EP2795887A1 - Dispositif et procédé de production d'images numériques - Google Patents

Dispositif et procédé de production d'images numériques

Info

Publication number
EP2795887A1
EP2795887A1 EP12813279.2A EP12813279A EP2795887A1 EP 2795887 A1 EP2795887 A1 EP 2795887A1 EP 12813279 A EP12813279 A EP 12813279A EP 2795887 A1 EP2795887 A1 EP 2795887A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
security module
digital image
digital
image
generating
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP12813279.2A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Andreas Johne
Thomas Delonge
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Giesecke and Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
Original Assignee
Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Giesecke and Devrient GmbH filed Critical Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Publication of EP2795887A1 publication Critical patent/EP2795887A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
    • H04N1/00127—Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus, e.g. for storage, processing or transmission of still picture signals or of information associated with a still picture
    • H04N1/00326—Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus, e.g. for storage, processing or transmission of still picture signals or of information associated with a still picture with a data reading, recognizing or recording apparatus, e.g. with a bar-code apparatus
    • H04N1/00339—Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus, e.g. for storage, processing or transmission of still picture signals or of information associated with a still picture with a data reading, recognizing or recording apparatus, e.g. with a bar-code apparatus with an electronic or magnetic storage medium I/O device
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
    • H04N1/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N1/32101—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
    • H04N2201/0008—Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus
    • H04N2201/0034—Details of the connection, e.g. connector, interface
    • H04N2201/0037—Topological details of the connection
    • H04N2201/0041—Point to point
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
    • H04N2201/0008—Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus
    • H04N2201/0034—Details of the connection, e.g. connector, interface
    • H04N2201/0048—Type of connection
    • H04N2201/0051—Card-type connector, e.g. PCMCIA card interface
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
    • H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H04N2201/3225—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document
    • H04N2201/3233—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document of authentication information, e.g. digital signature, watermark

Definitions

  • the invention relates to an apparatus and a method for generating digital images or photographs.
  • the digital images or photographs produced with a conventional digital camera are generally not safe from subsequent manipulations, i. it can not be guaranteed that a digital image has not been subsequently manipulated. In many cases, however, it is necessary to be able to clearly prove that a digital image has not been subsequently manipulated, i. that its integrity has not been corrupted.
  • its authenticity with regard to the photographer as the author is another important aspect, since by virtue of the authenticity with respect to the photographer, the identity of the originator of the digital image, i. of the photographer, and identify this as the copyright holder of a digital image.
  • the present invention has the object to provide an improved apparatus and an improved method for generating a digital image, in which ensures both the integrity of the digital image and its authenticity with respect to the photographer as the originator of the digital image with a sufficient safety standard can be.
  • the invention is based in particular on the basic idea of a device for generating a digital image, in particular a digital camera, on the one hand with a preferably installed in the device first security module, which ensures its integrity when generating the digital image, and on the other to provide a second security module which is provided on a portable data carrier, which can be connected to the device for generating the digital image, and which ensures its authenticity with respect to the photographer as the author when generating the digital image.
  • an apparatus for generating a digital image comprises an image generation unit for generating the digital image with a first security module.
  • the first security module is configured to cryptographically associate a first secret that unambiguously identifies the first security module and securely stored therein with the digital image in such a way that based on the invention result of this cryptographic link, the integrity of the digital image can be ascertained.
  • the device for generating a digital image further comprises a portable data carrier which can be introduced into the device.
  • the portable data carrier is provided with a second security module, which is configured to cryptographically associate a portable with the unique secure and securely deposited second secret with the digital image so that the identity of the portable data carrier clearly determined by the result of this cryptographic link can be.
