EP2441228A1

EP2441228A1 - Device and method for secure access to a remote server

Info

Publication number: EP2441228A1
Application number: EP10725090A
Authority: EP
Inventors: François LECOCQ; Cyrille Pepin
Original assignee: Morpho SA
Current assignee: Idemia Identity and Security France SAS
Priority date: 2009-06-11
Filing date: 2010-06-09
Publication date: 2012-04-18
Also published as: FR2946822B1; WO2010142740A1; US20120084849A1; US9185110B2; FR2946822A1

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of computer security and, specifically, to the field of protecting confidential personal information which enables encrypted access to a remote service. The invention describes a device and a method for securing confidential user information and secure exchanges of such information with the servers that host the services. The invention is based on personalising a chip card containing said information. Said chip card, connected to the user terminal, has a connection means enabling the terminal to appear as a standalone host of the user's local network. An encrypted connection is then established directly between the chip card and the server hosting the service for the transmission of confidential data. Said data, stored on the chip card, are then exchanged with the server via said encrypted connection. The data are never accessible in plain text on the user terminal.

Description

Device and method for secure access to a remote service

The present invention relates to the field of computer security and more specifically the field of protection of confidential personal information allowing encrypted access to a remote service.

Today, thanks to the significant development of the Internet network, the user can access a growing number of so-called "online" services. Most of these services require authentication of the user to allow him access to data concerning him. Examples of such services include access to bank account data, monitoring of medical reimbursement transactions, and online tax reporting. Fig. 1 illustrates the architecture of the network. The user typically uses a terminal 1.1 such as a personal computer or any similar device such as a personal assistant or a smartphone. This terminal is connected to an information exchange network 1.2, typically the Internet network. On this network are also connected 1.3 servers hosting remote services. The user can therefore access from his terminal to the services hosted on the servers 1.3 via the information exchange network 1.2. Many of these services deal with confidential information and it is important to secure access to these services. This securing generally involves providing the user with secret connection information that he must produce to establish the connection to the service. Typically this is an associated username and password. Upon login, the user is asked to enter this name and password which are used to authenticate and establish an encrypted connection to ensure the confidentiality of information exchanges between the user and the user. user and the remote service. It is common to secure these exchanges of connection information to prevent them from being stolen during transport between the terminal and the server. This security is typically done by creating an encrypted connection or an encrypted tunnel between the terminal and the server. This encrypted connection or tunnel can, for example, be created using the SSL protocol (Secure Socket Rent), or its successor TLS (Transport Layer Security in English). Fig. 2 illustrates the use of these techniques. The terminal sends a connection request 2.1, generally using its Internet browser to the server hosting the service. This request is not encrypted. It is interpreted by the server during a step 2.2 which responds with the message 2.3 comprising a public key corresponding to the certificate identifying the server or service. The terminal determines a pseudo-random symmetric key in a step 2.4. It encrypts it using the public key of the server received in the message 2.3 and sends it to the server in the message 2.5. Only the server is able to decrypt this symmetric key using its private key associated with its public key. It performs this decryption during step 2.6. At this time, the terminal and the server share the same secret key, the symmetric key, and are therefore able to establish an encrypted connection 2.7 using this shared key. This encrypted connection then allows the exchange of information between the terminal and the server in a secure manner. All data exchanged are encrypted using the shared secret key and can only be decrypted by both ends of the encrypted connection, the terminal and the server, which share the same secret. It can be seen that this method makes it possible to secure exchanges between the terminal and the server. On the other hand, the data exchanged are manipulated in clear by the server and the terminal. It is assumed a priori that the server is safe because of management by professionals. On the other hand, the security of the terminal poses a problem. Indeed, users are rarely aware of techniques to ensure the security of an information processing station. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to obtain from them a strict respect of safety rules. It is not uncommon for the user's terminal to be infected with viruses, spyware or any type of malicious software (malware). These malicious software are likely to discover the confidential information manipulated by the terminal and send it to third parties who may misuse it. And this, even when security techniques such as those described above secure the link between the terminal and the server. It turns out that the weak point of the system, as far as security is concerned, is the user's terminal. The user can also be seen as a weak point of security because, for example, a simple password choice, not robust or communication of it.

These security issues pose a real problem to the development of online services. They cause significant damage to economic actors in this sector.

The invention aims to solve the above problems by providing a device and a method for securing the confidential information of the user and their exchanges securely with the servers hosting the services. It is based on the personalization of a smart card containing this information. This smart card, connected to the user's terminal, has connection means allowing it to appear as an autonomous host of the user's local network. An encrypted connection is then established directly between the smart card and the server hosting the service for the transmission of confidential data. This data, stored on the smart card, is then exchanged with the server by this encrypted connection. They are never accessible in clear on the terminal of the user.

