EP2771834A1 - Systèmes et procédés de sécurité de codage et de décodage de contenu numérique - Google Patents

Systèmes et procédés de sécurité de codage et de décodage de contenu numérique

Info

Publication number
EP2771834A1
EP2771834A1 EP20120850173 EP12850173A EP2771834A1 EP 2771834 A1 EP2771834 A1 EP 2771834A1 EP 20120850173 EP20120850173 EP 20120850173 EP 12850173 A EP12850173 A EP 12850173A EP 2771834 A1 EP2771834 A1 EP 2771834A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
node
input field
policy
content
decoding
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP20120850173
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP2771834A4 (fr
Inventor
Steven Sprague
Michael Sprague
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Wave Systems Corp
Original Assignee
Wave Systems Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US13/295,686 external-priority patent/US9047489B2/en
Priority claimed from US13/610,636 external-priority patent/US9043866B2/en
Priority claimed from US13/610,657 external-priority patent/US9015857B2/en
Application filed by Wave Systems Corp filed Critical Wave Systems Corp
Publication of EP2771834A1 publication Critical patent/EP2771834A1/fr
Publication of EP2771834A4 publication Critical patent/EP2771834A4/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]

Definitions

  • social networking site APIs can allow integration of third-party software and give third-party developers access to user data. While these open interfaces enable site enhancements, there is an important privacy trade off, which many site users do not appreciate. Thus, social networking sites can pose serious privacy risks to their users by exposing user data to third-party developers and advertisers. To allay fears of privacy violations, some social networking sites provide users with some access control settings to place restrictions on who may view their personal information. The introduction of open APIs to social networks, however, enables such access control preferences to be circumvented, thus making user data vulnerable to data mining and other privacy issues.
  • Systems and methods may be provided in which end-users may encode (e.g. encrypt, mask, transform) content posted to a public Internet service.
  • the systems and methods may enable end-users to control a policy that governs access to that content.
  • Private data posted by end-users on public networks, such as social networking sites or publishing sites that allow end-users to post comments, may be encoded by the posting end-user.
  • a browser plugin may be provided on a client system to encode the posted data before it is available online and automatically decode the encoded posts into clear text for those viewers that are granted the key. In this way, data security and data control may be provided for end-user posting online. Access to the posted data may be restricted to a select group of viewers. Data that has already been posted may be destroyed, for example, by deleting the decryption key.
  • Content such as a written post or image
  • a form hosted in a tool such as a web browser. Examples include the comment forms made available with most blogs, the Google Gmail web interface or Facebook.
  • a privacy agent may be provided to intercept a post prior to the post being posted/effectuated.
  • the content to be posted can be intercepted and then encoded/encrypted before it is uploaded and, then decoded/decrypted, according to a given policy, prior to being rendered. No changes are introduced to the network infrastructure or the hosted web service
  • An end-user equipped with the privacy agent may select to encrypt the contents of a specified form field after supplying the content, but before instructing the hosting tool (such as a web browser) to deliver the content to the web service.
  • the end-user may identify the policy server and policy that will govern the content to be posted.
  • the end-user may have an account with the policy server where he or she may establish, and later modify, content access policies.
  • the privacy agent may contact the policy server and log in, given the end- user credentials.
  • the indicated policy may be fetched and along with it, the content encryption key. This communication may be cached for re -use or made automatic with device identity as is common in phones.
  • the privacy agent may encrypt the content and tag it with a recognizable identifier, the address of the policy server, and the policy identifier.
  • This encrypted package may be prepared in a manner that is likely to be accepted by the server. For example, textual content could be rendered into hexadecimal ASCII code surrounded by a header structure. The encrypted content may then be delivered to the web service.
  • the web service may deliver the encrypted content to a rendering
  • the same privacy agent running in the rendering environment may parse the content prior to display and identify segments that are to be decrypted by means of the recognizable identifier.
  • the policy server and policy identifier may be extracted from the content.
  • the policy server may be contacted to request a decryption key. If terms of the policy are satisfied, the decryption key may be delivered to the privacy agent, which may then decrypt the content and replace the encrypted blog with the cleartext. To the end-user rendering the content, this process can be invisible.
  • Methods and systems for encoding electronic data published by a user node may be provided.
  • Contents of an electronic document may be processed to identify one or more text input fields.
  • a policy for text input field may be assigned.
  • a unique identifier or tag assigned to the text input field and a key for encoding the text input of the text input field may be obtained.
  • the text input may be encoded by replacing the text input with encoded text.
  • a policy ID may be determined when assigning the policy that is associated with the text input field. When the text input at the text input field is detected, the policy ID may be transmitted to a policy node.
  • the policy node may be any type of computing system, such as a policy server or a cluster of nodes.
  • the policy node may respond to the receipt of the policy ID by generating a unique identifier assigned to the text input field.
  • the policy node may respond to the receipt of the policy ID by generating a key for encoding the text input at the text input field.
  • the policy node may respond to the receipt of the policy ID by transmitting to the publishing user node, the unique identifier and the key for encoding the text input.
  • the (i) unique identifier assigned to the text input field and (ii) the key for encoding the text at the text input field may be transmitted to the publishing user's node.
  • the publishing node may generate the key for encoding the text at the text input field.
  • the text input field in the electronic document may be identified by processing a Document Object Model (DOM) associated with the electronic document.
  • DOM Document Object Model
  • the system may respond to the identification of the text input field by attaching a blur even handler to the text input field.
  • the text input may be detected at the text input field by the event handler if the event handler detects an event (e.g. change event or blur event). For example, if a value associated with the text input field is modified and the text input field loses focus, then a blur event may be detected.
  • the policy associated with the input field may be determined.
  • the policy may be a set of terms to be satisfied by a viewing user node attempting to access the page (to receive access to a decoded version of the encoded text). If the viewing user node accesses the electronic document and the terms of the policy are not satisfied by the viewing user node, the encoded text may be replaced with error text at the viewing user node. If the terms of the policy specify that the viewing user node is permitted access, the encoded text may be replaced with cleartext.
  • the error text may be customizable (defined/configured) by the publishing node.
  • the publishing node can specify or select the error text that will appear at the viewing node.
  • the error text can be defined in the terms of the policy.
  • the error text that appears can be configured such that it depends on certain conditions including information known about or provided by the viewing node.
  • the terms of the policy may define a user (or a group of users) that can be granted access to the cleartext. If the viewing user node is a member of this access group, the viewing user node may be granted access to the cleartext.
  • the terms of the policy may define a user (or a group of users) which are denied access to the cleartext. If the viewing user node is a member of the access denied group, the viewing user node may be denied access to the cleartext.
  • the terms of the policy may specify an expiration date for providing access to the cleartext.
  • the terms of the policy may specify a geographic location associated with the point of access/operating location of a viewing user node in which access to the cleartext is granted or denied.
  • the terms of the policy may require a minimum or maximum age of a user associated with the viewing user node to grant/enable access to the cleartext.
  • the terms of the policy may require that the viewing user node be verified as trustworthy by a machine health monitoring system to enable access to the cleartext.
  • the terms of the policy may require that the viewing user node meet a specified level of cryptographic capability in order to protect access and use of the decoding key.
  • the publishing user node may select, from a plurality of potential policies, which policy is associated with the text input field.
  • the publishing user node may be able to configure its policy selection by selecting a specific style for the text input field. In this way, a particular style may correspond with a particular policy.
  • a user at the publishing user node makes a selection of a specific style for the text input field, this selection may control which policy is to be associated with that text input field.
  • the style selected may be, for example, background color selection. Thus, a selection of a background color of the text input field may be used to configure which one of the plurality of potential policies should be associated with the text input field.
  • the policy associated with the text input field may allow the publishing user node to define an encoding method for encoding the text input at the text input field.
  • the electronic document may be a webpage provided by a service provider.
  • the service provider may be a social networking service provider.
  • the text input may be a component provided by the publisher user node at the social networking webpage.
  • the process of encoding of electronic data may be applied to any content, such as video or image content.
  • a policy may be assigned that is associated to the detected content.
  • a unique identifier may be assigned to the detected content.
  • a key may be obtained for encoding the detected content.
  • the detected content may be replaced with encoded versions of the content.
  • a computer program product for encoding electronic data published by a user node may be provided.
  • the computer program product may include code that is configured such that when it is executed on a terminal it intercepts the processing of an electronic document to identify one or more text input fields.
