EP2499594A1 - Verfahren und system zum vertraulichen bereitstellen von softwarekomponenten - Google Patents

Verfahren und system zum vertraulichen bereitstellen von softwarekomponenten

Info

Publication number
EP2499594A1
EP2499594A1 EP10773595A EP10773595A EP2499594A1 EP 2499594 A1 EP2499594 A1 EP 2499594A1 EP 10773595 A EP10773595 A EP 10773595A EP 10773595 A EP10773595 A EP 10773595A EP 2499594 A1 EP2499594 A1 EP 2499594A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
oem
key
encrypted
cryptographic
software component
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP10773595A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Michael Braun
Markus Dichtl
Bernd Meyer
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP2499594A1 publication Critical patent/EP2499594A1/de
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method and system for the confidential provision of software components, in particular of OEM software components.
  • software components can be developed or manufactured.
  • Software components or software components can be, for example, program sections or subroutines.
  • This software ⁇ components are created using a development environment by a software component manufacturer or OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer).
  • OEM Olinal Equipment Manufacturer
  • Source code of the software component When creating software components, software component manufacturers or OEMs leave their industry-specific expertise or knowledge
  • the invention provides a method for confidential provision of a software component having the following steps: (A) encrypting the software component (SWK) using a secret cryptographic OEM key (K 0EM ) of a software component manufacturer (OEM);
  • SWK decrypted software component
  • Execution is provided on the target system device.
  • the first cryptographic system key is a public areas ⁇ cher cryptographic key and the second cryptographic key system, a private cryptographic key of an asymmetric encryption method.
  • the first cryptographic system key and the second cryptographic system key are a private cryptographic key of a symmetric encryption method.
  • the target system device is formed by a SpeI ⁇ mable logic controller.
  • the first cryptographic system key and the two ⁇ te cryptographic system key is generated as the key pair by a manufacturer of the target system device.
  • the software component is symmetrically encrypted by means of the secret cryptographic OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM.
  • the secret cryptographic OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM is asymmetrically encrypted by means of the public cryptographic key.
  • the private key is tamper-proof integrated in the Zielsyt- device.
  • the cryptographic checksum is formed by a message authentication code (MAC).
  • MAC message authentication code
  • the cryptographic checksum is formed by an electronic signature.
  • the encrypted software component and the encrypted key of the OEM Softwarekomponentenher ⁇ steller OEM transported saved to disk
  • the encrypted software component and the encrypted OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM are transported in data packets via a network.
  • a software component is encrypted by means of the secret cryptographic OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM.
  • a plurality of software components are simultaneously encrypted by means of the secret cryptographic OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM.
  • the invention further provides a system for confidently providing software components to a user having the features set forth in claim 13.
  • the invention provides a system for confidential providing software components (SWK) for a user comprising: at least a developing device of a Softwarekompo- nenten arrangements (OEM) on the means of a development ⁇ Tools software components (SWK) can be produced, each of which cryptographic by a secret OEM Key (K 0EM ) of the software component manufacturer (OEM) are encrypted,
  • the target system device comprises a programmable Steue ⁇ tion in which the private key is provided, which is generated by the manufacturer of the target system device.
  • the OEM development device of the software component manufacturer is connected to the target system device via a network.
  • the software component has at least one program executable on the target system device.
  • the invention further provides a target system device having the features specified in claim 17.
  • the invention provides a target system device with:
  • a second decryption unit that decrypts a transported ⁇ te encrypted software component (ENC-SWK) by means of the decrypted by the first decryption unit OEM key (K 0 EM) of the software components manufacturer (OEM), and
