EP2722633B1 - System and method for detecting an incoming threat - Google Patents
System and method for detecting an incoming threat Download PDFInfo
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- EP2722633B1 EP2722633B1 EP13189035.2A EP13189035A EP2722633B1 EP 2722633 B1 EP2722633 B1 EP 2722633B1 EP 13189035 A EP13189035 A EP 13189035A EP 2722633 B1 EP2722633 B1 EP 2722633B1
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- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- incoming threat
- countermeasure
- threat
- incoming
- controlling unit
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
- F41H5/00—Armour; Armour plates
- F41H5/007—Reactive armour; Dynamic armour
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
- F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41F—APPARATUS FOR LAUNCHING PROJECTILES OR MISSILES FROM BARRELS, e.g. CANNONS; LAUNCHERS FOR ROCKETS OR TORPEDOES; HARPOON GUNS
- F41F1/00—Launching apparatus for projecting projectiles or missiles from barrels, e.g. cannons; Harpoon guns
- F41F1/08—Multibarrel guns, e.g. twin guns
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41H—ARMOUR; ARMOURED TURRETS; ARMOURED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE, e.g. CAMOUFLAGE, IN GENERAL
- F41H11/00—Defence installations; Defence devices
- F41H11/02—Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile or anti-torpedo defence installations or systems
Definitions
- the present disclosed subject matter is concerned with defense systems and more specifically with active protection systems.
- An active protection system is related to protection systems which actively prevent sensor-based or other incoming threats from acquiring and/or destroying a target.
- the active protection system can protect soldiers, vehicles, buildings, military base and other platforms from large variety of threats.
- Electronic countermeasures that alter the electromagnetic, acoustic or other signature(s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behavior of an incoming threat are designated soft kill measures.
- the hard kill measures generally refer to measures taken in the so-called "end-game" shortly before a warhead/missile hits its target.
- the hard kill measure in general physically affects the incoming warhead/missile by means of either blast and/or fragment action.
- the active protection system using a hard kill measure, is operated by detecting the incoming threat and killing it before it hits the target. The detection of the coming threats can be based on radar detection systems that provide information related to the incoming threat.
- the killing interception of one type interception systems can occur at a far distance from the target, for example, between 10 to 100 meter.
- the killing interception of another type of interception system can occur close to the target's wall, for example, at a distance of between 1 to 5 meter.
- Each type of the hard killing interception systems has benefits and limitations regarding the cultural damage, the impact on the target, the protection threats level, the cost, the killing probability, reliability, weight and more.
- US 2012/0217301 A1 describes a system to track a threat and determine a countermeasure to counter the threat.
- US 2011/0127328 A1 describes a system for dual-band detection of incoming threats.
- EP 2338022 B1 describes a system and method for protecting an enclosure against attack of projectiles.
- VALPOLINI P "Active Armour Protection", ARMADA INTERNATIONAL, ZURICH, CH, vol. 34, no. 3, 1 June 2010 describes protection systems that sense and counter incoming projectiles.
- the background of the present invention concerns an active protection system for protecting a platform from an incoming threat.
- the active protection system comprises:
- the existence of two types of countermeasure arrangements, i.e., the first and the second countermeasure arrangements, within one active protection system allows this system to intercept a much wider variety of types of threats as opposed to the case, where only one of these countermeasure arrangements is used in an active protection system.
- the first countermeasure arrangement constitutes a first layer of active protection
- the second countermeasure arrangement constitutes a second layer of active protection.
- the active protection system of the presently disclosed subject matter can provide protection in a wide variety of combat scenarios such as: urban warfare, open terrain warfare, and rural areas.
- the present invention in accordance with one aspect and as defined in independent claim 1, provides a system for detecting an incoming threat, comprising:
- the analysis of the output data from said RF system can include application of pattern recognition techniques.
- the output data from the RF system comprises data can be related to electromagnetic pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat.
- the analysis of the output data from said RF system can further comprise performance of spectral analysis of the electromagnetic pulse.
- the present invention in accordance with another aspect and as defined in independent claim 3, provides a method for detecting an incoming threat, comprising:
- the step of analyzing the output data from said RF system can comprise a step of applying pattern recognition techniques.
