EP2338244A1 - Use of a secure element for writing to and reading from machine readable credentials - Google Patents
Use of a secure element for writing to and reading from machine readable credentialsInfo
- Publication number
- EP2338244A1 EP2338244A1 EP09813574A EP09813574A EP2338244A1 EP 2338244 A1 EP2338244 A1 EP 2338244A1 EP 09813574 A EP09813574 A EP 09813574A EP 09813574 A EP09813574 A EP 09813574A EP 2338244 A1 EP2338244 A1 EP 2338244A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- secure element
- encoding device
- encoding
- credential
- secure
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 50
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 18
- 239000003999 initiator Substances 0.000 claims description 18
- 239000000463 material Substances 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000002093 peripheral effect Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 abstract description 2
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000001010 compromised effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013500 data storage Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000013519 translation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000523 sample Substances 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
- G06F21/85—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
Definitions
- the present invention is generally directed to secure access systems and more particularly to secure encoding of credential cards.
- RFID transponder-based credential cards such as HID Global' s HID ProxTM and iCLASS ®
- credential cards typically contain identification data, such as a card number and site code as well as additional data, e.g., error detection and correction.
- Devices referred to as readers or reader/writers are employed to read data from and/or write data to these RFID credential cards although these concepts also apply to other types of machine- readable credentials such as magnetic stripe cards.
- the data storage locations in these credentials can be read and/or written by these devices, typically a device called a programmer is used to initially write sensitive data to a credential card. Other commonly used names include field programmer and encoder.
- provisioning The process of writing initialization data to previously unused credential cards is typically called provisioning.
- RWD Read/Write Device
- Any device used to either read from or write data to machine-readable credentials shall be referred to as an RWD (Read/Write Device) and, depending on the application, may be a stand-alone device or embedded into another device such as a printer or time clock running a program in firmware possibly under the control of a real-time operating system.
- RWDs are connected to a host device and this host device may be a computer running a program on a general-purpose, multi-programming operating system such as Windows, Linux, or Mac O/S.
- a device acting as a host shall be referred to as an initiator.
- the encoding rules that define how data is stored in a credential card, any cryptographic keys required to access the credential card, where the data is to be stored in the credential card, and other secret, sensitive and proprietary information typically resides in the initiator.
- this sensitive data is easily compromised. For example, if the encoding rules are proprietary and trade secrets of the manufacturer or the issuer of the credential card, then a security breach may compromise the manufacturer's or the issuer's future source of revenue.
- one aspect of the present invention to use a intermediate secure element, such as an integrated circuit card, to store and utilize these secrets and rules (e.g., formats, cryptographic keys, encryption rules, and/or sensitive data) in order to read, write, and provision credentials while guaranteeing the security and privacy of these secrets and rules.
- secrets and rules e.g., formats, cryptographic keys, encryption rules, and/or sensitive data
- Embodiments of the present invention allow for secure encoding of credential cards intermediated by a secure processing element that contains sensitive information such as cryptographic keys, data encoding rules and structures, encoder and encoding protocols, metering information, together with the program to perform communications with the credential card involving this data.
- RWDs are examples of devices that are capable of securely accessing the data storage area on credential cards in order to read data therefrom or write data thereto. These devices are employed when the machine-readable credential is being manufactured, initialized, personalized or read and/or written by means of a computer program running on a general-purpose, multi-programming operating system such as a Windows, Linux, or Mac O/S.
- the sensitive data such as cryptographic keys and personal identification data is typically stored in the computing environment of the computer program.
- sensitive data is susceptible to compromise and breach by other programs such as malware, spyware, software probes and debuggers running concurrently in the general purpose, multi-programming operating system.
- this sensitive data may also be left behind in the computer such as in the memory or in the operating system swap files when the reading/writing program is terminated and even when the computer itself is turned off. In all these cases this sensitive data is subject to discovery and breach.
- sensitive data can be compromised by exploitation of the hardware platform executing and supporting the movement of data to and from the RWD.
- Devices such as hardware probes and environmental monitors can detect and even alter sensitive data.
- Embodiments of the present invention propose the use of a secure element, e.g., an integrated circuit card, to contain both the sensitive data and the program used to provision the credential cards.
- a secure element e.g., an integrated circuit card
- the program execution and hardware environment of an integrated circuit card are more secure against attack than a general purpose, multi-programming, operating system, the above short-comings of the current art are addressed.
