EP2274728A1

EP2274728A1 - Document comprising an integrated microcircuit device and method of detecting an attack on the physical integrity of the document

Info

Publication number: EP2274728A1
Application number: EP09730324A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Sandrine Rancien
Original assignee: ArjoWiggins Security SAS
Current assignee: ArjoWiggins Security SAS
Priority date: 2008-04-04
Filing date: 2009-03-30
Publication date: 2011-01-19
Also published as: CA2720349A1; MX2010010882A; RU2500033C2; WO2009125144A1; US20110102153A1; FR2929738B1; RU2010144933A; FR2929738A1; BRPI0910067A2

Abstract

The present invention relates to a document (1) comprising an integrated microcircuit device (2), in particular an RFID device, the document (1) comprising at least one detector (3) configured so as to detect a change of at least one physicochemical quantity, this detection possibly being performed away from the reading field of an external reader capable of obtaining from the integrated microcircuit device (2) at least one item of information relating to said change, the integrated microcircuit device (2) being configured so as to signal to the external reader, during a communication with the latter, an attempt to attack the physical integrity of the document (1) following the detection of a corresponding change of said at least one physicochemical quantity.

Description

Document comprising an integrated microcircuit device and method for detecting the physical damage of the document

The present invention relates to a security document comprising an integrated microcircuit device, also called "E-document", the document comprising a detector capable of detecting a physical violation of the document.

The invention also relates to a method for detecting an attempt to undermine the physical integrity of such a document.

"Security document" means all the documents for which there may be an interest in avoiding an attempt to falsify or infringe, whether or not they have a function of identifying a person or a person. object, these documents can take various forms: booklet, card, adhesive label, means of payment, this list is not limiting.

BACKGROUND The security documents are liable to be forged for a number of reasons, for example to take the integrated microcircuit device inside to reinsert it into another document, or to remove a document. photograph to substitute for another, or for the purpose of falsifying data, for example information written or printed on the document. The intrusions or physical violations of a security document can be done in different ways, for example by mechanical, thermal, chemical means or a combination of these means.

When the attack of the physical integrity of the document is done by mechanical means, for example by manual peeling of one of the constituent layers of the document, evidence of falsification can be obtained visually by tearing or delamination of the layers of the document. fibrous substrates and / or plastics constituting the document, but this method of highlighting an intrusion is not always compatible with the desired durability of the document to use. Moreover, in the case of documents comprising an integrated microcircuit device, the fraudsters generally wish to recover the device contained in the document and give little importance to the fact that one of the constituent layers of the document is deteriorated. Also, the Applicant has investigated the means for detecting an intrusion or a physical violation of a document comprising an integrated microcircuit, and to inform a user that a falsification action has taken place.

E-document security systems are known based on a partial or total destruction of the integrated microcircuit device without contact (device

RFID) during an attempt to falsify. For example, this destruction may correspond to an antenna of the damaged device or to communication between the antenna and the damaged chip.

The French patent application FR 2 823 310 of the Applicant describes a self-adhesive document incorporating a radio frequency identification device (RFID) which is linked to the document with a sufficiently weak cohesion force so that during an attempt to falsify the document stuck on a support, part of the RFID device remains on the application support. Thus, when a fraudster attempts to recover the RFID device, it alters its operation by damaging it and it becomes impossible to reuse it later.

The systematic alteration of the RFID device remains constraining since the reading of the data in the chip is no longer possible after the falsification, which can be problematic in some cases. In addition, no information relating to the attempted intrusion or physical violation of the document can be given to the user, who can only see the non-functioning of the device.

RFID. This type of self-adhesive document also has other drawbacks, since it is possible to tamper with it without damaging the RFID device, by solubilizing, for example, the pressure-sensitive adhesive of the self-adhesive document with a solvent such as hexane.