  • the code may configure the terminal (processor) to respond to the detection of text input at one of the text input fields in the document by assigning a policy to the text input field.
  • the code may configure the processor to respond to the receipt of a unique identifier assigned to the text input field and a key for encoding the text at the text input field by replacing the text input with the encoded text.
  • a publishing node may include one or more computer processors that is configured to intercept the handling of contents of an electronic document by causing a search for one or more text input fields in portions of the contents of the electronic document.
  • a policy associated with the text input field may be assigned.
  • a unique identifier assigned to the text input field and key for encoding the text input at the text input field may be obtained by the publishing node.
  • the publishing node may respond to obtaining the unique identifier and the key by encoding the text input and replacing the text input with encoded text.
  • a unique postable item may be obtained by a policy node from a publishing node.
  • the policy node may respond to obtaining the unique postable item by (i) generating a decoding key for decoding the postable item, and (ii) assigning a policy to the postable item.
  • the policy may define the conditions on which the postable item is accessible to one or more of viewing nodes.
  • the policy node may respond to a request form a viewing node to decode the postable item by determining whether the requesting viewing node satisfies the terms of the policy.
  • a decoding key for decoding the postable item into cleartext may be generated by the policy node.
  • the policy node may transmit the decoding key to a node requesting access to view a decoded version of the postable item if the requesting node satisfies the terms of the policy.
  • the publishing node may generate the decoding key for decoding the postable item into cleartext.
  • Systems, methods and computer program products may be provided for decoding electronic data a viewing user node.
  • a user node that is processing an electronic document having encoded text may be detected.
  • control of at least a portion of the electronic document may be intercepted.
  • a tag (identifier/ID) for the encoded text may be identified.
  • a policy associated with the ID may be requested from a policy node. If the terms of the policy are satisfied, a decode key from the policy node may be received.
  • the encoded text may be replaced with clear text at the user node.
  • method/system/computer program product may detect that a host application executed by a computer processor is about to load the electronic document.
  • a Document Object Model (DOM) associated with the electronic document may be processed. Portions of the DOM may be modified/transformed to replace the encoded text with cleartext.
  • DOM Document Object Model
  • Systems, methods and computer program products for encoding electronic data published by a user node using tokens may be provided.
  • the contents of an electronic document may be processed to identify one or more text input fields.
  • the detected text input may be replaced with a token.
  • the detected text input may be stored at another node, such as a storage node.
  • a viewing node may access and process an electronic document (webpage), which has encoded input field content.
  • the encoded input field content may be an encoded version of input received from a publishing node at an input field in the webpage.
  • a decoding policy may be associated with that input field, which includes a reference to a third party policy node.
  • a policy node in communication with a client application executing at the viewing node, may be configured to facilitate determining whether the viewing node satisfies the terms of the decoding policy of the input field content in the electronic document.
  • the decoding policy may defer to the third party policy node regarding decoding decisions.
  • the third party policy node in communication with the policy node, may be configured to respond to a request from the policy node regarding whether the viewing node satisfies terms of a decoding policy. Instructions from the third party policy node may be received by the policy server.
  • the third party node instructions may specify whether the viewing node passed the terms of the policy.
  • the instructions as to whether the viewing node passed the policy terms indicate whether the encoded version of the input field content should be replaced with a decoded version of the input field content.
  • the policy node may receive a request from the client application at the viewing node to access the decoded version of the input field content.
  • the policy node may respond to the viewing node's request by transmitting a message to the third party policy node including session attributes about the viewing node.
  • the third party node may send instructions to the policy node as to whether the viewing node satisfies the terms of the policy. These instructions from the third party policy node are used to determine whether the encoded version of the input field content should be replaced with decoded content at the viewing node.
  • the policy node may respond by transmitting a message, to the client application executing on the viewing node, indicating that the viewing node is not permitted access to the decoded version of the input field content.
  • the policy node may respond by facilitating access to a decoding key to enable the viewing node to process the decoded version of the input field content.
  • a decoding key or a link to the decoding key may be sent to the viewing node so that the encoded version of the input field content may be decoded and replaced with the decoded version of the input field content.
  • the client application may respond to receipt of the decoding key by accessing a document object model (DOM) tree associated with the webpage to modify and replace instances of the encoded version of the input field content with the decoded version of the input field content.
  • the client application may further respond by directing the browser to draw at least the modified portions of the webpage at the viewing node.
  • DOM document object model
  • the third party policy node may be controlled by an independent entity having sovereign control over encoding/decoding decisions.
  • a decoding decision for instance, may cause the encoded input field content to be replaced in the DOM with a decoded version of the input field content.
  • the policy server may defer to an external system (e.g. the third party policy node) in making encoding or decoding decisions with respect to the input field content.
  • the third party node may be used to address privacy laws and/or as privacy concerns of any entity (e.g.
  • a sovereign third party policy server can be used to control access/define access terms to the encoded online published content.
  • a request to publish digital content received may be intercepted and received at an input field in an electronic document.
  • the request to publish the input field content may be received by, for example, a privacy agent, client application, plug-in or engine executing on the user node.
  • the privacy agent may determine whether to encode the input field content in the electronic document. For example, the privacy agent may pass session information about the user node to a policy node and, request instructions regarding an encoding policy associated with the input field content.
  • the policy node may send
  • the controlling entity may be, for example, an enterprise, organization, government entity, guardian, or other node having control over publishing requests made by the user node.
  • the first user node may be associated with a first user account. Requests associated with the first user account to publish content received at input fields in electronic documents, such as webpages, are decided by policies set by the controlling entity.
  • the controlling entity for example, may define a policy that indicates whether the input field content is encoded or decoded when published.
  • the controlling entity may be associated with an administrative account, which is configured to have preemptive control over the encoding/decoding decisions associated with input field content input at external sites by the user node.
  • the encoding policy defined by the control entity's account may be configured to specify which users or group of users have access to a decoding key that facilitates decoding of the encoded version of the input field content.
  • the encoding policy may be configured to specify at least one group, having one or more users, that is permitted to access a decoded version of the encoded input field content.
  • the controlling entity may have control over accounts of a certain domain (e.g. @wave.com).
  • the first user node's account may be associated with, for example, a first domain.
  • the controlling entity's account may be configured to enable it to eject or suspend the first user's account, or any other of a plurality of user's account in the same or other domains.
  • the encoding policy may be configured so that publishing requests made by the first user's account are encoded during a specified timeframe. For example, if the controlling entity is a company, it may define the encoding policy that specifies that posts made by the first user account are to be posted as encoded content during working hours, while during non-working hours the first user may have control over the encoding/decoding status of its posts.
  • the controlling entity may have the ability to access analytics information associated with content published by the first user node.
  • the first user's account may be associated with a minor.
  • the controlling entity's account may be associated with a guardian of the minor.
  • the creation of the minor's account may spawn creation of the guardian's account.
  • the guardian's account may be configured to define encoding policies associated with posts made by the minor's account.
  • An encoding policy for instance, may be configured to specify a least one group of users that is permitted to access a decoded version of the encoded input field content.
  • the policy for instance, may specify that posts may only be viewed in their unencoded form by a closed group.
  • the existence of the guardian's account and the control it has over the minor's account may be undetectable to other posters.
  • the existence of the controlling entity's account and the control that it has over the first user's account may be undetectable by other users.
  • the decision whether to encode the input field content in the electronic document can be facilitated by the privacy agent executing on the user node.
  • the privacy agent may monitor the input field in the electronic document for changes. When a request to publish digital content from the user node is received at an input field in an electronic document, the request may be detected as a result of a change event detected by the privacy agent at the input field. In response to the change event, the privacy agent may send a message to the policy node requesting instructions as to whether the content input at the input field should be published in an encoded form.
  • the privacy agent may transmit, to the policy node, session information concerning the user node and a unique identifier associated with the input field to enable the policy node to determine the associated encoding policy.