  • the target system device has at least one interface for receiving transported encrypted software components and encrypted OEM keys of a software component manufacturer.
  • the target system device has peripheral components for sensors and actuators, which are connected via a bus to the execution unit of the target system device.
  • the second cryptographic system key is a private cryptographic key of an asymmetric key method.
  • the invention further provides a developing device having the features specified in claim 22.
  • the invention provides a development device of a software component manufacturer
  • a first encryption unit for encrypting a software component (SWC) using a secret kryp ⁇ tographischen OEM key (K 0EM) of the software component manufacturer (OEM);
  • a second encryption unit for encrypting the cryptographic OEM key of the software component manufacturer (OEM) by means of a first cryptographic system key (K sys i),
  • the first cryptographic system key is a public cryptographic key of an asymmetric encryption method.
  • FIG. 1 shows a flow chart for illustrating a possible embodiment of the method according to the invention for the confidential provision of a method
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a possible embodiment of a system according to the invention for the confidential provision of software components for a user.
  • the invention Ver ⁇ drive to the confidential providing a software component essentially five steps S1-S5.
  • a first step S1 the software component SWK is encrypted by means of a secret cryptographic OEM key K 0 EM of a software component manufacturer OEM.
  • the OEM key K 0 EM of the software component manufacturer OEM is encrypted by means of a first cryptographic system key K sysl .
  • the encrypted software component ⁇ ENC-SWK and the encrypted OEM key is transported (ENC K 0 EM) of the software components OEM manufacturer to a target ⁇ system device.
  • This target system device is formed, for example, by a programmable logic controller PLC.
  • a transport of the encrypted software component ENC-SWK and the encrypted OEM key ENC-KOEM takes place in a possible embodiment ⁇ form on a data carrier, the encrypted software component and the encrypted OEM key stores.
  • the encrypted software component and the encrypted OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM are transported in data packets over a network.
  • step S4 a decryption of the encrypted transported OEM key ENC-K 0EM with ⁇ means of a second cryptographic system key K sys2 occurs.
  • step S5 the transported encrypted software component ENC-SWK is decrypted by means of the decryption ⁇ seldom OEM key K 0EM , wherein the entschlüs ⁇ rare software component SWK for execution on the Zielsyt- device, for example a programmable logic controller PLC, is provided ,
  • the first cryptographic system key s ysl and the second cryptographic system key K sys2 are generated as a key pair by a manufacturer of the target system device .
  • the encryption and decryption takes place by means of an asymmetric encryption method, WO in the first cryptographic system key K sysl a öf ⁇ fentaji cryptographic key K pub and the second cryptographic key K sys2 a private kryptographi ⁇ shear key K priv is.
  • the encryption and decryption using a symmetric encryption method is carried out, wherein the first cryptographic system key K and the second sysl kryp ⁇ tographische system key K sys2 are a private cryptographic key shear.
  • a cryptographic checksum that is specific exceed checked when decrypting the encrypted software component ported trans ⁇ ENC-SWK when encrypting the software component SWK in step Sl is generated.
  • These cryptographic checksum can ⁇ example, be formed by a message authentication code MAC.
  • the cryptographic checksum is formed ⁇ ge by an electronic signature.
  • a software component using a secret SWK kryp ⁇ tographischen OEM key of Softwarekomponentenherstel ⁇ coupler OEM is encrypted at step Sl.
  • multiple software components SWK are simultaneously encrypted by means of the secret cryptographic OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM.
  • the system 1 contains at least one development assembly 2 of a software component manufacturer OEM and a target system ⁇ device 3, for example, has a programmable programmable controller PLC.
  • the OEM development environment 2 of the software component manufacturer OEM contains at least one development device 2A, on which software components SWK can be produced by means of a development tool.
  • software components can be any software component or software components, in particular Pro ⁇ programs, subprograms or subroutines or files.
