acetylides, 1,2-dienes, are prone to deflagration; strained ring compounds such as azirines or epoxides, compounds with adjacent N atoms such as azo and diazo compounds, hydrazines, azides, compounds having contiguous O atoms such as peroxides and ozonides, oxygen-nitrogen compounds such as hydroxylamines, nitrates, N-oxides, 1, 2 oxalates, nitro and nitroso compounds; Halogen-nitrogen compounds such as chloramines and fluoramines, halogen-oxygen compounds such as chlorates, perchlorates, iodosyl compounds; Sulfur-oxygen compounds such as sulphonyl halides, sulphonyl cyanides, and compounds with carbon-metal bonds and nitrogen-metal bonds such as Grignard reagents or organo-lithium compounds. However, many other organic compounds without the said functional groups and a variety of inorganic compounds may also be deflagratable.

In principle, all substances with a enthalpy of enthalpy greater than or equal to 500 J / g are regarded as potentially capable of deflagration. There are also substances with decomposition enthalpy of 300 - 500 J / g known, which are deflagrationsfähig.

The deflagration ability of a substance must be determined separately in individual cases.

Various test methods are known for testing the deflagration behavior of substances and mixtures.

In the UN report "Transportation of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria", 5th Revised Edition, 2009, Section 23 (S 237 ff) describes two test methods for determining the deflagration capacity.

In the test C.I ("Time / Pressure Test"), 5 g of the substance to be tested are ignited in a pressure vessel with a content of approximately 17 ml. Criteria for the evaluation are the achievement of a limiting pressure of approximately 20.7 bar the time after ignition, in which the limit pressure is reached (Barü = bar overpressure)

The deflagration ability is assessed in test C.I as follows:

- Yes, fast deflagration capable, if the pressure within the pressure vessel after ignition in less than 30 seconds from 6.90 barü to 20.70 barü increases.

- Yes, slowly deflagration capable, if the pressure within the pressure vessel after ignition in 30 seconds or more from 6.90 barü to 20.70 barü increases.

- Not capable of deflagration, if the limit pressure of 20.70 barü is not reached.

In test C.2, a sample is filled into a Dewar vessel about 48 mm in inner diameter and 180-200 mm high. The mixture is ignited with an open flame. The deflagration ability is assessed in test C.2 as follows:

- Yes, fast deflagration capable, if the deflagration speed is greater than 5 mm / sec.

- Yes, slow to deflagrate if the deflagration rate is between 0.35 mm / sec to 5 mm / sec.

- Not capable of deflagration, if the deflagration rate is less than 0.35 mm / sec, or the reaction extinguishes before reaching the lower level.

Overall, a substance is classified as non-deflagrating if the substance was not classified as "fast deflagration" in test C.1 and non-deflagration in test C.2.

Another test for determining the deflagration capacity is described in VDI2263-1 (1990, p 13 ff.).

In the test according to VDI2263-1, a substance is filled into a glass tube, closed at the bottom, with a diameter of approx. 5 cm, in which several thermocouples are mounted radially offset at different heights. After local initiation by an incandescent filament, a glow plug, a microburner or an ignition mixture of lead (IV) oxide and silicon, the progress of the decomposition is determined. The initiation takes place from above and from the bottom of the bed. If the decomposition proceeds in at least one of the experiments (ignition from above and ignition from below), then the substance is considered capable of deflagration.

As ignition sources alternatively used are filament, glow plug, micro burner or an ignition mixture (silicon / lead oxide in the ratio 3: 2). The duration of action and the energy input of the ignition sources are not further defined.

The standard version according to VDI2263-1 measures the deflagration behavior at ambient temperature and pressure. It can also be measured at elevated temperature and in a closed vessel. It is known that many substances in the test according to VDI2263-1 without the formation of a closed front and not completely decompose. Frequently, within the bed, channels are formed, in the interior of which the decomposition progresses while the surrounding material does not decompose. However, such behavior means a potential hazard for the processing of a substance. The person skilled in the art will select the parameters for the examination of the deflagration behavior of a substance or substance mixture such that the situation during processing on the best reproduced. Thus, a substance for the test according to VDI2263-1 is brought to the temperature at which the processing of the substance takes place. With regard to the ignition source, it can be assumed that there is no deflagration capability if, after 300 seconds exposure time at a temperature> 600 ° C, for example, by a filament or a glow plug, the latter at an energy consumption of 40 W, corresponds to, no progression of Reaction is observed. As the reaction progresses, any mode of continued decomposition which propagates through the bed is to be considered indicative of deflagration behavior, even when channeling is occurring and the bed is not fully reacted to form a decomposition front.