- the output data from the RF system can comprise data related to electromagnetic pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat.
- the step of analyzing the output data from said RF system can further comprise performing spectral analysis of the electromagnetic pulse.
- the spectral analysis can include analysis in two bands: a high band of frequencies and a low band of frequencies.
- the method can further comprise a step of analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the RF system for tracking the incoming threat.
- the method can further comprise a step of analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the radar system for determining the type of the incoming threat.
- FIGs. 1A and 1B of the drawings schematically illustrates two examples of platforms in form of armored personnel carriers 10 and 20, each having a known in the art countermeasure arrangement mounted thereto.
- the armored personnel carrier 10 of Fig. 1A has a countermeasure arrangement 12 which is configured to intercept an incoming threat at a near interception point, i.e., at a location which is proximal to the walls of the armored personnel carrier 10.
- the countermeasure arrangement 12 is related to the "on the wall” countermeasure arrangements which intercept the incoming threat as close as possible to the walls of the armored personnel carrier.
- the principle behind the operation of the "on the wall” countermeasure arrangements is that as close to the platform the interception is performed, the collateral damage that is caused to the platform's surrounding is reduced.
- One example of the countermeasure arrangement 12 is the 'Iron Curtain' system available by Artis, LLC. This system is described, for example, in US patent 7,684,020 .
- the countermeasure arrangement 12 can be used in short range combat scenarios, e.g., urban scenarios, and against incoming threat such as ATGM, EFP, Long rods and Tandem.
- the armored personnel carrier 20 of Fig. 1B includes another type a countermeasure arrangement 22 which is configured to intercept an incoming threat at a far interception point, i.e., at a location which is not proximal to the walls of the armored personnel carrier 20.
- the countermeasure arrangement 22 is related to the "long distance" type of countermeasure arrangements which intercept the incoming threat in the air, at a distance which is not proximal to the armored personnel carrier 20.
- the countermeasure arrangement 22 can be suitable for use in combat scenarios such as open field warfare.
- the countermeasure arrangement 22 has an ability to encounter and intercept a large variety of threats, such as small and large missiles, and other types of serious threats. It is known that the collateral damage that can be caused by the countermeasure arrangement 22 is greater than the collateral damage that can be caused by the countermeasure arrangement 12.
- One example of the countermeasure arrangement 22 is the "fire wall" system available by Metal Storm Limited, Brisbane (AU).
- FIGs. 2 and 3 schematically illustrate an active protection system 100 mounted on a platform in form of an armored personnel carrier 102, in accordance with one example of the presently disclosed subject matter.
- the active protection system 100 is configured for actively protecting the armored personnel carrier 102 from an incoming threat 105 which is launched from a launcher 104 towards the armored personnel carrier 102.
- the active protection system 100 comprises a detection system 110 constituted by a radar system 150 and an RF system 160, a first countermeasure arrangement 120 constituting a first protective layer, a second countermeasure arrangement 130 constituting a second protective layer, and a controlling unit 140 (shown in Fig. 4 ) which operatively controls the operation of the active protection system 100.
- the first countermeasure arrangement 120 and the second countermeasure arrangement 130 are two external arrangements which are mounted on the armored personnel carrier 102 for providing an active protection thereto, as detailed below.
- the detection system 110 is operatively connected to the controlling unit 140, and the first and the second countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130 are also operatively connected to the controlling unit 140.
- the active protection system 100 is capable of detecting, identifying and tracking the incoming threat 105, and in response, selecting which of the first and the second countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130 is more suitable for intersecting the incoming threat 105, and afterwards, launching at least one countermeasure (e.g., a projectile, a bullet) from the selected countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130 toward the incoming threat 105.
- the countermeasure is configured for killing the incoming threat by directly hitting or discharging it.
- the first countermeasure arrangement 120 is a hard kill arrangement related to the "long distance" type of countermeasure arrangements, such as the arrangement of Fig. 1B , and is configured to intercept the incoming threat 105 at a far interception point 114.