The international application WO 2004/012228 of the Applicant describes a security document comprising an integrated microcircuit linked to a measurement chip. During the manufacture of the document, a particular characteristic of it is measured using the measurement chip and the result of the measurement is stored in the memory of the integrated microcircuit. When the integrated microcircuit communicates with an external reader, the measurement microcircuit is activated and measures said characteristic to compare it with the measurement previously stored in the integrated microcircuit. If a discrepancy appears between the two measurements, the document is not authenticated and no data exchange takes place between the integrated microcircuit and the external reader. Such a document can not account for any attempted intrusion or physical violation on the document. For example, a counterfeiter can perform a physical intrusion on the document while not causing any change in the value of the measurement of the particular characteristic of the document after intrusion. Therefore, during the authentication check of the document with an external reader, the measurement microcircuit will obtain the same result as that stored in the integrated microcircuit. Moreover, this document does not make it possible to account for several attempts of intrusion or violation of the document that may have occurred during the life of the document. International application WO 2004/078787 relates to a method of tracking a package containing a product during a supply chain of this product. The package comprises an electronic module connected to printed electrically conductive elements, the impedance of which is measured during the routing of the product by the electronic module. The electronic module does not have an inductive antenna and operates by capacitive coupling. At the end of the chain, the results of the impedance measurements are compared to the initial impedance of the electrically conductive elements in order to detect changes in the physical properties of the packaging during the conveyance. Thus, when the package has been damaged at some point during the course of the routing, it is possible to know precisely when the deterioration took place.

summary

There is a need to increase the security of documents comprising an integrated microcircuit device and in particular their resistance to forgery. In particular, there is a need to solve the drawbacks mentioned above and to provide a document comprising an integrated microcircuit device making it possible to detect any attempt to falsify and more particularly to damage the physical integrity of the document.

The invention aims to meet all or part of these needs. The object of the invention is, according to one of its aspects, a document comprising an integrated microcircuit device, in particular an RFID device, the document comprising at least one detector configured to detect a change of at least one a physicochemical magnitude. This change may be caused directly or indirectly by an external stimulus related to the attempt to falsify said document.

The detection can be performed outside the reading field of an external reader capable of obtaining at least one piece of information relating to the change from the integrated microcircuit device. The integrated microcircuit device may be configured to signal to the external reader, during a communication with it, one or more attempts to damage the physical integrity of the document, following the detection of one or more changes. corresponding of said at least one physicochemical magnitude.

The document can be selected from an identity document, for example a driver's license, an identity card, a sheet or a passport booklet, a ticket, a loyalty card, a gift card, a protection label and / or authentication, a traceability label, a visa, a coupon, a means of payment such as a check or a bank note.

The document may be a laminated complex comprising several layers of fibrous and / or plastic substrates. The different layers of substrates can be laminated together, hot by welding or melting, or cold by means of one or more adhesives arranged between the substrate layers.

The detector may be an integral part of the integrated microcircuit device or may be an independent electronic device but linked to the integrated microcircuit, for example connected by a light, optical, radio link, for example by inductive coupling.

Thanks to the invention, it is possible to detect one or more attempts to falsify the document, causing a change in the physicochemical magnitude.

In addition, it is possible to detect any attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document at any time during the life of the document, especially even if a fraudster could restore the value of the physicochemical magnitude as it was before this attempt.

The detector may, for example, be configured to detect and signal to the integrated microcircuit a change in the physicochemical magnitude without receiving control from another device, in particular from an external reader of the integrated microcircuit. Moreover, the invention makes it possible to inform a user of one or more attempts to compromise the physical integrity of the document during a communication of the integrated microcircuit device with the external reader.

The invention also makes it possible to detect an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document without damaging the integrated microcircuit device.

The attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document may correspond to an attempt to intrude, violate or falsify the document, these terms being used in the present case in an equivalent manner.

The attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document may result from at least one mechanical and / or thermal and / or chemical action on the document.

The "reading field" of the external reader may designate both an area near the external reader, allowing electrical or magnetic coupling with the integrated microcircuit device, and the possibility of establishing a direct electrical contact between the integrated microcircuit device. and the external player. By "detector" is meant an element capable of detecting a change in the physicochemical magnitude, in particular of the value of the physicochemical quantity, and to report this change to the integrated microcircuit device. The integrated microcircuit is advantageously able to keep in memory the change or changes.

