EP2616997A1

EP2616997A1 - Traceable marker of a security feature

Info

Publication number: EP2616997A1
Application number: EP11767624.7A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Oliver Paul; Michael Fiedler
Original assignee: Giesecke and Devrient GmbH
Current assignee: Giesecke and Devrient Currency Technology GmbH
Priority date: 2010-09-16
Filing date: 2011-09-14
Publication date: 2013-07-24
Also published as: CN103140867A; WO2012034691A1; DE102010045571A1; CN103140867B; WO2012034691A8

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for unambiguous tracing of a security feature (1), in which first of all an unambiguous first marker (C_o) of the security feature (1) is linked (S1) to the security feature (C_o). Upon every transmission of the security feature (1) by a transmitter (P₁, P₂) to a receiver (P₁, P₂, P₃) a sequence marker (C₁, C₂, C₃) is formed (S₂), by encrypting a marker (C₀, C₁, C₂) already linked to the security feature (1) - i.e. either the first marker (C_o) or a sequence marker (C₁, C₂) resulting from an earlier transmission - with a secret key (SK₁, SK₂, SK₃) of the particular receiver (P₁, P₂, P₃) of the security feature (1). The sequence marker (C₁, C₂, C₃) is then also linked (S3, S3') to the security feature (1), so that all transmissions of the security feature (1) can be traced, verified and evaluated (S5) using the sequence markers (C₁, C₂, C₃) linked thereto.

Description

Retrievable marking

a security feature

The present invention relates to a method for the unique tracing of a security feature, an indivisible security feature, a container for receiving an arbitrarily divisible security feature, and a system for unambiguously retrieving such security features.

It is known to use a variety of security features to secure valuable items and products, such as luxury goods or securities in the form of banknotes, identity documents, bank, account or cash cards, identity cards and the like. Such security features are usually applied firmly or applied to the product and at least guarantee or permit verification of the authenticity of the product. Such security features call e.g. difficult to forge or copy visual or other effects and are usually difficult to transfer from a genuine product to a counterfeit product.

In terms of security, the production of security features and their application to the products in question is fundamentally to be distinguished between indivisible, countable security features and arbitrarily divisible security features. While the former include authenticity seals, security labels, or optically variable or electronic security elements that are manufactured separately and applied as a whole to the product being secured The latter include, for example, liquid, powdered or otherwise arbitrarily divisible security features, such as, for example, paints, varnishes, and other non-self-supporting materials, which only take on a concrete shape upon application to the product, or customizable, self-supporting safety materials, such as Safety strips, threads, foils or the like, which must be adapted to the product before application to the product.

While indivisible security features are often provided with unique, eg printed, embossed or inscribed identifications and are individually identifiable, divisible security features are applied in predetermined amounts or concentrations to an object to be protected and act solely on the basis of the evoked optical and other effects. In this respect, the consumption or circulation of an indivisible security feature can be quantified by the number of secured products, while the consumption or circulation of a divisible security feature can only be quantified in quantities, for example by weight or area consumption. However, all security features have in common that the security gain, in addition to the actual technical specification of the security feature, results from strict controls during manufacture, further processing and application to an object to be protected, which prevent indivisible security features or quantities of divisible security features Security features are stolen, manipulated or exchanged. Accordingly, it is the object of the present invention to ensure a complete traceability of a security feature over its life cycle. This object is achieved by a method and apparatus having the features of the independent claims. In dependent claims advantageous embodiments and developments of the invention are given. According to the invention, a security feature is linked to a unique first identifier. If the security feature is passed on by a transferor to a recipient, a sequence identifier is formed and also linked to the security feature. The sequence identifier is formed by encrypting an identifier already associated with the security feature-that is, either the first identifier or a sequential identifier previously associated with the security feature-with a secret cryptographic key of the recipient. On the one hand, each sequence identifier is therefore clearly attributable to an identification previously linked to the security feature and, on the other hand, to the recipient concerned by the secret key used. On the basis of the sequence identifiers linked to the security feature, it is therefore possible to clearly trace back and subsequently check each forwarding of the security feature by hand-off agents to recipients over the entire life cycle of the security feature. Preferably, the sequence identifier is not formed by encrypting any associated with the security feature label, but by encrypting the last associated with the security feature label, so usually with a sequence-Kenn- drawing that has formed the handler, as the security feature was passed to him. However, the first receiver of the security feature after its manufacture forms the first sequence label from the first label. As a result, in the course of the life cycle of the security feature, a complete, logical structure, for example a sequence or a tree of sequence markings is constructed, from which all transfers can be reconstructed and are clearly attributable to the security feature in question via the underlying initial identifier. When passing on a security feature from a transferor to a recipient, the sequence identifier is preferably formed by the recipient himself and handed over to the transferor. The handler can then verify the validity of the received sequence identifier by the public key of the recipient. The subsequent identification is valid if, with the recipient's public key decrypted, it corresponds to the consecutive identification which the assignee has made when receiving the security feature. The valid consequence label thus provides proof to the discloser that he no longer possesses the security feature and has properly forwarded it to an authorized recipient.

