EP2295863B1 - Combustion system, automatic gas ignition device and device and method for interrupting a fuel supply for same - Google Patents

Combustion system, automatic gas ignition device and device and method for interrupting a fuel supply for same Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP2295863B1
EP2295863B1 EP10172195.9A EP10172195A EP2295863B1 EP 2295863 B1 EP2295863 B1 EP 2295863B1 EP 10172195 A EP10172195 A EP 10172195A EP 2295863 B1 EP2295863 B1 EP 2295863B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
switch
paths
path
independent
interrupting
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP10172195.9A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP2295863A3 (en
EP2295863A2 (en
Inventor
Klaus Krieger
Hartmut Birr
Michael Wenz
Arne Deseyve
Juergen Grossmann
Hanspeter Leutz
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Robert Bosch GmbH
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=42830289&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=EP2295863(B1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Application filed by Robert Bosch GmbH filed Critical Robert Bosch GmbH
Publication of EP2295863A2 publication Critical patent/EP2295863A2/en
Publication of EP2295863A3 publication Critical patent/EP2295863A3/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2295863B1 publication Critical patent/EP2295863B1/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
    • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
    • F23N5/00—Systems for controlling combustion
    • F23N5/24—Preventing development of abnormal or undesired conditions, i.e. safety arrangements
    • F23N5/242—Preventing development of abnormal or undesired conditions, i.e. safety arrangements using electronic means
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
    • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
    • F23N2231/00—Fail safe
    • F23N2231/04—Fail safe for electrical power failures
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
    • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
    • F23N2231/00—Fail safe
    • F23N2231/10—Fail safe for component failures
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
    • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
    • F23N5/00—Systems for controlling combustion
    • F23N5/24—Preventing development of abnormal or undesired conditions, i.e. safety arrangements

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault according to the preamble of patent claim 1.
  • the invention relates to a device for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault, according to the preamble of claim 5.
  • the invention also relates to a gas burner control for safe operation of a combustion system, according to the preamble of claim 9.
  • the invention relates to a combustion system, in particular a combustion system with a gas burner, according to the preamble of claim 10.
  • Combustion systems, gas burner control systems and methods and devices for interrupting a fuel supply are generally known from the prior art, such as from EP 0803680 A2 ,
  • overvoltage protection is provided on a power supply unit supplying the automatic gas burner.
  • the overvoltage protection is usually achieved with Zener diodes or suppressor diodes connected in parallel with the logic supply.
  • this overvoltage protection is very inaccurate, which can be damaged very easily to be supplied logic components such as microcontroller, so-called watchdogs, etc., thereby reducing the safety of the automatic burner control.
  • GFA automatic gas burner control
  • Third or multiple static errors are: In the event of such an error, it happens that e.g. several ports of a microcontroller keep their state permanently or that a microcontroller or the like by overvoltage, EMC pulse. permanently persisted in a current state, without leaving it again. This error consideration should be taken into account when revising the EN 298 standard.
  • the invention has for its object to provide a combustion system, a gas burner control apparatus, a device and a method for interrupting a fuel supply, in which the logic and / or switching parts are securely protected and unintentional opening of a fuel supply (gas valves) is reliably prevented.
  • the inventive method for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault, wherein the interruption is performed via at least two independent Abschaltwege is characterized as defined in claim 1.
  • the at least two switch-off paths are respectively monitored via at least one independent monitoring device.
  • the third shutdown path is triggered with at least the first and / or the second shutdown path.
  • Yet another embodiment of the present invention contemplates that the third shutdown path discontinues fueling when a dynamic signal generated by the at least one coupled independent shutdown path fails.
  • the device according to the invention for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault, wherein at least two independent shutdown paths are provided for interrupting the fuel supply is characterized as defined in claim 5.
  • the dependent Abschaltweg coupled via a dynamic signal with at least one of the independent Abschaltwege, in particular triggered.
  • the third switch-off path comprises a switch for interrupting the voltage and / or current supply of the valves, the switch being switchable as a function of a trigger signal.
  • the dependent shutdown path comprises at least one system base chip, in particular a watchdog IC or guard dog IC, for monitoring the coupled independent shutdown path (IC: integrated circuit).
  • the safety device at least for at least two independent shutdown each power failure protection, in particular an overvoltage protection having.
  • the automatic gas burner control unit according to the invention for safe operation of a combustion system, with switching means, is characterized in that the switching means comprise at least one device according to the invention.
  • the combustion system according to the invention is characterized in that at least one gas burner control device according to the invention is provided.
  • the third shutdown can be dangerous operating conditions, as they can be caused in the presence of third and / or multiple static errors, avoid what would otherwise lead to an unwanted opening or keeping open of actuators such as valves and to an unwanted fuel supply.
  • By coupling the Abschaltwege a redundant system is created, which is securely formed. Due to the redundancy, a secure overall system is realized in a simple manner.
  • This safety device or controlled by her third Abschaltweg interrupt the voltage or power supply of the fuel valves by means of a separate switch as soon as a normal operating conditions of at least one of the two shutdown regularly emitted trigger signal now in case of failure of these no longer sent and therefore no longer received by the third shutdown. This reliably shuts off the fuel supply and reliably precludes an unsafe operating state.
  • Fig. 1 schematically shows in a block diagram a circuit arrangement of a device 1 for a gas fire engine.
  • a gas supply takes place in accordance with the position of two safety solenoid valves 14, which are fed by a power supply 12.
  • the safety solenoid valves 14 close and thus interrupt a gas supply.
  • the device 1 comprises a safety device 4 having a first shut-off path 2, a second shut-off path 3 and a third shut-off path 5 according to the invention.
  • the shut-off paths 2, 3, 5 each comprise a logic circuit or a microcontroller 17, 10, 6, wherein each microcontroller with at least one switch 16, 11, 19 for interrupting a power supply of the safety solenoid valves 14 cooperates.
  • the microcontroller 6, 10 and 17 are each supplied in the illustrated embodiment by its own power source. For redundant design of the safety device 4, this at least for at least two independent shutdown paths 2, 3 depending on a power failure protection 7, in particular an overvoltage protection, on, here only one is shown schematically.
  • the first shut-off path 2 and the second shut-off path 3 are connected via corresponding lines 8 to an ionization detection circuit 9.
  • a heat demand as shown by the arrow P, also sent to the microcontroller 17, which switches the coupled components accordingly. ever After heat demand, the microcontroller 17 switches the safety solenoid valves 14, whereby the fuel supply is regulated or adjusted according to a safety solenoid valve position 14.
  • the first shut-off path 2 and the second shut-off path 3 are connected via corresponding lines 8 to an ionization detection circuit 9.
  • the second shutdown 3 includes according to the embodiment of Fig. 1 an ASIC, microcontroller or watchdog logic device 10 (ASIC: application specific integrated circuit). This is in turn coupled to a so-called high-side switch 11, which switches or interrupts a power supply 12 for safety solenoid valves 14. Downstream of the highside switch 11 is a gas fitting 13.
  • the gas fitting 13 comprises the two safety solenoid valves 14, which regulate a corresponding switching of the fuel supply.
  • the safety solenoid valves 14 may be connected in parallel, as shown.
  • the safety solenoid valves 14 are coupled via a safety temperature limiter 15 to the highside switch 11. Downstream of the safety solenoid valves 14 is a respective switch 16 of the first Abschaltweges 2.
  • the switches 16 are controlled by a microcontroller or short microcontroller 17, which is included in the first Abschaltweg 2.
  • the microcontroller 17 controls via a corresponding circuit 18, here a logical AND circuit, the power supply to the safety solenoid valves 14 so that a fuel supply according to the first Abschaltweg 2 by switching the switch 11 and thus the power supply to the safety solenoid valves 14 is switchable.
  • a heat demand as shown by the arrow P, also sent to the microcontroller 17, which switches the coupled components accordingly.
  • the microcontroller 17 switches the safety solenoid valves 14, whereby the fuel supply is regulated or adjusted according to a safety solenoid valve position 14.
  • the microcontroller 17 thus processes the heat requirements and operates the burner.
  • the microcontroller 17 is the watchdog, ASIC or microcontroller 10 of the second shutdown 3, which in the embodiment according to Fig. 1 the flame of a burner monitored by a flame signal (ionization).
  • the safety device 4 With the first shutdown 2, the safety device 4, more precisely, the third shutdown 5 of the safety device 4 is coupled.
  • the third shutdown path 5 includes the system base chip 6, which is designed here as a watchdog.
  • the watchdog 6 is triggered by the microcontroller 17 regularly, for example via a dynamic signal. If the watchdog 6 is not triggered, it opens a low-side switch 19, whereby the magnetic safety valves 14 are closed. Thus, the system is brought into a safe state even in the case of third static errors.
  • the watchdog 6 of the third shutdown can be configured as a time-out watchdog, a time-window watchdog or a smart watchdog with question-answer protocol.
  • the low-side switch 19 preferably comprises an N-channel power MOSFET (MOSFET: metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor).
  • the safety device 4 also includes a power failure protection 7, which is integrated here as overvoltage protection in the logic module 10.
  • Fig. 2 shows schematically in a block diagram another circuit arrangement of a device 1 for a gas fire engine.
  • the mode of operation essentially corresponds to that according to the exemplary embodiment Fig. 1 ,
  • the safety device 4 also includes three shutdown paths 2, 3, 5.
  • the first shutdown 2 includes the microcontroller 17, which processes the incoming heat demand and operates the burner. Two of the shutdown 2, 3, 5 are protected against overvoltage. In the present example, it is the second and third Abschaltweg 3, 5. They can be due to a smaller number of pins, less expensive, protect against overvoltages on all pins.
  • the second shutdown path 3 includes an ASIC 10 which has an internal voltage regulator and thus protects the integrated logic from overvoltage. Also, all pins of the ASIC are voltage resistant up to 42V.
  • the third shutdown path 5 includes a watchdog or timer IC. It is supplied via a protective circuit 20 with a valve supply voltage. A trigger input B is protected against overvoltage by microcontroller 17 (first shutdown path 2) via a high-impedance series resistor. Both voltage-protected switch-off paths 3, 5 each control a switch 16, 19, which interrupts the power supply for the safety solenoid valves 14 in the event of a fault. The switches 16 and 19 are in terms of their dielectric strength above the maximum (“worst case") occurring valve supply voltage and in turn contribute to overvoltage protection.
  • the third shut-off 5 is in Fig.
  • the watchdog 6 of the third shutdown 5 builds on a retriggerable monoflop 6a.
  • the microcontroller 17 must regularly trigger the monoflop 6a by a pulse. If this is not done, the monoflop 6a switches off a MOSFET 19 via its output Q and blocks the power supply of the gas valves 14.
  • the monoflop 6a is protected against overvoltages on the valve supply via the combination of resistor Rv and voltage Uz, thus ensuring a shutdown , Especially if the other shutdown 2, 3 were already destroyed by overvoltage of the 5V logic supply 21.
  • An error analysis according to standard EN 298 in this combination leads to the recognition of the error.
  • the resistor Rp additionally protects the monoflop input A from overvoltage on the part of the microcontroller 17.
  • the resistor Ra prevents a floating signal when the microcontroller 17 is defective.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Regulation And Control Of Combustion (AREA)
  • Feeding And Controlling Fuel (AREA)