In VDI report 975 (1992) page 99 ff a classification of deflagration hazardous powdery substances is described. The deflagration-capable substances are divided into 3 hazard classes. While substances of hazard class 3 may in principle not be processed in apparatus with mechanical installations, substances of hazard classes 1 and 2 can, under certain conditions, be processed in appliances with mechanical installations.

Important criteria for classification into one of the 3 hazard classes is the candle switch-on time, ie the time that the ignition source is switched on in test VDI2263-1 from the switch-on to the appearance of the decomposition reaction. The authors compare the candle on time with the minimum ignition energy in dust explosions. The candle-on time can also be interpreted in terms of processing in a production apparatus as the time that an ignition source such as a hot spot or a hot screw can act on the surrounding substance before cooling the contact point or screw or renewing the environment the hot spot is reached again an uncritical state. It is thus: "The shorter the candle switch-on, the easier the deflagration to trigger." The authors call a candle on time of <20 sec as a limit for classification in the hazard class 3, and a limit of> 60 sec as a limit for classification in hazard class 1.

The production of deflagration-capable solids is carried out with the usual process steps known from organic and inorganic chemistry. Usually, starting materials in liquid form or in the form of solutions are reacted with each other, the desired substance usually precipitates out as a solid. This is then separated from the remaining liquid components, and is available after any further purification steps, drying and intermediate storage in the desired form for filling and transport to the customer. Optionally, the desired substance is further processed and, for example, ground and / or mixed with other components.

The production of deflagratable solids on a laboratory scale is usually unproblematic. The amounts handled are small, the likelihood of initiation of deflagration is low, any deflagration that occurs is quickly detected, and even if deflagration is not detected and progressed, the extent of damage is small.

However, the problem is the production of deflagration-capable substances in larger quantities as it takes place in a pilot plant or in a production plant. In this case, a number of apparatuses are used which, on the one hand, have potential sources of initiation, and in which, on the other hand, a deflagration may possibly only be detected a longer time after the initiation. Apparatuses in technical and production plants are often equipped with mechanical devices which serve for transport, mixing, renewal of the surface or other purposes.

For example, mixers with moving mechanical elements such as plowshare mixers or screw mixers are used for the homogenization of solids. It is known that the mechanical devices are one of the most frequent causes for the initiation of deflagration. Thus, in the event of a fault, a moving mixing element can come into direct contact with the apparatus jacket, local heating takes place at the friction location, which causes the surrounding substance to decompose and thus initiate deflagration. There are also known cases in which a foreign body, for example a screw, had entered an apparatus, got there between the wall and the mixing / mixing element and caused a heat deflagration. Even by rubbing hard crusts or by friction in a clogged conveyor screw, deflagration has been triggered. It is also known that deflagration can be transferred from one apparatus to another. Thus, in a mixer an introduced screw can be heated by friction in the manner described. The hot screw is then discharged, for example, in a silo without mechanical installations. The temperature of the screw can still be sufficiently high to cause the surrounding substance in the silo to decompose and thus trigger a deflagration. In the same way, agglomerates in which a deflagrative decomposition has already been induced can be used in an apparatus without mechanical installations are discharged and there initiate the deflagrative decomposition of the apparatus contents.

There are a number of measures known that allow safe processing deflagrationsfähiger substances.

In the VDI report 975 (1992) page 99 ff a system is set out how to proceed in the assessment and selection of measures in the processing of deflagration-hazardous powdery substances The report describes a classification of the deflagration-capable substances in 3 hazard classes, with substances in Hazard class 3 has the highest hazard potential and substances in hazard class 1 have the lowest hazard potential. Appropriate processing methods are listed according to the hazard class. Although the criteria set out in the cited publication are not universally valid, the classification presented in this publication is a good approach for dealing with the assessment and processing of substances capable of deflagration. Further examples of safe processing of deflagration-capable substances can also be found in VDI Report 1272 (1996), page 441 ff. For substances with a high deflagration tendency, care is taken that the processing takes place without mechanical effects. This is done, for example, by drying on individual trays in a drying cabinet, instead of in a dryer with mechanical installations such as a paddle dryer. The processing without mechanical devices is very expensive. In many cases, the material transport must be done manually, which in addition to the high cost can also lead to health hazards of the operator and quality problems. Processing without mechanical means and will only be considered if safe processing with mechanical devices is not possible. In the previously cited publication In the VDI report 975 (1992) page 99 ff, for example, only processing methods without mechanical means are provided for the substances of hazard class 3.

