EP2460071A2 - Automated processing of multi-usage data, implementing functions requiring various levels of security or limits of responsibility - Google Patents
Automated processing of multi-usage data, implementing functions requiring various levels of security or limits of responsibilityInfo
- Publication number
- EP2460071A2 EP2460071A2 EP10752854A EP10752854A EP2460071A2 EP 2460071 A2 EP2460071 A2 EP 2460071A2 EP 10752854 A EP10752854 A EP 10752854A EP 10752854 A EP10752854 A EP 10752854A EP 2460071 A2 EP2460071 A2 EP 2460071A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- virtual machine
- data
- virtual machines
- software component
- security
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
- G06F9/455—Emulation; Interpretation; Software simulation, e.g. virtualisation or emulation of application or operating system execution engines
- G06F9/45533—Hypervisors; Virtual machine monitors
- G06F9/45558—Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
- G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
- G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
- G06F9/455—Emulation; Interpretation; Software simulation, e.g. virtualisation or emulation of application or operating system execution engines
- G06F9/45533—Hypervisors; Virtual machine monitors
- G06F9/45558—Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects
- G06F2009/45587—Isolation or security of virtual machine instances
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
- G06F21/53—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2113—Multi-level security, e.g. mandatory access control
Definitions
- the present invention relates to data processing systems, including aircraft information system data, and more particularly to a software component and a device for the automated processing of multi-purpose data, implementing functions requiring different levels of security or limits of liability.
- airlines have the regulatory obligation to implement technical and organizational means to maintain the level of safety of the elements of an aircraft as determined upon delivery of the aircraft. This regulatory obligation covers only physical security and not logical security.
- the data manipulated by the operational software applications implemented in the STADs can be downloaded, calculated, displayed and / or transmitted. Because of the security constraints mentioned above, there are strong security needs in terms of confidentiality, integrity and / or availability thereof.
- the invention solves at least one of the problems discussed above.
- the invention thus relates to a computer software component adapted to the automatic processing of multi-purpose data, the software component implementing functions requiring different levels of security or limits of responsibility and including,
- each virtual machine being adapted to perform at least one function requiring a predetermined level of security or a predetermined limit of responsibility;
- a hypervisor adapted to control the execution of said plurality of virtual machines.
- the software component according to the invention thus makes it possible to implement functions having different levels of safety or limits of responsibility in the same machine, independently of the hardware platform and the information system architecture used on board. aircraft. Publishers of software applications implemented are no longer dependent on the evolution of operating systems and master the life cycle of these applications.
- the software component can thus be implemented on a mobile STAD market, according to a list of hardware compatibility. Since the limits of responsibility are clearly identified, it can receive software applications from suppliers and the user. Such a STAD can be attached to an aircraft or a user.
- the use of the software component according to the invention does not increase the need for maintenance compared to a single-use equipment, mobile or not. It ensures a good level of segregation as well as a good level of security including the integrity of operational data. It makes it possible to control the sharing of resources between the various functions while being relatively independent with respect to the lack of reliability of the commercial products implemented.
- said hypervisor comprises authentication means for authenticating at least one virtual machine of said plurality of virtual machines in order, in particular, to check the validity of transmitted data.
- said authentication means are preferably adapted to verify the integrity of said at least one authenticated virtual machine.
- said authentication means are advantageously adapted to verify the isolation level of said at least one authenticated virtual machine with respect to at least one other virtual machine of said plurality of virtual machines in order, in particular, to check the validity of data passed to other virtual machines.
- the software component further comprises data storage means processed by least one virtual machine of said plurality of virtual machines, said storage means being adapted to store said processed data in a removable memory of said computer.
- the software component according to the invention thus makes it possible to store data whose level of confidence is not sure without compromising it.
- Such data storage means are preferably implemented by virtual machines of said plurality of virtual machines whose security level is below a predetermined threshold.
- the software component further comprises means for controlling a level of confidence of at least one piece of data processed by at least one virtual machine of said plurality of virtual machines, said at least one piece of data processed. can not be stored locally in said computer until it has been checked.
- the software component according to the invention thus makes it possible to store locally only data whose level of confidence is safe so as not to compromise it.
- the software component further comprises data transfer means between a first and a second virtual machine of said plurality of virtual machines, said transfer means being adapted to filter data transferred if the level of security of said second virtual machine is greater than the security level of said first virtual machine to validate the data exchanged, in particular according to their type or the need for access to these data.
- configuration data used to start at least one virtual machine of said plurality of virtual machines are not modified during the execution of said at least one started virtual machine in order to facilitate maintenance of the virtual machine. software component and allow it to restart from a stable and validated state.