- the far interception point can be calculated by the controlling unit 140, and can be located at a distance of between about 2 meter to about 100 meter from the armored personnel carrier 130.
- FIG. 3A illustrates a disassembled position of the first countermeasure arrangement 120
- Fig. 3B illustrates the first countermeasure arrangement 120 in operation.
- the first countermeasure arrangement 120 has an array of barrels 125, each configured to accommodate multiple countermeasures in form of projectiles 127 which can be directed along a path 122 during interception.
- the projectiles 127 can be configured for dramatically losing kinetic energy after the far interception point 114.
- the second countermeasure arrangement 130 is a hard kill arrangement related to the "on the wall" type of countermeasure arrangements, such as the arrangement of Fig. 1A , and is configured to intercept the incoming threat 105 at a near interception point 115.
- the far interception point 114 is usually located farther than the near interception point 115, with respect to the armored personnel carrier 102.
- the near interception point 115 is located in close proximity to the wall of the armored personnel carrier 102 for reducing the collateral damage.
- the near interception point is located at a distance of between about 0.1 meter to about 10 meter from the armored personnel carrier 102.
- the second countermeasure arrangement 130 comprises four linear arrays of countermeasure launchers 135, disposed at the surrounding of the armored personnel carrier 130.
- Each countermeasure launcher 135 is configured for accommodating at least one countermeasure in form of a bullet or a linear shaped charge that intercepts the incoming threat 105 in the near interception point 115.
- the countermeasures can be directed and launched in the substantially vertically downward direction along a path 132, as shown in Fig. 3C .
- the countermeasures can be directed and launched in the substantially downward direction along a path 133, as shown in Fig. 2 .
- the second countermeasure arrangement 130 is configured to direct and launch the countermeasures in a plane substantially perpendicular to the line of flight of the incoming threat.
- the second countermeasure arrangement 130 further comprises a triggering optical system 138, controllable by the controlling unit 140 and configured for: generating an optical zone 134; detecting passage of the incoming threat through the optical zone, thereby triggering the interception of the incoming threat 105 by at least one countermeasure selected from the linear array of countermeasures 135 and corresponding to the near interception point.
- a triggering optical system 138 controllable by the controlling unit 140 and configured for: generating an optical zone 134; detecting passage of the incoming threat through the optical zone, thereby triggering the interception of the incoming threat 105 by at least one countermeasure selected from the linear array of countermeasures 135 and corresponding to the near interception point.
- the detection system 110 is responsible for providing to the controlling unit 140 real-time information in form of an output data (e.g., threat's location, threat's direction, threat's speed, threat's altitude, threat's angle) related to the incoming threat 105 during its way towards the armored personnel carrier 102.
- the output data is received from the radar system 150 and the RF system 160, and processed by the controlling unit 140, while each of this system is responsible for the following:
- the RF system 160 is responsible for providing an output data according to which the launch of the incoming threat 105 can be detected.
- the detection of the incoming threat 105 is performed by the controlling unit 140 which identifies an electromagnetic RF pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat 105.
- the RF system 160 is additionally responsible for providing an output data according to which the type of the incoming threat 105 can be initially determined by the controlling unit 140 according to the above electromagnetic RF pulse.
- the controlling unit 140 initiates the operation of the radar system 150 which provides an output data useful for tracking the incoming threat 105.
- the output data received from the RF system 160 can also be useful for tracking the incoming threat 105.
- the controlling unit 140 constantly receives the output data from the detection system 110 and repeatedly analyzes this data. By analyzing the output data, the controlling unit 140 determines the type and the properties of the incoming threat 105, and accordingly selects a preferred countermeasure arrangement from the first and second countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130, with which the incoming threat is to be intercepted. In addition, following the selection of the preferred countermeasure arrangement, the controlling unit 140 determines the exact location of the respective far interception point 114 or the near interception point 115.
- the selection of the preferred countermeasure arrangement can be based on at least one of the following criteria:
- the controlling unit instructs the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat 105. It should be noted that the controlling unit 140 is configured for instructing the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat 105, while keeping the non-selected countermeasure arrangement inoperative against the same threat.