  • the development environment of the software component manufacturer 2 includes a first encryption unit 2B, through which the supplied software component SWK by means of a secret cryptographic key K OEM 0 EM of the software components ⁇ manufacturer OEM is encrypted.
  • This first encryption unit 2b may be a software component or gleichzei ⁇ tig encrypt multiple software components by means of the secret cryptographic key of the OEM Softwarekomponentenherstel ⁇ toddlers.
  • the secret cryptographic OEM key K 0 EM of the software component manufacturer is, as shown in Fig. 2, for example, in a
  • the software component SWK is preferably symmetrically encrypted by means of the secret cryptographic OEM key KQEM of the software component manufacturer OEM in the encryption unit 2B and arrives at an interface 2D of the OEM development environment 2.
  • the OEM development environment 2 has a second encryption unit 2e in addition to the first encryption unit 2B.
  • the second Ver ⁇ encryption unit 2e of surele from the memory 2C ⁇ sene secret cryptographic key of the OEM Softwarekom ⁇ ponentenselfs OEM is encrypted by a first cryptographic system key K Sysl.
  • the encrypted by the second encryption unit 2E secret OEM key of the software component manufacturer OEM, as well as by the first encryption unit 2B encrypted Softwarekom ⁇ component ENC-SWK is via the interface 2D of the OEM development environment 2 by means of a transport means 4 to an interface 3A a target system device 3 transported.
  • the target system device 3 is, for example, a memory-programmed controller SPS.
  • the Transport means 4 formed by a line or a network.
  • the encrypted software component ENC-SWK and the encrypted OEM key ENC-KQ EM of the software component manufacturer OEM are transported in data packets via the network to the target system device 3.
  • the transport means 4 is a data carrier on which the encrypted software component ENC-SWK and the encrypted OEM key ENC-KQ EM are stored.
  • ENC-SWK the encrypted software component
  • ENC-KQ EM the encrypted software component
  • the interface 3A to the target system device 3 reads in this embodiment the data stored on the disk key encrypted OEM ENC- Kom and the encrypted Softwarekomponen ⁇ te ENC-SWK from the disk.
  • the target system device 3 has a first decision ⁇ treatment unit 3B, which decrypts the transported encrypted OEM key ENC-KQ EM means of a second cryptographic system key K sys2 .
  • the target system device 3 has an execution unit 3D, which is connected via a bus 5 with peripheral components 6-1 to 6-n for sensors and actuators.
  • execution unit 3D is ⁇ example, be a CPU or a microprocessor.
  • the software recovered by the second decryption unit 3C component SWK can be formed for example by an executable program or subroutine, which is executed directly by the execution unit 3D of the target system device 3 after decryption.
  • a public cryptographic key is K pub.
  • the stored in a storage device 3E, the target system device 3 second cryptographic Systemschlüs ⁇ sel sys2 K is a private cryptographic key K priv in this embodiment.
  • This private key K priv is preferably integrated into the target system device 3 in a tamper-proof manner.
  • first cryptographic system key K is sysl and stored in the memory 3E of the target device 3 second cryptographic system key K sys2 a private cryptographic key of a symmetric encryption method.
  • first cryptographic system key K is sysl and the second cryptographic system key K sys2 preferably generated as a key pair before ⁇ by a manufacturer of the target system device.
  • the method and system according to the invention for confidential provision of software components or software components SWK protects against unauthorized reading and manipulation by using cryptographic encryption and decryption methods.
  • the inventive method and system provide software components SWK, which are developed, confidentially, with a know-how protection of the software components is achieved in that unauthorized third parties can read the software component SWK neither in plain text or as source code or object code, nor unnoticed change ,
  • a two-stage encryption and a two-stage decision ⁇ ment is made, wherein the encrypted OEM key EWC KOEM of the software component manufacturer OEM is transported together by means of the encrypted by the OEM key software component ENC SWK to the target system device 3.
  • the corresponding system key K sysl , K sys2 are generated first. This can be done in ⁇ example by the manufacturer of the target system device. 3
  • the second system key K sys2 is then stored preference ⁇ as tamper-proof by the manufacturer of the target system device 3, for example, in a particularly artillery th memory 3E.