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren zum Unterbrechen einer Brennstoffzufuhr zu einem Verbrennungssystem mittels von einem Gasfeuerungsautomaten gesteuerten Ventilen, bei Vorliegen eines Sicherheitsbedenkens und/oder einer Störung nach dem Oberbegriff des Patentanspruchs 1.The invention relates to a method for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault according to the preamble of patent claim 1.

Weiter betrifft die Erfindung eine Vorrichtung zum Unterbrechen einer Brennstoffzufuhr zu einem Verbrennungssystem mittels von einem Gasfeuerungsautomaten gesteuerten Ventilen, bei Vorliegen eines Sicherheitsbedenkens und/oder einer Störung, gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Anspruchs 5.Furthermore, the invention relates to a device for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault, according to the preamble of claim 5.

Auch betrifft die Erfindung einen Gasfeuerungsautomat zum sicheren Betreiben eines Verbrennungssystems, gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Anspruchs 9.The invention also relates to a gas burner control for safe operation of a combustion system, according to the preamble of claim 9.

Zudem betrifft die Erfindung ein Verbrennungssystem, insbesondere ein Verbrennungssystem mit einem Gasbrenner, gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Anspruchs 10.In addition, the invention relates to a combustion system, in particular a combustion system with a gas burner, according to the preamble of claim 10.

Verbrennungssysteme, Gasfeuerungsautomaten sowie Verfahren und Vorrichtungen zum Unterbrechen einer Brennstoffzufuhr sind allgemein aus dem Stand der Technik bekannt, wie zum Beispiel aus der EP 0803680 A2 .Combustion systems, gas burner control systems and methods and devices for interrupting a fuel supply are generally known from the prior art, such as from EP 0803680 A2 ,

Bei diesen bekannten Lösungen sind zwei unabhängige Abschaltwege vorgesehen. Hierbei weisen nur wenige Lösungen einen Überspannungsschutz auf, welche bei einer fehlerhaften oder unterbochenen Stromzufuhr ein ungewolltes Öffnen einer Gaszufuhrunterbrechung verhindern. In einer bekannten Lösung ist ein Überspannungsschutz an einem den Gasfeuerungsautomaten versorgenden Netzteil vorgesehen.In these known solutions two independent shutdown paths are provided. In this case, only a few solutions have an overvoltage protection, which prevent unintentional opening of a gas supply interruption in the event of a faulty or interrupted power supply. In a known solution, overvoltage protection is provided on a power supply unit supplying the automatic gas burner.

Der Überspannungsschutz wird in der Regel mit Z-Dioden oder Suppressor-Dioden, die parallel zur Logikversorgung geschaltet sind, erreicht. Dieser Überspannungsschutz ist jedoch sehr ungenau, wodurch zu versorgende Logikteile wie Mikrocontroller, sogenannte Watchdogs etc. sehr leicht beschädigt werden können und dadurch die Sicherheit des Gasfeuerungsautomaten verringern.The overvoltage protection is usually achieved with Zener diodes or suppressor diodes connected in parallel with the logic supply. However, this overvoltage protection is very inaccurate, which can be damaged very easily to be supplied logic components such as microcontroller, so-called watchdogs, etc., thereby reducing the safety of the automatic burner control.

