EP2289186A1 - System and method for covertly disabling improvised explosive devices - Google Patents
System and method for covertly disabling improvised explosive devicesInfo
- Publication number
- EP2289186A1 EP2289186A1 EP09757847A EP09757847A EP2289186A1 EP 2289186 A1 EP2289186 A1 EP 2289186A1 EP 09757847 A EP09757847 A EP 09757847A EP 09757847 A EP09757847 A EP 09757847A EP 2289186 A1 EP2289186 A1 EP 2289186A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- portable
- network system
- limited area
- wideband
- wideband network
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/92—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing remote control
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/42—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming frequency or wavelength
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/43—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming power, signal-to-noise ratio or geographic coverage area
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
- H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/16—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for telephony
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/24—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to weapons
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/45—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by including monitoring of the target or target signal, e.g. in reactive jammers or follower jammers for example by means of an alternation of jamming phases and monitoring phases, called "look-through mode"
Definitions
- the application is directed to the use of a mobile telecommunications network for protecting mobile military convoys from improvised explosive devices.
- IEDs or "improvised explosive devices" are popular tools for terrorists.
- An IED typically consists of an explosive charge, a detonator (i.e., blasting cap), and an initiator used for causing the detonator to explode.
- a mobile terminal hereinafter, also referred to as cell phone, or mobile phone.
- the IED can be triggered (initiated) from a remote location by calling, sending a message, or otherwise activating the ringer/speaker electronics of the mobile terminal connected to the IED.
- the cell phone is the initiator and instead of a call causing the phone ringer to ring, the power for the ringer is typically sent to the detonator which detonates the explosive charge.
- Another problem is that tracking and locating devices work only when the mobile terminal is transmitting, so most of the time a "quiet" terminal (e.g., initiator cell phone in an IED) cannot be located. What is needed is a method for suppressing the triggering of IEDs without revealing that convoy movement is imminent in a particular area and to do so in such as way that the potential to trace the call is enhanced. This solution must assume limited to no cooperation with mobile operators.
- the present invention provides a message from the control node to the second node identifying the specified MG.
- This disclosure discusses the suppression of IED triggers via GSM mobile phones by making modifications to GSM network equipment. In one embodiment, it also enhances capabilities to trace the origin of the calls that cause detonation.
- a portable wideband network system (also referred to as a portable network), installed in a vehicle, is used to determine operator frequency or frequencies active on a route along which the vehicle will travel.
- the vehicle includes a wideband transmitter for raising a radio frequency noise floor across all of the active cellular frequencies in a limited area surrounding the portable wideband network system during passage along the route.
- a notch filter is used by the system for filtering a particular frequency from the noise floor.
- the power level of the portable wideband network system is increased so that the strongest signal at the particular frequency in the limited area is provided by the portable system's base station. All mobile terminals in the limited area around the vehicle are connected to the portable system and the portable system prevents call completion of any of the connected mobile terminals.
- one or more of the systems can also provide information as well as prevent a call from triggering a cell phone initiator.
- Local operator MSCs or HLRs may then be accessed to determine the identity of suspicious cell phones that connect to the mobile network.
- a wideband radio frequency generator is included with a portable wideband network system.
- the frequency generator is set automatically or manually to local frequencies in an area in which the portable wideband system will travel.
- a vehicle with the system installed may travel through city streets and the local operator frequencies that are detected are determined and the wideband radio frequency generator raises a "noise" floor across all of the active frequencies in a limited area surrounding the portable network system during passage along the route traveled by the vehicle.
- a notch filter is also provided for filtering a particular frequency from the noise floor.
- the power level of the portable network system is increased at the particular frequency, basically the width of the channel that the local base station transmit on (e.g., for GSM, 200khz per GSM transceiver).
- the portable network system transmits the strongest signal on the particular frequency in the limited area around the portable wideband network. This permits connecting all mobile terminals in the limited area to the portable network system and preventing call completion of any connected mobile terminals.
- FIGURE 1 depicts a system for disabling Improvised Explosive Devices according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention
- FIGURE 2 illustrates a process for covertly disabling cell phone triggered Improvised Explosive Devices in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
- DETAILED DESCRIPTION Figure 1 depicts a high level block diagram of a system 100 for disabling
- a mobile network system 102 and a wideband RF transmitter 104 is installed in vehicle 114 for transport through an area that may have IEDs.