"Physicochemical quantity" means an intrinsic characteristic parameter or property of the document or of an element present in or on the document, the value of this parameter or property being modified during an intrusion or a violation physical of the document.

"External reader" means any device that makes it possible to communicate with the integrated microcircuit device, to activate it, to authenticate it, to read the data contained therein, to receive this data and, where appropriate, to modify or even delete them partially or totally. The external drive can operate remotely or in contact.

The integrated microcircuit device can result from the association of a chip with at least one antenna in the case of a non-contact system. A chip comprises, for example, a semiconducting base, generally a doped silicon wafer or sometimes made of a semiconductive polymer, and also generally comprises a memory, or even one or more microprocessors, making it possible to process data. In order to function, it needs to be powered by a source of electrical energy brought by contact and / or without contact, that is to say in the latter case, remotely via a communication interface. via an antenna. The chip is for example arranged in the center of the antenna for an inductive contactless power supply or in a construction forming a capacitor, an antenna can also be part of this construction, for a capacitive type contactless power supply. In the case of a power supply of the inductive type, the reader of the chip sends waves picked up by the antenna which then induces an electric current which supplies and activates the chip. The chips with antenna are called transponders and generally use radio-frequency waves, hence their qualification of radio frequency identification devices (RFID in English). These waves, for example through a modulation of the signal, for example frequencies, also allow a dialogue between the chip and the external reader.

In the case where the integrated microcircuit device is said to be "active", the chip may include a battery (also called micro-battery) integrated in its integrated microcircuit or be connected to a micro-battery built into the document. By "battery" is meant a source of energy of electrochemical origin, rechargeable or not.

The integrated microcircuit device is advantageously adapted to contactless communication technology, for example as described in the ISO 14443 standard.

The integrated microcircuit device according to the invention can contain an electronic double contact contact / contactless module for dual chip card or contain two chips, one for contact technology, the other for non-contact card technology. hybrid chip.

The integrated microcircuit device may comprise an electronic microcircuit capable of processing the data resulting from the physicochemical magnitude evaluations by the detector.

The integrated microcircuit device may comprise the detector, the latter being a constituent element of the integrated microcircuit device. The integrated microcircuit device and the detector can be united within the same component. Alternatively, the detector may be distinct from the integrated microcircuit device. The detector can be connected or coupled, for example electrically or magnetically, to the integrated microcircuit device.

The detector can be powered by a battery present on the integrated microcircuit device. Alternatively, the detector may be powered by a battery external to the integrated microcircuit device.

When the detector and / or the battery supplying the detector are distinct from the integrated microcircuit device, these elements can be located in the same plane inside the document. For example, they may be located on the same substrate layer within the laminate complex. Alternatively, the detector and the battery supplying the detector may be located on different substrate layers of the layer supporting the integrated microcircuit device.

The detector may be a sensor capable of measuring the physicochemical magnitude. The detector may be sensitive to at least one external stimulus related to the attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document in which it is integrated, this or these stimuli being able to be of a mechanical (for example document peeling), thermal ( heat attack), chemical (attack with solvents).

The detector can be sensitive to one or more stimuli, directly (in one step) or indirectly (in several steps).

In a first case, the external stimulus can directly cause a variation of one or more physicochemical quantities associated with this stimulus.

For example, a mechanical stimulus such as an attempt to peel may directly cause a variation in speed and inclination of one of the constituent layers of the document relative to another, these variations being detected by a sensor.

A mechanical stimulus such as an attempt to peel may also directly cause a variation in brightness within the constituent layers of the document, these variations being detected by a sensor. A chemical stimulus such as an attempt to tamper with one or more solvents may result in the presence of the chemical of falsification at a given concentration or rate, this variation in concentration being detected by a sensor.

A thermal stimulus such as hot melt hot plate or dry hair falsification can cause a temperature rise in the heart of the document, which is detected by a sensor.

In a second case, the external stimulus may indirectly cause a variation of one or more physicochemical quantities. This process may comprise at least a first step in which the external stimulus induces a variation of at least one parameter associated with this stimulus and a second step in which the variation of the at least one parameter associated with the stimulus itself induces a variation of one or more physicochemical quantities associated with this at least one parameter.