  • the policy node may responds to the receipt of the session information and the unique identifier by: generating a decoding key for decoding the encoded version of the input field content; and determining a policy for the input field, the policy defining conditions on which the input field content is accessible to other viewing nodes.
  • the privacy agent may replace, in the electronic document, the input field content with an encoded version of the input field content by: accessing a document object model (DOM) tree associated with the electronic document to modify and replace instances of the input field content with the encoded version of the input field content; and directing the browser to draw the modified electronic document.
  • DOM document object model
  • Systems, methods and computer apparatuses for controlling digital content may be provided that use an external or third party key server to control access to decoding keys.
  • the third party key node may be controlled by an independent entity that has sovereign control over access to the decoding keys.
  • An encoded version of input field content in an electronic document may be decoded at, for example, a node attempting to view a decoded version of the input field content.
  • a decoding key to facilitate decoding of at least portions of the encoded version of the input field content in the electronic document may be requested.
  • a universal resource identifier (URI) reference to the decoding key may be received from a policy node. The URI reference to the decoding key may be used to request access to the decoding key from a third party key node to facilitate replacement of at least portions of the encoded version of the input field content with a decoded version of the input field content.
  • URI universal resource identifier
  • the encoded version of the input field content may be an encoded form of input, which is received at an input field in the electronic document.
  • the electronic document may be a webpage.
  • the URI reference to the decoding key may be transmitted from the policy node in response to a request from the viewing node to access the decoded version of the input field content in the electronic document.
  • the policy node may receive the viewing node's request to access the decoded version of the input field content.
  • the policy node may process session attributes about the viewing node to verify its credentials to determine whether it is authorized to view the decoded version of the input field content.
  • the policy node may respond to the viewing node's request to access the decoded version of the input field content by transmitting a message to the viewing node, including the URI reference to the decoding key at the third party key node.
  • the message which includes the URI reference to the decoding key, is transmitted to the viewing node in response to the policy node verifying the credentials of the viewing node and determining that the viewing node satisfies the terms of a decoding policy associated with the input field content.
  • the decoding policy may specify at least one group having one or more users that is permitted to access the decoded version of the encoded input field content.
  • the URI reference to the decoding key may enable decoding at the viewing node of only a portion of the encoded input field content, while other portions of the input field content can remain encoded.
  • the URI reference to the decoding key may be a link to the decoding key at the third party key node.
  • the URI reference to the decoding key may permit only the viewing node to access the decoding key at the third party key node.
  • a client application such as a privacy agent, that is executing at the viewing node may respond to receipt of the decoding key by: (1) accessing a document object model (DOM) tree associated with the electronic document to modify and replace instances of the encoded version of the input field content with the decoded version of the input field content; and (2) directing a browser to draw the modified electronic document at the viewing node.
  • DOM document object model
  • the systems/apparatuses/methods for controlling digital content may include a viewing node that has one or more processors configured to process an electronic document having an encoded version of input field content.
  • the system may include a policy node that is in communication with the viewing node.
  • the policy node may have one or more processors configured to facilitate determining whether the viewing node satisfies terms of a decoding policy associated with the encoded version of the input field content in the electronic document.
  • the system may include a third party key node that is in communication with the policy node and the viewing node.
  • the third party key node may have one or more processors configured to respond to a request from the viewing node to access a decoding key that decodes the encoded version of the input field content if the viewing node satisfies terms of a decoding policy.
  • a policy node system may receive, from the viewing node, a request for a decoding key to facilitate decoding of at least portions of an encoded version of the input field content in the electronic document.
  • the policy node may respond to the request by the viewing node by transmitting a universal resource identifier (URI) reference to the decoding key.
  • URI universal resource identifier
  • the URI reference may be used by the viewing node to access the decoding key, which facilitates decoding of at least portions of the encoded version of the input field content.
  • a third party key node system may receive, from a viewing node, a request for a decoding key to facilitate decoding of at least portions of an encoded version of the input field content in the electronic document.
  • the third party key node system may respond to the request by forwarding, to the viewing node, the decoding key to facilitate decoding of at least portions of the encoded version of the input field content.
  • Input field content in an electronic document may be processed.
  • a request to encode portions of the input field content in the electronic document may be detected if, for instance, an encoding marker (e.g. tag) is detected in the input field content.
  • the encoding marker may define the portions of the input field content, which should be encoded.
  • the encoding marker may be a string of characters.
  • the string of characters may be any string of characters, for example, "@@”.
  • the encoding marker in the input field content may defines which portions of the input field content are to be encoded via a start encoding tag and an end encoding tag.
  • the portion of the content to be encoded may be the content in between the start encoding tag and the end encoding tag.
  • the content outside of the start encoding tag and the end encoding tag may be ignored, and thus, not encoded.
  • the system for encoding portions of digital content may include a privacy agent that is executing on a client machine.
  • the privacy agent may process input field content to try to detect the encoding markers, which defines the portions of the input field content that are to be encoded.
  • the portions of the input field content defined by the encoding marker(s) may be encoded by the privacy agent.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow diagram showing the interaction between example system components according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing example components according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 3 A is a block diagram showing example components of a browser plugin according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 3B is a block diagram showing example components of a content rendering environment according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram of example components of a policy server according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of example components of an account manager according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a flow diagram showing an example process of encoding cleartext according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a flow diagram showing an example process of deleting a post according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a flow diagram showing an example of the process of decoding encoded content according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 9 is an example screenshot of a portion of an electronic document having encrypted posts/comments according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 10A is an example screenshot of a toolbar for a browser interface in which a user may login to access encoding/decoding features according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 10B is an example screenshot of a toolbar for a browser interface in which a user has logged in to access encoding/decoding features according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 11 is an example use case diagram of the users (actors) according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 12A is an example sequence use case diagram for posting content according to an example implementation.
  • FIG. 12B is an example sequence use case diagram for reading content according to an example implementation.
  • FIG. 12C is an example sequence use case diagram for reading content using an external policy server according to an example implementation.
  • FIG. 12D is an example sequence use case diagram for posting content using an external key server according to an example implementation.
  • FIG. 12E is an example sequence use case diagram for reading content using an external key server according to an example implementation.
  • FIG. 13A is an example interface of a text field containing tags, which provide instructions to encode a portion of text input to a post.
  • FIG. 13B is an example of the interface shown in FIG. 13A in which a portion of the text in a post is encoded.
  • FIGs. 13C and 13D are examples of interfaces, which are used to facilitate to facilitate control over access to an encoded post.
  • FIGs. 13E and 13F are examples of interfaces, which are used to facilitate management of domain accounts.
  • FIG. 14 illustrates an example computer network or similar digital processing environment in which the present inventions may be implemented.
  • FIG. 15 is a block diagram of the internal structure of a computer of the network of FIG. 14. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • Example features of embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented in a software or hardware environment.
  • a system 100 is provided for encoding/decoding information.
  • a publisher node 102 can access an electronic document (e.g. webpage, website) using a browser.
  • the publisher node 102 can be, for example, operated by a user who posts information at a webpage.
  • the webpage may be hosted/provided by an online service provider 104.
  • the online service provider 104 can be, for example, any website or service, including any online service provider that enables users to post/share/upload/transmit information.
  • the online service provider may provide any type of web-based content creation and management system that a user can interact with.
  • the online service provider 104 may be a site that allows users to publish information/comments.