Auch sind Gasfeuerungsautomaten (GFA) bekannt, die nur einen ihrer Abschaltwege, z.B. mit Hilfe einer internen Spannungsregelung, vor Überspannung schützen. Hier versagt der Gasfeuerungsautomat bei einer weitergehenden Betrachtung nach Europäischer Norm EN 298 (9.1.6.2), wenn dieser Abschaltweg bereits als defekt angenommen wird und eine Überspannung auftritt die den Rest der GFA-Schaltung gefährdet. Häufig ist der Überspannungsschutz nur eine redundante Maßnahme, die nicht prüfbar ist. Wird der Überspannungsschutz innerhalb der Lebensdauer des GFA aus irgendeinem Grund unwirksam, ist die Sicherheit des GFA gefährdet.Also known are automatic gas burner control (GFA) systems that only have one of their shutdown paths, e.g. protect against overvoltage with the aid of an internal voltage regulation. In this case, the automatic gas burner control system fails on further consideration according to European Standard EN 298 (9.1.6.2), if this switch-off path is already assumed to be defective and an overvoltage occurs which endangers the rest of the GFA circuit. Often the overvoltage protection is just a redundant measure that can not be tested. If the overvoltage protection becomes ineffective for any reason within the lifetime of the GFA, the safety of the GFA is compromised.

Bei Versagen lässt sich ein dritt- und mehrfach statischer Fehler nicht ausschließen. Bei dritt- oder mehrfach statischen Fehlern handelt es sich um Folgendes: Bei einem derartigen Fehlerfall kommt es vor, dass z.B. mehrere Ports eines Mikrocontrollers ihren Zustand dauerhaft behalten oder dass ein Mikrocontroller durch Überspannung, EMV-Puls o.ä. in einem aktuellen Zustand dauerhaft verharrt, ohne diesen wieder zu verlassen. Diese Fehlerbetrachtung soll bei einer Überarbeitung der Norm EN 298 berücksichtigt werden.In case of failure, a third and multiple static error can not be ruled out. Third or multiple static errors are: In the event of such an error, it happens that e.g. several ports of a microcontroller keep their state permanently or that a microcontroller or the like by overvoltage, EMC pulse. permanently persisted in a current state, without leaving it again. This error consideration should be taken into account when revising the EN 298 standard.

Der Erfindung liegt die Aufgabe zugrunde, ein Verbrennungssystem, einen Gasfeuerungsautomaten, eine Vorrichtung und ein Verfahren zum Unterbrechen einer Brennstoffzufuhr zu schaffen, bei denen die Logik- und/oder Schaltteile sicher geschützt sind und ein unbeabsichtigtes Öffnen einer Brennstoffzufuhr (Gasventile) sicher verhindert ist.The invention has for its object to provide a combustion system, a gas burner control apparatus, a device and a method for interrupting a fuel supply, in which the logic and / or switching parts are securely protected and unintentional opening of a fuel supply (gas valves) is reliably prevented.

Erfindungsgemäß wird dies durch die Gegenstände mit den Merkmalen des Patentanspruches 1, des Patentanspruchs 5, des Patentanspruchs 9 und des Patentanspruchs 10 gelöst. Vorteilhafte Weiterbildungen sind den Unteransprüchen zu entnehmen.This is achieved by the objects with the features of claim 1, claim 5, claim 9 and claim 10 according to the invention. Advantageous developments can be found in the dependent claims.

Das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren zum Unterbrechen einer Brennstoffzufuhr zu einem Verbrennungssystem mittels von einem Gasfeuerungsautomaten gesteuerten Ventilen, bei Vorliegen eines Sicherheitsbedenkens und/oder einer Störung, wobei das Unterbrechen über mindestens zwei unabhängige Abschaltwege durchgeführt wird, ist gekennzeichnet, wie in Anspruch 1 definiert.The inventive method for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault, wherein the interruption is performed via at least two independent Abschaltwege is characterized as defined in claim 1.

In einer Ausführungsform des erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens ist vorgesehen, dass die mindestens zwei Abschaltwege jeweils über mindestens eine unabhängige Überwachungseinrichtung überwacht werden.In one embodiment of the method according to the invention, it is provided that the at least two switch-off paths are respectively monitored via at least one independent monitoring device.

In einer anderen Ausführungsform der vorliegenden Erfindung ist vorgesehen, dass der dritte Abschaltweg mit bzw. von mindestens dem ersten und/oder dem zweiten Abschaltweg getriggert wird.In another embodiment of the present invention, it is provided that the third shutdown path is triggered with at least the first and / or the second shutdown path.

Wiederum eine andere Ausführungsform der vorliegenden Erfindung sieht vor, dass der dritte Abschaltweg die Brennstoffzufuhr unterbricht, wenn ein von dem mindestens einen gekoppelten unabhängigen Abschaltweg generiertes dynamisches Signal ausbleibt.Yet another embodiment of the present invention contemplates that the third shutdown path discontinues fueling when a dynamic signal generated by the at least one coupled independent shutdown path fails.

Die erfindungsgemäße Vorrichtung zum Unterbrechen einer Brennstoffzufuhr zu einem Verbrennungssystems mittels von einem Gasfeuerungsautomaten gesteuerten Ventilen, bei Vorliegen eines Sicherheitsbedenkens und/oder einer Störung, wobei mindestens zwei unabhängige Abschaltwege zum Unterbrechen der Brennstoffzufuhr vorgesehen sind, ist gekennzeichnet, wie in Anspruch 5 definiert.The device according to the invention for interrupting a fuel supply to a combustion system by means of valves controlled by a gas burner control device, in the presence of a safety concern and / or a fault, wherein at least two independent shutdown paths are provided for interrupting the fuel supply is characterized as defined in claim 5.

In noch einer weiteren Ausführungsform der vorliegenden Erfindung ist vorgesehen, dass der abhängige Abschaltweg über ein dynamisches Signal mit mindestens einem der unabhängigen Abschaltwege gekoppelt, insbesondere getriggert, ist.In yet another embodiment of the present invention, it is provided that the dependent Abschaltweg coupled via a dynamic signal with at least one of the independent Abschaltwege, in particular triggered.

In einem weiteren Ausführungsbeispiel der Erfindung ist vorgesehen, dass der dritte Abschaltweg einen Schalter zum Unterbrechen der Spannungs- und/oder Stromversorgung der Ventile umfasst, wobei der Schalter in Abhängigkeit eines Triggersignales schaltbar ist.In a further exemplary embodiment of the invention, it is provided that the third switch-off path comprises a switch for interrupting the voltage and / or current supply of the valves, the switch being switchable as a function of a trigger signal.

Wiederum eine weiteres Ausführungsbeispiel der vorliegenden Erfindung sieht vor, dass der abhängige Abschaltweg mindestens einen System-Basis-Chip, insbesondere einen Watchdog-IC oder Wachhund-IC, zum Überwachen des gekoppelten unabhängigen Abschaltweges umfasst (IC: integrierter Schaltkreis, englisch integrated circuit).Yet another embodiment of the present invention provides that the dependent shutdown path comprises at least one system base chip, in particular a watchdog IC or guard dog IC, for monitoring the coupled independent shutdown path (IC: integrated circuit).