The cryptographic infrastructure provided according to the invention requires that all subscribers, that is, all potential recipients of a security feature during the life cycle of the security feature be equipped with a suitable cryptographic key pair, consisting of a secret encryption key and a public decryption key. Potential participants are therefore all those involved in the production, processing, handling or application of the security feature on a product and / or issue of the product to dealers or end users or responsible persons.

Preferably, as part of an upstream "RoUout" process, all subscribers (ie all potential recipients and handlers) are provided with a suitable key pair, where the public keys of the subscribers can also be deposited with a trusted entity, such as electronically with a background system or From this background system, a redirector can then obtain the public key of the recipient.

In addition to the public keys of the subscribers, all subsequent identifications can be centrally stored on the background system, so that the tracing back of the life cycle of the relevant security feature can be carried out centrally. In this case, the first identification is also stored centrally, so that each sequence identifier can be assigned to the relevant security feature, for example by specifying an identification of the security feature, which may correspond to the first identification. The centrally stored sequential identifiers are then in each case uniquely linked to the security feature via the associated first identifier, even if the sequential identifiers are not so firmly connected to the security feature as the first identifier. If the security feature is an arbitrarily divisible, eg liquid or powdered, security feature, the sequence markings are associated with a container in which the divisible security feature is kept. As a result, security features which can not be unambiguously identified and counted, and which thus can not be directly connected to the first and subsequent identifiers, can be incorporated into the security infrastructure and can also be traced and verified, just like conventional indivisible security features Form of authenticity seals, security labels or security elements.

In this way, regardless of whether it is an indivisible or separable security feature, transfers of sensitive feature types can be centralized along the lifecycle of the security feature in question to detect and locate unauthorized deviations based on the sequence of sequence identifiers, by: the last responsible recipient of the security feature is determined. The unambiguous link between the security feature or the container and the relevant initial marking is of central importance, since only in this way can it be ensured that a clear and always reproducible connection to the relevant protein is obtained during later tracing by stepwise checking of the sequence markings. safety feature.

Therefore, the Erst-marking is so firmly connected to the indivisible security feature or the container of the divisible security feature that they without affecting the indivisible security feature or the container can not be separated from this. Particularly suitable for this purpose are appropriate printing and embossing methods with which the initial marking can be irrevocably printed on or stamped on the indivisible security feature or the container. It is likewise possible for the indivisible security feature or the container to have an electronic storage device, for example in connection with a microchip mounted on the indivisible security feature or the container, into which the first identification is stored in such a way that it does not is more erasable without destroying the electronic memory device or the chip.

If the indivisible security feature or container comprises a memory device for storing the first identifier, it is preferably firmly connected to the indivisible security feature or the container such that the memory device is not separated therefrom without adversely affecting the atomic security feature or the container can. In this memory device, all sequential identifications which are incurred during the life cycle of the security feature are preferably also stored. Likewise, the associated public keys can also be stored there. The data stored in the storage device can thus be identical to the data stored on the trusted background system, so that the traceability of the security feature's life cycle can be carried out locally on the one hand using an existing security feature or container, or centrally by the trusted entity.

The indivisible security feature or the container preferably comprises a radio device, with which the first identification and / or the sequential identification can be transmitted to the trusted location or centrally deposited public keys of a recipient can be requested by the handing over. In this context, it is also possible to provide a location device in addition to the radio device, which enables, for example via GPS or GSM, a local localization of the indivisible security feature or container.

Preferably, the participants, i. all potential recipients of a security feature, equipped with suitable terminals to generate a sequence tag by encryption or to verify by decryption and to perform all other necessary data communication steps. These may be, for example, correspondingly equipped mobile phones or smart phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), portable computers or even personal computers or the like.