- a secure element comprising: one or more of cryptographic material such as cryptographic keys, sensitive data such as personally identifiable information, and encoding rules; and a provisioning program operable to access the one or more of cryptographic material, sensitive data, and encoding rules and provide such information via a secure communication channel to an encoding device.
- the provisioning program resides inside an integrated circuit card.
- the encoding rules are utilized by the encoding device to provision a credential card.
- the encoding rules are provided to the encoding device in response to the secure element receiving a request for the encoding rules.
- the intermediate secure element resides within the encoding device.
- the intermediate secure element is a peripheral device to the encoding device.
- the intermediate secure element comprises two communication channels, a first of the two channels being in communication with an initiator and a second of the two channels being in communication with a device comprising the encoding device.
- the first channel may comprise communication using a
- USB protocol and the second channel may comprise a communication using a serial communication protocol.
- Fig. 1 depicts a first system configuration for writing data to and reading data from a credential card in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention
- Fig. 2 depicts a second system configuration for writing data to and reading data from a credential card in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention
- Fig. 3 depicts a third system configuration for writing data to and reading data from a credential card in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention
- Fig. 4 depicts a fourth system configuration for writing data to and reading data from a credential card in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention
- Fig. 5 depicts a fifth system configuration for writing data to and reading data from a credential card in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention
- Fig. 6 depicts a sixth system configuration for writing data to and reading data from a credential card in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention.
- the system 100 may include a host or initiator computer 108 that is operated by a security administrator or similar type of security personnel.
- exemplary types of hosts 108 include, but are not limited to, personal computers, laptops, and/or a hardware appliance such as a time clock.
- the host or computer 108 is adapted to run a program on a general-purpose, multi-programming operating system such as Windows, Linux, or Mac O/S.
- the host or computer 108 is in communication with an insecure reader/writer 112 that has the capability to read and write data from the credential card 116.
- the host or computer 108 as well as the reader/writer 112 are typically insecure in that data stored thereon may be relatively easily accessed by unauthorized persons. More specifically, while the host or computer 108 and reader/writer 112 may be utilized to initiate data reads/writes to credentials 116 using third party proprietary or sensitive data, the host or computer 108 and reader/writer 112 is not operated by the third party and, thus, may not employ security provisions in accordance with the third party's requirements. Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention propose the use of an intermediate secure element 104 for interfacing with the insecure reader/writer 112.
- the intermediate secure element 104 may contain any proprietary, secret, or sensitive third party data and that data may be secured in accordance with the third party's requirements.
- a security administrator can interface with the host or computer 108 (for example using a graphical user interface) and the host or computer 108 is capable of communicating directly with the insecure reader/writer 112.
- the communications between the host or computer 108 and insecure reader/write 112 typically include instructions to initiate a read/write of data from/to the credential card 116.
- the insecure reader/writer 112 Upon receiving such a command from the host or computer 108, the insecure reader/writer 112 is configured to communicate with the secure element 104 and retrieve the necessary secrets and/or rules to complete the data read/write.
- the secure element 104 may correspond to an integrated circuit or circuit card that is insertable into the reader/writer 112.
- the secure data and/or rules can be obtained from the secure element 104 (e.g., cryptographic keys, sensitive data, encoding rules and a provisioning program operable to access the encoding rules).
- the secure element 104 can then provide the sensitive data and the secure data and/or encoding rules to the reader/writer 112 via a secure communication channel and said sensitive data and rules can be used by the reader/writer 112 for reading data from or writing data to the credential card 116.
- the insecure host or computer 108 may communicate with the reader/writer 112 through the intermediate secure element 104.
- the host or computer 108 can communicate directly with the secure element 104 and instruct the secure element 104 to retrieve sensitive data and encoding rules and provide said sensitive data and encoding rules to the reader/writer 112.
- the intermediate secure element may comprise two different communication channels.
- the first channel may be used to facilitate communications with the host or computer 108 while the second channel may be used to facilitate communications with the reader/writer 112.
- the first channel may comprise a USB communication protocol or similar communication protocol that is capable of facilitating communications with a host or computer 108 in a native format of the host or computer 108 and the second channel may comprise a serial communication protocol (e.g., SCSI, RS-232, and RS-422).
- Fig. 3 depicts yet another alternative configuration of the system 300.
- system elements are configured in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention.
- the system 300 may utilize an intermediate secure element 104 that can communicate with the credential card 116 in the absence of a reader/writer 112.