Gemäß Anspruch 5 ist vorgesehen, dass die Sicherheitseinrichtung mindestens für mindestens zwei unabhängige Abschaltwege je einen Stromausfallschutz, insbesondere einen Überspannungsschutz, aufweist.According to claim 5 it is provided that the safety device at least for at least two independent shutdown each power failure protection, in particular an overvoltage protection having.

Der erfindungsgemäße Gasfeuerungsautomat zum sicheren Betreiben eines Verbrennungssystems, mit Schaltmitteln, ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Schaltmittel mindestens eine erfindungsgemäße Vorrichtung umfassen.The automatic gas burner control unit according to the invention for safe operation of a combustion system, with switching means, is characterized in that the switching means comprise at least one device according to the invention.

Das erfindungsgemäße Verbrennungssystem, ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass mindestens ein erfindungsgemäßer Gasfeuerungsautomat vorgesehen ist.The combustion system according to the invention is characterized in that at least one gas burner control device according to the invention is provided.

Mit dem erfindungsgemäßen Verfahren, der erfindungsgemäßen Vorrichtung, dem erfindungsgemäßen Gasfeuerungsautomaten und dem erfindungsgemäßen Verbrennungssystem werden insbesondere die folgenden Vorteile realisiert:
Durch den dritten Abschaltweg lassen sich gefährliche Betriebszustände, wie sie bei Vorliegen von dritt- und/oder mehrfach statischen Fehlern verursacht werden können, vermeiden, was sonst zu einem ungewollten Öffnen oder Offenhalten von Stellgliedern wie Ventilen sowie zu einer ungewollten Brennstoffzufuhr führen würde. Durch die Kopplung der Abschaltwege ist ein redundantes System geschaffen, welches sicher ausgebildet ist. Durch die Redundanz ist ein sicheres Gesamtsystem auf einfache Weise realisiert.With the method according to the invention, the device according to the invention, the gas burner control apparatus according to the invention and the combustion system according to the invention, the following advantages are realized in particular:
The third shutdown can be dangerous operating conditions, as they can be caused in the presence of third and / or multiple static errors, avoid what would otherwise lead to an unwanted opening or keeping open of actuators such as valves and to an unwanted fuel supply. By coupling the Abschaltwege a redundant system is created, which is securely formed. Due to the redundancy, a secure overall system is realized in a simple manner.

Nach dem Stand der Technik sind Verfahren bekannt, bei denen zwei unabhängige Abschaltwege sich gegenseitig überwachen und bei Feststellung eines Defekts des jeweils anderen überwachten Abschaltweges die Brennstoffzufuhr unterbrechen. Hier besteht die Gefahr, dass bei Vorliegen eines Defekts bei einem ersten Abschaltweg (beispielsweise fest durchgeschaltete Schalter der Magnetventile, verschweißte Kontakte, durchlegierte Transistoren) ein weiterer Defekt bei einem zweiten Abschaltweg zwar erkannt, auf diesen Defekt aber nicht mehr durch Abschalten mittels des ersten Abschaltweges reagiert werden könnte. Diese Unsicherheit soll in absehbarer Zeit durch eine überarbeitete Norm EN 298 ausgeschlossen werden. Die hier vorgestellte Erfindung löst dieses Problem, indem mindestens einer der beiden herkömmlichen Abschaltwege von einer zusätzlichen Sicherheitseinrichtung überwacht wird. Diese Sicherheitseinrichtung bzw. ein von ihr beherrschter dritter Abschaltweg unterbrechen die Spannungs- bzw. Stromversorgung der Brennstoffventile mittels eines eigenen Schalters, sobald ein unter normalen Betriebsumständen von mindestens einem der beiden Abschaltwege regelmäßig ausgesandtes Triggersignal nun im Störungsfall von diesen nicht mehr ausgesandt und daher vom dritten Abschaltweg auch nicht mehr empfangen wird. Damit wird die Brennstoffversorgung sicher unterbrochen und ein unsicherer Betriebszustand sicher ausgeschlossen.According to the prior art, methods are known in which two independent shutdown paths monitor each other and interrupt the fuel supply upon detection of a defect in the other monitored Abschaltweges. Here there is a danger that in the presence of a defect in a first Abschaltweg (for example, permanently switched switch the solenoid valves, welded contacts, alloyed transistors) yet another defect in a second Abschaltweg recognized on this defect but not by switching off by the first Abschaltweges could be reacted. This uncertainty should be ruled out in the foreseeable future by a revised standard EN 298. The invention presented here solves this problem by monitoring at least one of the two conventional switch-off paths by an additional safety device. This safety device or controlled by her third Abschaltweg interrupt the voltage or power supply of the fuel valves by means of a separate switch as soon as a normal operating conditions of at least one of the two shutdown regularly emitted trigger signal now in case of failure of these no longer sent and therefore no longer received by the third shutdown. This reliably shuts off the fuel supply and reliably precludes an unsafe operating state.

Die Zeichnungen stellen mehrere Ausführungsbeispiele der Erfindung dar und zeigen in den Figuren:

Fig. 1
schematisch in einem Blockdiagramm ein Schaltungsanordnung einer Vorrichtung für einen Gasfeuerautomaten und
Fig. 2
schematisch in einem Blockdiagramm eine andere Schaltungsanordnung einer Vorrichtung für einen Gasfeuerautomaten.
The drawings illustrate several embodiments of the invention and show in the figures:
Fig. 1
schematically a block diagram of a circuit arrangement of a device for a gas automatic burner and
Fig. 2
schematically a block diagram of another circuit arrangement of a device for a gas burner control.

Fig. 1 zeigt schematisch in einem Blockdiagramm eine Schaltungsanordnung einer Vorrichtung 1 für einen Gasfeuerautomaten. Eine Gasversorgung erfolgt entsprechend der Stellung zweier Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14, welche von einer Stromversorgung 12 gespeist werden. Bei einer Unterbrechung der Stromversorgung schließen die Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14 und unterbrechen so eine Gaszufuhr. Fig. 1 schematically shows in a block diagram a circuit arrangement of a device 1 for a gas fire engine. A gas supply takes place in accordance with the position of two safety solenoid valves 14, which are fed by a power supply 12. When the power supply is interrupted, the safety solenoid valves 14 close and thus interrupt a gas supply.

Um sicherzustellen, dass bei Störungen und/oder Vorliegen von Sicherheitsbedenken eine Gaszufuhr unterbrochen wird, umfasst die Vorrichtung 1 eine Sicherheitseinrichtung 4 mit einem ersten Abschaltweg 2, einem zweiten Abschaltweg 3 und einem erfindungsgemäßen dritten Abschaltweg 5. Die Abschaltwege 2, 3, 5 umfassen jeweils eine Logikschaltung oder einen Microcontroller 17, 10, 6, wobei jeder Mikrocontroller mit mindestens einem Schalter 16, 11, 19 zur Unterbrechung einer Stromversorgung der Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14 zusammenwirkt. Die Microcontroller 6, 10 und 17 werden in dem dargestellten Ausführungsbeispiel jeweils von einer eigenen Spannungsquelle versorgt. Zur redundanten Ausbildung der Sicherheitseinrichtung 4 weist diese mindestens für mindestens zwei unabhängige Abschaltwege 2, 3 je einen Stromausfallschutz 7, insbesondere einen Überspannungsschutz, auf, wobei hier nur einer schematisch dargestellt ist.To ensure that a gas supply is interrupted in the event of faults and / or safety concerns, the device 1 comprises a safety device 4 having a first shut-off path 2, a second shut-off path 3 and a third shut-off path 5 according to the invention. The shut-off paths 2, 3, 5 each comprise a logic circuit or a microcontroller 17, 10, 6, wherein each microcontroller with at least one switch 16, 11, 19 for interrupting a power supply of the safety solenoid valves 14 cooperates. The microcontroller 6, 10 and 17 are each supplied in the illustrated embodiment by its own power source. For redundant design of the safety device 4, this at least for at least two independent shutdown paths 2, 3 depending on a power failure protection 7, in particular an overvoltage protection, on, here only one is shown schematically.