Accordingly, a system for uniquely tracing security features includes a trusted site or background server, as well as a plurality of indivisible security features and / or containers for holding an arbitrarily divisible security feature. Furthermore, a communication infrastructure is provided, via which electronic data communication between the background server and the indivisible security features and / or containers for the divisible security features is possible. For this purpose, the trusted background server and the security features / containers are each equipped with electronic commutation devices, for example for wireless data transmission via a mobile radio network or the like. Furthermore, the subscriber terminals may also be involved in the system and be equipped such that they can communicate with the security features / containers and / or the background system in data communication. While an indivisible security feature forms a string of sequence tags throughout its life cycle, a tree structure may be formed in a sharable security feature when a subset of the security feature set held in the container is shared by a handler and forwarded to two or more recipients becomes. The leaves of this sequential tag tree then represent all subscribers who own a subset of the security tag and thus the total amount of the sharable security tag in circulation.

By evaluating the resulting sequence identifiers, for example by the trusted authority, a complete accounting of the consumed indivisible security features of a specific feature type can take place. All follow-up markings of the security features of this type are taken into account. Since the markings in indivisible security features with memory device is also still evaluable when the security feature has been applied to the product to be protected and is in circulation, in addition to the balance of the applied security features also a Rückverf olulation of the security features in circulation possible.

In the case of a divisible security feature, a balance can be used to determine the total used quantity or number of labeled products on the basis of the subsequent identifiers in order to detect possible discrepancies between the quantity originally packaged in the container and the actually consumed quantity of the security feature. Preferably, the container of an arbitrarily divisible security feature is equipped with a special locking mechanism, which only allows a removal of a subset of the security feature if the last identifier associated with the container is indicated by the withdrawing party. Simultaneously with the indication of the last tag associated with the container or the initial tag, the recipient may also indicate the sequential tag formed therefrom to gain access to the security feature in the bag. Preferably, the closure mechanism of the container is designed in the form of a time lock, so that further withdrawals of the security feature from the container are possible only within a predetermined period of time.

Preferably, upon manufacture of the security feature, the container is filled with a predetermined amount, e.g. is required for a particular manufacturing layer and / or a specific production lot and / or a predetermined number of the objects to be secured with the security feature, so that a stealing of a subset of the security feature is possible by a final accounting, e.g. by a comparison of the originally filled in the container amount of security feature with the corresponding secured products.

Further features and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following description of exemplary embodiments according to the invention and further alternative embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, which show:

Figure 1 shows a first preferred embodiment of the invention in the context of indivisible security features; Figure 2 shows a second embodiment of the invention in the context of indivisible security features; and

FIG. 3 shows further embodiments in connection with arbitrarily divisible security features.

High-quality and tamper-proof security features for valuable items, banknotes, securities or the like can not be tampered with or manipulated at unreasonably high cost, e.g. because their optically variable or other effects are difficult or impossible to reproduce. However, the safety effect of such security features does not result solely from their technical complexity or heavy counterfeitability, but not least from the fact that they are closely monitored in their handling and further processing in the context of manufacturing and applying to a product to be secured to a misappropriation to avoid misuse for counterfeit products, or tampering and counterfeiting.

In this respect, it is necessary to suitably secure the production, handling, application to an object, as well as all other uses of high-quality security features, possibly over the entire life cycle of the security feature in question from its production to at least for application to an object to be secured and / or for the delivery of the protected object to an end user, possibly even beyond, until the circulation of the secured articles in free trade.

Here, a distinction must be made between indivisible, countable, ie discrete security features, such as authenticity seals, security labels, or optically variable, electronic or other related and preproduced security elements, and any divisible security features that are quantified not by counting but as quantity, volume, weight or area of the security feature, such as security paints or lacquers, powders, liquids or even at the attachment to the product in question made up security threads, strips, security films or the like.

For example, the monitoring and control of the handling of such security features extends to, but is not limited to, the following and other stations in the life cycle of a security feature:

• The ordering of the security feature as quantity or quantity by authorized persons or companies at a supplier;

· The procurement of specific components of a security feature for its manufacture;

• establishing the security feature in a secure environment;

• the disposal of scrap and leftover feature quantities from the manufacturing phase;

· Safe storage and delivery to the point that applies the security feature to the products to be protected;

• the misuse-proof application or incorporation of the security feature into product production; and

• the controlled disposal of defective products with safety features and residual amounts of the safety feature.