For substances in which the hazard potential due to deflagration is less pronounced, under certain conditions, they can also be processed with mechanical devices. In the cited publication In the VDI report 975 (1992) page 99 ff this applies to substances of danger classes 1 and 2.

One common way to avoid deflagration is to carefully avoid the entry of foreign bodies. This can be done for example by a metal deposition, which before entry into the apparatus and prevents entrainment of screws and other metallic foreign bodies in the processing step.

Also, in the construction of the apparatuses attention can be paid to the avoidance of possible sources of ignition, for example, in which the distances between the mechanical mixer and the wall are chosen to be large.

The mentioned methods of avoiding ignition sources can significantly reduce the risk of deflagration, but the deflagration can not be excluded in this way. The methods mentioned are also complex and in some cases associated with a deterioration in the performance of the apparatus.

Another way to avoid deflagration is to mix the deflagration-capable substance with another, not deflagration-capable and non-catalytically active substance. A disadvantage of this measure is that the desired substance can not be obtained in the desired composition. The reduction of the deflagration ability by adding another substance is described for example in US5268177.

Another method for the safe processing of substances capable of deflagration is to safely remove the pressure created during deflagration or the gases produced during deflagration. This can be done, for example, by installing appropriately sized rupture disks and corresponding Abieiteinrichtungen. It should be noted that the deflagration rate increases with increasing pressure, set pressure and discharge are to be interpreted accordingly. Care must also be taken to ensure that entrained substances are prevented from continuing to deflagrate. This can be done, for example, by introducing the discharged gases into a water bath.

Another known method for the safe processing of substances capable of deflagration is to recognize the beginning of a deflagration in time and to prevent the onset of deflagration by dissipating the energy. Detection can be done through a number of indicators. For example, the monitoring of temperature and / or pressure are known. However, it can also detect the occurrence of certain decomposition gases such as carbon monoxide. When the tripping value is reached, the energy is removed from the system. In general, this is done by adding a larger amount of water. Due to the heat capacity of the water, the deflagration substance cools to temperatures below the decomposition temperature. An additional heat dissipation can be done by the formation of water vapor. A detergent may be added to the water to ensure good wetting of the deflagrating substance.

A disadvantage of the above-mentioned methods is that they only have a damage-limiting effect and become effective only after the deflagration has been triggered. Thus, these methods result in the loss of at least a portion of the substance, as it partially decomposes and the undecomposed portions are rendered unusable by water and other reagents, as a rule. Another problem is the safe removal of water vapor. It should be noted that the previously described methods for processing deflagration-capable substances have disadvantages.

The object of the present invention was therefore to provide better measures for the processing and / or handling of deflagratable solids or solid mixtures. In particular, these measures should reduce the likelihood of triggering a deflagration, without changing the material properties by adding another substance.

The object is achieved by a method wherein the processing and / or handling of the deflagratable solids is carried out in a reduced-pressure environment. It has surprisingly been found that the initiation of deflagration during the processing and handling of deflagration-capable substances in a reduced-pressure environment can be significantly delayed.

A delay in the initiation of deflagration can surprisingly be achieved by a slight reduction in the pressure within the apparatus below the ambient pressure / atmospheric pressure. Thus, even with a reduction of the pressure within the vessel to below or equal to 800 mbara a significant delay was found (bara = bar absolute). Preferably, the processing and handling takes place at the lowest possible pressure within the apparatus. Preferred for processing is a pressure range of <500 mbara, more preferably a pressure range <100 mbara, more preferably in a pressure range <20 mbara. For economic and technical reasons, the lower limit of the pressure range within the vessel> 2 mbara, preferably> 10 mbara is recommended.