- the armored personnel carrier 102 can also include a passive armor mounted on its walls for providing an additional passive protection from the incoming threat or its shrapnel.
- the controlling unit 140 is a computerized system with at least one processor and a memory which stores the software that is executable by the processor to control the operation of the active protection system 100.
- FIG. 5 schematically illustrates a block diagram of a method for actively protecting a platform from an incoming threat, in accordance with one example of the presently disclosed subject matter.
- the method 200 begins with step 210 which includes providing a mountable first countermeasure arrangement configured to intercept the incoming threat at a far interception point, and a mountable second countermeasure arrangement configured to intercept the incoming threat at a near interception point.
- This step can further include a step of mounting the first and second countermeasure arrangements on the platform.
- Step 220 includes obtaining an output data from a detection system, at least for detecting the incoming threat.
- Step 230 includes analyzing by the controlling unit at least the output data at least for tracking the incoming threat.
- Step 240 includes selecting by a controlling unit a preferred countermeasure arrangement from the first and second countermeasure arrangements, at least based on the output data.
- Step 250 includes instructing the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat.
- the active protection system 100 can further include a soft kill countermeasure arrangement (e.g., a laser system) operatively connected to the controlling unit 140.
- a soft kill countermeasure arrangement e.g., a laser system
- This arrangement is configured for confusing the targeting mechanism of the incoming threat, and thereby causing it to miss its target, i.e., the platform. If the soft kill countermeasure arrangement fails to intersect the incoming threat, the controlling unit will instruct the preferred hard kill countermeasure arrangement to intersect the incoming threat.
- the detection system 110 can further include other detection means such as, an electro-optical system or an IR system.
- the detection system 110 can further include its own controller which analyses at least a part of the output data and transfers it the controlling unit 140.
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Description
- The present disclosed subject matter is concerned with defense systems and more specifically with active protection systems.
- An active protection system is related to protection systems which actively prevent sensor-based or other incoming threats from acquiring and/or destroying a target. The active protection system can protect soldiers, vehicles, buildings, military base and other platforms from large variety of threats.
- Electronic countermeasures that alter the electromagnetic, acoustic or other signature(s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behavior of an incoming threat (e.g., a guided missile) are designated soft kill measures.
- Measures that physically counterattack an incoming threat thereby destroying/altering its payload/warhead in such a way that the intended effect on the target is severely impeded are designated hard kill measures. The hard kill measures generally refer to measures taken in the so-called "end-game" shortly before a warhead/missile hits its target. The hard kill measure in general physically affects the incoming warhead/missile by means of either blast and/or fragment action. The active protection system, using a hard kill measure, is operated by detecting the incoming threat and killing it before it hits the target. The detection of the coming threats can be based on radar detection systems that provide information related to the incoming threat.
- Different types of hard kill interception systems are known in the art. The killing interception of one type interception systems can occur at a far distance from the target, for example, between 10 to 100 meter. The killing interception of another type of interception system can occur close to the target's wall, for example, at a distance of between 1 to 5 meter. Each type of the hard killing interception systems has benefits and limitations regarding the cultural damage, the impact on the target, the protection threats level, the cost, the killing probability, reliability, weight and more.
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US 2012/0217301 A1 describes a system to track a threat and determine a countermeasure to counter the threat.US 2011/0127328 A1 describes a system for dual-band detection of incoming threats.EP 2338022 B1 describes a system and method for protecting an enclosure against attack of projectiles. VALPOLINI P: "Active Armour Protection", ARMADA INTERNATIONAL, ZURICH, CH, vol. 34, no. 3, 1 June 2010 describes protection systems that sense and counter incoming projectiles. - The background of the present invention concerns an active protection system for protecting a platform from an incoming threat. The active protection system comprises:
- a. a detection system configured for providing an output data associated with an incoming threat;
- b. a first countermeasure arrangement mountable on the platform and configured to intercept an incoming threat at a far interception point;
- c. a second countermeasure arrangement mountable on the platform and configured to intercept an incoming threat at a near interception point; and
- d. a controlling unit, in communication with the detection system and with the first and second countermeasure arrangements, configured for receiving said output data and selecting a preferred countermeasure arrangement from said first and second countermeasure arrangements, with which the incoming threat is to be intercepted.