  • the online service provider may provide social networking, news, blogging, podcast, product review, search services, recommendation systems, or other types of services.
  • the browser When the webpage is requested from the service provider 104, the browser typically collects all the images (including the page structure) and stores this data in the browser cache. The browser renders the webpage and, before the browser draws the page such that it would be visible on the display of the publisher node 102, it raises an event indicating that the browser is about to draw the page.
  • the inventive system 100 includes a client application (browser plugin) 300 that provides a listener, which listens for this event to detect when the browser is about to draw the page. Referring to FIGS. 1-3, as the webpage that is requested by the publisher 102 is rendering at the browser, the system 100 parses the webpage content for input fields (e.g. text input entry boxes/forms).
  • processes which may be implemented in a client application component, such as a browser plugin 300, are executed at the user/publisher's computer, to process the Document Object Mode (DOM) node -tree of the webpage in order to detect one or more input fields in the webpage content.
  • DOM Document Object Mode
  • the client 300 intercepts control of the page from the browser.
  • the parser 310 then processes the page to detect input fields.
  • the parser 310 identifies all input fields on the page and loops through each field.
  • the client 300 assigns a unique post ID and an event handler (e.g. an onChange event / blur event handler) to each input field identified.
  • the onChange event can be fired when the content of an input field changes.
  • the handlers that are assigned to each input field are added to the webpage's DOM.
  • control is then passed back from the client 300 over to the browser and, the webpage is allowed to be drawn by the browser.
  • the client 300 monitors the webpage and its associated contents in the background, waiting for the onChange events to be fired.
  • the client 300 monitors the page to detect the situation where the publisher 102 inputs digital content into an input field on the webpage and then the system 100 responds by encoding/encrypting the input.
  • the encoded content is then forwarded to the service provider 104 for
  • FIG. 6 is a flow diagram showing the process 600 of encoding digital content (e.g. a post/comment/image/video) according to an embodiment.
  • digital content e.g. a post/comment/image/video
  • the page is loaded, and at 614 the system 100 determines whether cloaking
  • Encryption/encoding is enabled. If encoding is disabled, then at 616 the webpage is displayed without any encryption/encoding. If encoding is, however, enabled then the page is parsed at 620 to detect its input fields in its DOM tree. An event handler is attached to each of the input fields at 622, and the page is displayed at 616. Events (onChange events) are assigned to each input field and are added to the webpage's DOM.
  • the onChange event is fired when the content of an input field changes (e.g. the field blurs). Specifically, once the client detects that the publisher's curser exits the field (e.g. loses focus/blurs), the onChange event is fired and detected by the event handler. In response to detecting an onChange event, at 626 components of the system 100 determine an active policy associated with the input field.
  • the policy server 108-1 receives the unique identifier and the viewing node's 110 credentials/session information, and in response three pieces of information are generated (ID for post 628, decoding key or a URI to the key, and a link to a preexisting policy for decryption).
  • the policy is a collection of terms that need to be satisfied. While the example of FIG. 1 shows the system 100 having one policy server 108-1, other implementations of the system 100 are envisioned that may include one or more external policy and/or external key servers (see e.g. 108-2, 108-3; FIGs. 12C, 12D, 12E).
  • the policy server 108-1 stores the assigned key and the post ID associated with that input field.
  • the digital content e.g. cleartext
  • the browser is then instructed to draw that portion of the page (at the location of the input field) with the encrypted text and post ID.
  • the user(s) e.g. the publisher 102 (and any viewer(s) 110), will see encrypted text once it is posted.
  • each input field detected represents a unique postable item and, for each input field detected, a unique identifier/tag is assigned and a key is generated that is associated with that identifier, which can enable the system 100 to identify that field and encrypt digital content that has been input into the page through that input field.
  • the browser With publishing (encrypting text/image/video content), the browser fires the event and the listener detects the event. With viewing the page at, for example, a viewing node 110, this process occurs in reverse in that the listener is fired before the page is drawn/rendered by the browser.
  • components of the system 100 e.g. the parser 312 process the page to detect cloaked items. Referring to FIG. 8, for example, if the client 300 is available at 804, the page is processed at 806 to detect a tag and post ID that are used to identify an encrypted post (e.g. to detect a cloaked or encoded item 808).
  • the parser 312 detects the tag/encoded item, it finds a post ID, and looks up the policy associated with the post ID at 810.
  • a tag (e.g. header marker) 1306-4 and a post ID 1306-3 are shown in a published post that includes partially encoded text.
  • textual content (plaintext) 1306-1 has been replaced by the client 300 in the page's DOM with a header structure 1306-4, post ID 1306-3, and hexadecimal ASCII code (encoded content) 1306-2.
  • the client 300 traverses the DOM of a requested webpage, the client 300 searches for a marker (e.g. header tag) 1306-4 [scramblstest ⁇ to detect any encoded content.
  • the header 1306-4 is used to help the client 300 identify that the webpage includes encoded content 1306-2.
  • the post ID 1306-3 is shown as being represented by a unique string of characters, DCCTXMZ. The parser can search through every node on the HTML DOM node tree of the page to detect the encoded content tag 1306-4 and the post ID 1306-3.
  • the encoded content tag 1306-4 and the post ID 1306-3 are strings of characters that do not include browser instructions or code (e.g. any markup or scripting code for displaying web pages).
  • the encoded content tag 1306- 4 and the post ID 1306-3 can be inserted by the client 300 into the webpage source code as text content during the publishing/posting process.
  • the encoded content tag 1306-4 and the postID 1306-3 are processed and displayed in the webpage as text. Because the encoded content tag 1306-4 and the postID 1306-3 do not include any HTML/scripting instructions, the encoded content tag 1306-4 and the postID 1306-3 are ignored by the browser engine and, processed by the browser as text elements appearing on the webpage.
  • the post ID 1306-3 provides instructions for the client 300 regarding the protocol that should be used to interpret/handle the encoded digital content that follows the post ID 1306-3.
  • the post ID 1306-3 may be used to look up the policy associated with the encoded content 1306-2, or may be used to inform the client application 300 that there are Unicode characters in the encoded post.
  • the client 300 determines the policy associated with the post ID at 810.
  • the client 300 sends a message to the policy server 108-1 requesting the policy governing the post.
  • the policy server 108-1 looks up the terms associated with the post.
  • the system tests the policy's terms. For example, the system looks up the policy associated with the post and processes the terms of the policy to try to come up with a true/false response.
  • the policy server may consider whether the user computer node attempting to view the page with the encrypted content is located the US. The policy server may also consider whether the viewing computer node is associated with a particular email address.
  • the decoding key or the universal resource identifier (URI) to the key is sent to the viewing node 110 so that the encoded item may be decoded at 818.
  • the encoded content (cloaked text or tag) is replaced with the decoded content and the page is displayed by the viewing node 110 at 822.
  • the error text is displayed. Specifically, at 816 the cloaked item is replaced with the error text.
  • the error text may be any kind of content.
  • the error text may be content that is displayed as unreadable; it can be advertisements, an image, a URL, or defined text, e.g. "I do not like you.”
  • the error text may be customized content specified in the policy terms.
  • FIG. 9 is an example screenshot of a portion of an electronic document 900 having encrypted posts/comments 902, which are shown as unreadable.
  • FIGs. 12A and 12B are example sequence use case diagrams for
  • FIGs. 12C, 12D and 12E are examples of other potential policy server/key server implementations.
  • one or more third party policy or key servers (108-2, 108-3, ...,108-n) may be implemented in the system 100.
  • a third party (e.g. foreign) policy or key server may be included to provide sovereign control of policy terms and/or handle key management.
  • the policy server 108-1 may defer to an external system (e.g. other third party policy node for further handling/processing).
  • the third party node may customize the policy terms and/or perform key management to address privacy laws and/or as privacy concerns of any entity (e.g. governments, organizations, or businesses) who may have an interest in maintaining control of policy terms and/or keys for the content that is posted, uploaded or transmitted.
  • a sovereign third party policy server can be used to control access/define access terms to the encoded content
  • a sovereign third party key factory can be used to provide independent control of key issuance and/or maintenance.
  • a user can define a policy that defers to an external policy or key server.
  • the user can specify the URI of the external server(s) to which they want the policy server 108-1 to redirect.
  • This URI redirection to an external node can become a term of the policy by which encoding/decoding decisions may be controlled.
  • FIG. 12C is an example sequence use case diagram for reading/viewing content using an external/third party policy server 108-2 according to an optional example implementation of the system 100.
  • a viewing node 110 may login to the system 100 to establish a secure session. The viewing node 110 uses its browser to access a webpage. The browser fetches the webpage 1202 from an external web service provider 104.
  • the client application e.g. plug-in 300
  • the client application may parse 1204 the page's DOM node -tree for images or video content to detect whether there are any encoded content tags in the image/video properties, metadata, and other embedded information.
  • the client application 300 extracts the post ID and passes it to the policy server 108-1.
  • the policy server 108-1 looks- up the policy associated with the post ID.
  • the policy server 108-1 processes the policy terms to determine if the policy conditions have been met. For example, the policy server 108-1 may process the viewing node's 110 login credentials
  • the policy specifies that the encoding/decoding status of the post are to be controlled/decided by an external policy server 108-2.