- the secure element 104 may include an encoding device 208 (i.e., functionality of the reader/writer 112) and may also be provided with an antenna 120.
- the credential card 116 may also be provided with an antenna 124.
- Wireless communications between the secure element 104 and credential card 116 can be facilitated via the antennas 120, 124 using known wireless communication standards and techniques such as FSK, PSK, ASK, ISO/IEC 14443, ISO/IEC 15693, etc.
- Fig. 4 depicts still another alternative configuration of the system 400.
- system elements are configured in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention.
- This particular embodiment shows an initiator 212 (which may be similar or identical) a host computer 208 in communication with an encoding device 204.
- the encoding device is capable of reading/writing data from/to the credential 216.
- the initiator 212 is generally similar or identical to the host or computer 108 and the encoding device 204 may be similar or identical to the reader/writer 112 depicted in Figs. 1-3.
- the encoding device may comprise a secure element 104, which is also referred to as a secure processing element or SPE, and an encoder 208.
- the internal secure element 104 may still contain generally secret or proprietary data (e.g., encoding rules, sensitive data, cryptographic keys, protocols to be used with initiator 212 and/or protocols to be used between the encoder 208 and credential 216) and the encoder 208 can be used to execute read/write operations of the encoding device 204.
- the encoder 208 is adapted to retrieve sensitive data and encoding rules from the intermediate secure element 104 prior to communicating with the credential 216.
- the communications between the secure element 104 and encoder 208 may be either wired (e.g., USB, RS485, TTL, etc.) or wireless (e.g., Bluetooth, Zigbee, Wi-Fi, ISO/IEC 14443, ISO/IEC 15693, NFC, etc.) communications.
- the secure element 104 may include one or more of a contact smart card, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, a Security Authentication Module (SAM) card, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or any similar type of device.
- SIM Subscriber Identity Module
- SAM Security Authentication Module
- TPM Trusted Platform Module
- the system 500 may include a intermediate secure element 104 in the initiator 212 and the encoding device may comprise one or more of an encoder 208 and firmware 220. Encoding rules and other sensitive data from the secure element 104 may be provided directly to the encoding device 204 using RF circuitry. Alternatively, or in addition, data from the secure element 104 may be provided to the embedded encoder 208 using the encoder's protocol (e.g., ISO 7816). Alternatively, or in addition, data from the secure element 104 may be provided to the encoding device 204 using wired or wireless communications with the firmware 220 that is embedded in the device 204.
- the encoder's protocol e.g., ISO 7816
- Fig. 6 depicts yet another alternative configuration of the system 600.
- system elements are configured in accordance with at least some embodiments of the present invention.
- the intermediate secure element 104 is separate from both the initiator 212 and encoding device 204 ⁇ i.e., the secure element 104 is a stand-alone device). Communications from the initiator 212 to the encoding device 204 may flow through the secure element 104 which injects any secure data or encoding rules that is necessary for the encoder 208 to communicate with the credential 216.
- the data from the secure element 104 may be provided to the encoding device 204 in any number of different ways previously discussed in connection with Fig. 5.
- embodiments of the present invention make use of the elevated security context available to programs executing within a secure element 104, such as an integrated circuit card, to provide a secure conduit between the provisioning program and the credential card being provisioned.
- a secure element 104 such as an integrated circuit card
- a provisioning program running in the secure element 104 accesses data stored also in the same secure element and: • Outputs to the RWD commands to establish a communication channel between the
- the establishment of the shared security context may include authentication of the credential card by the provisioning program running inside the secure element 104 and authentication of the provisioning program running inside the secure element by the credential card.
- DRM digital rights management
- the secure element can contain metering data so that only a certain number of credentials can be encoded or deciphered.
- the secure elements meters could be altered or changed using a secure interchange between itself and an initiator or even by using data that resides on a machine readable credential.
- the secure element 104 may also perform protocol and data translation services on the communication between the insecure host computer and the credential card.
- protocol and data translation services which are based on the sensitive data contained in the secure element 104.
- One advantage offered by the present invention is that one need only provide an additional communication channel on the programmer/reader-writer/encoder to enhance the security of communication with credential cards.
- the systems, methods and protocols of this invention can be implemented on a special purpose computer in addition to or in place of the described access control equipment, a programmed microprocessor or microcontroller and peripheral integrated circuit element(s), an ASIC or other integrated circuit, a digital signal processor, a hard-wired electronic or logic circuit such as discrete element circuit, a programmable logic device such as TPM, PLD, PLA, FPGA, PAL, a communications device, such as a server, personal computer, any comparable means, or the like.