The invention relates to a device for secure access to a remote service comprising a smart card; means for connecting the smart card to a user terminal connected to a communication network; communication means with the user terminal to which the device is connected; communication means with a server hosting the remote service, said server being connected to the communication network, said communication means establishing the communication via the user terminal to which the device is connected; means for storing the address of said server hosting the remote service and means of authentication with this server; means for establishing an encrypted connection between the device and the server hosting the remote service using said connection identifiers and means for relaying the traffic between the user terminal and the server via said encrypted connection. According to a particular embodiment of the invention, it further comprises means for authenticating the user.

According to a particular embodiment of the invention, the authentication means are biometric means.

According to a particular embodiment of the invention, the device further comprises means for storing a list of accessible services and means for offering a choice from this list.

According to a particular embodiment of the invention, the device further comprises means for storing a client software allowing access to the secure service when it is executed on the user terminal. The invention also relates to a remote service connection method which comprises a step of establishing an encrypted connection between a device comprising a smart card and a remote server hosting a secure service, said device being connected to a user terminal. itself connected to a communication network, said remote server being accessible via the communication network, the encrypted connection being established by routing the communication by the user terminal, said encrypted connection being established using connection identifiers stored on said device and a step of using the service from the user terminal, the traffic between the terminal and the remote server being relayed by said device by said encrypted connection. According to a particular embodiment of the invention, the device storing a list of accessible services with the corresponding identifiers, the method further comprises a step of proposing the list of services to the user and a step of choosing the service with which establish the encrypted connection.

According to a particular embodiment of the invention, the method comprises a prior step of authenticating the user.

According to a particular embodiment of the invention, the method comprises a prior step of loading remote service access software from the device on the user terminal. The characteristics of the invention mentioned above, as well as others, will emerge more clearly on reading the following description of an exemplary embodiment, said description being given in relation to the attached drawings, among which: FIG. . 1 illustrates the architecture of the network;

Fig. 2 illustrates an example of connection to a secure service according to the prior art;

Fig. 3 illustrates the principle architecture of an exemplary embodiment of the invention; Fig. 4 illustrates the protocol architecture of an exemplary embodiment of the invention;

Fig. 5 illustrates the process of using a secure service according to an exemplary embodiment of the invention.

In the access architecture to a secure remote service by a user, the weak point from the point of view of security is the terminal of the user. Indeed, the user is rarely aware of the security rules to guard against contamination of the post by malware. In particular, it is not uncommon for the user terminal to be invaded by software such as computer viruses or spyware. Some of these malware, once operational on the terminal, are able to spy on the actions of the user and take note of the potentially confidential information of the latter.

Sensitive confidential information may include information enabling the user to connect to secure remote services such as his bank's website, e-commerce sites, and others. Once in possession of this sensitive data, these malicious software may use the network connection of the post to send this sensitive information to third parties who may use it fraudulently.

In addition to the direct harm caused by these acts of piracy, the very existence of the threat poses a considerable obstacle to the growth of online services because of the loss of confidence of the user. It is therefore particularly important to provide the user with the means to securely access remote services.

Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of an exemplary embodiment of the invention. The client terminal 3.1 has a first network interface 3.2 allowing the connection of the terminal to the Internet network 3.5. On this network are available servers hosting services. One of these servers 3.6 is shown connected to the network 3.5. The device according to the invention 3.4 is connected to the terminal 3.1 by a second network interface 3.3. This second network interface is based in the exemplary embodiment of the invention on a USB serial physical interface. The arrows 3.7 and 3.8 represent the data flows when using the device for a connection of the user to a secure service. The arrow 3.7 between the device 3.4 and the server 3.6 illustrates the encrypted connection that is established between these two elements. This encrypted connection is relayed by the terminal which then functions as a simple network router. The transferred data is protected against any attack by any malicious software on the terminal 3.1 by the encryption used to establish the encrypted connection. The terminal therefore has no means of access to these data although they transit through it.

The arrow 3.8 represents in fact two different data streams passing between the terminal and the device 3.4. At first, the user may be required to authenticate with the device to prevent fraudulent use. It must also, at least when the device hosts multiple services, select the service that it wants to access for the device to initiate the connection to this service. Confidential data for this connection may include login name and password pairs, digital encryption certificates, and any other information that may be required depending on the implementation of the service. A software module present on the device then establishes the encrypted connection with the server 3.6. Once this encrypted connection is established, the user can use the service from the terminal 3.1. This use is done by interaction, arrow 3.8, with a software module on the device for relaying information between the server and the user via the encrypted connection 3.7.