  • the policy server 108-1 may pass data about the viewing node 110 to the third party policy server 108-2.
  • the information sent to the third party policy server 108-2 may include any information about the viewing node 110 that may be required by the third party policy server 108-2 to compare with the terms of the policy. For example, the user ID, IP address, and browser's session variables may be sent to the third party policy server 108-2.
  • the third party policy server 108-2 may test any of the information it received about the viewing node 110 against its policy terms.
  • the third party policy server 108-2 may transmit a message to the policy server 108-1 regarding its decision as to whether the encoded post can be viewed in its decoded state at the viewing node 110.
  • the third party policy server 108-2 may send a pass or fail message indicating its decision.
  • the policy server 108-1 may transmit to the client 300 the key/cipher/token to enable the client 300 to decode the encoded content. If the client 300 satisfies the policy terms, the client may then receive or generate the decoding key.
  • the client 300 decodes the encoded content and traverses the webpage's DOM tree to replace the encoded content with the decoded content, which enables the browser to display the decoded content at the viewer node 110.
  • the policy terms may have policy server 108-1 instruct the client 300 to redirect the session so that the client 300 can interface directly with the third party policy server 108-2.
  • FIG. 12D is an example sequence use case diagram for posting/publishing content using an external key node 108-2 according to an optional example implementation of the system 100.
  • the system operates in a manner that is similar to certain publishing/posting implementations described herein, except that an external key server is included as a component of the system 100.
  • the client 300 intercepts control of the page and tags the page's editable input fields with event handlers and with post IDs that are registered with the policy server 108-1.
  • the client 300 monitors the webpage for any indication of posting activity, such as the firing of an OnChange event associated with one of the tagged input fields.
  • the client 300 When the client 300 detects that publishing node 102 has entered one of the editable input fields in the webpage, the client 300 determines an active policy associated with the page, and transmits the post ID associated with the input field and requests a key from an external key node (e.g. keyfactory) 108-3.
  • the key node 108-3 returns a uniform resource identifier (URI) to the policy server 108-1 , which is registered at the policy server 108-1.
  • the key URI may include a string of characters that can be used to identify/locate the key at the external key node 108-1. In this way,
  • the key/cipher/token itself does not pass through the policy server 108-1. Rather, the
  • the system 100 can help address privacy laws/concerns by providing a system that allows an external entity (e.g. corporation, government agency, etc.) to maintain sovereign control of keys/ciphers/tokens.
  • an external entity e.g. corporation, government agency, etc.
  • the key URI may include a uniform resource name (URN) and/or a uniform resource locator (URL) associated with the key at the external key node 108-3.
  • URN uniform resource name
  • URL uniform resource locator
  • FIG. 12E is an example sequence use case diagram for reading/viewing content using an external key node 108-3 according to an optional example implementation of the system 100.
  • the process in FIG. 12E is similar to some of the other example approaches in the present disclosure, except an external/third party key node 108-3 is used to manage the keys/ciphers for reading/viewing the encoded content in the clear.
  • an encoded content tag e.g. 1306-4, FIG. 13B
  • the client application 300 In response to identifying the encoded content tag, the client application 300 extracts the post ID associated with the encoded content and passes it to the policy server 108-1 with the credentials and session information of the viewer node 110.
  • the policy server 108-1 tests the policy associated with the post ID, and if the policy terms are met, then the policy server 108-01 may transmit a signed message to the client 300 including the key URI for the external key server 108-3.
  • the client 300 accesses the key through the URI at the external key server 108-3.
  • the client uses the key to decode the encoded content and traverses the webpage's DOM tree to replace the encoded content with the decoded content.
  • FIGs. 12A through 12E show different implementations including various policy servers, external policy servers, and external key servers, it should be understood that other possible combinations/configurations are within the scope of the present disclosure.
  • An external policy server 108-2 may be implemented so that it includes the external key factory 108-3.
  • Additional external policy servers may be included in the system to provide additional hierarchies/levels of policy/key control, security and/or independence.
  • the client 300 may use other resource(s) to handle the policy/key management provided by the policy/key servers.
  • a peer-to-peer hybrid like system may be used.
  • a distributed client application operating in a peer-to-peer like manner may be implemented across a plurality of networked viewing/publishing nodes, and it may perform the policy and key management.
  • FIG. 3 A is a block diagram showing example components of a client application/browser plugin 300 according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • the client may facilitate handling the client session using session ids/cookies.
  • the policy server 108-1 can maintain a relationship with the browser session executing at the publishing/viewing node(s) 110, 102 to communicate with the client 300 by sending/ receiving information packets (e.g. session ids/cookies).
  • the client 300 may include a parser 312, an extension manifest component 314, a transformation engine 318, and a preference settings component 316.
  • the parser 312 may be used to process a webpage to detect any unique postable item (e.g. text input fields or other image/video content for encoding - publishing) and to parse the webpage for encrypted/encoded/tagged text (viewing).
  • the unique postable item/content may be any user-entered and user-controlled text/image/video content that is to be cloaked/encrypted/encoded.
  • the extension manifest 314 may provide a specific structure for the browser that enables events to be declared.
  • an onload event handler can be defined that detects when the electronic document/webpage is loaded (e.g. detects when an onload event is fired); in this way, the client 300 can detect when the webpage is being loaded so that it can process the page for text input fields or other fields that allow for the creation of unique postable items.
  • the transformation engine 318 may facilitate changing cleartext into encrypted/encoded/tagged text (or unencoded content into encoded content).
  • the client 300 may include a toolbar interface for a browser.
  • FIG. 10A is an example screenshot of a toolbar for a browser interface in which a user may login to access encoding/decoding features according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 10A is an example screenshot of a toolbar for a browser interface in which a user may login to access encoding/decoding features according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • 10B is an example screenshot of a toolbar for a browser interface in which a user has logged in to access encoding/decoding features according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • the policy may be defined by selecting a policy from the drop down menu for "Policy".
  • the displayed policy will be the one set as the default for the current site.
  • the toolbar can allow the user (publisher) to specify whether or not the user wants to encrypt posts on the current webpage that the user is accessing.
  • the client 300 can enable proactive transformation of the user's posts by allowing the user to specify whether they want to encrypt and, the client can enable reactive
  • the toolbar interface may be provided to facilitate encoding/decoding for the user environment (e.g. publishing/viewing).
  • the publishing/viewing nodes may interact with a policy server environment to facilitate encryption/decryption of content by processing the terms of the policy.
  • FIG. 3B is a block diagram showing example components of a content rendering environment according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • the interaction environment 320 may be any type of environment capable of
  • the content rendering environment may include a client (browser plugin) 300 executed by a processor.
  • the platform 322 for facilitating processing and implementation of the content rendering environment may include a browser, smartphone applications, websites, and the like.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing example components according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • the account manager 210 may provide a collection of information about the various entities, e.g. the publisher 102, viewer 110, etc. Such information may include email addresses, account information, post history, sign in and authentication information, etc.
  • the key factory/server 230 stores encoding/decoding keys. Components of the system 100 (e.g. publisher 102, viewer 110, policy server 108) may interface with the key server to record and fetch keys.
  • the ecommerce gateway 220 may provide billing and invoicing services for the publisher 102 and viewer 110.
  • the post tracker 250 records or tracks posts made by the publisher 102.
  • the analytics 260 component facilitates analysis/reporting of the records recorded by the post tracker.
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram of example optional components of the policy server 108.
  • Policy repository 410 may provide a database storing policy terms. The terms of the policy may specify any access terms, for example, whether the user attempting to view the content is in the US; whether a specific browser (e.g. Firefox) is used by the user attempting to access the content; whether the user attempting to access is specifically excluded from access.
  • a publisher/user may have a policy specifying restricted access for a particular user (e.g. user B), such that everyone but User B is able to view the publishing node's posts.
  • the directory interpreter 412 can interface with other external components
  • the policy may be defined to deliver access to specific users identified in some third party system, such as a corporate directory or online contacts list and, the directory interpreter can be used to interface with these third party systems.
  • the directory interpreter 412 may be used to help implement this portion of the policy by inputting (importing) the publisher's Facebook friends. In this way, group access can be created.
  • the policy enforcement interface 416 may be used to interface with the client 300 at the viewing/publishing node(s).
  • the client 300 may pass a post, an ID for the post, and a key to the policy enforcement interface 416 for processing at the policy node 108.
  • the policy node 108 may be an automated key management server.