- Wideband RF transmitter 304 is used to raise the level of noise floor 106 within a predetermined area surrounding mobile network system 102.
- Noise floor 106 may be effective across a wide spectrum (for instance from 450 Mhz to 2100 Mhz) with a "notch" around a particular frequency, for instance 900 -A -
- a portable GSM, GPRS or WCDMA system would operate on this 900 Mhz frequency at a power level above noise floor 106.
- This notch (not shown) causes mobile or wireless terminals operating on the 900 Mhz frequency, for instance, within range (typically inside the noise floor range) of mobile network platform 102 to camp on to mobile network system 102.
- mobile network system 102 e.g., QuicLink from
- mobile network system 102 includes a Base Station controller (BSC), Base Transceiver Station (BTS), an MSC, Home Location Register (HLR), Visitor Location Register (VLR), a BSC (for the antenna installation associated with the moving network) and wideband transmitter 104 for transmitting "noise" in the frequency bands covered by commercial cellular systems that are operating in the area where mobile network platform 102 is traveling.
- BSC Base Station controller
- BTS Base Transceiver Station
- MSC Home Location Register
- VLR Visitor Location Register
- Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
- Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
- Mobile network system 102 can be configured to broadcast the network ID of a network that is normally active in that area. Therefore, users will not notice a difference in the network being displayed on their mobile phones.
- the BTS (not shown) of mobile network system 102 and base station 110 transmit a "pilot" signal or "control channel signal” which is received by cell phones within range of Base Station 110 and the BTS.
- the cell phones, both legitimate 112 and IED initiator cell phone 108 measure all the pilot signals they receive and transmit these measurements to the BTS on the mobile network platform 102 and to BS 110.
- BS 110 receives signals from both cell phone 112 and cell phone 108. These measurements are the level of signal and signal quality of BS 110 and BTS signals received by cell phone 108. These measurements are typically used by a network to determine a frequency and channel for a cell phone to connect through a Base Station to a cellular network.
- a cell phone As a cell phone approaches a connecting tower, the cell phone is commanded to reduce signal power and as the cell phone moves away, the signal is commanded to increase.
- This exchange of information is what keeps a phone connected to a network. The phone must hear the tower and the tower must hear the phone and as long as this condition is in place, the cell phone stays connected to the network.
- a power level at which the cell phone is to transmit is provided by mobile network platform 102. In this case, mobile network system 102 has raised the noise floor level so that BS 110 is drowned out and cell phones 112 and 108 will attempt to connect to mobile network system 102 because of the "notch" frequency transmitting at the higher power. In the present situation, cell phones 112, 108 and 114 are all connected to mobile network system 102.
- a "notch" can be used in a particular frequency band (for instance if 900 Mhz is not used in an area otherwise providing GSM services). If all relevant frequencies are in use, then the noise floor across the entire spectrum can be raised, in effect “drowning out” the local networks so that mobile terminals cannot hear or connect to them.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a process for covertly disabling cell phone triggered Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
- the process is implemented in a portable network, a so-called “network in a box". All the equipment to implement a network for a reduced number of subscribers including MSC, BS, BSC, MSC authentication, etc., is included in a unit that can be loaded in a "Humvee" military vehicle for instance.
- a mobile network system or, portable network (PN), and a wideband radio frequency noise generator is installed in a military vehicle prior to being used when traveling from one point to another in an area that may include IEDs.
- PN portable network
- PN wideband radio frequency noise generator
- step 202 begins with step 202 as the PN is loaded, either before or during the beginning of the PN trip, with determining the frequencies used by local cellular operators (step 204).
- step 204 determines the frequencies used by local cellular operators.
- step 206 the operators' frequencies are set in the PN. If the PN is not equipped with a frequency sniffer, the process moves to step 208 where the local frequencies are manually entered into the PN. If the PN is equipped with a frequency sniffer, the process next goes to step 210 and the PN begins automatically determining the active frequencies in the area affected by the antenna footprint of the PN (see Figure 1) and the vehicle carrying the PN begins the trip (step 210)
- step 212 when the PN is operating a wideband radio frequency transmitter causes a "noise floor" to be transmitted in a radius around the vehicle.