  • a corresponding method for generating a digital image comprises the following steps: the generation of a digital image by means of an image generation unit of a device for generating a digital image; cryptographically linking the digital image to a first secret securely stored in a first security module that is part of the image generation unit and uniquely identifying the first security module, the integrity of the digital image being determined from the result of that cryptographic association; and cryptographically concatenating the digital image with a second secret securely stored in a second security module that is part of a portable volume that can be inserted into the digital image generating device and that uniquely identifies the second security module, wherein Based on the result of this cryptographic link, the identity of the portable data carrier can be clearly established.
  • the image generation unit of the apparatus for generating a digital image comprises a sensor unit for processing of The apparatus includes optical signals in digital raw data and a processor unit for processing the digital raw data into the digital image.
  • the first security module is preferably designed as part of the processor unit.
  • the first security module may be a separate component from the processor unit.
  • the functions of the processor unit may be integrated into the first security module, so that in this case the processor unit is provided by the first security module.
  • the first and the second security module can each be implemented as hardware in the form of a security device. Smartcardcontrollers or as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) be configured.
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • the first and / or the second security module can be designed as software in the form of a TrustZone.
  • a normal runtime environment and a secure, trusted runtime environment can be implemented in the processor unit of the image generation unit.
  • the secure runtime environment is isolated from the normal runtime environment and is used to execute safety-critical applications.
  • a preferred example of a secure runtime environment is known from the prior art ARM ® TrustZone ®. Within this TrustZone runs a separate secure or hardened operating system, preferably the also known operating system MobiCore ® .
  • the portable data carrier in addition to the second security module, for example in the form of a security controller, a mass storage on which the generated digital image can be stored.
  • the portable data carrier is a memory card on which the second security module is implemented and which can be plugged into a corresponding card slot of the device for generating a digital image.
  • the memory card preferably includes, in addition to the second security module and the mass memory, for example a flash memory, a memory controller for managing the mass memory.
  • the second security module can be configured to store the digital image on the mass memory of the memory card in encrypted form on the basis of a cryptographic key stored in the second security module.
  • the memory card may be, for example, an SD card, an SDHC card, an SDXC card, a miniSD card, a microSD card, or the like.
  • the first secret which is securely stored in the first security module of the image generation unit, is a first signature key, which is cryptographically linked by the first security module to the digital image in the form of a first digital signature.
  • the first secret may be a MAC key, which is cryptographically linked by the first security module to the digital image by determining a MAC (Message Authentication Code) of the digital image by means of the MAC key.
  • the second secret which is securely stored in the second security module, is preferably a second signature key, which is cryptographically linked to the digital image in the form of a second digital signature.
  • the second secret may also be a MAC key that is cryptographically linked to the digital image by using the MAC key a MAC (Message Authentication Code) of the digital image is determined.
  • the device for generating a digital image may be a digital camera, a mobile device with a digital camera or a digital video camera.
  • the apparatus for generating a digital image may be a scanner, a copier, and / or a printer.
  • the first security module configured as a security controller may be a SIM card, USIM card or embedded in the mobile telephone electronics Act security controller.
  • the first security module of the processor unit may further be configured to provide the digital image with a digital watermark. This can be a visible and / or a non-visible digital watermark.
  • the first security module and / or the second security module can communicate with a background system in the form of a central key management server.
  • the central key management server is operated by a Trusted Service Manager (TSM).
  • TSM Trusted Service Manager
  • the invention has the following advantages in particular.
  • a secret stored securely on the digital camera not only a secret stored securely on the digital camera but also a secret securely stored on a portable data carrier is used, which uniquely identifies the portable data medium or the photographer.
  • a secret securely stored on a portable data carrier is used, which uniquely identifies the portable data medium or the photographer.
  • the digital image can be stored encrypted on the portable data carrier.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of a system with a preferred embodiment of a device for generating a digital image in the form of a digital camera.
  • An essential element of the system 10 shown schematically in Figure 1 for generating a digital image is the device for generating a digital image in the form of a digital camera 20.
  • the digital camera 20 In addition to the usual components of conventional digital cameras, such as an optical unit 25 in the form of an objective, the digital camera 20, an image forming unit 30 configured to form a digital image from the optical signals incident on the lens 25 of the digital camera 20 to create.