  • the policy node 108 may also confirm that a viewing node attempting to access contents of an encoded post meets the terms for the post ID associated with that item. If the terms are met, then the policy node 108 may return the key. If the terms are not met, then the request for the key may be denied. If the key is returned, then the encoded posts are swapped out for the cleartext at the viewing node. The encrypted text is therefore transformed into cleartext.
  • the policy may be configured so that viewer access is limited to viewers having a rendering environment that is a trustworthy. For example, if the policy node 107 is able to confirm that the viewing node is trustworthy, the policy node 107 can ensure that the decryption key is likely not to be compromised, stored or redistributed. For example, the viewing node may be considered trustworthy if it has a trusted hardware environment, such as a trusted platform module.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of example components of an account manager 210, 500 according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • New user/create account signup may be provided with an account management component 500, which interfaces 512 with the client 300.
  • an account management component 500 By setting up an account, a user can login, for example, using the login portion of the browser toolbar interface. Login credentials may be stored in the repository 510 and used to help manage identity of system users.
  • a persistent session can be established that enables the client 300 (and policy server 108-1) to continuously verify their respective identities.
  • the policy server 108-1 can use attributes of the session context (e.g. client's credentials, IP address, and location information) to manage the user's respective identify/identities. Even if a user has multiple identities (e.g. work email, personal email, Twitter handler, etc.), the system will be able to recognize them.
  • An end user's account may be configured so that it is associated with a controlling entity's user's account (e.g. cosigned/guardian/parental account).
  • the controlling entity's account may be arranged so that it has preemptive rights to override posting decisions or policy configuration decisions made by the end user. These preemptive rights associated with the cosigned account may be hidden from other users and from the end user.
  • an end user's account may be configured so that additional user(s), such as a parent or co-signatory have override control over the encoding/decoding status of content.
  • the parent/co-signatory may have the ability to override the policy associated with a post made by, for example, an end user who is a minor.
  • the parent/co-signatory may have control over whether the minor user can published certain content and, whether such content is
  • This feature may uniquely allow, for example, a co-signatory/parent to have control over whether his/her child's social networking posts are encoded or decoded.
  • the system may have a setting enabling the cosignatory/parent to specify that all posts made by the child online are to be encoded.
  • the system may enable the cosignatory/parent to control which users are granted key access to view the encoded posts as cleartext.
  • the cosignatory/parent may be able to preemptively specify that all posts made by the minor user may only be decoded by a closed group. This preemptive cosignatory/parent account may facilitate compliance with Child Online Protection Act (COP A) requirements.
  • COP A Child Online Protection Act
  • the parent/cosignatory may be able to configure the minor user's account so that it is not apparent to the group (or any other users) that the policy decisions associated with the minor's account are controlled by a parent/cosignatory.
  • This hidden status associated with the parent/cosignatory account may be a feature that can be enabled so that it appears as though the minor user is operating independently without any preemptive control by another user. In this way, the parent/cosignatory may have rights that supersede the rights of the minor user, while the parent/cosignatory operates in a manner that appears invisible to other users.
  • Accounts associated with the system may be configured so that a second party, such as an enterprise or other controlling entity, has control over the publishing status of posts made by users from within its domain.
  • a domain of accounts may be determined based on the identity of the account. For example, if the domain is "wave.com", then users with an @wave.com address fall into the domain automatically.
  • a new enterprise account may have an associated group defined which matches that of the domain. If, for instance, an enterprise account is
  • EndUser@wave.com the account settings may be configured such that all users from the same domain, i.e. "from @wave.com” are granted access to decoding keys to view EndUser@wave. corn's posts in the clear.
  • FIGs. 13E and 13F are examples of interface controls 1320, 1326 configured to facilitate managing domain accounts. As new, or existing users can claim accounts with their domain address, they will appear in the domain accounts list 1324.
  • the administrator which could be an employer, enterprise, guardian, or any other controlling entity, may then view the activity of that account 1324, as shown in FIG. 13F.
  • the administrator can use these interfaces 1320, 1326 to suspend or delete a user.
  • the administrator can use the interface 1320 to add an additional domain 1322 to be managed/monitored.
  • FIGs. 13E and 13F generally relate to managing a domain of email identities, similar features for individual identities (such as family members/cosigned/guardian accounts) may be supported as well.
  • similar features for individual identities such as family members/cosigned/guardian accounts
  • the administrator claims oversight over another account.
  • the other account approves of this oversight.
  • the oversight control may be a condition/feature/policy associated with an account setup if the user setting up the account is a minor.
  • the plug-in 300 can be configured so that it is always on. In this way, for example, any publishing activity by a user node can be subject to the policies defined by controlling entity, e.g. enterprise, employer, or guardian.
  • the enterprise/employer/guardian can configure a user's account with a failsafe to ensure that the plug-in is always on when the user is logged-in to the system 100 or when a certain computer system is used by the user.
  • the controlling entity may configure the policy so that the plug-in 300 executes and cannot be turned off during a specific timeframe.
  • the controlling entity may specify that all posts made by a user to external sites are encoded during working hours (e.g. from 9 AM -5 PM). While during non- working hours, the encoding status of posts may be defined by the user. This time sensitivity configuration may be useful if the user has a company laptop, for example, that they are permitted to take home after working hours.
  • a user at a publishing node 102 who posts a comment to a third party site 104 is typically unable to obtain analytics information concerning the post.
  • the publishing user may be unable to find out information concerning other users who have viewed the post, where the other users are located, where the click path taken by the other users after viewing the post.
  • Such analytics information is typically unavailable to the posting user unless, for example, the third party site provides the information.
  • a system 100 may be provided that may enable a user who publishes a post on a third party site 104 to control who has access a decoded version of the post and determine analytics data associated with the those viewers who accessed the decoded version of the post.
  • the publishing user e.g. author of a post/comment on a third party site
  • An aggregate view of traffic accessing/viewing the post may be provided to the publisher.
  • the publisher may be provided with analytics information concerning the number of viewers that rolled over the post, the number of viewers that successfully view the post, and the number of viewers that were rejected and thus, unable to view the post.
  • the publisher/user encodes his or her post/comment when it is published at a third party site, the user is able to monitor traffic accessing the post/comment, including information about who are the visitors, IP geolocation of the visitors, and the number of views. Access to this information helps gauge traffic and popularity trends which is useful information previously unavailable to most users who post on third party sites 104.
  • the publishing user may configure the policy associated with an encoded post to specify that analytics data should be gathered.
  • the policy for instance, may be configured so that if the encoded post is decoded by a viewing node 110, an alert may be generated to notify the publishing user about the analytics details concerning the viewing node who viewed the decoded post.
  • FIG. 13A is an example interface 1300-1 of a text field 1301 containing tags 1302, which provide instructions to the client 300 to encode a specific portion 1306-1 of text input in a post.
  • the tags @@ may be inserted around the content to be encoded.
  • the portion of the string 1304 in the input field 1301 outside of the @@ tag 1302 remains in the clear, while the portion 1306-1 of the string that is surrounded by the @@ tags is configured to be encoded.
  • FIG. 13B is an example of the interface 1300-2 shown in FIG. 13A in which the portion 1306-1 of the string surrounded by @@ tags 1302 has been encoded 1306-2.
  • a policy associated with the post may be configured to allow tiered access for user(s)/ group(s) to the decoding keys for the post.
  • certain user(s)/ group(s) may be granted access to a decoding key to reveal subsets of the encoded content, while other user(s)/ group(s) may be granted access to a decoding key that decodes all of the encoded content.
  • FIGs. 13C and 13D are examples of interface control features for defining group access to an encoded post.
  • an end user may specify which users should be granted access to the decoded text.
  • the user can instruct the client 300 to encode only portions of the text marked using the @@ tags, and the user can further instruct the client 300 as to which users (or groups of users) should be permitted access to the cleartext.
  • a monetization scheme may be provided to such a user by allowing the user to define a policy associated with the post that requires prospective viewers to pay a fee for decoding key access. Users that desire to view decoded
  • posts/comments published at a third party site may be required to pay a fee for the decoding key.
  • a user having a Facebook or Twitter page may define a policy that requires viewers to pay for key access so that the viewers may view decode a post.
  • This monetization scheme may be further enhanced by the technology described herein, which encodes portions of a post. In this way, if a publishing user encodes a portion of their post and uses the unecoded portion of the post as a teaser to entice viewers to request/pay for access to view the entire post in the clear.
  • a viewer interested in viewing the entire post may, for example, click on the encoded portion to create an account through the account manager 500 and/or login to the system 100, and then execute a payment transaction in exchange for a token (key/cipher) to view the encoded portion of the post.