For example, a mechanical stimulus may tear a conductive film present as an intermediate layer in the document, which tear is then detected by a change in electrical conductivity by a sensor. A mechanical stimulus can cause a mechanical failure of integrated microcapsules in one or more constituent layers of the document, these microcapsules comprising a chemical species which, released, is detected by a change in concentration of this species in the environment of a sensor.

A chemical stimulus may solubilize an adhesive charged with magnetic particles, which is then detected by a magnetic magnitude change by a sensor.

A thermal stimulus may further cause a phase shift from the solid to the liquid of a dye present in one of the intermediate layers of the document, which dye is then detected by a change in colorimetric magnitude at an optical sensor.

Advantageously, the integrated microcircuit device, and in particular the detector, is configured to detect a change in the physicochemical quantity at predefined time intervals, in particular at least once a day, preferably at least once a half day, better at least once an hour, more preferably continuously. In this way, the invention makes it possible to detect the slightest attempted intrusion or violation of the document having occurred at any time during the life of the document. The integrated microcircuit device, and in particular the detector, may also be configured to detect a possible change in the physicochemical quantity when it is present in the reading field of the external reader, in particular on control of the external reader. The detector can be supplied with electricity by the integrated microcircuit device. The detector can be supplied with electricity by magnetic, electrical or electromagnetic coupling.

The detector can still be supplied with electricity by a battery, including a microbattery on chip mounted in thin layers on the silicon layer of the integrated microcircuit device.

The detector when it needs more power, can also be powered by a battery of its own, for example a flexible thin film battery separate from the chip, this micro battery being for example inserted in the intermediate layers of the document . The detector can be powered by a voltaic photo module. The detector may in particular be powered by a live photovoltaic module, that is to say, continuously subject to exposure to a light source and / or via a battery.

When communicating the integrated microcircuit device with the external reader, the device may allow a user to be notified by the external reader that there has been an attempted intrusion or physical violation of the document.

The integrated microcircuit device may be arranged to interrupt or prohibit communication with the external reader in the event of detection by the integrated microcircuit device of one or more changes of one or more physicochemical quantities corresponding to one or more attempts to achieve the physical integrity of the document. The data contained in the integrated microcircuit device can be modified or deleted, totally or partially, by the external reader, when at least one intrusion attempt is detected.

The deletion of the data contained in the microcircuit device can be done automatically by the integrated microcircuit device itself, after a proven attempt at tampering or during a communication with the external reader, in the latter case, at the same time. instigation of the user. In this way, the integrated microcircuit device can be arranged to automatically delete the data that it comprises without communication with the external reader, in the event of detection by the integrated microcircuit device of a change in size. physicochemical corresponding to an attempt to undermine the physical integrity of the document.

In particular, during a communication of the integrated microcircuit device with the external reader, the external reader sends commands to the integrated microcircuit device. In response, the integrated microcircuit device sends information to the external reader relating to one or more attempts to falsify the document that has occurred and / or controls the detector in order to verify the value of the physicochemical quantity (s) at the time of the exchange. information and compare it to its initial value (s).

The invention can make it possible to point out to a user any attempt to intrude or physically violate the document that has taken place without any visual external sign revealing it.

The invention can also make it possible to memorize the least intrusion or physical violation that has occurred, even if the information relating to this intrusion or violation is communicated to the user only during the communication of the integrated microcircuit device with the reader. external. The physicochemical magnitude may relate to a parameter or a property detectable and / or measurable by the integrated microcircuit device via the detector, this property being modified during a physical attack of the document or part of the document.

The physicochemical magnitude may be an intrinsic characteristic parameter or property of the document or element present in or on the document.

The physicochemical quantity may especially correspond to a characteristic of at least one predefined element of the document, in particular a paper or plastic substrate, a film, an adhesive, an ink or varnish, a powder, an external coating or a security element, visible or not, such as a watermark. The physical quantity may also correspond to a feature of the document such as the laminate complex as a whole.