Der erste Abschaltweg 2 und der zweite Abschaltweg 3 sind über entsprechende Leitungen 8 mit einer lonisationsdetektionsschaltung 9 verbunden.The first shut-off path 2 and the second shut-off path 3 are connected via corresponding lines 8 to an ionization detection circuit 9.

Eine Wärmeforderung wird, wie durch den Pfeil P dargestellt, ebenfalls an den Mikrocontroller 17 gesendet, der entsprechend die gekoppelten Komponenten schaltet. Je nach Wärmeforderung schaltet der Mikrocontroller 17 die Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14, wodurch die Brennstoffzufuhr entsprechend einer Sicherheitsmagnetventilstellung 14 geregelt oder eingestellt wird.A heat demand, as shown by the arrow P, also sent to the microcontroller 17, which switches the coupled components accordingly. ever After heat demand, the microcontroller 17 switches the safety solenoid valves 14, whereby the fuel supply is regulated or adjusted according to a safety solenoid valve position 14.

Im Folgenden ist der Aufbau detaillierter beschrieben. Der erste Abschaltweg 2 und der zweite Abschaltweg 3 sind über entsprechende Leitungen 8 mit einer lonisationsdetektionsschaltung 9 verbunden. Der zweite Abschaltweg 3 umfasst gemäß dem Ausführungsbeispiel nach Fig. 1 einen ASIC, Mikrocontroller oder Watchdog-Logikbaustein 10 (ASIC: anwendungsspezifische integrierte Schaltung, englisch: application specific integrated circuit). Dieser ist wiederum mit einem sogenannten Highside-Schalter 11 gekoppelt, der eine Spannungsversorgung 12 für Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14 schaltet oder unterbricht. Nachgeschaltet zu dem Highside-Schalter 11 ist eine Gasarmatur 13. Die Gasarmatur 13 umfasst die zwei Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14, welche ein entsprechendes Schalten der Brennstoffzufuhr regeln. Die Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14 können, wie dargestellt, parallel geschaltet sein. Eingangsseitig sind die Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14 über einen Sicherheitstemperaturbegrenzer 15 mit dem Highside-Schalter 11 gekoppelt. Nachgeschaltet zu den Sicherheitsmagnetventilen 14 ist jeweils ein Schalter 16 des ersten Abschaltweges 2. Die Schalter 16 werden über einen Mikrocontroller oder kurz Mikrocontroller 17 gesteuert, der in dem ersten Abschaltweg 2 umfasst ist. Je nach Stellung der Schalter wird die Stromzufuhr zu den Sicherheitsmagnetventilen 14 geschaltet oder unterbrochen. Der Mikrocontroller 17 steuert über eine entsprechende Schaltung 18, hier eine logische UND-Schaltung, die Stromzufuhr zu den Sicherheitsmagnetventilen 14, sodass eine Brennstoffzufuhr entsprechend auch über den ersten Abschaltweg 2 durch Schalten des Schalters 11 und damit der Stromzufuhr zu den Sicherheitsmagnetventilen 14 schaltbar ist. Eine Wärmeforderung wird, wie durch den Pfeil P dargestellt, ebenfalls an den Mikrocontroller 17 gesendet, der entsprechend die gekoppelten Komponenten schaltet. Je nach Wärmeforderung schaltet der Mikrocontroller 17 die Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14, wodurch die Brennstoffzufuhr entsprechend einer Sicherheitsmagnetventilstellung 14 geregelt oder eingestellt wird.In the following, the structure is described in more detail. The first shut-off path 2 and the second shut-off path 3 are connected via corresponding lines 8 to an ionization detection circuit 9. The second shutdown 3 includes according to the embodiment of Fig. 1 an ASIC, microcontroller or watchdog logic device 10 (ASIC: application specific integrated circuit). This is in turn coupled to a so-called high-side switch 11, which switches or interrupts a power supply 12 for safety solenoid valves 14. Downstream of the highside switch 11 is a gas fitting 13. The gas fitting 13 comprises the two safety solenoid valves 14, which regulate a corresponding switching of the fuel supply. The safety solenoid valves 14 may be connected in parallel, as shown. On the input side, the safety solenoid valves 14 are coupled via a safety temperature limiter 15 to the highside switch 11. Downstream of the safety solenoid valves 14 is a respective switch 16 of the first Abschaltweges 2. The switches 16 are controlled by a microcontroller or short microcontroller 17, which is included in the first Abschaltweg 2. Depending on the position of the switch, the power supply to the safety solenoid valves 14 is switched or interrupted. The microcontroller 17 controls via a corresponding circuit 18, here a logical AND circuit, the power supply to the safety solenoid valves 14 so that a fuel supply according to the first Abschaltweg 2 by switching the switch 11 and thus the power supply to the safety solenoid valves 14 is switchable. A heat demand, as shown by the arrow P, also sent to the microcontroller 17, which switches the coupled components accordingly. Depending on the heat demand of the microcontroller 17 switches the safety solenoid valves 14, whereby the fuel supply is regulated or adjusted according to a safety solenoid valve position 14.

Der Mikrocontroller 17 bearbeitet somit die Wärmeforderungen und betreibt den Brenner. Demgegenüber steht dem Mikrocontroller 17 der Watchdog, ASIC oder Mikrocontroller 10 des zweiten Abschaltweges 3, der in dem Ausführungsbeispiel nach Fig. 1 die Flamme eines Brenners anhand eines Flammsignals (Ionisation) überwacht. Mit dem ersten Abschaltweg 2 ist die Sicherheitseinrichtung 4, genauer der dritte Abschaltweg 5 der Sicherheitseinrichtung 4 gekoppelt. Der dritte Abschaltweg 5 umfasst den System-Basis-Chip 6, der vorliegend als Watchdog ausgebildt ist. Der Watchdog 6 wird durch den Mikrocontroller 17 regelmäßig getriggert, etwa über ein dynamisches Signal. Wird der Watchdog 6 nicht getriggert, öffnet er einen Lowside-Schalter 19, wodurch die Magnetsicherheitsventile 14 geschlossen werden. Damit wird das System auch im Falle von dritt statischen Fehlern in einen sicheren Zustand gebracht. Über den System-Basis-Chip 6 wird der der Gasarmatur 13 nachgeschaltete Schalter 19 geschaltet, sodass auch über den dritten Abschaltweg 5 eine Brennstoffzuführungsunterbrechung realisierbar ist. Der Watchdog 6 des dritten Abschaltwegs kann als Time-Out-Watchdog, ein Zeitfenster-Watchdog oder einen intelligenten Watchdog mit Frage-Antwort-Protokoll ausgebildet sein. Der Lowside-Schalter 19 umfasst bevorzugt einen N-Kanal-Power-MOSFET (MOSFET: Metall-Oxid-Halbleiter-Feldeffekttransistor).The microcontroller 17 thus processes the heat requirements and operates the burner. In contrast, the microcontroller 17 is the watchdog, ASIC or microcontroller 10 of the second shutdown 3, which in the embodiment according to Fig. 1 the flame of a burner monitored by a flame signal (ionization). With the first shutdown 2, the safety device 4, more precisely, the third shutdown 5 of the safety device 4 is coupled. The third shutdown path 5 includes the system base chip 6, which is designed here as a watchdog. The watchdog 6 is triggered by the microcontroller 17 regularly, for example via a dynamic signal. If the watchdog 6 is not triggered, it opens a low-side switch 19, whereby the magnetic safety valves 14 are closed. Thus, the system is brought into a safe state even in the case of third static errors. About the system base chip 6 of the gas valve 13 downstream switch 19 is switched so that a fuel supply interruption can be realized via the third Abschaltweg 5. The watchdog 6 of the third shutdown can be configured as a time-out watchdog, a time-window watchdog or a smart watchdog with question-answer protocol. The low-side switch 19 preferably comprises an N-channel power MOSFET (MOSFET: metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistor).