  • the image generation unit 30 has an imaging optical sensor unit 32, which may be, for example, a CCD or a CMOS sensor. As known to those skilled in the art, such a CCD or CMOS sensor converts the optical signals imaged thereon by the lens 25 into corresponding electrical signals.
  • the electrical signals or raw data generated by the optical sensor unit 32 can be read out by a processor unit 34 of the image generation unit 30, optionally further comprising an A / D converter in order to convert the electrical signals generated by the optical sensor unit 32 into digital raw data ,
  • the processor unit 34 is preferably an image processing processor, which is configured in particular to suitably process the raw data generated by the optical sensor unit 32.
  • the processor unit 34 in the form of an image processing processor, may be configured to perform the following image processing steps:
  • the image processing steps undertaken by the processor unit 34 are logged.
  • This information can be stored together with the digital image generated by the processor unit 34 or separately therefrom, for example in a memory unit 38 of the image generation unit 30 connected to the processor unit 34.
  • the digital image from the optical sensor unit 32 and possibly an A / D converter provided digital raw data is not further processed, but are stored directly as digital raw data in the memory unit 38.
  • the image generation unit 30 comprises a security module 36, which is also known to the person skilled in the art as a secure element.
  • the security module 36 is designed as a security controller, which is also known to the person skilled in the art as a trusted platform module (TPM).
  • TPM trusted platform module
  • Such a security controller which is known to the person skilled in the art, in particular from the field of chip cards, as a chip card or smart card controller, preferably has its own processor unit and its own memory unit, which can preferably not be accessed from outside the security controller.
  • the security module 34 which is preferably configured as a security controller, can be part of the processor unit 34 or be formed as a separate element, as shown in FIG.
  • the entire processor unit 34 may be configured as a security controller.
  • the image processing steps described above, such as noise reduction or data compression, would be performed by the security controller.
  • the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30, which is preferably designed as a security controller, is configured in particular to provide the digital image provided by the optical sensor unit 32 and optionally processed by the processor unit 34 with a digital signature.
  • a first secret in the form of a first signature key is preferably stored in the secure memory unit of the security module 36 configured as a security controller, which uniquely identifies the security module 36 or digital camera 20 configured as a security controller.
  • the processor unit and the security module configured as security controller are preferably designed such that the corresponding data is generated to create the signature of a digital image from the processor unit 34 to the security controller 36 configured as security controller, which are then signed there with the first signature key stored in the secure storage unit and the signed digital image is again transferred to the processor unit 34, so that the first signature key always remains in the secure one Environment of configured as a security controller security module 36 remains.
  • the digital signature may also incorporate the image processing steps to which the digital image in the processor unit 34 has been subjected. It is also conceivable that both the raw data of a digital image and the processed digital image are provided with a digital signature.
  • the security module 36 which is preferably configured as a security controller, can, in addition to the creation of a digital signature described above, also be adapted to encrypt a digital image. Encrypting a digital image has the advantage that only a legitimate recipient can decrypt, watch, and later process the encrypted digital image. For example, a photographer can transmit his encrypted digital images to a recipient, eg an editor, via insecure data networks without third parties having access to the digital images. This often happens today when cameras are connected to a background system via WLAN or wireless networks online.
  • an embodiment of the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 is also conceivable in the form of a software solution implemented on the processor unit 34 Secure mobile phone range is known and in the processor unit 34 is a normal runtime environment ("normal zone”) and a secure runtime environment (“TrustZone”), preferably in the form of a so-called.
  • ARM ® TrustZone ® are formed. As is known in the art, it is in the ARM ® TrustZone ® to one developed by the company ARM ® system architecture that provides a processor unit a "safe", trusted and a "normal” untrusted in the control range.
