EP2452286A1 - Sicherung des orts eines remote-codes durch aufdruck des empfängers - Google Patents

Sicherung des orts eines remote-codes durch aufdruck des empfängers

Info

Publication number
EP2452286A1
EP2452286A1 EP10725742A EP10725742A EP2452286A1 EP 2452286 A1 EP2452286 A1 EP 2452286A1 EP 10725742 A EP10725742 A EP 10725742A EP 10725742 A EP10725742 A EP 10725742A EP 2452286 A1 EP2452286 A1 EP 2452286A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
computer
code
information
key
fingerprint
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP10725742A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Jacques Fournier
Laurent Gauteron
Franck Imoucha
Véronique Charpeignet
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Thales DIS France SA
Original Assignee
Gemalto SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Gemalto SA filed Critical Gemalto SA
Priority to EP10725742A priority Critical patent/EP2452286A1/de
Publication of EP2452286A1 publication Critical patent/EP2452286A1/de
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/606Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes

Definitions

  • the invention relates to securing the location of a remote code through the recipient's fingerprint.
  • the invention relates to securing exchanges between two devices during the execution of a distributed code.
  • Intelligent Keys have the particularity of having a memory, an electronic intelligence, and access to a secure electronic module.
  • an executable computer code one or more software
  • the communication interface of the Intelligent Key often USB
  • This particular code is commonly called CDROM because in most cases, this code is stored as an 'ISO' image on a 'Read Only' partition that emulates a CD-ROM that will be seen as such (ie to the a "compact disc") by the host electronic device (the computer).
  • the computer detects it, recognizes it, and activates it.
  • the activation phase involves, among other things, mounting on the operating system the different
  • This technology can transport executable code, potentially large, on a non-fixed media, and this through a USB communication interface widely deployed on computers. Indeed, the compact disc, and its subsequent generations, can transport such a computer code, but in a static manner.
  • Intelligent Keys offer the possibility of developing this computer code, but also a whole set of functionalities related to embedded intelligence and the secure electronic module. These features can for example be related to security.
  • these devices make it possible to execute computer applications on a device (called an execution device) without relying on the software resources of this execution device.
  • an execution device the computer code provided by the Intelligent Key only uses the electronic resources of the execution device.
  • a major risk of this system lies in the fact that the execution device may include a malicious program type, for example, computer virus or Trojan.
  • a computer virus is a computer program written for the purpose of spreading to other computers by inserting into legitimate programs called "hosts". It can also have the effect, wanted or not, of harming by disrupting more or less seriously the operation of the infected computer.
  • Trojans are programs that perform damaging actions while presenting themselves to the user as useful applications or files.
  • malware in English
  • This expression refers to a program that captures all or part of the events that occurred on the infected computer, and transmits them (usually via the internet) to a so-called attacking computer, and vice versa. This mechanism allows among other things to spy on the infected computer, but also to divert some of these applications.
  • the malware will allow the computer attacker, for example, to use the services of the smart key without the knowledge of its legitimate owner.
  • malware a malware as being able to spy on the events that occurred on the infected computer, and to transmit them to the attacking computer, and vice versa.
  • the present invention proposes to prevent such attacks.
  • the invention notably describes a security method, comprising at least a first electronic device called “smart key”, able to communicate with at least a second electronic device called “computer”, the electronic device “smart key” comprising at least one controller, a mass memory in which is recorded a first executable computer code, also comprising access to a second executable computer code called the Secure Agent, the first executable computer code being intended to be executed by the "computer” device.
  • This method comprises at least the steps of:
  • the information related to all or part of the electronic components that make up the "computer" device can be non-modifiable information.
  • This information can be, for example, serial numbers, or technical characteristics.
  • the fingerprint can be generated by said Secure Agent code