- This noise floor is for "drowning" out the local base stations using the known or sniffed frequencies (of course the area of coverage of the PN is dependent on the PN transmitter power and antenna configuration).
- a manual adjustment of the frequencies may be made in response to measured (e.g., a simple radio survey) or known cellular frequencies in an area.
- a more advanced approach is to use a frequency sniffer to "sniff' frequencies in the surrounding area being used by the local operators. Noise is then transmitted selectively on the sniffed and determined frequencies to raise the noise floor level.
- the noise is drowning out regular cellular system transmissions and the portable network is providing a signal level higher than the local, stationary base stations near an IED.
- any nearby active cell phones e.g., an active IED with a cell phone as trigger
- a notch frequency is introduced around a specific frequency, preferably the frequency of operators in the area (step 214).
- the portable wideband radio frequency generator raises the noise floor across a wide spectrum (for instance from 450 Mhz to 2100 Mhz) with a "notch" around a particular frequency, for instance 900 Mhz.
- a portable GSM system operates on this 900 Mhz frequency at a power level above the noise floor. This causes terminals to camp on to the portable network (step 216). Once that has been achieved, then incoming calls for the purpose of detonating the IED will become ineffective. As will be detailed, this approach can be covert as well as lend itself to tracing the origin of the calls intended to detonate the devices.
- this network can register the users that tried to make connections during the travel of the mobile network platform. By doing so, incoming calls to the area covered by the protective cellular "bubble" will then actually terminate in an MSC of our choosing. This provides the possibility to run traces on calls that are incoming to the area where the vehicle or convoy is located.
- the registered users can then be checked against the HLR of a local subscription network by, for instance, using or spoofing point codes from actual cooperating networks (step 218). If the subject users are not considered suspicious, the process moves to step 222 and the investigation into the user is dropped. If the caller and called devices are deemed suspicious, the process moves instead to step 220.
- Forcing terminals to register onto this moving network also provides various other possibilities; e.g., hooking up with one or more other mobile network platforms traveling in tandem in an area to triangulate the location of mobile cell calls (for instance a call to a mobile phone in the middle of a street, may or may not be suspicious) and an application on the mobile network platform MSC or the MSC within which they are registered (or IMS) could be used originate calls.
- Such an application in a helicopter would allow "sweeps" of areas, potentially triggering the devices while they are being manufactured or transported.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US5866908P | 2008-06-04 | 2008-06-04 | |
US12/212,363 US8010038B2 (en) | 2008-09-17 | 2008-09-17 | System and method for covertly disabling improvised explosive devices |
PCT/IB2009/005769 WO2009147493A1 (en) | 2008-06-04 | 2009-05-27 | System and method for covertly disabling improvised explosive devices |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2289186A1 true EP2289186A1 (en) | 2011-03-02 |
Family
ID=41036781
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09757847A Withdrawn EP2289186A1 (en) | 2008-06-04 | 2009-05-27 | System and method for covertly disabling improvised explosive devices |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2289186A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN102057598B (en) |
WO (1) | WO2009147493A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US8400367B2 (en) * | 2007-08-31 | 2013-03-19 | Allen-Vanguard Corporation | Radio antenna assembly |
Family Cites Families (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2764144B1 (en) * | 1997-06-02 | 2000-06-02 | Raoul Girod | APPARATUS FOR FILTERING RADIOTELEPHONES |
US20040242149A1 (en) * | 2003-05-28 | 2004-12-02 | Louis Luneau | Flexible mobile base station |
US7138936B2 (en) * | 2005-01-26 | 2006-11-21 | Sentel Corporation | Method and apparatus for protecting personnel from RF-triggered explosive devices (RTED) using ultra-wideband (UWB) transmission |
-
2009
- 2009-05-27 WO PCT/IB2009/005769 patent/WO2009147493A1/en active Application Filing
- 2009-05-27 EP EP09757847A patent/EP2289186A1/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2009-05-27 CN CN200980120754.8A patent/CN102057598B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
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None * |
See also references of WO2009147493A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN102057598B (en) | 2014-02-26 |
WO2009147493A1 (en) | 2009-12-10 |
CN102057598A (en) | 2011-05-11 |
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