  • the transaction may be processed by components of the system 100 using a communications network (credit card network, debit card network, or private label network).
  • transformation which involves encoding the content prior to its posting to a third-party web service (service provider 104).
  • service provider 104 the client 300 may be designed with an open architecture platform so that third parties have the ability to insert their own transformation engine 318.
  • tokenization which involves posting a pointer to the content and keep the content on the, for example, policy nodes/servers (or somewhere else).
  • policy server or other system may be configured so that it is not responsible for storing the post and, therefore, it is not responsible for all the data storage.
  • an external site receives an id, and that id provides a pointer to the encoded (tokenized) content, which can be stored at another node (e.g. a storage node, the policy server node, or on another system, such as a peer-to-peer network).
  • another node e.g. a storage node, the policy server node, or on another system, such as a peer-to-peer network.
  • tokenization One example benefit with tokenization is that the content may be individually managed; for example, an unwanted post may be easily removed by deleting the pointer (token).
  • tokenization may be more resistant to
  • cryptanalysis such as to attacks.
  • the crypto may be more difficult to guess since one would not need to maintain size and word structure.
  • the integrity of the content would likely be complete (e.g. provided that the external server returns back the entire ID, since half an ID string may be inefficient.)
  • tokenization implementation may be provided without modifying existing browser systems. Therefore, browsers can encode/decode using the tokenization approach with or without a plug-in interface.
  • a variation on tokenization may involve embedding an ID in English.
  • a paragraph long sequence of real words, for example, may provide enough variation to represent a unique ID. With this configuration, it is possible that the token may be undetectable by external servers.
  • FIG. 7 is a flow diagram showing an example process of deleting a post according to an optional embodiment of the invention.
  • the page is loaded and at 706 it is process for cloaked items and displayed 708.
  • the user selects a cloaked item at 710, and requests to delete this item at 712.
  • the policy is modified to reflect that that post is deleted at 714, and this information is stored in the repository 716.
  • FIG. 11 is an example use case diagram of the example users (actors) of the system 100 and the different functions/uses of the system 100 that they can perform.
  • a user is able to do several functions in the system 100: browse with cloak support 1124; configure cloak settings for external sites 1102; cloak a post 1110; revoke a post 1104; browse with cloak support (plugin support) 1124; browse a page that has been cloaked been cloaked by the user 1106; configure cloaking policies 1108; create an account 112; configure social graph 114 (configure groups and relationships between viewers that are granted/denied access, etc.); manage their profile 1120; browse someone else's cloaked page 1122; install the client application/browser plugin 1118.
  • a mobile agent implementation of the invention may be provided.
  • a client server environment on which to enable mobile security services may be provided.
  • a background cloaking agent/client on the device uses, for example, the XMPP protocol to tether a background cloaking agent/client on the device to a server (e.g. 108-1, 108-2, 108-3).
  • the server can then issue commands to the phone on request.
  • Embodiments of the security/cloaking schemes of the inventions may be implemented using self-encrypting drives. Such security schemes may be used to help protect against data loss due to a lost or stolen PC.
  • the Trusted Drive Manager software activates the security that distinguishes a self-encrypting drive from a standard hard drive. Examples of such technology are described in, for example, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,036,020 and 7,426,747, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Processing Environment
  • FIG. 14 illustrates an example computer network or similar digital processing environment in which the present inventions may be implemented.
  • the viewer nodes 110 or publisher nodes 102 may be client computer(s)/devices 50 a, b..n (50 generally) and the policy provider 108 and service provider 104 may be server computer(s) 60 that provide processing, storage, and input/output devices executing application programs and the like.
  • the viewer 110 and publisher 102's client computer(s)/devices 50 can also be linked through communications network 70 to other computing devices, including other client devices/processes 50 and server computer(s) 60.
  • a communications network 70 can be part of a remote access network, a global network (e.g., the Internet), a worldwide collection of computers, Local area or Wide area networks, and gateways that currently use respective protocols (TCP/IP, Bluetooth, etc.) to communicate with one another.
  • a global network e.g., the Internet
  • IP Transmission Control Protocol/IP
  • Bluetooth Bluetooth
  • Other electronic device/computer network architectures are suitable.
  • FIG. 15 is a diagram of the internal structure of a computer (e.g., client processor/device 50 or server computers 60) in the computer system of FIG. 14.
  • Each computer 50, 60 contains system bus 79, where a bus is a set of hardware lines used for data transfer among the components of a computer or processing system.
  • Bus 79 is essentially a shared conduit that connects different elements of a computer system (e.g., processor, disk storage, memory, input/output ports, network ports, etc.) that enables the transfer of information between the elements.
  • Attached to system bus 79 is I/O device interface 82 for connecting various input and output devices (e.g., keyboard, mouse, displays, printers, speakers, etc.) to the computer 50, 60.
  • Network interface 86 allows the computer to connect to various other devices attached to a network (e.g., network 70 of FIG. 1).
  • Memory 90 provides volatile storage for computer software instructions 92 and data 94 used to implement components of the encoding/decoding features of the present inventions.
  • Disk storage 95 provides non-volatile storage for computer software instructions 92 and data 94 used to implement an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Central processor unit 84 is also attached to system bus 79 and provides for the execution of computer instructions.
  • the processor routines 92 and data 94 are a computer program product (generally referenced 92), including a computer readable medium (e.g., a removable storage medium such as one or more DVD-ROM's, CD-ROM's, diskettes, tapes, etc.) that provides at least a portion of the software instructions for the invention system.
  • Computer program product 92 can be installed by any suitable software installation procedure, as is well known in the art.
  • a computer readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that can contain, or store a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
  • at least a portion of the software instructions may also be downloaded over a cable, communication and/or wireless connection.
  • the invention programs are a computer program propagated signal product 107 embodied on a propagated signal on a propagation medium (e.g., a radio wave, an infrared wave, a laser wave, a sound wave, or an electrical wave propagated over a global network such as the Internet, or other network(s)).
  • a propagation medium e.g., a radio wave, an infrared wave, a laser wave, a sound wave, or an electrical wave propagated over a global network such as the Internet, or other network(s).
  • Such carrier medium or signals provide at least a portion of the software instructions for the present invention routines/program 92.
  • the propagated signal is an analog carrier wave or digital signal carried on the propagated medium.
  • the propagated signal may be a digitized signal propagated over a global network (e.g., the Internet), a telecommunications network, or other network.
  • the propagated signal is a signal that is transmitted over the propagation medium over a period of time, such as the instructions for a software application sent in packets over a network over a period of milliseconds, seconds, minutes, or longer.
  • the computer readable medium of computer program product 92 is a propagation medium that the computer system 50 may receive and read, such as by receiving the propagation medium and identifying a propagated signal embodied in the propagation medium, as described above for computer program propagated signal product.
  • carrier medium or transient carrier encompasses the foregoing transient signals, propagated signals, propagated medium, storage medium and the like.
  • the computer readable medium may be a computer readable signal medium or a computer readable storage medium.
  • Computer program code for carrying out operations for aspects of the present invention may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including JavaSpript, XML, Java, Smalltalk, C++, C# or the like and conventional procedural programming languages, such as the "C" programming language or similar programming languages.
  • the program code may execute entirely on the user's computer as a browser plugin, partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or server.
  • the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider).
  • LAN local area network
  • WAN wide area network
  • Internet Service Provider an Internet Service Provider
  • These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable medium that can direct a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other devices to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable medium produce an article of manufacture including instructions which implement the function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.
  • the computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other devices to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus or other devices to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide processes for implementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.
  • each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s).
  • the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved.
  • each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration can be implemented by special purpose hardware- based systems that perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
  • UML Unified Modeling Language
  • the service provider 104 can be, for example, any type of service provider that hosts electronic documents.
  • Example service providers may include news/media service providers, such as CNET, or any social networking service providers, such as Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln, and the like.
  • CNET news/media service providers
  • social networking service providers such as Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln, and the like.
  • encryption keys/ciphers one skilled in the art of cryptology would understand that other forms of encryption processes can be used, such as codebook based encryption.
  • content encoded using the systems of the present disclosure may be "nested" in that they may be encoded again to provide for additional protection.