  • the collected information can be transmitted to the device "Smart Key” which generates the fingerprint, or the information collected can transmitted to a secure electronic device SE that generates the print.
  • the creation of the imprint may further include the use of non-fixed data, which may be a random number.
  • the method according to the invention can be implemented before executing the first executable code, or during the execution of the first executable code, for example triggered by it.
  • FIG. 1 shows the malicious operation of a malware according to the prior art.
  • FIG i we can identify a smart key 2, which is connected to an electronic device 1.
  • This device is represented by a computer.
  • the computer i and the key 2 communicate through a communication channel illustrated by the double arrow 4.
  • This channel can be implemented by any computer communication protocol.
  • These protocols can be filai re such as T-carrier (Tl, T3, etc.), R3232, Ethernet, IDE, ... or wireless such as infrared, wifi, Bluetooth, RFID, ...
  • the key and the computer communicate through the TJSB protocol ("Un i ver sa 1 Se ria 1 Bus" in English).
  • TJSB protocol Un i ver sa 1 Se ria 1 Bus
  • drivers low-level software commonly called "drivers” that are present in the majority of operating systems.
  • the most advanced keys contain a security module 3 such as a smart card.
  • controller 6 in the smart keys.
  • This controller implies the presence, in the smart key 2, of at least one calculation component (microprocessor), a working memory (volatile memory), and a nonvolatile memory (eg RAM or ROM).
  • the key includes a nonvolatile memory 7, called mass memory, which contains an executable computer code 5 which we will call "application” in the remainder of this document.
  • the key When connecting the key 2 to the computer 1, the key receives the energy necessary to start it. Therefore, the controller 6 enters into communication with the computer 1.
  • the controller initiates a communication session, this passes, among other things, by identifying the key by its type of electronic device (mass storage unit, multimedia device, etc.).
  • the controller 6 of the key 2 sends the application 5 to the computer 1 which executes it 8.
  • This computer system allows, among other things, the execution of an application 5 on a computer 1 not having it.
  • the use of the security module 3 allows to restrict the use of the application 5 with the most advanced cryptographic tools. For example, it is possible to associate, with any invasive command for the application, an authent ic ion delegated to the security module (for example through the use of a personal code ("PIN code" in English). ).
  • a softphone is a type of software used to make Internet telephony from a computer rather than a phone. In order to ensure an optimal level of security, some softphones work with the help of an external dongle, usually USB.
  • the code of the softphone 5 is contained in a non-volatile memory 7 of the key? .. s and delivered to the computer 1 through a CD-ROM,
  • the security module 3 contains all the elements necessary for the authentication of the user on the telephony network. These Information is confidential: they are critical in the sense that their use entails not only billing for the user, but also his responsibility. Indeed fraudulent actions carried out through a private communication entail the responsibility of its owner.
  • the pictogram 911 is shown in the computer i.
  • This virus is in contact with its counterpart 10 on computer 11 of a hacker.
  • the virus can communicate by any means, including infrared, Bluetooth, ..., the most common means being the sending of any internet connection 13.
  • the hacker has on his computer 11 a version 12 of the softphone application. it may be in possession of this version of the application in that it is also in possession of an intelligent key of the same type as the key 2, but whose rights have for example expired, or by 1 ' geti 11 icitede application, through illegal download for example.
  • the application 12 In order to be able to function, to call in our example, the application 12, must have access to a key containing valid e 1 emen tio n fo rs, which the hacker does not possess.
  • the virus 10 will therefore come into contact with the virus 9 in order to exploit the elements contained in the secure module 3 of the de 2.
  • the virus 10 can pass for a key from the softphone 12.
  • Tl will receive the communications for a hypothetical key. This information will be transmitted to virus 9, which goes to in turn, send them to key 2 instead of softphone 8.
  • the information returned by key 2 can go the same way in the opposite direction to be communicated to the softphone 12.
  • FIG. 2 embodies the present invention in this scheme.
  • the method according to the invention calculates a fingerprint of the computer 21. This fingerprint is based on the computer electronics.
  • an electronic device such as a computer