- The existence of two types of countermeasure arrangements, i.e., the first and the second countermeasure arrangements, within one active protection system allows this system to intercept a much wider variety of types of threats as opposed to the case, where only one of these countermeasure arrangements is used in an active protection system. The first countermeasure arrangement constitutes a first layer of active protection, and the second countermeasure arrangement constitutes a second layer of active protection. The combination of these two layers of active protection against an incoming threat within one active protection system allows obtaining much more accurate interception results, a reduced collateral damage, multi hit capability, high reliability, and reduced costs. The costs can be saved, for example, when instead of using an expensive countermeasure against a small threat, a much cheaper countermeasure is chosen and used.
- The active protection system of the presently disclosed subject matter can provide protection in a wide variety of combat scenarios such as: urban warfare, open terrain warfare, and rural areas.
- While said active protection system as such merely represents the technical context, the present invention is rather concerned with a system and a method for detecting an incoming threat. The present invention, in accordance with one aspect and as defined in independent claim 1, provides a system for detecting an incoming threat, comprising:
- a. a radio frequency RF system configured for providing an output data being associated with the incoming threat, being used for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;
- b. a radar system configured for providing an output data associated with the incoming threat, being used at least for tracking the incoming threat after the detection of its launch and the determination of its type; and
- c. a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the RF system and the radar system, wherein the controlling unit is configured for receiving and analyzing the output data from the RF system for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat at least prior to initiating the operation of the radar system.
- The analysis of the output data from said RF system can include application of pattern recognition techniques.
- The output data from the RF system comprises data can be related to electromagnetic pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat.
- The analysis of the output data from said RF system can further comprise performance of spectral analysis of the electromagnetic pulse.
- The present invention, in accordance with another aspect and as defined in independent claim 3, provides a method for detecting an incoming threat, comprising:
- a. providing a detection system comprising: a radar system; a radio frequency RF system; and a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the RF system and the radar system;
- b. receiving from said RF system, in said controlling unit, an output data being associated with the incoming threat, and being used for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;
- c. analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the RF system for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;
- d. initiating, by said controlling unit, operation of the radar system after the detection of launch of the incoming threat and determination of the type of the incoming threat;
- e. receiving from said radar system, in said controlling unit, an output data being associated with the incoming threat; and
- f. analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the radar system for tracking the incoming threat.
- The step of analyzing the output data from said RF system can comprise a step of applying pattern recognition techniques.
- The output data from the RF system can comprise data related to electromagnetic pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat.
- The step of analyzing the output data from said RF system can further comprise performing spectral analysis of the electromagnetic pulse.
- The spectral analysis can include analysis in two bands: a high band of frequencies and a low band of frequencies.
- The method can further comprise a step of analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the RF system for tracking the incoming threat.
- The method can further comprise a step of analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the radar system for determining the type of the incoming threat.