Several implementations can be used here differentiating by the level of intelligence of the embedded software on the device. One solution is as follows: the device is content with a relay (proxy in English) at the transport layer of the network, in this case TCP / IP (Transmission Control Protocol I Internet Protocol in English defined by RFC 791 and 793). The client-server model is implemented between a client hosted on the terminal, for example an HTTP client (HyperText Transfer Protocol defined by RFC 2616) or browser and the device. This same model is also implemented between the device that hosts the client and the remote service that the user wants to access. The exemplary embodiment of the invention is based on the use of a smart card inserted in a smart card reader connected in USB to the client terminal. A first adaptation aims to allow TCP / IP communication over the USB connection. To do this, the choice fell on the use of the protocol RNDIS (Remonte Network Driver Interface Specification developed by Microsoft). This is a specification for network devices running on a bus such as USB. This choice makes it possible to be compatible without requiring parameterization or to add a particular software with a wide selection of user terminal operating systems such as Windows Vista, Apple Mac OS X or Linux, which integrate into their distribution. by default the management of RNDIS. On Windows XP, it is simply necessary to add a ".inf" file of a few kilobytes. This choice therefore allows the simple use of the device according to the invention with most user terminals available on the market. Those skilled in the art understand that other choices can be made on this point, more particularly if the invention is made with a connection other than USB between the device and the terminal.

It is also necessary to add a TCP / IP communication stack to the operating system of the smart card which is generally without it. The choice here was focused on the TCP / IP stack implemented in the free operating system Contiki (http://www.sics.se/contiki/). This system is a lightweight, multitasking, highly portable operating system that contains a TCP / IP stack that is particularly suitable for porting to a smart card due to its low resource requirements and small size. Advantageously, this stack is made even more compact by deactivating all functions not strictly necessary for its operation. Thanks to the implementation of these two technologies, the smart card within its USB drive acquires the status of TCP / IP network host in its own right. All that is required is for the user's terminal to be configured in relay mode to share its network connection so that the device has network access via this intermediary.

The creation of the encrypted connection between the device and the server hosting the service requires an encryption software layer. Various solutions can be used to establish the encrypted connection such as IPsec, a set of protocols to secure data transport over the IP protocol, PPTP (Point to Point Tunneling Protocol), SSL (Secure Socket Rent) or still its evolution TLS (Transport Loyer Security in English). The example of realization is based on the use of TLS, which is advantageously implemented to use the crypto graphics coprocessor generally present on smart cards. This use of the crypto graphics coprocessor significantly improves the performance of the encryption and decryption operations compared to a purely software solution.

Fig. 4 illustrates the protocol layers involved in the implementation of the embodiment of the invention. We find the user terminal 4.1, the device according to the invention 4.4 and the server hosting the secure service 4.6. The user terminal 4.1 and the device 4.4 have a USB connection over which the RNDIS protocol is ported to allow IP communication. Above IP, the TCP transport layer is conventionally used to implement reliable sessions. The transferred data is secured by encryption by the TLS layer which is an evolution of SSL. It is this layer that allows the encryption and therefore the creation of the encrypted communication connection. The application layer is based in the exemplary embodiment on a WEB environment and therefore on the HTTP transport protocol (HyperText Transfer Protocol in English defined by RFC 2616).

The user terminal 4.1 has a second network interface, typically based on Ethernet, but other interfaces such as a Wi-Fi wireless interface can also be used, which allows it to communicate with the server 4.6. This server 4.6 also has the IP / TCP / TLS / HTTP layers already mentioned, typically over an Ethernet interface. Arrow 4.8 represents the traffic between the user terminal 4.1 and the device 4.4. Typically, this traffic corresponds to an authentication phase of the user with the device, the choice of the service and the traffic relating to the chosen service that the device refers to the terminal for use by the user. Arrow 4.7, for its part, represents the encrypted connection between the device 4.4 and the server 4.6. This encrypted connection goes through the terminal operating as a network router at the IP layer.