Die Sicherheitseinrichtung 4 umfasst zudem einen Stromausfallschutz 7, der hier als Überspannungsschutz in dem Logikbaustein 10 integriert ist.The safety device 4 also includes a power failure protection 7, which is integrated here as overvoltage protection in the logic module 10.

Fig. 2 zeigt schematisch in einem Blockdiagramm eine andere Schaltungsanordnung einer Vorrichtung 1 für einen Gasfeuerautomaten. Die Funktionsweise entspricht im Wesentlichen der gemäß dem Ausführungsbeispiel nach Fig. 1. Die Sicherheitseinrichtung 4 umfasst dabei ebenfalls drei Abschaltwege 2, 3, 5. Der erste Abschaltweg 2 umfasst den Mikrocontroller 17, der die eingehende Wärmeforderung bearbeitet und den Brenner betreibt. Zwei der Abschaltwege 2, 3, 5 sind vor Überspannung geschützt. Im vorliegenden Beispiel ist es der zweite und der dritte Abschaltweg 3, 5. Sie lassen sich, aufgrund einer geringeren Pinanzahl, weniger aufwändig, an allen Pins gegen Überspannungen schützen. Der zweite Abschaltweg 3 umfasst einen ASIC 10, das einen internen Spannungsregler besitzt und damit die integrierte Logik vor Überspannung schützt. Auch sind sämtliche Pins des ASIC bis zu 42 V spannungsfest. Eine Ausnahme bilden die Eingänge eines Resonators, der keine Verbindung zu anderen Schaltungsteilen hat. Der dritte Abschaltweg 5 umfasst einen Watchdog oder Timer-IC. Er wird über eine Schutzbeschaltung 20 mit einer Ventilversorgungsspannung versorgt. Ein Triggereingang B ist über einen hochohmigen Vorwiderstand vor Überspannung seitens Mikrocontroller 17 (erster Abschaltweg 2) geschützt. Beide spannungsgeschützten Abschaltwege 3, 5 steuern je einen Schalter 16, 19, der die Stromversorgung für die Sicherheitsmagnetventile 14 im Fehlerfall unterbricht. Die Schalter 16 und 19 liegen bezüglich ihrer Spannungsfestigkeit oberhalb der maximal ("worst case") auftretenden Ventil-Versorgungsspannung und tragen ihrerseits zum Überspannungsschutz bei. Der dritte Abschaltweg 5 ist in Fig. 2 genauer dargestellt und im Folgenden detailliert beschrieben:
Der Watchdog 6 des dritten Abschaltwegs 5 baut auf ein retriggerbares Monoflop 6a auf. Der Mikrocontroller 17 muss das Monoflop 6a regelmäßig durch einen Puls triggern. Tut er das nicht, schaltet das Monoflop 6a über seinen Ausgang Q ein MOSFET 19 ab und sperrt die Stromversorgung der Gasventile 14. Das Monoflop 6a wird über die Kombination von Widerstand Rv und Spannung Uz vor Überspannungen auf der Ventilversorgung geschützt und stellt somit eine Abschaltung sicher, insbesondere wenn die anderen Abschaltwege 2, 3 durch Überspannung der 5V Logikversorgung 21 bereits zerstört wurden. Eine Fehlerbetrachtung nach Norm EN 298 in dieser Kombination führt zum Erkennen des Fehlers. Der Widerstand Rp schützt zusätzlich den Monoflop Eingang A vor Überspannung seitens des Mikrocontrollers 17. Der Widerstand Ra verhindert ein schwebendes Signal bei defektem Mikrocontroller 17. Fig. 2 shows schematically in a block diagram another circuit arrangement of a device 1 for a gas fire engine. The mode of operation essentially corresponds to that according to the exemplary embodiment Fig. 1 , The safety device 4 also includes three shutdown paths 2, 3, 5. The first shutdown 2 includes the microcontroller 17, which processes the incoming heat demand and operates the burner. Two of the shutdown 2, 3, 5 are protected against overvoltage. In the present example, it is the second and third Abschaltweg 3, 5. They can be due to a smaller number of pins, less expensive, protect against overvoltages on all pins. The second shutdown path 3 includes an ASIC 10 which has an internal voltage regulator and thus protects the integrated logic from overvoltage. Also, all pins of the ASIC are voltage resistant up to 42V. An exception is the inputs of a resonator, which has no connection to other circuit parts. The third shutdown path 5 includes a watchdog or timer IC. It is supplied via a protective circuit 20 with a valve supply voltage. A trigger input B is protected against overvoltage by microcontroller 17 (first shutdown path 2) via a high-impedance series resistor. Both voltage-protected switch-off paths 3, 5 each control a switch 16, 19, which interrupts the power supply for the safety solenoid valves 14 in the event of a fault. The switches 16 and 19 are in terms of their dielectric strength above the maximum ("worst case") occurring valve supply voltage and in turn contribute to overvoltage protection. The third shut-off 5 is in Fig. 2 shown in more detail and described in detail below:
The watchdog 6 of the third shutdown 5 builds on a retriggerable monoflop 6a. The microcontroller 17 must regularly trigger the monoflop 6a by a pulse. If this is not done, the monoflop 6a switches off a MOSFET 19 via its output Q and blocks the power supply of the gas valves 14. The monoflop 6a is protected against overvoltages on the valve supply via the combination of resistor Rv and voltage Uz, thus ensuring a shutdown , Especially if the other shutdown 2, 3 were already destroyed by overvoltage of the 5V logic supply 21. An error analysis according to standard EN 298 in this combination leads to the recognition of the error. The resistor Rp additionally protects the monoflop input A from overvoltage on the part of the microcontroller 17. The resistor Ra prevents a floating signal when the microcontroller 17 is defective.