FIG. 1 shows an embodiment of the present invention in which an indivisible security feature 1, for example a authenticity seal or a security seal, is used. safety label, is provided with a first marking Co (step S), which is not to be removed from this without affecting or even destruction of the security feature 1. The first-mark Co can be imprinted on the security feature 1 printed imprinted, punched or irrevocably secured by other application and fastening techniques.

All authorized subscribers Pi, P ₂ , P ₃ , ie persons, organizations or other entities that come into contact with, receive or pass on this within the lifecycle of security feature 1, are used in a rollout process with a cryptographic process Key pair equipped, each consisting of a secret key SKi, SK ₂ , SK3 and the respectively associated public key PKi, PKi, PKi. Over the life cycle, a sequence of labels is formed, starting with the first identifier Co and derived therefrom labels O, C2, C3, each of the immediately preceding prime or sequence identifier Co, O, C2 by a Cryptographic operation emerge. On the basis of the identification sequence Co, Ci, C2, C3, the life cycle of the security feature 1 can be fully traced and reconstructed so that deviations or irregularities in the handling of the security feature 1 can be detected, located and assigned to the relevant subscriber Pi P2, P3. An uninterrupted code sequence Co, Ci, C ₂ , C3 for a security element 1 is an indication that it was handled correctly and correctly and that abuse can be ruled out. Both the first identifier Co and all subsequent identifiers O, Ci, C3 are uniquely associated with the security feature 1, so that a later evaluation of the life cycle of the security feature 1 on the code sequence Co, Q, C2, C3 can be made unambiguously. While the initial identifier Co is firmly connected to the security feature 1, the unique assignment of the sequence identifier Q, C ₂ , C ₃ to the security feature 1 by the unique combination of the sequence labels Q, C ₂ , C ₃ with the relevant initial marking Co possible.

In this case, a physical unambiguous linking of each sequence identifier drawing Ci, C _{2 /} C3 with the security feature 1, for example by directly applying the sequence identifiers O, C2, C3 to the security feature 1, is not absolutely necessary. Rather, as indicated in FIG. 1, the sequence identifiers O, C ₂ , C ₃ can also be stored on a background server 5 or in a memory 6 thereof, since the sequence identifiers O, C ₂ , C ₃ are stored via a Logical link with the initial identifier Co are assigned to the security feature 1 at any time.

This logical connection is made by the most recently associated with the security feature 1 labeling Ci with its secret key SK ₂ encrypted with a transfer of the security feature 1 of a relaying Pi to a receiver P ₂ of the receiver P _2, and so the sequence identification C2 forms (step S2). Subsequently, the sequence identifier C _{2 is sent} to the background server 5 (step S3), for example via a wireless data communication connection, and stored there in the memory 6 in connection with the initial identifier C ₀ and the already stored sequence identifiers O.

In addition, the formed by the receiver P ₂ sequence marking C ₂ together with the public key PK2 of the recipient P _2, which corresponds to the just-used secret key SK2 of the recipient P2, is passed to the assignee \ so that he can check the validity of the sequence identifier C2 by decrypting with the public key PK _{2 of} the recipient P ₂ (step S4). The decrypted sequence identifier C2 must then match the sequence identifier Q previously generated by the handler Fi. The sequential identifier C2 can archive the Relaying Pi, since it serves as a proof of transfer, with which it can be proven that the security feature 1 has been passed on properly to the receiver P2.

On the background system 5 all the markings, that is, the initial marking Co and all sequence labels O, C2, C3 and additionally the associated public key ΡΚι, PK ₂ , PK3 deposited in the memory 6 to the code sequence Co, Q , C2, C3 in a traceability of the life cycle of the security feature 1 to successively check and to be able to refer back to the first identifier Co and thus to the security feature 1 (step S5). For data communication with the background server 5, the participants Pi, P2 preferably have suitable terminals, such as mobile assistants, mobile devices, laptops or the like, which are configured to form a sequence identifier Ci, C2, a cryptographic examination of the sequence identifier C2 allow the receiver P2 through the Relaying Pi and perform the necessary data communication with the background server 5 to transmit at least the sequence tags Ci, C ₂ , C3 to this. The public keys ΡΚι, PK2, PK3 are in contrast already in the context of the "rollout" process on the one hand together with the associated secret keys SKi, SK2, SK3 to the Participants Pi, P ₂ , P3 or transmit their terminals and the background server 5 passed.