  • the processor unit 34 of the image generation unit 30 is operated in the trusted or in the untrusted area. Furthermore, a switch between the trusted and the non-trusted monitored area of the processor unit 34.
  • the secure runtime environment is isolated from the normal runtime environment and encapsulates security-critical processes, providing efficient protection against attacks by unauthorized third parties.
  • a secure or hardened operating system (also known as a secure operating system) runs in the TrustZone, preferably that known from the prior art. knew operating system MobiCore ® .
  • the normal runtime environment includes a conventional operating system.
  • the operating system implemented in the normal runtime environment is a so-called "Rieh OS" with a far-reaching functional scope.
  • the operating system of the mobile phone may be, for example, Android, Apple iOS, Windows Phone or the like.
  • the digital camera 20 includes a portable data carrier 40.
  • the portable data carrier is preferably configured as a memory card 40 whose shape is complementary to the shape of a corresponding card slot in the housing of the digital camera 20 and which thus fits into this card slot in the housing of the digital camera 20 bring and can be removed from this again.
  • the memory card 40 is inserted into the digital camera 20
  • the memory card 40 is in communication with the image forming unit 30 of the digital camera 20 via an input / output interface 42.
  • the input / output interface 42 in turn communicates with a memory controller and a mass memory of the memory card 40.
  • the memory controller and the mass memory of the memory card 40 as a flash controller 44 and a flash memory 46 designed.
  • the memory card 40 of the digital camera 30 differs, in particular, in that the memory card 40 has a security module 48, which is preferably designed as a security controller, which is in communication with the flash controller 44.
  • the security module 48 of the memory card 40 can be a security controller known to those skilled in the art of chip cards. Accordingly, the security module 48 of the memory card 40 in the form of a security controller comprises its own processor unit and its own secure storage unit.
  • a corresponding memory card is marketed, for example, by Giesecke & Devrient Secure Flash Solutions under the product name "Mobile Security Card”, in which a Common Criteria EAL 5+ certified smart card controller is installed.
  • this "Mobile Security Card” thus contains a security module in the form of a security controller and can thus provide functions of a conventional smart card or chip card, in particular the digital signing of data, the encryption of data and / or authentication functions.
  • the security account manager can be operated with the "Java Card” operating system.
  • At least one second secret in the form of a second signature key for generating a digital signature of a digital image is securely stored in the secure memory area of the security module 48 of the memory card 40, wherein the second signature key uniquely identifies the security module 48 configured as a security controller.
  • the security module 48 further secrets or data that uniquely identify the portable data carrier 40 or the photographer, as well as cryptographic keys, for example, be securely stored for encrypting a digital image.
  • the memory card 40 is in communication with the image forming unit 30 of the digital camera 20 via its input / output interface 42 when the memory card 40 is inserted into a corresponding card slot of the digital camera 20.
  • the digital camera 20 is now preferably configured such that a digital image stored in the memory 38 of the image generation unit 30, which has been digitally signed by means of the security module 36 and the first signature key stored therein, can be transferred to the security module 48 of the memory card 40.
  • the intermediate storage in the memory 38 can also be omitted, so that the signed digital image is transferred directly to the security module 48 of the memory card 40.
  • the digital image already signed by the security module 36 designed as a security controller can additionally be digitally signed by the security module 48 of the memory card 40.
  • the second signature key stored in the secure memory unit of the security module 48 which uniquely identifies the memory card 40 or the photographer, preferably flows into this creation of a further digital signature.
  • the image thus digitally signed by the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40 can then be stored in the flash memory 46 of the memory card 40.
  • the security module 48 of the memory card 40 uses the second signature key used for this purpose only within the security module 48.
  • the security module 48 can additionally be configured to encrypt the digital image provided therefrom with a digital signature to store the encrypted digital image in the flash memory 46 of the memory card 40.
  • the second signature key can be transmitted from the secure memory area of the security module 48 of the memory card 40 configured as a security controller to the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 of the digital camera 20.