Claims (10)

  1. Method for interrupting a fuel supply to an internal combustion engine by means of valves which are controlled by an automatic gas burner control unit, when there is a safety concern and/or a fault, wherein the interruption is carried out by means of at least two independent switch-off paths (2, 3),
    characterized in that at least one independent monitoring process of at least one of the independent switch-off paths (2; 3) is carried out by means of a third switch-off path (5) which is coupled to at least one of the independent switch-off paths (2, 3), to ensure reliable interruption of the fuel supply in the event of a fault in at least one of the switch-off paths (2, 3), wherein the switch-off paths (2, 3, 5) each have a logic circuit or a microcontroller (6, 10, 17), wherein each logic circuit or each microcontroller (6, 10, 17) interacts with at least one switch (16, 11, 19) for interrupting a power supply to the valves, and wherein at least two of the independent switch-off paths (2, 3, 5) each have a power failure protection (7).
  2. Method according to Claim 1,
    characterized in that the at least two switch-off paths (2, 3) are each monitored by means of at least one independent monitoring device.
  3. Method according to Claim 1 or 2,
    characterized in that the third switch-off path (5) is triggered with at least the first and/or the second switch-off path (2, 3).
  4. Method according to one of Claims 1 to 3,
    characterized in that the third switch-off path (5) interrupts the fuel supply if a dynamic signal which is generated by the at least one coupled independent switch-off path (2, 3) fails to occur.
  5. Device (1) for interrupting a fuel supply to an internal combustion engine when there is a safety concern and/or a fault, by means of valves which are controlled by an automatic gas burner control unit, wherein at least two independent switch-off paths (2, 3) for interrupting the fuel supply are provided,
    characterized in that means for carrying out a method according to one of Claims 1 to 4 are provided, wherein the means comprise at least one safety device (4) which is coupled to at least one of the independent switch-off paths (2, 3) and controls a dependent, in particular third switch-off path, in order to ensure reliable interruption of the fuel supply when there is a fault in the at least one independent switch-off path (2, 3), wherein the switch-off paths (2, 3, 5) each comprise a logic circuit or a microcontroller (6, 10, 17), and each logic circuit or each microcontroller (6, 10, 17) has at least one switch (16, 11, 19) for interrupting a power supply to the valves, and wherein at least two of the independent switch-off paths (2, 3, 5) each have a power failure protection (7) .
  6. Device (1) according to Claim 5,
    characterized in that the dependent switch-off path (5) is coupled to at least one of the independent switch-off paths (2, 3) by means of a dynamic signal, in particular is triggered thereby.
  7. Device (1) according to Claim 5 or 6,
    characterized in that the third switch-off path (5) comprises a switch (19) for interrupting the voltage supply and/or power supply of the valves, wherein the switch (19) can be switched as a function of a trigger signal.
  8. Device (1) according to one of Claims 5 to 7,
    characterized in that the dependent switch-off path (5) comprises at least one system base chip (6), in particular a watchdog IC, for monitoring the coupled independent switch-off path (2, 3).
  9. Automatic gas burner control unit for reliably operating an internal combustion engine, having switching means,
    characterized in that the switching means comprise at least one device (1) according to one of Claims 5 to 8.
  10. Internal combustion engine,
    characterized in that at least one automatic gas burner control unit according to Claim 9 is provided.
EP10172195.9A 2009-08-06 2010-08-06 Combustion system, automatic gas ignition device and device and method for interrupting a fuel supply for same Active EP2295863B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102009036423.4A DE102009036423C5 (en) 2009-08-06 2009-08-06 Method and device for interrupting a fuel supply and use thereof

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2295863A2 EP2295863A2 (en) 2011-03-16
EP2295863A3 EP2295863A3 (en) 2014-06-11
EP2295863B1 true EP2295863B1 (en) 2019-05-01

Family

ID=42830289

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP10172195.9A Active EP2295863B1 (en) 2009-08-06 2010-08-06 Combustion system, automatic gas ignition device and device and method for interrupting a fuel supply for same

Country Status (2)

Country Link
EP (1) EP2295863B1 (en)
DE (1) DE102009036423C5 (en)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3869102A1 (en) 2020-02-24 2021-08-25 Vaillant GmbH Method and device for diagnosing faults affecting a firing controller
DE102020128045A1 (en) 2020-10-26 2022-04-28 Vaillant Gmbh Method and apparatus for preventing flashback in a premixed fuel-air combustor assembly

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
HUE058879T2 (en) 2020-01-10 2022-09-28 Siemens Ag Circuit with protection against internal faults

Citations (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE2433447A1 (en) 1974-07-11 1976-01-22 Ind Copreci S C I Igniter for as burner e.g for oven or heater - with timing circuits for ignition and burning operation requiring only on transformer
US4695246A (en) 1984-08-30 1987-09-22 Lennox Industries, Inc. Ignition control system for a gas appliance
EP0308831A2 (en) 1987-09-21 1989-03-29 Honeywell Inc. System for processing a flame sensor output signal
DE3923773A1 (en) 1988-07-20 1990-03-01 Vaillant Joh Gmbh & Co Microcomputer control for gas-fired central heating boiler
DE3108409C2 (en) 1981-03-06 1990-04-19 3119 Bienenbüttel Friedrich Bartels Ingenieurbüro Flame guard
EP0508081A2 (en) 1991-04-12 1992-10-14 Robert Bosch Gmbh Circuit and method for monitoring a fuel-heated apparatus
WO1995016944A1 (en) 1993-12-16 1995-06-22 Robert Bosch Gmbh Device for monitoring at least one safety-relevant function of an apparatus
EP0803680A2 (en) 1996-04-23 1997-10-29 Robert Bosch Gmbh Circuit and method for monitoring a fuel-heated apparatus
EP1199519A2 (en) 2000-10-19 2002-04-24 RB Controls Co., Ltd. Combustion control apparatus
EP1141633B1 (en) 1998-12-28 2003-12-17 Robert Bosch Gmbh Control device for a burner
EP1394469A2 (en) 2002-09-02 2004-03-03 RB Controls Co., Ltd. Combustion control device
EP1477739A2 (en) 2003-05-15 2004-11-17 BBT Thermotechnik GmbH Process to command a safety relay in an automatic burner
US20050244765A1 (en) 2004-03-05 2005-11-03 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Method of controlling operation of fuel gas production apparatus

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19612423A1 (en) 1996-03-28 1997-10-02 Siemens Ag Redundant control and safety system for crane
DE102004017950B3 (en) 2004-04-14 2005-06-23 Moeller Gmbh Mechanical-electronic position indicator has microcontroller that detects potentiometer slider voltage, has digital output connected via converter to output stage, outputs watchdog signals to monitoring stages controlling supply voltage