The process according to the invention is applicable to the processing and handling of deflagratable solid substances including explosive solid substances. For the purposes of this invention, all substances which can be classified as deflagration-capable either according to the UN "Transportation of Dangerous Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria", 5th Revised Edition, 2009, Deflagration, Criteria under Section 23.2.2 are considered to be capable of deflagration (Question "Can it propagate adeflagration?" - Answer "yes, rapidely" or "yes, slowly"), and / or in test VDI2263-1 when tested at the temperature intended for processing and ignition from above or below with a squib, Zündwendel or glow plug, the latter with a recorded power of at least 40 W and an exposure time of 300 seconds have an automatic decomposition, wherein the decomposition can proceed in the form of a decomposition front as well as in the form of decomposition channels.

Typical deflagration-capable substances within the meaning of the present invention are organic compounds having functional groups such as carbon-carbon double and triple bonds such as acetylenes, acetylides, 1,2-dienes; strained ring compounds such as azirines or epoxides, compounds with adjacent N atoms such as azo and diazo compounds, hydrazines, azides, compounds with contiguous O atoms such as peroxides and ozonides, oxygen-nitrogen compounds such as hydroxylamines, nitrates, N-oxides , 1,2 oxalates, nitro and nitroso compounds; Halogen-nitrogen compounds such as chloroamines and fluoramines, halogen-oxygen compounds such as chlorates, perchlorates, iodosyl compounds; Sulfur-oxygen compounds such as sulphonyl halides, sulphonyl cyanides, and compounds with carbon-metal bonds and nitrogen-metal bonds such as Grignard reagents or organo-lithium compounds. Deflagratable solids are deflagratable substances in solid form, which substance is pure or mixed in solid form, e.g. is present as a powder or granules in any grain size. Deflagratable solids within the meaning of this invention also include deflagratable liquids, which are absorbed on non-deflagratable solids and thus present in solid form. For the purposes of this invention, deflagratable solids likewise include substances capable of deflagration in solid form which still have residues of water or other liquids such as solvents (moist solids). The grain size and the particle size distribution are known to influence the deflagration behavior, but the two parameters are not limiting for the present invention.

In the experiments carried out (see Examples 1 to 4) according to VDI VDI2263-1, the ignition times or plug-on times were extended by applying a reduced pressure within the measuring vessel by a factor of 2 to 8. In accordance with the VDI report 975 (1992) page 99 If the firing times or spark-in times are prolonged, the above-mentioned criteria will decrease Probability that a deflagration can be triggered. Under reduced pressure, solids capable of deflagration behave less deflagration-capable according to the categorizations mentioned above, which in turn makes it possible, in particular, to use apparatus with mechanical installations under a lower risk of deflagration.

Processing and handling in the sense of this application are process and handling steps for the production, processing, storage and transport of deflagratable solids, in particular filtration, drying, grinding, sieving, mixing, homogenizing, granulating, compacting, filling, storing and transporting in a transport container , as well as mechanical transport such as the promotion in augers or by rotary valves. For the purposes of the invention, these process steps can be carried out either in or with the aid of apparatus in which the processed solid is moved by means of mechanical means, such as in a plowshare mixer, or in or by means of apparatuses without mechanical means, such as for example silos. Particularly advantageous is the method for processing and handling deflagrationsfähiger solids in apparatus with mechanical installations. The prior art discloses processing storage and transport in or with the aid of apparatuses without mechanical installations under reduced pressure for reducing the risk of explosion of explosive solids or for protection against damage by atmospheric oxygen. However, the reduced pressure is associated with the provision of an inert atmosphere.

Also, drying under reduced pressure is well known. But here the reduced pressure accelerates drying and is not associated with a reduction in the deflagration and explosion risk of deflagration and explosive solids. The surprising reduction of deflagration and explosion risk of deflagration and explosive solids is done in comparison to the prior art for the action of explosive mixtures regardless of whether the processing and / or handling is carried out under an inert atmosphere. The invention therefore provides a process for processing and / or handling deflagratable solids with one or more process steps from the group comprising filtration, milling, sieving, mixing, homogenizing, granulating, compacting, filling, drying, storage and transport in a transport container and other Steps in apparatus with mechanical installations, characterized in that the processing and / or handling takes place in a reduced pressure environment. The reduction in pressure in the apparatus is accomplished by techniques known to those skilled in the art by means of vacuum pumps such as positive displacement pumps, jet pumps, rotary vane pumps, centrifugal pumps, water ring pumps, Roots pumps and other equipment suitable for generating the desired pressure.