  • a computer is composed of a set of electronic components 22, 23, 24.
  • These components are by definition unique.
  • two processors of the same model and the same series are different, for example by their serial numbers, two memories differ by their serial numbers or the arrangement of their addressable space.
  • the invention consists in collecting this type of information, on certain components, in order to obtain a unique imprint of our device 21.
  • the performance calculation is based on the fact that the same (relatively complex) operation entrusted to two components is performed in slightly different times. These times are also signatures of these components.
  • the invention therefore proposes an executable computer code 25, called a secondary agent, which is responsible for the collection of This Secure Agent is provided by the clp> 26, and executed on the computer 21, which it will analyze the components 22, 23, 24.
  • This secure agent can be stored, either in a non-volatile memory 27 Oe the key 26, either in the security module 28.
  • This secure agent can also be in charge of calculating the footprint 29, from the data collected.
  • the secure agent can be transmitted and executed as soon as the intelligent die is initialized, or later, but in any case, before the use of the applications requiring the level of security provided by the invention. .
  • all the components 22, 23, 24, having characteristic values can be set.
  • only certain components are used to define the footprint 29. The choice of these particular components can be made by their nature, or at a minimum, or by a combination of technical and technical factors.
  • a solution consists in that, during the step of defining the imprint 29, the secure agent 25 collects a list of all or part of the components 22, 23, 24, capable of fu ing a characteristic v er. This list is transmitted to the key 26 which will select a subset of this list, and thus define the components whose values will create the footprint 29.
  • a particularly effective mode is a regular change of this subset, to guard against spying on communication, and a "reieu”.
  • "Replay” attacks are “Man in the middle” attacks that intercept and replay data packets, that is, retransmit them as they are. (without any decryption) to the recipient server.
  • the calculation of the imprint 29 can be done in the computer 21, by a part of the application 20, in the key 26, or in the module secure 28.
  • the use of the secure module to generate the fingerprint makes it possible to exploit, during this generation, a turn or p a r t i e s of th e c y e rs p r e p a t i g e s i s e r e s i n e 1 secure module 23.
  • the generation of the imprint from the values of the selected components is done by the application of at least one mathematical function.
  • This function must be reproducible, that is, at a set of input parameters, the function matches one and only one result.
  • a hash function is a function, which, to an element, is capable of associating a fingerprint (also called a hc) and a key to it.
  • SHA-I Secure Hash Algorichm 1: 160 bits
  • SHA-2 SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 bits of choice
  • s on ⁇ hash functions used frequently.
  • the generation of the fingerprint further comprises the use of another value.
  • This value is a non-fixed value, which can be for example a random number.
  • the impression 29 obtained it must be partacree by the application softphone 20 and the key 26, in order to secure all or part of the exchanged. It is generally the secure module 28 that retains and uses the imprint 29 for the 26,
  • the Secure Agent 25 is loaded and executed on the computer 21, This secure agent collects the information on all or part of the components 22, z3 f 24, of the computer 21, and transmits to the key 26.
  • This fingerprint is integrated in the program 2 Obi s, before it is loaded and executes on the computer 21.
  • the progr amme 20 is in conn ection with the 2 9 th term, without the need for e 1
  • Computer 21 and Key 26 Securing exchanges can take many forms. Indeed, it can be one-way or two-way,
  • the softphone will use the imprint 29 on its messages, and the key 26 will check that the correct imprint has been used.
  • security can, protect the exchanges in terms of confidentiality, or not.
  • this data will, in a preferred mode of impiementation of the invention, be ignored. At the same time, this data can be processed, but information can be saved for later analysis.
  • the virus 31, installed on the computer 21 can not relay information from the application 32 to the key 26 because it does not have the hollow 29 needed to "ia securing these data.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
EP10725742A 2009-07-06 2010-06-18 Sicherung des orts eines remote-codes durch aufdruck des empfängers Withdrawn EP2452286A1 (de)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP10725742A EP2452286A1 (de) 2009-07-06 2010-06-18 Sicherung des orts eines remote-codes durch aufdruck des empfängers