Abstract

La présente invention concerne des systèmes et des procédés de masquage de données sur des réseaux publics. Au niveau d'un nœud de publication, le système peut administrer des champs d'entrée de données d'une page Internet et intercepter et coder un contenu, comme du texte, des images et une entrée vidéo au niveau des champs d'entrée de données, avant que le contenu ne soit publié en ligne sur un site Internet du fournisseur de services publics. Une politique peut être définie pour contrôler ceux des utilisateurs qui ont un accès autorisé à une clé pour décoder le contenu codé. La politique peut renvoyer vers un nœud de politique de tiers en déterminant un accès par clé. Un compte d'une entité de contrôle, telle qu'un gardien ou un employeur, peut être configuré pour contrôler l'état de codage de publications effectuées par un autre accès par clé et de décodage. Un agent de confidentialité peut traiter le contenu de champ d'entrée pour tenter de détecter des marqueurs de codage dans le contenu de champ d'entrée, lesquels marquent le contenu à coder. Un serveur de clé de tiers peut être utilisé pour mémoriser les clés de décodage. Une référence d'URI à la clé de décodage peut être utilisée pour accéder à la clé de décodage par un nœud pour tenter de visionner la version décodée du contenu de champ d'entrée.
EP12850173.1A 2011-11-14 2012-10-18 Systèmes et procédés de sécurité de codage et de décodage de contenu numérique Withdrawn EP2771834A4 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US13/295,686 US9047489B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2011-11-14 Security systems and methods for social networking
US13/610,636 US9043866B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2012-09-11 Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
US13/610,657 US9015857B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2012-09-11 Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
PCT/US2012/060828 WO2013074245A1 (fr) 2011-11-14 2012-10-18 Systèmes et procédés de sécurité de codage et de décodage de contenu numérique

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2771834A1 true EP2771834A1 (fr) 2014-09-03
EP2771834A4 EP2771834A4 (fr) 2015-06-17

Family

ID=48430034

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP12850173.1A Withdrawn EP2771834A4 (fr) 2011-11-14 2012-10-18 Systèmes et procédés de sécurité de codage et de décodage de contenu numérique

Country Status (3)

Country Link
EP (1) EP2771834A4 (fr)
CA (2) CA3103222C (fr)
WO (1) WO2013074245A1 (fr)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9946898B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2018-04-17 Esw Holdings, Inc. Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
US9977921B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2018-05-22 Esw Holdings, Inc. Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
US9990516B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2018-06-05 Esw Holdings, Inc. Security systems and methods for social networking

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2019126202A1 (fr) * 2017-12-19 2019-06-27 Veeva Systems Inc. Système et procédé pour contrôler des communications électroniques
CN117150484B (zh) * 2023-10-30 2024-02-13 信智慧通科技（北京）有限公司 一种页面信息的处理方法、装置及设备

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6226618B1 (en) * 1998-08-13 2001-05-01 International Business Machines Corporation Electronic content delivery system
US6289450B1 (en) * 1999-05-28 2001-09-11 Authentica, Inc. Information security architecture for encrypting documents for remote access while maintaining access control
EP1752925A1 (fr) * 2005-07-20 2007-02-14 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et système pour la distribution de contenu protégé digitalement dans un réseaux poste à poste
JP4829632B2 (ja) * 2006-02-10 2011-12-07 株式会社リコー データ暗号化装置、データ暗号化方法、データ暗号化プログラム、および記録媒体
EP2120172A1 (fr) * 2008-05-08 2009-11-18 Zentech S.r.l. Procédé et système permettant de partager légalement un contenu numérique protégé par copyright

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9946898B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2018-04-17 Esw Holdings, Inc. Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
US9977921B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2018-05-22 Esw Holdings, Inc. Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
US9990516B2 (en) 2011-11-14 2018-06-05 Esw Holdings, Inc. Security systems and methods for social networking

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CA3103222A1 (fr) 2013-05-23
CA2855828C (fr) 2021-02-16
WO2013074245A1 (fr) 2013-05-23
EP2771834A4 (fr) 2015-06-17
CA2855828A1 (fr) 2013-05-23
CA3103222C (fr) 2023-05-09

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US11775686B2 (en) Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding content
US11132463B2 (en) Security systems and methods for encoding and decoding digital content
US11741264B2 (en) Security systems and methods for social networking
US8539231B1 (en) Encryption key management
KR101603149B1 (ko) 인터넷 사이트에 업로드되는 멀티미디어에서 사용자의 프라이버시를 보호하는 시스템 및 방법
US8848922B1 (en) Distributed encryption key management
CA2855828C (fr) Systemes et procedes de securite de codage et de decodage de contenu numerique
US10931650B1 (en) Apparatus and method for building, extending and managing interactions between digital identities and digital identity applications
Zhu et al. User agent and privacy compromise
Breeding Key Technologies with Implications for Privacy: Encryption, Analytics, and Advertising Tracking

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20140530

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR

DAX Request for extension of the european patent (deleted)
RA4 Supplementary search report drawn up and despatched (corrected)

Effective date: 20150520

RIC1 Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant

Ipc: G06F 21/60 20130101ALI20150513BHEP

Ipc: G06F 21/62 20130101ALI20150513BHEP

Ipc: H04L 29/06 20060101ALN20150513BHEP

Ipc: H04L 9/08 20060101ALI20150513BHEP

Ipc: G06F 21/30 20130101AFI20150513BHEP

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED TO BE WITHDRAWN

18D Application deemed to be withdrawn

Effective date: 20151219