In the production of deflagration-capable substances, mixers with mechanical components such as plowshare mixers or screw mixers ("Nauta mixers") are frequently used for homogenizing or mixing in additives.The mixers are generally operated at atmospheric pressure Crushing tools ("chopper") may be built in. Malfunctioning, for example due to deformation of the mixing element or the insertion of a screw, may result in local heating due to friction, which can cause deflagration, if such a mixer is used instead of at atmospheric pressure operated in an apparatus under reduced pressure, the probability of triggering a deflagration can be greatly reduced, the risk of uncontrolled decomposition of the apparatus contents decreases, and the safety of the system is significantly increased.

As a further application for the improvement by the measure according to the invention, the filtration in a suction filter is described. In a filter chute, a suspension is usually applied to a sieve or other filter medium. The filtrate permeates through the sieve or filter medium by gravity, and the filtration rate can be increased by subduct on the filtrate side and / or overpressure on the addition side. To stabilize the filtration and the filter cake, the suspension is stirred as a rule by means of a stirrer. As long as there is liquid on the addition side, the risk of deflagration is low. After separation of the liquid phase increases the risk of deflagration. By mechanical installations, for example the stirrer, a malfunction due to frictional heat can cause a deflagration to be triggered. According to the invention, the filter cake is kept under reduced pressure. This can be done, for example, by applying a slight negative pressure on the addition side of, for example, 500 mbara at a higher negative pressure of, for example, 20 mbara on the filtrate side, while still maintaining a pressure difference across the filter. Likewise, according to the invention can be brought to a pressure according to the invention below the atmospheric pressure at the end or after completion of the filtration and before switching on the mechanical devices such as stirrer, the apparatus on the task side or the entire apparatus. It is also possible to proceed in such a way that the stirrer is switched on during the presence of the liquid phase on the filter, the stirrer is switched off when the liquid level drops to avoid the triggering of deflagration and is switched on again only after the generation of a negative pressure according to the invention. The discharge from a filter chute is usually done by a mechanical discharge. This can be done for example by the stirrer, which is driven to discharge in the reverse direction, or a separate mechanical discharge device. In the event of malfunction, frictional heat may cause the deflagration to be triggered. According to the invention, the discharge from a suction filter at a pressure below atmospheric pressure, whereby the probability of occurrence of deflagration is significantly reduced.

As further applications for the improvement by the measure according to the invention the transport of deflagrationsfähiger substances by means of screw conveyors or rotary valves are described.

The transport of solids is often carried out by screw conveyors, which are installed in a pipe or pipe-like apparatus. By friction of the screw on the wall, or by entry of a foreign body such as a screw in the screw, it can come by frictional heat to trigger a deflagration. Cases are also known in which deflagrations have already been triggered by the compression in a clogged conveyor screw. According to the invention, the pressure in the apparatus surrounding the screw conveyor is reduced to a pressure below the atmospheric pressure, whereby the probability of occurrence of deflagration is significantly reduced. Rotary valves are often used in the transition from one device to another. By friction of the cell wheel on the wall, or by entry of a foreign body such as a screw in the rotary valve, it can come by friction heat to trigger a deflagration. According to the invention, the pressure in the rotary valve is reduced to a pressure below the atmospheric pressure, whereby the probability of occurrence of deflagration is significantly reduced.

By the aforementioned screw conveyors or rotary valves, or by other conveyor techniques enter deflagratory substances in apparatuses without mechanical installations such as buffer tanks, silo containers, transport containers or other containers.

By entrenched hot foreign bodies, such as a screw heated by friction in a screw conveyor, a deflagration can be triggered in apparatus without mechanical means. According to the invention, these apparatuses are kept at a pressure below atmospheric pressure during and after filling, which significantly reduces the likelihood of deflagration. A particular problem in the processing of deflagrationsfähiger substances is the crushing and milling. In mills, crushers and analogous comminution organs mechanical energy is introduced into the material to be ground, there is already in normal operation to a heating by friction, by which a deflagration can be triggered , If a foreign object such as a screw is introduced, the probability of triggering a deflagration increases significantly. According to the invention, the mill or the comminution device is operated at a pressure below atmospheric pressure, which significantly reduces the probability of a deflagration occurring. The mills or comminution means may be known mills such as roll crushers, spiked or toothed roller crushers.