- the invention also relates to a device comprising means adapted to the implementation of each of the elements of the component previously described software whose advantages are similar to those mentioned above.
- FIG. 1 shows schematically an example of environment in which can be used a multi-purpose automated data processing system implementing the invention
- FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary architecture of an automated multi-purpose data processing system according to the invention
- FIG. 4 schematically illustrates certain steps implemented to analyze the risks associated with the functions that must be performed on the same STAD
- FIG. 5 schematically illustrates an exemplary algorithm for distributing software applications implemented in a STAD in virtual machines according to the functions they use;
- FIG. 6 shows an example of a device for implementing at least partially the invention.
- the invention makes it possible in particular to replace the single-use automated data processing systems (STAD), mobile or fixed, used today for maintenance and mission, by a single secure STAD, preferably mobile.
- STAD single-use automated data processing systems
- FIG. 1 schematically represents an example of environment 100 in which a multi-purpose automatic data processing system embodying the invention can be used.
- a STAD 105 can be used by a crew member in an aircraft 110 for example to run flight management software applications.
- the same STAD 105, or a similar STAD 115, can be used by a maintenance team to access the maintenance data of the aircraft 110 and / or to update data or software applications of the aircraft.
- the same STAD 105, or a similar STAD 120 can be used in the airline's offices 125, for example for the preparation of a flight.
- the same STAD 105, or a similar STAD 130 can be used by its owner to access office applications and e-mail from, for example, a network access of a hotel 135.
- the operational applications, the office applications and the personal applications of a STAD are thus hosted in several virtual machines implemented in the STAD, according to the needs of security levels and preferably by responsibility.
- a virtual machine offers a runtime environment with its own configuration characteristics.
- two virtual machines can be considered as two independent physical machines.
- Each virtual machine runs with its operating system, its drivers (called drivers in English terminology), its software applications and its configuration management and data exchange.
- a virtualization mechanism allows the execution of several virtual machines on a real machine using a hypervisor.
- the hypervisor is responsible for sharing the resources of the real machine and enforcing resource access control rules.
- the resources shared between the virtual machines are, for example, the computing power CPU (acronym for Central Processing Unit in English terminology), the communication channels, the interrupts hardware and software, input / output ports, memory, clocks, system buses, controllers and / or mass storage.
- the invention is based on the use of a standard hypervisor, personalized to manage the virtual machines according to predetermined rules.
- the virtualization implemented here is a hardware virtualization, for example a complete virtualization according to which the hypervisor manages all the requests of the virtual machines or a paravirtualisation according to which certain requests are managed directly by the virtual machines.
- virtualization software tools adapted to real time are used for their benefits in terms of performance and security level.
- virtualization makes it possible, for embedded systems, to optimize the weight of the computer hardware implemented including servers, switches and cabling, as well as a reduction in electrical consumption as well as a simplification of deployment and maintenance procedures, which is particularly advantageous in an aeronautical environment.
- FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary architecture of a STAD according to the invention, which is sufficiently safe to be used in environments having different levels of security.
- the STAD 200 here comprises a hardware layer 205.
- PDA personal digital Assistant
- the hardware layer to be trusted can consist of an open platform of PC type whose level of confidence is improved by the use of an authentication module called TPM (acronym Trusted
- the hardware layer 205 allows the execution of a software layer 210 comprising the hypervisor. It allows to run multiple machines separate virtual machines, for example virtual machines MV1, MV2, MV3 and MVx, referenced 215-1, 215-2, 215-3 and 215-x, respectively.
- a first virtual machine here the virtual machine 215-1, has a particular role and rights. This is the administration machine that serves as access for the maintenance and configuration of the platform. It uses an OS1 operating system here. Still according to this example, the virtual machine 215-1 includes a storage space, or mass memory, and a communication interface, denoted I / O (acronym for Input / Output in English terminology).
- a second virtual machine here the virtual machine 215-2, allows the STAD to connect to the most sensitive information system, that is to say that of the aircraft.
- the display associated with this virtual machine may be directed to the STAD screen or aircraft-specific displays according to, for example, a standard graphical user interface of the client / server type.
- the virtual machine 215-2 here uses the OS2 operating system and an input / output interface for exchanging data with the aircraft information system via a cockpit docking type link.
- the virtual machine 215-2 makes it possible to execute operational applications.
- the devices that are available in this environment and the administrative rights must be precisely defined to ensure the required level of security.
- a third virtual machine allows the STAD to connect to insensitive information systems, here systems separate from the information system of the aircraft.