- In order to understand the disclosed subject matter and to see how it may be carried out in practice, embodiments will now be described, by way of non-limiting examples only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
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Fig. 1A is a schematic illustration of one known in the art active protection system mounted on an armored personnel carrier; -
Fig. 1B is a schematic illustration of another known in the art active protection system mounted on an armored personnel carrier; -
Fig. 2 is a schematic illustration of an active protection system mounted on an armored personnel carrier, according to one example of the presently disclosed subject matter; -
Figs. 3A and 3B are schematic illustration of a first countermeasure arrangement used in the active protection system ofFig. 2 , according to one example of the presently disclosed subject matter; -
Fig. 3C is a schematic illustration of a second countermeasure arrangement used in the active protection system ofFig. 2 , according to one example of the presently disclosed subject matter; -
Fig. 4 is a schematic representation of the main components of the active protection system ofFig. 2 ; and -
Fig. 5 is a schematic block diagram of a method according to which the active protection system ofFig. 2 is operated, according to one example of the presently disclosed subject matter. - Attention is first directed to
Figs. 1A and 1B of the drawings which schematically illustrates two examples of platforms in form ofarmored personnel carriers 10 and 20, each having a known in the art countermeasure arrangement mounted thereto. - The armored personnel carrier 10 of
Fig. 1A has acountermeasure arrangement 12 which is configured to intercept an incoming threat at a near interception point, i.e., at a location which is proximal to the walls of the armored personnel carrier 10. Thecountermeasure arrangement 12 is related to the "on the wall" countermeasure arrangements which intercept the incoming threat as close as possible to the walls of the armored personnel carrier. The principle behind the operation of the "on the wall" countermeasure arrangements is that as close to the platform the interception is performed, the collateral damage that is caused to the platform's surrounding is reduced. One example of thecountermeasure arrangement 12 is the 'Iron Curtain' system available by Artis, LLC. This system is described, for example, inUS patent 7,684,020 . - The
countermeasure arrangement 12 can be used in short range combat scenarios, e.g., urban scenarios, and against incoming threat such as ATGM, EFP, Long rods and Tandem. - Differently from the armored personnel carrier 10, the
armored personnel carrier 20 ofFig. 1B includes another type acountermeasure arrangement 22 which is configured to intercept an incoming threat at a far interception point, i.e., at a location which is not proximal to the walls of thearmored personnel carrier 20. Thecountermeasure arrangement 22 is related to the "long distance" type of countermeasure arrangements which intercept the incoming threat in the air, at a distance which is not proximal to thearmored personnel carrier 20. Thecountermeasure arrangement 22 can be suitable for use in combat scenarios such as open field warfare. Thecountermeasure arrangement 22 has an ability to encounter and intercept a large variety of threats, such as small and large missiles, and other types of serious threats. It is known that the collateral damage that can be caused by thecountermeasure arrangement 22 is greater than the collateral damage that can be caused by thecountermeasure arrangement 12. One example of thecountermeasure arrangement 22 is the "fire wall" system available by Metal Storm Limited, Brisbane (AU). - Attention is now directed to
Figs. 2 and3 , which schematically illustrate anactive protection system 100 mounted on a platform in form of anarmored personnel carrier 102, in accordance with one example of the presently disclosed subject matter. Theactive protection system 100 is configured for actively protecting thearmored personnel carrier 102 from anincoming threat 105 which is launched from alauncher 104 towards thearmored personnel carrier 102. - The
active protection system 100 comprises adetection system 110 constituted by aradar system 150 and anRF system 160, afirst countermeasure arrangement 120 constituting a first protective layer, asecond countermeasure arrangement 130 constituting a second protective layer, and a controlling unit 140 (shown inFig. 4 ) which operatively controls the operation of theactive protection system 100. Thefirst countermeasure arrangement 120 and thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130 are two external arrangements which are mounted on thearmored personnel carrier 102 for providing an active protection thereto, as detailed below. Thedetection system 110 is operatively connected to the controllingunit 140, and the first and thesecond countermeasure arrangements unit 140. - In general, the
active protection system 100 is capable of detecting, identifying and tracking theincoming threat 105, and in response, selecting which of the first and thesecond countermeasure arrangements incoming threat 105, and afterwards, launching at least one countermeasure (e.g., a projectile, a bullet) from the selectedcountermeasure arrangements incoming threat 105. The countermeasure is configured for killing the incoming threat by directly hitting or discharging it. - The
first countermeasure arrangement 120 is a hard kill arrangement related to the "long distance" type of countermeasure arrangements, such as the arrangement ofFig. 1B , and is configured to intercept theincoming threat 105 at afar interception point 114. The far interception point can be calculated by the controllingunit 140, and can be located at a distance of between about 2 meter to about 100 meter from thearmored personnel carrier 130. - A detailed example of the