Also in sieves and grating sieves or sieve screens such as Frewitt sieves, frictional heat can occur in malfunctions and, as a consequence, the triggering of deflagration. According to the invention, the screening or sieving is carried out with a friction sieve or strainer at a pressure below atmospheric pressure, whereby the probability of occurrence of deflagration is significantly reduced.

In the drying of solids, these are usually moved by mechanical installations to constantly renew the surface and thus to improve the mass and heat transport. Typical dryers are, for example, paddle dryers or plate dryers. Also, certain of the above-described filter suckers are equipped so that a drying step can be followed in these apparatuses after filtration. By malfunction, for example by a deformation of the mixing element or by the entry of a screw, it can come by friction to a local heating, by which a deflagration can be triggered. The drying can also be carried out in apparatus without mechanical installations, such as in a fluidized bed dryer. Even in such aggregates, it may be due to entry of foreign bodies under unfavorable circumstances to deflagration, for example, by malfunction of a mechanical rake in the inlet area. The drying is usually carried out in such a way that a hot gas such as hot air or hot nitrogen are passed through the dryer (= by Gaskon vectionströmungen). The hot gases cause both the energy input for evaporation and the mass transfer. The energy input can also be done by heating the wall or heated internals. Instead of in the gas stream, the drying can also be done in a vacuum. The influence of a reduced pressure on the deflagration tendency had not been known / investigated so far, so that the decision for Drying under vacuum was based on other criteria such as the boiling point of the solvent or the melting point of the substance to be dried. According to the invention, the drying of substances capable of deflagration always takes place at reduced pressure. The adjustment of the reduced pressure can be carried out solely by generating the negative pressure by means of a pump, as well as by generating the negative pressure by means of a pump and simultaneously supplying a limited amount of gas into the dryer to improve the mass transfer. Both measures significantly reduce the likelihood of deflagration.

Analogously to the applications described, it can be expected that the safety can also be significantly increased in other apparatuses with mechanical installations, provided that they are operated under reduced pressure according to the invention.

Examples

The following experiments demonstrate the influence of the reduced pressure on the deflagration capacity of azodicarbonamide without limiting it.

Measurements of the deflagration behavior according to VDI 2263 were carried out.

The measurements were carried out in a metal tube 4.8 cm in diameter and 13.5 cm in height. The ignition source was a bottom of the metal tube (= test tube) recessed glow plug type 0 250 201 032-4FS Bosch. The test tube was in each case filled with azodicarbonamide 97%, obtained from Sigma-Aldrich. Subsequently, four 1.5 mm NiCr-Ni cladding thermocouples were inserted in the middle of the bed in such a way that the first element was 1 cm above the top of the glow plug and the other elements each 2 cm higher.

For the measurements, the test tube was transferred to an autoclave of 4 l internal volume and an internal height of 15.5 cm. For this purpose, the test tube was attached to a rod fixed to the autoclave lid in such a way that the test tube had no contact with the jacket of the autoclave. Autoclave and sample were at room temperature.

In the autoclave lid were gas-tight passages for the wires for heating the ignition source and for the thermocouples and a capillary for a mounted outside the autoclave pressure sensor and a valve for evacuating or relaxing the apparatus.

A measurement begins with the simultaneous application of electrical power and the start of the temperature-time recording. The introduced power was constantly controlled to 40 W over the duration of the measurement. At the time of igniting the substance, the temperature rise at the first measuring point (1 cm above the ignition source) was evaluated. The temperature at the first measuring point remained virtually constant after the beginning of application of the electrical power, or rose slowly by a few ° C., when the deflagration occurred, a strong temperature rise of> 5 ° C./sec was observed. The increase in temperature at the other temperature sensors and the pressure in the autoclave increased after the start of the ignition in each case with a time delay. Example 1 - Azodicarbonamide - At atmospheric pressure

The test tube described above was filled with 85 g of azodicarbonamide (ADCA). The test tube was transferred to the autoclave. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 19 seconds, the temperature rose to the temperature sensor mounted 1 cm above the glow plug.

The experiment was repeated twice under the same conditions. The temperature rose after 19 and 15 seconds, respectively.

