EP2767065A1 - System for secure id authentication - Google Patents

System for secure id authentication

Info

Publication number
EP2767065A1
EP2767065A1 EP12798337.7A EP12798337A EP2767065A1 EP 2767065 A1 EP2767065 A1 EP 2767065A1 EP 12798337 A EP12798337 A EP 12798337A EP 2767065 A1 EP2767065 A1 EP 2767065A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
ias
response
user module
request
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP12798337.7A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Inventor
designation of the inventor has not yet been filed The
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS MANAGEMENT LIMITED
Original Assignee
Technology Business Management Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Technology Business Management Ltd filed Critical Technology Business Management Ltd
Publication of EP2767065A1 publication Critical patent/EP2767065A1/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/16—Payments settled via telecommunication systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/325—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices using wireless networks
    • G06Q20/3255—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices using wireless networks using mobile network messaging services for payment, e.g. SMS
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4012—Verifying personal identification numbers [PIN]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/12—Messaging; Mailboxes; Announcements
    • H04W4/14—Short messaging services, e.g. short message services [SMS] or unstructured supplementary service data [USSD]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/102—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for e-commerce

Definitions

  • This invention relaters to secure ID authentication procedures, particularly, but not exclusively, for authenticating financial and other transactions over publicly accessible communications networks such as cellular telephone networks.
  • An accepted authentication procedure for credit and debit card transactions involves the use of a PIN - a personal identification codes, usually consisting of a four digit number, such as 7356 - that is known, or supposed to be known, only to the card holder. Not even the issuing bank or card company knows the user's PIN.
  • a payment card PIN is held on the card as an element of data in a magnetic strip.
  • the terminal reads the PIN from the magnetic strip and requests the user to enter the PIN on a keypad. If they match, the transaction is authenticated. In this instance, there is no transmission of the PIN over the network.
  • the module simply confirms that the payment is authorised.
  • the PIN is vulnerable, however, to discovery when transmitted over a publicly accessible network. Knowledge of the PIN could enable unauthorised access to the PIN holder's accounts and other restricted access information. It has been proposed to improve security by more complex procedures.
  • a common approach is to require a two-part identity check, one part being specific to the instrument used to transmit the information to the service module, the other part being specific to the user.
  • the instrument is a mobile phone
  • a combination of phone ID and user ID is required.
  • the phone will have a unique ID, being, of course, the telephone number as it appears on the SIM card.
  • the industry mandates that there is only ever one SIM card with any particular number.
  • the user ID input might be the user's PIN number.
  • SIM card ID is unique - it is only required to record and re-use the data stream to access the service module. Simply encrypting the information is no help. It would, in any event, be the encoded information that is intercepted. It is not necessary to de-encrypt it, just use it in the encrypted format, to gain access.
  • one-time passwords require software on the user module to generate them, and corresponding software on the service module to verify them, and, in order to provide acceptable levels of security, the software and its usage are sometimes made deliberately complex, in some instances requiring time-limited passwords and random number generators, or costly ancillary equipment.
  • the present invention provides simpler approaches to the problem of secure ID authentication.
  • the invention comprises a secure ID authentication system for authenticating over a cellular radio network that has a UDDI network a response from a user module comprising a SIM card to a request from an application programming interface (API) to authenticate a transaction, in which; a request is sent to an identity application server (IAS) holding a database of user module ID information; the IAS transmits the request as a class 2 SMS message to the SIM card;
  • API application programming interface
  • the SIM card causes the request to be displayed on the user module; when a response is entered, the user module encrypts the response and associated data and transmits the encrypted data over the UDDI network to an OTA gateway to the IAS; and the IAS decrypts the data and transmits the response to the API.
  • a UDDI (Universal Discovery Description and Integration) network is a network in which network service providers and businesses can be listed. It has its own servers under the control of service pro viders, and affords a more secure communication channel within networks used for mobile phone services.
  • the system may involve a user PIN request, and the system may then include a PIN test server holding a database of encrypted user module ID and associated PIN data.
  • the OTA gateway then transmits the encrypted data to the PIN test server, which, if it has a match for user module ID and ⁇ data, transmits the data to the IAS, which decrypts it and forwards he response to the API as being PIN authenticated.
  • Figure 1 is a block diagram
  • Figure 2 is a flow chart
  • the drawing illustrates a secure ID authentication system for authenticating over a cellular radio network that has a UDDI network a response from a user module, such as a mobile phone MP, comprising a SIM card to a request from an application programming interface (API) to authenticate a transaction.
  • the transaction may be one not requiring to be secured by a PIN, such as a subscription to a newsletter or one requiring a simple yes/no answer or a selection from a list of options, or one involving a payment or the provision of personal information, that needs a PIN entry.
  • the request is sent - Step I, Figure 2 - to an identity application server (IAS) holding a ⁇ database of user module ID information.
  • IAS identity application server
  • the IAS converts the request - Step II - to a Class 2 SMS message which it transmits - Step III - over the Cellular Radio Network CN to the SIM card of the phone MP which displays the message on the phone VDU, with optional audio for visually impaired users, and requests an input.
  • the user enters the information requested at Step IV.
  • the information is encrypted and sent - Step V - to an OTA gateway, such as a 03.48 gateway. Encryption can be effected in any secure way, such as hash encryption.
  • PTS PIN test server
  • the message is forwarded - Step VIII -to the IAS, or the procedure terminated - Step XI - perhaps with a "wrong PIN" message back, to the phone MP.
  • the message does not contain a PIN, it is sent straight from the OTA gateway to the IAS. Messages that reach the IAS result - Step IX - in a "transaction approved" message sent back to the API and the procedure terminated at Step X.
  • Hacking into any transaction requires access to the UDDI channel and to be able to tie up a response sent thereover with the initial authentication request, which is thwarted by the response being encrypted.
  • the system can provide secure access to a personal database that might be kept in the API.
  • the database might a virtual vault that securely stores personal data such as birth certificate and passport details, purchase records, from which a personal profile might be built up which could be selectively available to retailers, who might thereby recommend products and services, an address book, clearly, and a CV, as well as driving licence and insurance details. All this could be securely accessed by, and added to or changed, from a mobile phone or like device.