- the virtual machine 215-3 allows the STAD to access an internal network of the company operating the STAD or the Internet, for example at a WiFi access point of a hotel.
- the risks associated with the virtual machine 215-3 are higher than those of the virtual machines 215-1 and 215-2 because it is open to environments likely to be a source of compromise.
- This virtual machine can therefore be a target for malware, called malware in English terminology.
- software applications and the drivers implemented in this virtual machine are a priori standard software, they represent potentially known faults.
- a virtual machine 215-x can be used for the execution of software applications requiring a level of security equivalent to that of the virtual machine 215-2 but whose provider is different from that of the applications running in virtual machine 215-2.
- a single STAD it is possible to use a single STAD.
- the execution level is constrained in the user space at the start of the STAD so that the administration rights are not accessible.
- the login banner is preferably disabled to prevent a user from exiting the virtualization layer. It only accesses virtual machines.
- the sequence of start keys is deactivated.
- hardware virtualization features are implemented in the STAD processor, they are configured so as not to degrade the expected level of security.
- the STAD When the STAD starts or when it is activated, for example after a standby, the user is authenticated. Such authentication is here performed by the hypervisor. Access to virtual machines depends on this authentication. Thus, for example, a pilot and a co-pilot will be able to access all the virtual machines implemented on a STAD, with the exception of the administration virtual machine used to configure the STAD, while a maintenance technician will be able to access this. last.
- Virtual machines can be launched automatically when the STAD is started or when the user requests it. Each virtual machine can be started and stopped independently, depending on the needs of the user. It can pass from one virtual machine to another according to a standard mechanism, for example via a graphical interface. According to a particular embodiment, the functions implemented in the virtual machines are adapted according to certain parameters such as the level of safety of the virtual machine in which they are executed.
- FIG. 3 schematically illustrates an example of adaptation of certain functions executed in virtual machines according to these parameters, as a function of the type of function (step 300).
- the virtual machines go through an authentication phase to connect to certain systems external to the STAD (step 305), for example to an information system of an aircraft.
- This authentication phase implemented by the hypervisor during the launch of the virtual machine and / or data exchange, comprises the following steps,
- step 310 authentication of the virtual machine according to a standard authentication mechanism
- checking the integrity of the virtual machine by checking, for example, several security criteria such as the operating system and the date of last update (step 315); and,
- step 320 checking the isolation level of the virtual machine with respect to the other virtual machines according to the functions implemented. This step makes it possible to verify that no other virtual machine can interact with the one whose authentication is requested, for example via the user interface or the network, when the virtual machine is connected with a system of an aircraft. Alternatively, this step may consist in checking compliance with predetermined communication rules.
- the data are effectively transmitted (step 325) only after authentication of the virtual machine so that it can not transmit erroneous data to an external system.
- the transfer of data between virtual machines is controlled to ensure the required levels of security. Indeed, whether they have been isolated for purposes of limit of liability or levels of different functions, some functions may require a transfer of data between virtual machines and thus the setting of a communication channel.
- an import function is created to validate the data transiting to a virtual machine having a higher security level than that of the source virtual machine (denoted MV * in FIG. 3).
- the principle of this function is in particular to filter the data according to their type (step 330) and to ensure that only the expected data (step 335) pass through the open communication channel (step 325).
- the user remains master of the validation, that is to say the effective transfer of data from one virtual machine to another having a higher level of security.
- snapshots in English terminology
- the snapshot feature allows all virtual machine data to be stored at a particular time so that the virtual machine can be relaunched and reconfigured later to return to the state it was in when the data has been stored as a photograph.
- This function may be activated by a user or may be automatically activated at a predetermined periodicity, for example every week or month, or in response to particular events.
- step 340 only the necessary operations are allowed to write data to the STAD mass memory, depending on the level of security of the virtual machine. For example, only operational data and user data that has been specifically identified can be stored in the STAD. In addition, if the security level of the virtual machine is high, only data whose confidence level is verified can be stored in the STAD (steps 345 and 350). Such verification consists, for example, in validating the integrity or the origin of the data or in verifying the environment in which they were produced.
- a particular treatment is performed for the data that the user acquires from a virtual machine whose security level is low, that is to say the security level of which is below a predetermined threshold, for example when a virtual machine can access the Internet and therefore receive messages, applications and cookies (commonly called cookies in English terminology) or when devices such as storage devices can be connected to the STAD.
- these data can not be stored only on a removable medium such as an SD card or USB type (step 355).