first countermeasure arrangement 120 is presented inFigs. 3A and 3B . In particular,Fig. 3A illustrates a disassembled position of thefirst countermeasure arrangement 120, andFig. 3B illustrates thefirst countermeasure arrangement 120 in operation. As shown in these figures, thefirst countermeasure arrangement 120 has an array ofbarrels 125, each configured to accommodate multiple countermeasures in form ofprojectiles 127 which can be directed along apath 122 during interception. According to a specific example, theprojectiles 127 can be configured for dramatically losing kinetic energy after thefar interception point 114. - The
second countermeasure arrangement 130 is a hard kill arrangement related to the "on the wall" type of countermeasure arrangements, such as the arrangement ofFig. 1A , and is configured to intercept theincoming threat 105 at anear interception point 115. Thefar interception point 114 is usually located farther than thenear interception point 115, with respect to thearmored personnel carrier 102. Thenear interception point 115 is located in close proximity to the wall of thearmored personnel carrier 102 for reducing the collateral damage. The near interception point is located at a distance of between about 0.1 meter to about 10 meter from thearmored personnel carrier 102. - A detailed example of the
second countermeasure arrangement 130 is presented inFig. 3C .Thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130 comprises four linear arrays ofcountermeasure launchers 135, disposed at the surrounding of thearmored personnel carrier 130. Eachcountermeasure launcher 135 is configured for accommodating at least one countermeasure in form of a bullet or a linear shaped charge that intercepts theincoming threat 105 in thenear interception point 115. According to one example, the countermeasures can be directed and launched in the substantially vertically downward direction along apath 132, as shown inFig. 3C . According to another example, the countermeasures can be directed and launched in the substantially downward direction along apath 133, as shown inFig. 2 . - According to other examples, the
second countermeasure arrangement 130 is configured to direct and launch the countermeasures in a plane substantially perpendicular to the line of flight of the incoming threat. - The
second countermeasure arrangement 130 further comprises a triggeringoptical system 138, controllable by the controllingunit 140 and configured for: generating anoptical zone 134; detecting passage of the incoming threat through the optical zone, thereby triggering the interception of theincoming threat 105 by at least one countermeasure selected from the linear array ofcountermeasures 135 and corresponding to the near interception point. - The
detection system 110 is responsible for providing to the controllingunit 140 real-time information in form of an output data (e.g., threat's location, threat's direction, threat's speed, threat's altitude, threat's angle) related to theincoming threat 105 during its way towards thearmored personnel carrier 102. The output data is received from theradar system 150 and theRF system 160, and processed by the controllingunit 140, while each of this system is responsible for the following:
TheRF system 160 is responsible for providing an output data according to which the launch of theincoming threat 105 can be detected. The detection of theincoming threat 105 is performed by the controllingunit 140 which identifies an electromagnetic RF pulse associated with the engine ignition of theincoming threat 105. TheRF system 160 is additionally responsible for providing an output data according to which the type of theincoming threat 105 can be initially determined by the controllingunit 140 according to the above electromagnetic RF pulse. - In case of detection of the
incoming threat 105, the controllingunit 140 initiates the operation of theradar system 150 which provides an output data useful for tracking theincoming threat 105. In addition, according to a specific example, the output data received from theRF system 160 can also be useful for tracking theincoming threat 105. - During the tracking of the incoming threat by the
radar system 150, the controllingunit 140 constantly receives the output data from thedetection system 110 and repeatedly analyzes this data. By analyzing the output data, the controllingunit 140 determines the type and the properties of theincoming threat 105, and accordingly selects a preferred countermeasure arrangement from the first andsecond countermeasure arrangements unit 140 determines the exact location of the respectivefar interception point 114 or thenear interception point 115. - According to different examples of the presently disclosed subject matter, the selection of the preferred countermeasure arrangement can be based on at least one of the following criteria:
- the distance of the
incoming threat 105 from thearmored personnel carrier 102. For example, if the incoming threat is too close to thearmored personnel carrier 102 to be intercepted by thefirst countermeasure arrangement 120, thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130 can be preferred; - the expected residual impact of the determined type of the incoming threat if intercepted. For example, if the expected residual impact is high, the
first countermeasure arrangement 120 can be preferred, since itsfar interception point 114 is farther from thearmored personnel carrier 102 than thenear interception point 115 of thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130. In general, thefirst countermeasure arrangement 120 is selected for incoming threats having an expected residual impact that is greater than the expected residual impact for which thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130 is selected; - the caliber of the determined type of the incoming threat. For example, if the caliber of the incoming threat is large, the