- any device capable of implementing a state machine that is in turn capable of implementing the methodology illustrated herein can be used to implement the various data messaging methods, protocols and techniques according to this invention.
- the disclosed methods may be readily implemented in software.
- the disclosed system may be implemented partially or fully in hardware using standard logic circuits or VLSI design. Whether software or hardware is used to implement the systems in accordance with this invention is dependent on the speed and/or efficiency requirements of the system, the particular function, and the particular software or hardware systems or microprocessor or microcomputer systems being utilized.
- the analysis systems, methods and protocols illustrated herein can be readily implemented in hardware and/or software using any known or later developed systems or structures, devices and/or software by those of ordinary skill in the applicable art from the functional description provided herein and with a general basic knowledge of the computer arts.
- the disclosed methods may be readily implemented in software that can be stored on a storage medium, executed on a programmed general-purpose computer with the cooperation of a controller and memory, a special purpose computer, a microprocessor, or the like.
- the systems and methods of this invention can be implemented as program embedded on personal computer such as a JAVA® or CGI script, as a resource residing on a server or computer workstation, as a routine embedded in a dedicated communication system or system component, or the like.
- the system can also be implemented by physically incorporating the system and/or method into a software and/or hardware system, such as the hardware and software systems of a communications device or system.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US9668908P | 2008-09-12 | 2008-09-12 | |
PCT/US2009/056447 WO2010030731A1 (en) | 2008-09-12 | 2009-09-10 | Use of a secure element for writing to and reading from machine readable credentials |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2338244A1 true EP2338244A1 (en) | 2011-06-29 |
EP2338244A4 EP2338244A4 (en) | 2012-11-14 |
EP2338244B1 EP2338244B1 (en) | 2021-06-16 |
Family
ID=42005461
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09813574.2A Active EP2338244B1 (en) | 2008-09-12 | 2009-09-10 | Use of a secure element for writing to and reading from machine readable credentials |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20110264926A1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2338244B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2010030731A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9032058B2 (en) * | 2009-03-13 | 2015-05-12 | Assa Abloy Ab | Use of SNMP for management of small footprint devices |
US8332498B2 (en) * | 2009-03-13 | 2012-12-11 | Assa Abloy Ab | Synchronized relay messaging and coordinated network processing using SNMP |
EP2228746A1 (en) | 2009-03-13 | 2010-09-15 | Assa Abloy Ab | Realization of access control conditions as boolean expressions in credential authentications |
EP2406749B1 (en) | 2009-03-13 | 2018-06-13 | Assa Abloy Ab | Transfer device for sensitive material such as a cryptographic key |
GB2505601B (en) * | 2011-06-10 | 2019-01-09 | Securekey Tech Inc | Credential authentication methods and systems |
US9177161B2 (en) * | 2013-03-15 | 2015-11-03 | Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. | Systems and methods for secure access modules |
US9703973B2 (en) | 2015-04-28 | 2017-07-11 | International Business Machines Corporation | Customer load of field programmable gate arrays |
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EP0668579A2 (en) * | 1994-02-08 | 1995-08-23 | AT&T Corp. | Secure money transfer techniques using smart cards |
WO1998052136A1 (en) * | 1997-05-12 | 1998-11-19 | American Card Technology, Inc. | Dual smart card access control electronic data storage and retrieval system and methods |
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WO2006013162A1 (en) * | 2004-07-26 | 2006-02-09 | Proton World International N.V. | Recording a key into an integrated circuit |
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TWI246064B (en) * | 2002-07-29 | 2005-12-21 | Milsys Ltd | Data storage and processing device, electronic appliance, electronic system and method of operating an appliance that responds to a plurality of commands |
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2009
- 2009-09-10 US US13/063,072 patent/US20110264926A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2009-09-10 EP EP09813574.2A patent/EP2338244B1/en active Active
- 2009-09-10 WO PCT/US2009/056447 patent/WO2010030731A1/en active Application Filing
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WO1998052136A1 (en) * | 1997-05-12 | 1998-11-19 | American Card Technology, Inc. | Dual smart card access control electronic data storage and retrieval system and methods |
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Title |
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See also references of WO2010030731A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP2338244A4 (en) | 2012-11-14 |
WO2010030731A1 (en) | 2010-03-18 |
US20110264926A1 (en) | 2011-10-27 |
EP2338244B1 (en) | 2021-06-16 |
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