Technically, the formation of a sequence identifier Ci, C ₂ , C3 by encrypting with a secret key SKi, SK ₂ , SK3 corresponds to forming a cryptographic signal which can be verified by any other authority in possession of the associated public key PKi , PK., PK3 is. For further protection of a sequence identifier C ₂ , it can be encrypted by the receiver P2 in addition to the public key PKi of the relaying Pi, so that only the relaying Pi is able to encrypt the encrypted sequence identifier C ₂ with its secret key SKi to decrypt and verify their origin with the public key PK _{2 of} the recipient P ₂ . As an alternative to the embodiment of FIG. 1, FIG. 2 shows an embodiment in which the first marking Co of the security feature 1 can not be printed on, impressed or otherwise suitably applied to it. Rather, the security feature 1 comprises a memory device 3, for example as part of a microchip permanently connected to the security feature 1, into which the first identifier Co (step 1) as well as all sequence identifiers O, C ₂ , C3 when the security feature is passed on 1 are stored (step 3).

The checking of the forwarding of the security feature 1 from relaying Pi to the recipient P ₂ in the course of the life cycle can thus take place locally on the basis of the data stored on the security feature 1. For this purpose, the respective public keys PKi, PK ₂ , PK3 are deposited in the memory device 3, with their associated secret keys SKi, SK ₂ , SK3 the sequence labels O, C ₂ , C3 were generated. In addition, the identifiers Co, Ci, C2, C3 and possibly also the public keys PKi, PK2, PK3 can be sent to the background system 5 by a radio device of the security feature 1 and stored in the memory 6 (step 3 '). Alternatively, the sequence identifiers OL, C _{2 /} C3 and / or the public keys ΡΚ ₁ PK _{2 /} PK3 can also be sent directly from the subscribers Pi, P2, P3, eg via suitable portable terminals, to the background server 5. Thus, besides the local check on the basis of the data in the memory device 3, a central check based on the data in the memory 6 can also take place. For this purpose, the security feature 1 and / or the terminals of the subscriber P _l P _{2 is} equipped with a wireless data communication device, such as a mobile device or the like. In this embodiment, the security feature 1 is in particular an electronic label, an RFID tag or any other suitable electronic device.

FIG. 3 shows variants of the two embodiments according to FIG. 1 and FIG. 2 when using an arbitrarily divisible security feature 1, for example a liquid or pulverulent security ink or a security lacquer or any security threads, strips, films or other safety applications that can not be assembled have given size or extent, but only when applied to the object to be protected are brought into the final form in which they are to act as a security element of the object.

The arbitrarily divisible security feature 1 is packaged in a container 2 which is permanently connected to the first identifier Co of the security feature 1. is the (step Sl), because on the liquid security feature 1 no initial marking Co can be attached. For this purpose, printing or embossing methods are suitable. In addition, the first identifier Co can also be stored in a permanently connected to the container storage device 3, so that the initial marking Co on the one hand from the outside is visible and on the other hand can be evaluated electronically.

Upon removal of a subset of the security feature 1 by participants Pi, P2 from the container 2, for example, to apply this to one or more objects to be protected, in step S2 each a sequence label d, C2 with the corresponding secret key SKi, SK2 directly formed from the initial marking Co. As a result, an arbitrarily divisible security feature 1 does not necessarily form a successively widening identification sequence Co, C, C2, C3, in which each identification is derived from the immediately preceding identification. Rather, a tree structure (indicated in the memory 6), for example, by the receiver Pi enmimmt a subset of the security feature 1 from the container 2 and generates the sequence identifier Ci, while the subscriber P ₂ also takes a subset directly from the container 2 and generates the sequence identifier C2, which is here with the sequence identifier O in no direct relation. However, the subset of the security element 1 removed from the container 2 by the subscriber P2 can, in turn, be taken over by a subscriber P3 after the corresponding processing, which in turn forms the sequence identifier C _{2 of} the person P ₃ from the sequence identifier C _{2 of} the person P ₃ , so that the tree structure indicated in the memory 6 of the background system 5 forms.

In the case of the arbitrarily divisible security feature 1, the sequence markings C 1, C 2, C 3 can in turn be stored either in a storage device or in a storage device. 3 of the container 2 are stored securely (step 3) or in a memory 6 of the background system 5 (step 3 '). Of course, it is also possible to store the sequence identifiers Q, C2, C3 both in the memory device 3 of the container 2 and in the memory 6 of the background system 5 in order to ensure both local and global verification and tracing of the security feature 1 to enable.