Fig. 5 illustrates an example of use of the invention. In a first step 5.1, the device connects to the terminal. Advantageously, to avoid the fraudulent use of the device during a second step 5.2, the user must authenticate with the device. Several authentication solutions can be used. The safest is to provide the device with a biometric sensor for identification, for example by a fingerprint recognition device executed on the device (Match On Card or MOC). As a result, no authentication entry is made on the client terminal and is therefore unlikely to be captured by malicious software. Alternatively, password authentication can be done. In this case, the user opens a web browser for example on the terminal and connects to the device. The device has an embedded WEB server which proposes an authentication page. Advantageously, the traffic between the terminal and the device 3.8, 4.8 is also protected by encryption. This limits the risk of malware attacks on the device. Once the user is authenticated, the device advantageously allows it to select one of the accessible services offered during a step 5.3. This step is optional, the device being configurable to only provide access to a particular service. This step can be implemented via a WEB page transmitted by HTTP to the terminal. The user can then select the desired service during a step 5.4 of choice of the service. When the service is chosen, the device establishes the encrypted connection with the server hosting the chosen service in a step 5.5. This encrypted connection is performed by the TLS security layer in the exemplary embodiment. To do this, the device has the service address and authentication means to the server, for example the identifiers required for connection to the server or service. This confidential data is entered in the card during a prior stage of personalization thereof. They benefit from the protection techniques against both software and hardware attacks intrinsic to smart cards. This preliminary programming of the card can be done using a dedicated software on the terminal. Advantageously, this personalization step is made before the distribution of the card to the user, for example by a service provider who can be the manager of one of the secure services, for example a banking establishment. These parameters typically consist of a list of accessible services and for each service are available the service address and login credentials, preferably a digital encryption certificate. Once the encrypted connection is established, the service can be used in a conventional manner. The device then functions as a relay (proxy in English) for HTTP traffic between the user terminal and the service. The user can use the service, during a step 5.6, using his web browser as if he were directly connected to the server via his terminal. HTTP traffic is directed to the device that relays it to the server through the encrypted connection. The traffic goes back to the terminal, but encrypted, the terminal functioning as a simple IP router. At the end of the session, the device closes the encrypted connection in step 5.7. If a connection, for example encrypted, was established between the terminal and the device, this connection is also closed in step 5.8. Alternatively, it is possible to further increase the security of the system by allowing the connection to the device only from a client software provided by the system and not from the web browser of the terminal. This client software can be a web browser, but can also be a client based on a different protocol possibly developed for the occasion. Advantageously, this client is stored securely and can not be modified without authorization on the card within a storage space. This storage space can then be seen from the terminal as a removable storage device visible from the terminal when the device is connected. This software allows access to the secure service when it is run on the user terminal. The use of the device then comprises a preliminary step of loading this access software from the device on the user terminal. This avoids manipulation and / or espionage exchanges by modification of the client software.

By doing so, the user can connect to a secure service without at any time, the service address or login credentials are present in clear on the terminal. Eventually, this information is never even brought to the attention of the user who is provided with a personalized card ready to use.

Claims

1 / Device for secure access to a remote service comprising:

- a smart card; means for connecting the smart card to a user terminal connected to a communication network; characterized in that it further comprises:

means of communication with the user terminal to which the device is connected; means for communicating with a server hosting the remote service, said server being connected to the communication network, said communication means establishing communication via the user terminal to which the device is connected;

means for storing the address of said server hosting the remote service and means of authentication with this server;

means for establishing an encrypted connection between the device and the server hosting the remote service using said connection identifiers;

means for relaying the traffic between the user terminal and the server via said encrypted connection.

2 / Apparatus according to claim 1, characterized in that it further comprises means for authenticating the user.

3 / Apparatus according to claim 2, characterized in that the authentication means are biometric means.

4 / Apparatus according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the device further comprises means for storing a list of accessible services and means to offer a choice from this list.

5 / Apparatus according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the device further comprises means for storing a client software for access to the secure service when it is executed on the user terminal. 6 / Method for connection to a remote service characterized in that it comprises the following steps:

a step of establishing an encrypted connection between a device comprising a smart card and a remote server hosting a secure service, said device being connected to a user terminal itself connected to a communication network, said remote server being accessible by the communication network, the encrypted connection being established by routing the communication by the user terminal, said encrypted connection being established using connection identifiers stored on said device; a step of using the service from the user terminal, the traffic between the terminal and the remote server being relayed by said device by said encrypted connection.

A method according to claim 6, characterized in that the device stores a list of accessible services with corresponding identifiers, it further comprises:

a step of proposing the list of services to the user;

a step of choosing the service with which to establish the encrypted connection.

8 / A method according to one of claims 6 to 7, characterized in that it comprises a prior step of authenticating the user.

9 / A method according to one of claims 6 to 8, characterized in that it comprises a prior step of loading a remote service access software from the device on the user terminal.