- each virtual machine corresponds here to a predetermined security level need
- the applications for example the operational applications, the office applications and the user's personal applications being distributed in several virtual machines by security level needs. according to the functions they use.
- it is important to fine-tune the hypervisor and the virtual machines, taking into account, in particular, the good uses, the strictly necessary drivers and the means of communication supporting the functions of the STAD in order to reduce as much as possible the attack surface and thus not degrade the level of safety.
- Figure 4 schematically illustrates some steps implemented to analyze the risks associated with the functions that must be performed on the same STAD. These risks make it possible to define the virtual machines to be implemented in the STAD and the distribution of these functions in the virtual machines used.
- This analysis includes determining the execution parameters of the functions to determine, in particular, the communication interfaces that can be used, the operating system used and the source of the processed data. These parameters make it possible to characterize the parameters of the virtual machine capable of implementing the function and to define a security level.
- a security level can also be directly associated with a function, for example if it is imposed.
- a first step (step 400) is aimed at analyzing the context in order to determine the parameters enabling the risk of each function to be evaluated.
- the risks being assessed here in the event of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability or authenticity, the parameters that may be taken into account to assess the risks may include:
- step 300 provides context for the analysis of the functions to be implemented in a STAD to meet particular needs.
- a second step (step 405), the risks are identified. After having defined the list of assets to be protected and identified the responsibilities, the potential threats as well as the vectors of these threats and the means of mitigation already implemented are identified. It should be noted that the lists used must be sufficiently detailed to allow decision-making on the needs of the security levels.
- a next step (step 410), the risks are estimated by crossing the information obtained previously with the known vulnerabilities as well as the type and the level of consequences in case of exploitation of a vulnerability and the probability of an attack.
- This step allows in particular to evaluate the possible consequences for a given risk according to the context and to establish a list of risks to which a function may be subject.
- step 415 the level of risk is evaluated for each function, using the grid established above and the associated treatments.
- Figure 5 schematically illustrates an example of an algorithm for distributing software applications implemented in a STAD in virtual machines according to the functions they use.
- a variable / representing the index of the software applications implemented in the STAD
- a variable y representing the index of the functions called by the application having the index /
- Functions to which the application having the index / are used are determined (step 505). They are here stored as a table in the database 510.
- the security level requirement of the application having for index Z 1 is then defined as being the security level requirement of the function having for index y, called BNS (/) (step 515).
- a test is then performed (step 520) to determine whether the value of the index corresponds to the number of functions used by the function having index /. If so, the index is incremented by one (step 525) and another test is performed (step 530) to determine if the security requirement of the function having index y (BNSO) is greater than the need in security level of the application having for index / (BNS (Z)). If yes, the security level requirement for the Z-indexed application
- the application with Z index is associated with the virtual machine whose security level corresponds to BNS (Z) (step 540 ). This information is here stored in the database 545.
- the value of the Z index is then compared to the number of applications implemented by the STAD to determine if all applications have been associated with a virtual machine (step 550). If yes, the process ends. In the opposite case, the index / is incremented by one and the preceding steps (steps 505 to 550) are repeated.
- an application provider can deliver one or more virtual machines integrating its applications and communicate the installation procedure of the recommended software platform (virtualization-based) to the STAD.
- the latter can also be provided with the hypervisor and the virtual machine (s) pre-installed.
- customers may use a USB key or SD card to store the profile and user data such as an email id, cookies and favorites from an Internet browser, and login scripts. .
- the STADs are interchangeable and can be managed in a fleet.
- a common software base is installed on a fleet of STADs, for all uses and all types of aircraft to which the STADs are likely to be connected.
- the virtual machine (s) corresponding to the types of use and / or aircraft are then installed.
- one or more reference images are created to allow the configuration of the STAD during its use. These reference images can also be restored by the user without the need for a technician.
- the tool case known as the Electronic Flight Bag is here considered.
- This is a tool kit to from which a pilot and his second prepare a mission to perform.
- L 1 EFB is not an application having a high level of safety.
- Mission data is loaded into a portable STAD from the ground.
- the STAD is carried on board the aircraft but it is not connected to the on-board information system. Data is exchanged with the ground only after landing;
- this is a standard portable STAD, attached to a pilot.
- the STAD exchanges data with the ground, including the airline and the airport, and with the aircraft information system during all phases of flight; and,
- the STAD is supportive of the cockpit and can access critical systems that require a high level of certification.
- Class 2 EFBs can therefore be managed by a STAD according to the invention.
- the EFB provider delivers the operational applications or part of them to the client. It communicates the list of compatible systems and the minimum configuration of the hypervisor or delivers the STAD with the hypervisor and virtual machines pre-installed.