Abstract

A secure ID authentication system for authenticating over a cellular radio network that has a UDDI network a response from a user module comprising a SIM card to a request from an application programming interface (API) to authenticate a transaction, in which; a request is sent to an identity application server (IAS) holding a. database of user module ID information; the IAS transmits the request as a class 2 SMS message to the SIM card; the SIM card causes the request to be displayed on the user module; when a response is entered, the user module encrypts the response and associated data and transmits the encrypted data over the UDDI network to an OTA gateway to the IAS; and the IAS decrypts the data and transmits the response to the API.

Description

SYSTEM FOR SECURE ID AUTHENTICATION
This invention relaters to secure ID authentication procedures, particularly, but not exclusively, for authenticating financial and other transactions over publicly accessible communications networks such as cellular telephone networks.
An accepted authentication procedure for credit and debit card transactions involves the use of a PIN - a personal identification codes, usually consisting of a four digit number, such as 7356 - that is known, or supposed to be known, only to the card holder. Not even the issuing bank or card company knows the user's PIN.
A payment card PIN is held on the card as an element of data in a magnetic strip. At a payment terminal connected in a communications network, the terminal reads the PIN from the magnetic strip and requests the user to enter the PIN on a keypad. If they match, the transaction is authenticated. In this instance, there is no transmission of the PIN over the network. The module simply confirms that the payment is authorised.
However, in many other transactions between a user and a service module, which do not use a dedicated payment terminal with a facility for checking an entered PIN, the PIN would need to be stored on the service module, and checked there in order to authenticate the transaction.
The PIN is vulnerable, however, to discovery when transmitted over a publicly accessible network. Knowledge of the PIN could enable unauthorised access to the PIN holder's accounts and other restricted access information. It has been proposed to improve security by more complex procedures.
A common approach is to require a two-part identity check, one part being specific to the instrument used to transmit the information to the service module, the other part being specific to the user. If the instrument is a mobile phone, a combination of phone ID and user ID is required. The phone will have a unique ID, being, of course, the telephone number as it appears on the SIM card. The industry mandates that there is only ever one SIM card with any particular number. The user ID input might be the user's PIN number.
However, transmitting this information over a network is open to the risk of
eavesdropping.. It does not matter that the SIM card ID is unique - it is only required to record and re-use the data stream to access the service module. Simply encrypting the information is no help. It would, in any event, be the encoded information that is intercepted. It is not necessary to de-encrypt it, just use it in the encrypted format, to gain access.
Resort is had, therefore, to a one-time password. Interception is now pointless, as the same data stream will not work a second time. Examples of one-time password systems are found in WO2010/101476, WO0131840, and numerous other patent publications.
However, one-time passwords require software on the user module to generate them, and corresponding software on the service module to verify them, and, in order to provide acceptable levels of security, the software and its usage are sometimes made deliberately complex, in some instances requiring time-limited passwords and random number generators, or costly ancillary equipment. The present invention provides simpler approaches to the problem of secure ID authentication.
The invention comprises a secure ID authentication system for authenticating over a cellular radio network that has a UDDI network a response from a user module comprising a SIM card to a request from an application programming interface (API) to authenticate a transaction, in which; a request is sent to an identity application server (IAS) holding a database of user module ID information; the IAS transmits the request as a class 2 SMS message to the SIM card;
the SIM card causes the request to be displayed on the user module; when a response is entered, the user module encrypts the response and associated data and transmits the encrypted data over the UDDI network to an OTA gateway to the IAS; and the IAS decrypts the data and transmits the response to the API.
A UDDI (Universal Discovery Description and Integration) network is a network in which network service providers and businesses can be listed. It has its own servers under the control of service pro viders, and affords a more secure communication channel within networks used for mobile phone services.
The system may involve a user PIN request, and the system may then include a PIN test server holding a database of encrypted user module ID and associated PIN data. The OTA gateway then transmits the encrypted data to the PIN test server, which, if it has a match for user module ID and ΡΓΝ data, transmits the data to the IAS, which decrypts it and forwards he response to the API as being PIN authenticated.
Embodiments of the system will now be described will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawing, in which: Figure 1 is a block diagram; and Figure 2 is a flow chart.
The drawing illustrates a secure ID authentication system for authenticating over a cellular radio network that has a UDDI network a response from a user module, such as a mobile phone MP, comprising a SIM card to a request from an application programming interface (API) to authenticate a transaction. The transaction may be one not requiring to be secured by a PIN, such as a subscription to a newsletter or one requiring a simple yes/no answer or a selection from a list of options, or one involving a payment or the provision of personal information, that needs a PIN entry.
The request is sent - Step I, Figure 2 - to an identity application server (IAS) holding a ~ database of user module ID information. The IAS converts the request - Step II - to a Class 2 SMS message which it transmits - Step III - over the Cellular Radio Network CN to the SIM card of the phone MP which displays the message on the phone VDU, with optional audio for visually impaired users, and requests an input.
The user enters the information requested at Step IV. The information is encrypted and sent - Step V - to an OTA gateway, such as a 03.48 gateway. Encryption can be effected in any secure way, such as hash encryption. If the information contains a PIN - decision step VI - it is sent on to a PIN test server PTS, which contains a database of module ID information and associated PINs, where it is matched, Step VII, or not, with data stored in the database. If the module user ID and associated PIN are found on the PTS, the message is forwarded - Step VIII -to the IAS, or the procedure terminated - Step XI - perhaps with a "wrong PIN" message back, to the phone MP.
If the message does not contain a PIN, it is sent straight from the OTA gateway to the IAS. Messages that reach the IAS result - Step IX - in a "transaction approved" message sent back to the API and the procedure terminated at Step X. Hacking into any transaction requires access to the UDDI channel and to be able to tie up a response sent thereover with the initial authentication request, which is thwarted by the response being encrypted.
In addition to facilitating secure financial transactions, including payments by credit or debit card or to and from bank accounts, the system can provide secure access to a personal database that might be kept in the API. The database might a virtual vault that securely stores personal data such as birth certificate and passport details, purchase records, from which a personal profile might be built up which could be selectively available to retailers, who might thereby recommend products and services, an address book, clearly, and a CV, as well as driving licence and insurance details. All this could be securely accessed by, and added to or changed, from a mobile phone or like device.