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP09305649A EP2273407A1 (de) 2009-07-06 2009-07-06 Securitisation for localising a remote code using the addressee's fingerprint
EP10725742A EP2452286A1 (de) 2009-07-06 2010-06-18 Sicherung des orts eines remote-codes durch aufdruck des empfängers
PCT/EP2010/058668 WO2011003721A1 (fr) 2009-07-06 2010-06-18 Securisation de localisation d'un code distant a travers l'empreinte du destinataire

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2452286A1 true EP2452286A1 (de) 2012-05-16

Family

ID=41693171

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP09305649A Withdrawn EP2273407A1 (de) 2009-07-06 2009-07-06 Securitisation for localising a remote code using the addressee's fingerprint
EP10725742A Withdrawn EP2452286A1 (de) 2009-07-06 2010-06-18 Sicherung des orts eines remote-codes durch aufdruck des empfängers

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP09305649A Withdrawn EP2273407A1 (de) 2009-07-06 2009-07-06 Securitisation for localising a remote code using the addressee's fingerprint

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US9053331B2 (de)
EP (2) EP2273407A1 (de)
JP (1) JP5546631B2 (de)
WO (1) WO2011003721A1 (de)

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US6665709B1 (en) * 2000-03-27 2003-12-16 Securit-E-Doc, Inc. Method, apparatus, and system for secure data transport
DE10310372B4 (de) * 2003-03-10 2005-02-03 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Übertragung von mobilen Programmen
JP4638158B2 (ja) * 2003-10-06 2011-02-23 美恵子 露崎 著作権保護システム
US20070113090A1 (en) * 2004-03-10 2007-05-17 Villela Agostinho De Arruda Access control system based on a hardware and software signature of a requesting device
JP4631303B2 (ja) * 2004-04-16 2011-02-16 ソニー株式会社 データ利用システム,記憶装置,データ利用方法,およびコンピュータプログラム
CN100580611C (zh) * 2004-06-30 2010-01-13 松下电器产业株式会社 程序执行设备及该程序执行方法
KR100713128B1 (ko) * 2004-11-08 2007-05-02 주식회사 비젯 바이러스 방역 장치 및 시스템
US20070083610A1 (en) * 2005-10-07 2007-04-12 Treder Terry N Method and a system for accessing a plurality of files comprising an application program
GB2434887A (en) * 2006-01-13 2007-08-08 Deepnet Technologies Ltd Access control by encrypting stored data with a key based on a "fingerprint" of the device storing the data
JP2007233226A (ja) * 2006-03-03 2007-09-13 I-O Data Device Inc 可搬性記憶媒体、機密保護システム、および機密保護方法
JP2007249575A (ja) * 2006-03-15 2007-09-27 Ricoh Co Ltd 情報処理装置、コンピュータ読み取り可能な可搬性記録媒体、情報処理方法、情報処理プログラム及び情報処理システム
US20080132279A1 (en) * 2006-12-04 2008-06-05 Blumenthal Steven H Unlicensed mobile access
KR101368714B1 (ko) * 2006-12-22 2014-03-05 삼성전자주식회사 이동식 저장장치, 소프트웨어 자동설치시스템 및소프트웨어 자동설치방법
JP2008210324A (ja) * 2007-02-28 2008-09-11 Sync Inc ソフトウェアの実行制御プログラム、および実行制御方法
CN102016865A (zh) * 2008-03-04 2011-04-13 苹果公司 基于可用权利来授权执行软件代码的系统和方法
US8782404B2 (en) * 2010-09-07 2014-07-15 Nicholas L. Lamb System and method of providing trusted, secure, and verifiable operating environment
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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2011003721A1 (fr) 2011-01-13
JP5546631B2 (ja) 2014-07-09
US9053331B2 (en) 2015-06-09
US20120110265A1 (en) 2012-05-03
EP2273407A1 (de) 2011-01-12
JP2012532392A (ja) 2012-12-13

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