On the basis of the sequential identifiers Ci, C ₂ , C3 in the memory device 3 or the memory 6 each responsible for the security feature 1 participants Pi, P2, P3 can be determined by the public key ΡΚι, PK3 those sequence identifier Ci , C3, which form the leaves of the tree structure and indicate that the respective participants Pi, P3 are still in possession of a certain amount of security feature 1.

Likewise, a complete traceability of all withdrawn from the container 2 subsets of the security feature 1 by a controller 7 of the background system 5 in a step S5 is possible, as well as the complete accounting of all removed from the container 2 sub-sets of security feature 1 to check whether the entire quantity of security feature 1 initially present in container 2 was also used to secure objects and products without partial quantities of security feature 1 being stolen without authorization. For example, it can be checked on the basis of the tree structure stored in the memory 6 whether the sum of all subsets of the security feature 1 represented by the leaves of the tree corresponds to the initial quantity of the security feature 1 in the container 2. In this context, it may be advantageous for the secret keys SKi, SK ₂ , SK3 to include certain important information about the respective subscriber Pi, P _{2 /} P ₃ , for example their function, workstation or the like, so that this information is also included in the following table. Designations Q, C2, C3 are received and verifiable.

Such evaluations can either be carried out centrally by the background system 5 or its control device 7 (step S5), or after the return of the empty container 2 on the basis of the sequence markings O, C2, C3 stored in the storage device 3 and the corresponding public keys ΡΚι, PK2, PK3.

The container 2 preferably also comprises a closure device 4, which can then be opened to remove further subsets of the security element 1 if the person in question Pi, P2, P3 with the last created sequence code Q, C2 with the first Flag Co and / or its secret key SKi, SK2, SK3 legitimized. If, therefore, the subscriber P3 in FIG. 3 still requires a further subset of the security feature 1 from the container 2, he can, for example, use the sequence identifier C2, which is already present in the storage device 3, and / or his secret key SK3 Legitimate to the closure device 4.

In addition, the container 2 can also be provided with a locating device, so that its location, for example, from the background system 5, via a suitable communication protocol, such as GPS or GSM, can be determined. This locating device is preferably linked to the memory device 3 or a corresponding microchip, which comprises the memory device 3 and the locating device as well as optionally a radio device. Preferably, the closure device 4 also time-controlled, so that a further removal of subsets of the security element 1 is possible only within a certain time interval since the last removal. The container 2 may be equipped for further protection with a paint bomb.

Claims

Patent claims

A method for uniquely tracking a security feature (1) characterized by the steps of:

- linking (Sl) a unique initial identifier (Co) of the security feature (1) with the security feature (1);

Forming (S2) a sequence identifier (Ci, C _{2 /} C3) in a transfer of the security feature (1) from a relay (Pi, P ₂ ) to a receiver (P, P ₂ , P3), by encrypting one already with the security feature (1) associated identifier (Co, O, C ₂ ) with a secret key (SKi, SK _{2 /} SK3) of the receiver (Pi, P _{2 /} P3); Linking (S3, S3 ') of the sequence identifier (O, C2, C3) to the security feature (1).

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the sequence identifier (O, C2, C3) by encrypting the last associated with the security feature identifier (Co, Q, C ₂ ) is formed.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the receiver (Pi, P2, P3) forms the sequence identifier (O, C2, C3) and the

Passing (Pi, P ₂ ) the resulting sequence identifier (Ci, C ₂ , C3) with a with the secret key (SKi, SK ₂ , SK3) of the receiver (Pi, P ₂ , P ₃ ) corresponding public key (PKi , PK ₂ , PK3) verified (S4).

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that a with the secret key (SKi, SK ₂ , SK3) of the receiver (Pi, P2, P ₃ ) corresponding public key (PKi, PK2, PK3) for a latter Verification (S4) of the sequence identifier (Q, C ₂ , C3) at a trusted authority (5) is deposited.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized marked, that an indivisible security feature (1), such as an optically variable or electronic security element, or a container (2), a predetermined amount of liquid, powder or otherwise arbitrarily divisible security feature (1), is linked to the initial marking (Co) and the sequence marking (O, C _{2 /} C3) (Sl, S3, S3 ').