Claims

Claims:
1 A secure ID authentication system for authenticating over a cellular radio network that has a UDDI network a response from a user module comprising a SIM card to a request from an application programming interface (API) to authenticate a transaction, in which; a request is sent to an identity application server (IAS) holding a database of user module ID information; the IAS transmits the request as a class 2 SMS message to the SIM card; the SIM card causes the request to be displayed on the user module; when a response is entered, the user module encrypts the response and associated data and transmits the encrypted data over the UDDI network to an OTA gateway to the IAS; and the IAS decrypts the data and transmits the response to the API.
2 A system according to claim 1 , which includes a PIN test server holding a database of encrypted user module ID and associated PIN data.
3 A system according to claim 2, in which the OTA gateway transmits the encrypted data to the PIN test server, which, if it has a match for user module ID and PIN data, transmits the data to the IAS, which decrypts it and forwards he response to the API as being PIN authenticated.
4 A system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, in which encryption is hash encryption,
5 A system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, when used for authenticating financial transactions. 6 A system for the secure storage of data, such as personal data, comprising an access system comprising a secure ID authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 5.
EP12798337.7A 2011-10-12 2012-10-11 System for secure id authentication Withdrawn EP2767065A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB1117640.1A GB2499360B8 (en) 2011-10-12 2011-10-12 Secure ID authentication
PCT/GB2012/000775 WO2013054073A1 (en) 2011-10-12 2012-10-11 System for secure id authentication

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2767065A1 true EP2767065A1 (en) 2014-08-20

Family

ID=45091952

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP12798337.7A Withdrawn EP2767065A1 (en) 2011-10-12 2012-10-11 System for secure id authentication

Country Status (6)

Country Link
EP (1) EP2767065A1 (en)
JP (1) JP2015501572A (en)
CN (1) CN104429036A (en)
GB (1) GB2499360B8 (en)
HK (1) HK1208573A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2013054073A1 (en)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
GB2499360B (en) 2015-03-04
JP2015501572A (en) 2015-01-15
GB2499360B8 (en) 2016-01-27
GB2499360A8 (en) 2016-01-27
WO2013054073A8 (en) 2014-12-11
GB201117640D0 (en) 2011-11-23
HK1208573A1 (en) 2016-03-04
CN104429036A (en) 2015-03-18
GB2499360A (en) 2013-08-21
WO2013054073A1 (en) 2013-04-18

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