first countermeasure arrangement 120 can be preferred since it can encounter more serious threats than thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130; - the weight of the determined type of the incoming threat. For example, if the weight of the incoming threat is large, the
first countermeasure arrangement 120 can be preferred since it can encounter more heavy threats than thesecond countermeasure arrangement 130; and - the effectiveness of each of the first and second countermeasure arrangements against the determined type of the incoming threat. For example, if the incoming threat is an RPG, the
second countermeasure arrangement 130 can be preferred. - Following the selection of the preferred countermeasure arrangement and the determination of the interception point, the controlling unit instructs the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the
incoming threat 105. It should be noted that the controllingunit 140 is configured for instructing the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept theincoming threat 105, while keeping the non-selected countermeasure arrangement inoperative against the same threat. - It should be indicated that the
armored personnel carrier 102 can also include a passive armor mounted on its walls for providing an additional passive protection from the incoming threat or its shrapnel. - The controlling
unit 140 is a computerized system with at least one processor and a memory which stores the software that is executable by the processor to control the operation of theactive protection system 100. - Reference is now made to
Fig. 5 which schematically illustrates a block diagram of a method for actively protecting a platform from an incoming threat, in accordance with one example of the presently disclosed subject matter. - The
method 200 begins withstep 210 which includes providing a mountable first countermeasure arrangement configured to intercept the incoming threat at a far interception point, and a mountable second countermeasure arrangement configured to intercept the incoming threat at a near interception point. This step can further include a step of mounting the first and second countermeasure arrangements on the platform. - Step 220 includes obtaining an output data from a detection system, at least for detecting the incoming threat.
- Step 230 includes analyzing by the controlling unit at least the output data at least for tracking the incoming threat.
- Step 240 includes selecting by a controlling unit a preferred countermeasure arrangement from the first and second countermeasure arrangements, at least based on the output data.
- Step 250 includes instructing the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat.
- According to other examples, the
active protection system 100 can further include a soft kill countermeasure arrangement (e.g., a laser system) operatively connected to the controllingunit 140. This arrangement is configured for confusing the targeting mechanism of the incoming threat, and thereby causing it to miss its target, i.e., the platform. If the soft kill countermeasure arrangement fails to intersect the incoming threat, the controlling unit will instruct the preferred hard kill countermeasure arrangement to intersect the incoming threat. - According to other examples, the
detection system 110 can further include other detection means such as, an electro-optical system or an IR system. In addition, thedetection system 110 can further include its own controller which analyses at least a part of the output data and transfers it the controllingunit 140.
Claims (3)
- A system (100) for detecting an incoming threat (105), comprising:a. a radio frequency RF system (160) configured for providing an output data being associated with the incoming threat, being used for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;b. a radar system (150) configured for providing an output data associated with the incoming threat, being used at least for tracking the incoming threat after the detection of its launch and the determination of its type; andc. a controlling unit (140) configured for controlling the operation of the RF system and the radar system, wherein the controlling unit is configured for receiving and analyzing the output data from the RF system for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat at least prior to initiating the operation of the radar system.
- A system according to Claim 1, wherein the analysis of the output data from said RF system includes application of pattern recognition techniques.
- A method for detecting an incoming threat, comprising:a. providing a detection system comprising: a radar system; a radio frequency RF system; and a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the RF system and the radar system;b. receiving from said RF system, in said controlling unit, an output data being associated with the incoming threat, and being used for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;c. analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the RF system for detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;d. initiating, by said controlling unit, operation of the radar system after the detection of launch of the incoming threat and determination of the type of the incoming threat;e. receiving from said radar system, in said controlling unit, an output data being associated with the incoming threat; andf. analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the radar system for tracking the incoming threat.
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IL22249412 | 2012-10-17 |
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CN107798208B (en) * | 2016-08-28 | 2021-07-13 | 南京理工大学 | Algorithm for maximum damage of flying fragments of air-target missile |
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AU2018203637A1 (en) | 2018-06-14 |
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