This is ADCA according to VDI Report 975 (1992) page 99 ff of hazard class 3. (Not suitable for apparatus with mechanical installations)

Example 2 - Azodicarbonamide - Reduced pressure of 750 mbara

The test tube described above was filled with 85 g of azodicarbonamide (ADCA). The test tube was transferred to the autoclave, the autoclave was evacuated to 750 mbara by means of a pump. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 34 seconds, the temperature rose to the temperature sensor mounted 1 cm above the glow plug.

The experiment was repeated twice under the same conditions. The temperature rose after 37 and 41 seconds, respectively. Example 3 - Azodicarbonamide - Reduced pressure of 500 mbara

The test tube described above was filled with 85 g of azodicarbonamide (ADCA). The test tube was transferred to the autoclave, the autoclave was evacuated to 500 mbara by means of a pump. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 53 seconds, the temperature rose to the temperature sensor mounted 1 cm above the glow plug.

The experiment was repeated twice under the same conditions. The temperature rose after 67 and 65 seconds, respectively. Example 4 - Azodicarbonamide - Reduced pressure of 100 mbara

The test tube described above was filled with 85 g of azodicarbonamide (ADCA). The test tube was transferred to the autoclave, the autoclave was evacuated to 100 mbara by means of a pump. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 149 seconds, the temperature rose to the temperature sensor mounted 1 cm above the glow plug.

The experiment was repeated twice under the same conditions. The temperature rose after 137 and 189 seconds, respectively.

Under the applied negative pressure, ADCA behaves like a deflagration-capable substance of hazard class 1 according to the categorization of VDI Report 975 (1992) page 99 ff. (Processing in apparatus with mechanical installations possible).

Example 5 - Azodicarbonamide - Reduced pressure of 10 mbara

The test tube described above was filled with 85 g of azodicarbonamide (ADCA). The test tube was transferred to the autoclave, the autoclave was evacuated to 10 mbara by means of a pump. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 172 seconds, the temperature rose to the temperature sensor mounted 1 cm above the glow plug.

The experiment was repeated twice under the same conditions. The temperature increased after 166 and 190 seconds, respectively.

Example 6 - Tolylfluanid (50%) - At Atmospheric Pressure

The test tube described above was filled with 40 g of a mixture of 50% tolylfluanid and 50% by weight diatomaceous earth. The test tube was transferred to the autoclave. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 75 seconds, the temperature rose at the temperature sensor mounted 1 cm above the glow plug, the temperature increase at this temperature sensor reached a maximum of 3.9 K / sec after 170 seconds. Example 7 - Tolylfluanid (50%) - Under reduced pressure of 100 mbara

The test tube described above was filled with 40 g of a mixture of tolylfluanid (50%). The test tube was transferred to the autoclave, the autoclave was evacuated to 100 mbara by means of a pump. The mixture was heated by means of the glow plug with a power of 40 W applied over the duration of the measurement. After 103 seconds, the temperature at the 1 cm above the glow plug mounted temperature sensor, the temperature rise at this temperature sensor reached after 240 sec, a maximum of 1.9 K / sec.

Compared to the measurement at atmospheric pressure, a significant slowdown in both the initiation and the progression of deflagration is observed. For the processing of a tolylfluanid (50%) mixture, this means that processing at a pressure of 100 mbar significantly reduces the risk of both triggering and uncontrolled spread.

Claims

Process for processing and / or handling deflagratable solids and mixtures, characterized in that the processing and / or handling takes place in a reduced pressure environment of <500 mbara, and wherein the processing and / or handling selects one or more process steps from a Group comprising filtration, milling, sieving, mixing, homogenizing, granulating, compacting, filling, drying, storing and transporting in a transport container and other steps in apparatuses with mechanical installations.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the method step is the transport in screw conveyors or by rotary valves.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the method step takes place in a ploughshare mixer, screw mixer or other mixer with mechanical mixing and / or chopping tools.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the method step takes place in a Nutsche, a pendulum sieve, a rotary screen or another filter or sieve device with mechanical tools.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the method step is carried out in a roll crusher, spiked or toothed roller crusher, or other crushing apparatus.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the method step takes place in a paddle dryer, plate dryer or fluidized bed dryer.

A method according to claim 1, characterized in that a storage or intermediate buffering container without mechanical tools.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that a transport takes place in a transport container.