  • the second signature key is preferably transmitted in encrypted form to the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 of the digital camera 20 configured as a security controller.
  • both a first secret preferably the first signature key
  • the dual-signed digital image is authenticated by the first signature key that is specific to the digital camera 20 and is additionally referred to the photographer by the second signature key that is specific to the photographer or the memory card 40.
  • the secret private key of a key pair which also includes a public key is generally used to create a digital signature.
  • the first signature key stored in the secure memory area of the security module 36 is preferably a first private key and in the secure memory area of the security module.
  • Duls 48 stored second signature key preferably to a second private key. It is known to the person skilled in the art that it may be advantageous, in particular for larger amounts of data, to sign the hash value of the digital image and to attach the signature to the digital image instead of signing the image itself.
  • a first public key which forms a first key pair together with the private first signature key stored in the secure memory area of the security module 36
  • a second public key Key which forms a second key pair together with the stored in the secure memory area of the security module 48 private second signature key, applied to the two-digit digitally signed digital image.
  • the order should be in the
  • the digital camera 20 is preferably configured to communicate with the personal computer 50 in communication.
  • the digital camera 20 has a USB connection for this purpose, which can be connected to a USB connection of the personal computer 50 via a corresponding cable, for example a digital image digitally signed from the flash, as described above
  • Memory 46 of the memory map 40 in the personal computer 50 to transfer.
  • the personal computer 50 may include a suitably shaped card slot into which the memory card 40 may be inserted to allow the personal computer 50 access to the digital images stored in the flash memory 46 of the memory card 40.
  • the personal computer 50 is preferably connected via the Internet 60 to a background system in the form of a key management server 70, which, as will be described in detail below, is preferably configured as a central key management agency.
  • the key management server 70 may be connected to a database 80, which of course could also be part of the key management server 70.
  • the first public key which forms a first asymmetric key pair with the private first signature key stored in the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30, and the second public key, which is stored with the private second signature key stored in the security module 48 of the memory card 40 forms a second asymmetric key pair.
  • the personal computer 50 Since a plurality of public keys will usually be deposited on the key management server 70, the personal computer 50, along with the dual-signed digital image, will transmit information that enables unambiguous identification of both the memory card 40 and the digital camera 20 to provide this information to query the corresponding public keys from the key management server 70.
  • the second signature key from the security module 48 of the memory card 40 is preferably encrypted to the Security module 36 of the image forming unit 30 is transmitted, it is preferably provided that the transmitted to the security module 36 of the image forming unit 30 second signature key is deleted there as soon as the associated memory card 40 is removed from the card slot of the digital camera 20.
  • the processor unit 34 whose security module 36 is provided with a one-to-one identification element, for example a serial number.
  • This one-to-one identification element can be used to generate the first signature key.
  • a corresponding identification element for generating the second signature key can be stored on the security module 48 of the memory card 40 during the production of the memory card 40.
  • Both the identification element of the security module 36 and the identification element of the security module 48 can be stored on the key management server 70.
  • the key management server 70 is able, on the one hand, to verify the double digital signature of a digital image and, on the other hand, to generate a key set for secure communication between the security module 36 and the security module 48.
  • the keys for the one security module are preferably generated so that they form a kind of closed system with the keys for the other security module. It can thereby be ensured that the photographer's key stored on the memory card 40 can only be transferred to a correspondingly equipped digital camera 20.
  • the key management server 70 is preferably effective in both manufacturing and image verification. Every digital Camera 20 and / or each memory card 40 are cryptographically linked to the key management server 70 as part of the manufacturing process. This process is known to those skilled in the field of smart cards as Personalisierurig.
  • the photographer must authenticate himself to the security module 48 of the memory card 40, for example by means of the memory card 40 entering a PIN. If an incorrect PIN is entered three times in succession, the digital camera 20 can either be disabled or operated without the security module 48 of the memory card 40, so that in this case no second digital signature is made by the security module 48 and thus nothing about the authorship of the so generated digital image.