- the client prepares the virtual machines according to the operational applications and the received configuration data. It also prepares virtual machines to implement enterprise-specific applications, such as messaging applications.
- an IT technician can install the STAD hypervisor, which then makes it possible to use the company's IT resources, the functionalities of the EFB and, possibly, others.
- the data of the users is preferably stored on a removable memory card, for example an SD type card and not on the internal hard disk of the STADs.
- a removable memory card for example an SD type card
- the user can restart the virtual machine using the most recent associated reference image without recourse to a technician.
- the technician retrieves the user's memory card and inserts it into another STAD of the fleet. It does not need to customize this STAD or copy user data.
- FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary hardware architecture adapted to implement the invention.
- the device 600 here comprises a communication bus 605 to which are connected:
- CPU Central Processing Unit
- ROM Read OnIy Memory in English terminology
- ROM Read OnIy Memory
- RAM Random Access Memory
- cache memory 620 comprising registers adapted to record variables and parameters created and modified during the execution of the aforementioned programs
- a communication interface 650 adapted to transmit and receive data.
- the device 600 also preferably has the following elements:
- a screen 625 making it possible to display data such as representations of the commands and to serve as a graphical interface with the user who can interact with the programs according to the invention, using a keyboard and a mouse 630 or another pointing device such as a touch screen or remote control;
- a hard disk 635 that may include the aforementioned programs and data processed or to be processed according to the invention; and a memory card reader 640 adapted to receive a memory card 645 and to read or write to it data processed or to be processed according to the invention.
- the communication bus allows communication and interoperability between the various elements included in the device 600 or connected to it.
- the representation of the bus is not limiting and, in particular, the central unit is able to communicate instructions to any element of the device 600 directly or via another element of the device 600.
- the executable code of each program enabling the programmable device to implement the processes according to the invention can be stored, for example, in the hard disk 635 or in the read-only memory 615.
- the memory card 645 may contain data, in particular a correspondence table between the detected events and the commands that can be requested, as well as the executable code of the aforementioned programs which, once read by the device 600, is stored in the hard disk 635.
- the executable code of the programs may be received, at least partially, via the interface 650, to be stored in a manner identical to that described above.
- program or programs may be loaded into one of the storage means of the device 600 before being executed.
- the central unit 610 will control and direct the execution of the instructions or portions of software code of the program or programs according to the invention, instructions which are stored in the hard disk 635 or in the read-only memory 615 or else in the other elements of aforementioned storage.
- the program or programs that are stored in a non-volatile memory for example the hard disk 635 or the read-only memory 615, are transferred into the random access memory 620 which then contains the executable code of the program or programs according to the invention, as well as registers for memorize the variables and parameters necessary for the implementation of the invention.
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0955281A FR2948789B1 (en) | 2009-07-28 | 2009-07-28 | SOFTWARE COMPONENT AND DEVICE FOR THE AUTOMATED PROCESSING OF MULTI-PURPOSE DATA, IMPLEMENTING FUNCTIONS REQUIRING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SAFETY OR LIMITS OF LIABILITY |
PCT/FR2010/000552 WO2011020954A2 (en) | 2009-07-28 | 2010-07-28 | Software component and device for the automated processing of multi-usage data, implementing functions requiring various levels of security or limits of responsibility |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2460071A2 true EP2460071A2 (en) | 2012-06-06 |
Family
ID=41432807
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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EP10752854A Ceased EP2460071A2 (en) | 2009-07-28 | 2010-07-28 | Automated processing of multi-usage data, implementing functions requiring various levels of security or limits of responsibility |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US9804875B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2460071A2 (en) |
JP (1) | JP5646622B2 (en) |
CN (1) | CN102656559B (en) |
CA (1) | CA2769239C (en) |
FR (1) | FR2948789B1 (en) |
RU (1) | RU2012107091A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2011020954A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (15)
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CN102656559A (en) | 2012-09-05 |
CN102656559B (en) | 2016-12-07 |
US9804875B2 (en) | 2017-10-31 |
WO2011020954A2 (en) | 2011-02-24 |
US20120167089A1 (en) | 2012-06-28 |
RU2012107091A (en) | 2013-09-10 |
FR2948789B1 (en) | 2016-12-09 |
CA2769239A1 (en) | 2011-02-24 |
CA2769239C (en) | 2018-10-23 |
FR2948789A1 (en) | 2011-02-04 |
JP2013500531A (en) | 2013-01-07 |
JP5646622B2 (en) | 2014-12-24 |
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