Patent Citations (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE2433447A1 (en) 1974-07-11 1976-01-22 Ind Copreci S C I Igniter for as burner e.g for oven or heater - with timing circuits for ignition and burning operation requiring only on transformer
DE3108409C2 (en) 1981-03-06 1990-04-19 3119 Bienenbüttel Friedrich Bartels Ingenieurbüro Flame guard
US4695246A (en) 1984-08-30 1987-09-22 Lennox Industries, Inc. Ignition control system for a gas appliance
EP0308831A2 (en) 1987-09-21 1989-03-29 Honeywell Inc. System for processing a flame sensor output signal
DE3923773A1 (en) 1988-07-20 1990-03-01 Vaillant Joh Gmbh & Co Microcomputer control for gas-fired central heating boiler
EP0508081A2 (en) 1991-04-12 1992-10-14 Robert Bosch Gmbh Circuit and method for monitoring a fuel-heated apparatus
WO1995016944A1 (en) 1993-12-16 1995-06-22 Robert Bosch Gmbh Device for monitoring at least one safety-relevant function of an apparatus
EP0803680A2 (en) 1996-04-23 1997-10-29 Robert Bosch Gmbh Circuit and method for monitoring a fuel-heated apparatus
EP1141633B1 (en) 1998-12-28 2003-12-17 Robert Bosch Gmbh Control device for a burner
EP1199519A2 (en) 2000-10-19 2002-04-24 RB Controls Co., Ltd. Combustion control apparatus
EP1394469A2 (en) 2002-09-02 2004-03-03 RB Controls Co., Ltd. Combustion control device
EP1477739A2 (en) 2003-05-15 2004-11-17 BBT Thermotechnik GmbH Process to command a safety relay in an automatic burner
US20050244765A1 (en) 2004-03-05 2005-11-03 Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Method of controlling operation of fuel gas production apparatus

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
"Entiwicklung Feuerungsautomaten Vitodens 100, Projekt "Brussel" Projekt-Nr.;P107091 HArdware - Konzept", VIESMANN, 5 May 2008 (2008-05-05), XP055679884
"Montage- und Serviceanleitung fuer die Fachkraft Vitodens 100-W", VIESSMANN, September 2008 (2008-09-01), pages 1 - 64, XP055679892
"Vitodens 100", VIESSMANN, June 2008 (2008-06-01), pages 7.1-1 - 7.1-20, XP055679897

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3869102A1 (en) 2020-02-24 2021-08-25 Vaillant GmbH Method and device for diagnosing faults affecting a firing controller
DE102020104766A1 (en) 2020-02-24 2021-08-26 Vaillant Gmbh Method and device for fault diagnosis on a burner control
DE102020128045A1 (en) 2020-10-26 2022-04-28 Vaillant Gmbh Method and apparatus for preventing flashback in a premixed fuel-air combustor assembly

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE102009036423A1 (en) 2011-02-17
DE102009036423C5 (en) 2023-03-02
EP2295863A3 (en) 2014-06-11
DE102009036423B4 (en) 2013-03-28
EP2295863A2 (en) 2011-03-16

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1627402B1 (en) Safety switching device for the failsafe shutdown of an electric consumer and corresponding method
EP1869687B1 (en) Safety switch for the safe disconnection of an electric consumer
EP3192091B1 (en) Monitored adaptable emergency off-switch
EP2089892B1 (en) Safety switch device
DE102013101050A1 (en) Safety switching device with safe power supply
CH650087A5 (en) RELAY CONTROL ARRANGEMENT.
EP2104974B1 (en) Voltage protection arrangement for an electronic device
DE4242792C2 (en) Safety switch arrangement
WO2014131822A1 (en) Safety switching apparatus for the connection and failsafe disconnection of a technical system
EP2295863B1 (en) Combustion system, automatic gas ignition device and device and method for interrupting a fuel supply for same
EP3452336A1 (en) Multi-voltage control device for a motor vehicle, motor vehicle and operating method for the control device
DE4428115C2 (en) Control unit with a circuit arrangement for protecting the control unit when the control unit mass is interrupted
DE102007052512B3 (en) Control device for a safety switching device, safety switching device, use of a control device and method for controlling a safety switching device
EP2733556A2 (en) Safety-related device for the safe switching of an electrical load
EP1902517B1 (en) Circuit arrangement for actuating an electric motor in a motor vehicle
EP1863681B1 (en) Device for controlling and diagnosticate a reversible protection system
EP3848633B1 (en) Circuit with protection against internal faults
EP1529707B1 (en) Fail-safe switching unit for resetting a failure condition for vehicles, especially for railway vehicles
WO2016207417A1 (en) Device and method for controlling an end stage for an actuator in a vehicle
DE10050542A1 (en) Protective device especially for set-up on automatic assembly machines
DE60117367T2 (en) CONTROL AND SAFETY DEVICE FOR VALVES
DE102012101615A1 (en) Multifunctional I / O device
DE102014117411A1 (en) Logic circuit for holding the switching state of switching outputs
CH682111A5 (en) Safety circuit for automatic machine programme control - verifies function outputs of programme control via diversity stage channels to prevent dangerous operation of machine

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK SM TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Extension state: BA ME RS

PUAL Search report despatched

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009013

RIC1 Information provided on ipc code assigned before grant

Ipc: F23N 5/24 20060101AFI20140430BHEP

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK SM TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Extension state: BA ME RS

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20141211

RBV Designated contracting states (corrected)

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK SM TR

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: EXAMINATION IS IN PROGRESS

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20170306

GRAP Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: GRANT OF PATENT IS INTENDED

INTG Intention to grant announced

Effective date: 20181120

GRAS Grant fee paid

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE PATENT HAS BEEN GRANTED

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK SM TR

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: NOT ENGLISH

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: REF

Ref document number: 1127434

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20190515

Ref country code: CH

Ref legal event code: EP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R096

Ref document number: 502010015967

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: FG4D

Free format text: LANGUAGE OF EP DOCUMENT: GERMAN

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: NL

Ref legal event code: FP

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: LT

Ref legal event code: MG4D

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: AL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: NO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190801

Ref country code: ES

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: LT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: PT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190901

Ref country code: HR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: SE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: LV

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: BG

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190801

Ref country code: GR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190802

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IS

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190901

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: EE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: RO

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: CZ

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: SK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: DK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R026

Ref document number: 502010015967

Country of ref document: DE

PLBI Opposition filed

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009260

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: SM

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: IT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

26 Opposition filed

Opponent name: VIESSMANN WERKE GMBH & CO. KG

Effective date: 20200131

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: TR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

PLAX Notice of opposition and request to file observation + time limit sent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNOBS2

GBPC Gb: european patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee

Effective date: 20190806

RAP2 Party data changed (patent owner data changed or rights of a patent transferred)

Owner name: ROBERT BOSCH GMBH

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: PL

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: CH

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190831

Ref country code: SI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: LU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190806

Ref country code: MC

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: LI

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190831

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: BE

Ref legal event code: MM

Effective date: 20190831

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FR

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190831

Ref country code: IE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190806

PLBB Reply of patent proprietor to notice(s) of opposition received

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNOBS3

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: BE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190831

Ref country code: GB

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190806

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: AT

Ref legal event code: MM01

Ref document number: 1127434

Country of ref document: AT

Kind code of ref document: T

Effective date: 20190806

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: AT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20190806

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: CY

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MT

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

Ref country code: HU

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT; INVALID AB INITIO

Effective date: 20100806

PLAB Opposition data, opponent's data or that of the opponent's representative modified

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009299OPPO

R26 Opposition filed (corrected)

Opponent name: VIESSMANN GROUP GMBH & CO. KG

Effective date: 20200131

RDAF Communication despatched that patent is revoked

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNREV1

APBM Appeal reference recorded

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNREFNO

APBP Date of receipt of notice of appeal recorded

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNNOA2O

APAH Appeal reference modified

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSCREFNO

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: MK

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT

Effective date: 20190501

APBQ Date of receipt of statement of grounds of appeal recorded

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNNOA3O

APAH Appeal reference modified

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSCREFNO

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: NL

Payment date: 20230823

Year of fee payment: 14

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20231025

Year of fee payment: 14