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that the first identifier (Co) with the indivisible security feature (1) or with the container (2) is linked (Sl) by the Erst-marking (Co) so firmly with the indivisible security feature (1) or connected to the container (2) that it can not be separated without affecting the indivisible security feature (1) or the container (2).

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that the sequence identification (O, C _{2 /} C3) with the indivisible security feature (1) or with the container (2) is linked (S3, S3 ') _r by the subsequent Marking (O, C2, C3) together with the initial marking (Co) is transmitted to a trusted point (5) and stored there (S3, S3 ') in such a way that the sequence marking (Q, C ₂ , C3) can be determined by specifying the initial identifier (Co) and can be assigned to the indivisible security feature (1) or the container (2).

8. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 7, characterized in that the initial marking (Co) and / or the sequence marking (O, C ₂ , C3) with the indivisible security feature (1) or with the container (2) is linked by the first identifier (Co) and / or the sequence identifier (Ci, C2, C3) in such a way with the indivisible Security element (1) or with the container (2) fixedly connected storage device (3) is stored (Sl, S3, S3 ') that the memory device (3) without affecting the indivisible security feature (1) or the container (2) not from this can be separated.

9. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 8, characterized in that a radio device of the indivisible security feature (1) or the

Container (2) transmits the first identifier (Co) and / or the sequence identifier (O, C2, C3) to a trusted point (5).

10. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 9, characterized in that the initial marking (Co) in producing the indivisible security feature (1) with the indivisible security feature (1) or in producing the arbitrarily divisible security element (1) with the container (2) is linked (SI).

11. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 10, characterized in that the security feature (1) is applied to at least one object to be secured and the number of secured with an indivisible security feature (1) of a given type objects o- on the amount of an arbitrarily divisible security feature (1) applied on the basis of the respective initial marking (Co) and / or sequence markings (Ci, C ₂ , C3) is determined.

12. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 11, characterized in that a closure mechanism (4) of the container (2) for removing a ner subset of arbitrarily divisible security feature (1) by specifying the last associated with the container label (Co, Ci, C2) is opened.

13. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 12, characterized in that the container (2) with an amount of arbitrarily divisible security feature (1) is filled, which for the in the context of a manufacturing layer and / or a production lot with the security feature (1 ) is required to be secured objects.

14. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, characterized in that with each passing of the security feature (1) a sequence identifier (Ci, C2, C3) of the security feature (1) is formed and all passages of the security feature (1) based the successive identifiers (O, C2, C3) associated with the security feature (1) are traced.

15. Indivisible security feature (1), such as an optically variable or electronic security element, or container (2) for receiving a predetermined quantity of a liquid, powdery or otherwise arbitrarily divisible security feature (1), characterized by

a first identifier (Co) of the security feature (1) associated with the security feature (1), which is so firmly connected to the indivisible security feature (1) or to the container (2) that it can be used without impairing the indivisible security feature ( 1) or the container (2) can not be separated from this, as well

a memory device (3) fixedly connected to the indivisible security feature (1) or to the container (2), in which at least one sequence identifier (Ci, C2, C3) associated with the security feature (1) stored in the case of a passing on of the security feature (1) from a forwarding party (Pi, P2) to a receiver (Pi, P2, P3) with a secret key (SKi, SK _{2 /} SK3) of the recipient (Pi, P2, P3) encrypted version already associated with the indivisible security feature (1) or with the container (2) identification (Co, Ci, C2).

16. indivisible security feature (1) or container (2) for receiving an arbitrarily divisible security feature (1) according to claim 15, characterized in that the indivisible security feature (1) or the container ter (2) is arranged such that with a Method according to one of claims 1 to 14 passing the security feature (1) to a receiver (Pi, P2, P3) on the basis of the stored sequence identifiers (O, C2, C3) can be traced.

17. System (1, 5, 2, 5) for unique tracking of security features (1), comprising a trusted authority (5) and a plurality of indivisible security features (1) and / or containers (2) for receiving an arbitrarily divisible security feature (1) according to claim 15 or 16, characterized in that the trusted location (5) is set up,

First and subsequent identifiers (Co, Ci, C2, C ₃ ) associated with the plurality of indivisible security features (1) and / or containers (2) to receive and store; and

the number of items secured with an indivisible security feature (1) of a given type or the quantity of an arbitrarily divisible security feature (1) applied to items to be secured, based on the stored initial identifier (Co) and / or consecutive Identify identifications (Ci, C2, C3).