  • the first system key K sysl which is used to encrypt the OEM key of the software ⁇ component manufacturer, is stored in a memory 2C of the development environment.
  • the public or first system key K sysl can be delivered directly to the development environment 2 to the software component manufacturer OEM.
  • the second system key for example a private key, is preferably stored tamper-proof, for example in a firmware of the target system device 3.
  • encryption takes place symmetrically, since this allows higher performance than with an asymmetric encryption method.
  • the use of a symmetric encryption method causes a significantly faster decryption, in particular in the subsequent decryption of the software protection in the target system device 3.
  • the secret text generated by the symmetric encryption is no longer legible without knowledge of the corresponding key.
  • the OEM key used for encryption is in turn encrypted with a first system key K sysl , so that even this OEM key is not in plain text and therefore can not be used to decrypt the previously encrypted OEM software components.
  • the encrypted software or Softwarekompo ⁇ component SWK can now be delivered along with the encrypted key OEM or transported. To Aus ⁇ delivery of encrypted OEM software component together with the encrypted OEM key these two data packets to the target system device 3 or the PLC hardware are loaded. In the PLC hardware or the target system device 3 of the second system key is already since the expire ⁇ tion of the hardware in a key sel Grande 3E.
  • This second system key K sys2 may be, for example, a private key. Using this private key K sys2 , the OEM key is now decrypted. Following this, the software components SWK or software components are preferably decrypted by means of a symmetric decryption using the OEM key. This means that the software component SWK is ready for execution in plain text in the PLC hardware. With the method and system according to the invention, the software component manufacturer OEM can protect its generated software components or software components SWK and this
  • Remove protection without any interaction between the software component manufacturer OEM and the manufacturer of the target system device 3 is necessary.
  • a customer of the soft ⁇ ware components manufacturer OEM and component manufacturers can not decrypt the software components, that is the know-how protection of a software component manufacturer OEM can not be canceled by a customer or other software components manufacturer. Due to the fact that the software components or software components of a software component manufacturer OEM are encrypted, the delivery of this software or software components can also be made via insecure channels.
  • the soft ⁇ ware component can be sent in electronic form via Internet download or in a MMC memory card. In the method and system according to the invention, therefore, the know-how protection does not depend on the safety of the transport channel 4.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Programmable Controllers (AREA)
EP10773595A 2009-11-09 2010-10-14 Verfahren und system zum vertraulichen bereitstellen von softwarekomponenten Ceased EP2499594A1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102009052454A DE102009052454A1 (de) 2009-11-09 2009-11-09 Verfahren und System zum vertraulichen Bereitstellen von Softwarekomponenten
PCT/EP2010/065370 WO2011054643A1 (de) 2009-11-09 2010-10-14 Verfahren und system zum vertraulichen bereitstellen von softwarekomponenten

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2499594A1 true EP2499594A1 (de) 2012-09-19

Family

ID=43302512

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP10773595A Ceased EP2499594A1 (de) 2009-11-09 2010-10-14 Verfahren und system zum vertraulichen bereitstellen von softwarekomponenten

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US9542537B2 (zh)
EP (1) EP2499594A1 (zh)
CN (1) CN102598014B (zh)
DE (1) DE102009052454A1 (zh)
WO (1) WO2011054643A1 (zh)

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US11163910B2 (en) * 2017-06-29 2021-11-02 Salesforce.Com, Inc. Methods and systems for data migration
EP3439228B1 (de) * 2017-08-02 2020-07-29 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren und vorrichtungen zum erreichen einer sicherheitsfunktion, insbesondere im umfeld einer geräte- und/oder anlagensteuerung

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US9542537B2 (en) 2017-01-10
DE102009052454A1 (de) 2011-05-12
CN102598014A (zh) 2012-07-18
US20120321089A1 (en) 2012-12-20
WO2011054643A1 (de) 2011-05-12
CN102598014B (zh) 2015-04-29

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