  • the PIN request can be made, for example, via a display unit of the digital camera 20, which can generally also be used to display the acquired or generated digital image.
  • a key of a preferably symmetrical key pair can be stored on the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40.
  • This symmetrical key pair can be used for mutual authentication, preferably a challenge-response authentication, between the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40 and, secondly, between the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40 a secured, ie keyed to train communication channel.
  • the symmetrical keys stored in each case in the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40 can be used as the master key, from which a session key is derived.
  • the security module 36 can transmit a challenge to the security module 48 of the memory card 40, for example in the form of a random number, which is subsequently transmitted by the security module 48 according to an agreed encryption algorithm the memory card 40 is encrypted using an authentication key stored there and the result of this encryption is again transmitted to the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30.
  • the procedure on the side of the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 is analogous, ie the random number transmitted by the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 to the security module 48 of the memory card 40 is encrypted by means of a corresponding authentication key stored in the security module 36, and it is checked whether this is the Result of this encryption is equal to the transmitted by the security module 48 of the memory card 40 encrypted random number. If this is the case, the security module 34 of the image generation unit 30 can assume that the authentication key stored in the security module 48 of the memory card 40 is equal to the authentication key stored in the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and thus the memory card 40 is authentic.
  • authentication of the digital camera 20 with respect to the memory card 40 can be carried out in a corresponding manner.
  • the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40 use the same method of calculating the encrypted random number.
  • the security module 36 of the image generation unit 30 and the security module 48 of the memory card 40 must use the same crypto-algorithm for encryption.
  • the apparatus for generating a digital image is designed as a digital camera or as a mobile phone with a digital camera, those skilled in the art will recognize that the invention can be applied to a variety of other devices which include a digital image is generated, such as scanners, printers and copiers.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Studio Devices (AREA)
  • Television Signal Processing For Recording (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un dispositif (20) ainsi qu'un procédé permettant de produire une image numérique. Le dispositif (20) comprend une unité de génération d'images (30) servant à produire l'image numérique, avec un premier module de sécurité (36) conçu pour lier par cryptographie à l'image numérique un premier secret identifiant de manière univoque le premier module de sécurité (36) et stocké de manière sûre dans celui-ci de telle façon que le résultat de cette liaison cryptographique permet de déterminer l'intégrité de l'image numérique. Le dispositif (20) comprend en outre un support de données portable (40), qui peut être introduit dans le dispositif (20). Ce support de données portable (40) est doté d'un deuxième module de sécurité (48) conçu pour lier par cryptographie à l'image numérique un deuxième secret identifiant de manière univoque le support de données portable (40) et stocké de manière sûre dans celui-ci de telle façon que le résultat de cette liaison cryptographique permet de déterminer l'identité du support de données portable (40).
EP12813279.2A 2011-12-23 2012-12-19 Dispositif et procédé de production d'images numériques Withdrawn EP2795887A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102011122273A DE102011122273A1 (de) 2011-12-23 2011-12-23 Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Erzeugen von digitalen Bildern
PCT/EP2012/005279 WO2013091862A1 (fr) 2011-12-23 2012-12-19 Dispositif et procédé de production d'images numériques

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2795887A1 true EP2795887A1 (fr) 2014-10-29

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP12813279.2A Withdrawn EP2795887A1 (fr) 2011-12-23 2012-12-19 Dispositif et procédé de production d'images numériques

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US9165147B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP2795887A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN103999442B (fr)
DE (1) DE102011122273A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2013091862A1 (fr)

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US20140321640A1 (en) 2014-10-30
WO2013091862A1 (fr) 2013-06-27
DE102011122273A1 (de) 2013-06-27
CN103999442A (zh) 2014-08-20
US9165147B2 (en) 2015-10-20
CN103999442B (zh) 2017-02-22

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