The physical quantity can also correspond to an intrinsic characteristic of the document such as its brightness. The physicochemical magnitude may be relative to a parameter or a mechanical, magnetic, electrical, optical property, in the visible or non-visible domain, in particular absorption and / or electromagnetic, thermal, chemical, acoustic or biological reflection.

Preferably, the physicochemical quantity can only be modified by a physical violation of the document, for example during an attempt to separate a constituent layer of the document or during an abrasion or cutting attack.

The physicochemical magnitude may be other than an impedance or an electrical conductance.

The physicochemical magnitude may be associated with a physical integrity indicator, which preferably determines the choice of the physicochemical magnitude.

The "physical integrity witness" may include the detector and some or all of the document, which is likely to have its physical or chemical magnitude (s) characterizing it change under the direct or indirect effect of a stimulus of mechanical, thermal or chemical nature, related to the attempt or attempts to falsify. For example, the physical integrity witness may be an oxygen sensor and an opaque laminated card body of a document when the physicochemical magnitude corresponds to a measure of a change in oxygen content under the effect of a chemical stimulus related to the intake of ambient outside air, during an attempt to peel the card body. For example, the physical integrity witness may be the combination of a magnetic field sensor and an adhesive comprising magnetic particles forming part of the document.

When the document is a collapsible document, for example a passport, the physical integrity indicator may still constitute a shield and / or an electromagnetic attenuation system when it is located in an area facing the integrated microcircuit device. The physical integrity indicator may include an opaque element, especially when the sensor is sensitive to light.

The document may be such that the physicochemical magnitude and the detector are chosen, among others, from among the following physicochemical-detector size combinations: magnetic characteristic and inductive sensor, magnetic characteristic and Hall effect sensor, magnetic characteristic and magneto-resistive head sensor , magnetic characteristic and nuclear magnetic resonance sensor, motion characteristic and inclinometer, motion characteristic and gyrometer, motion characteristic and accelerometer, electrical characteristic and voltmeter, electrical characteristic and ammeter, electrical characteristic and ohmmeter, optical characteristic and optoelectronic sensor, by example of a matrix type, for example of the CCD or CMOS camera type, colorimetric characteristic and optoelectronic detector, characteristic of absorption of waves in the visible and / or ultraviolet range and / or in the infrared and optical sensor, in particular photodiode, or phototransistor, wave absorption characteristic in the visible and / or ultraviolet and / or infrared range and photomultiplier type sensor, thermal characteristic and thermal sensor, biological characteristic and biological sensor, chemical characteristic and electrochemical sensor, quantity of light, in particular visible light, and light sensor, for example photodiode, phototransistor, photoresist or photovoltaic detection sensor, characteristic of a chemical compound, for example concentration of this compound, and sensor for measuring the chemical compound, in particular the ORP or pH potential, chemical species concentration and chemical sensor, in particular thin-layer chemical sensor, gas species concentration and gas sensor, oxygen content and oxygen measurement sensor. According to another of its aspects, the subject of the invention is also a method for detecting an attempt to damage the physical integrity of a document comprising an integrated microcircuit device, in particular an RFID device. integrated microcircuit being arranged to detect, by means of a detector, a change of at least one physicochemical quantity corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document, the method comprising the steps of: performing by means of integrated microcircuit device at least one detection of said change, while the document is out of the reading field of an external reader capable of receiving at least one piece of information relating to said change from the integrated microcircuit device, in case of detection of one or more several changes corresponding to one or more attempts to damage the physical integrity of the document, signaling to an external reader the during a communication with it.

Thanks to the invention, it is possible to benefit from a method making it possible to detect any attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document, by detecting an intrusion or violation outside the reading field of the external reader, the relative information the intrusion or violation being communicated to a user at the time of this communication. In this way, even if a fraudster manages to restore the value of the physicochemical magnitude after having introduced or violated the document, it is still possible to know the prior existence of an intrusion or a violation on the document by the intermediate detector that will record a change in physicochemical magnitude.

The method may further include the step of: prohibiting or interrupting communication with the external reader upon detection of a change corresponding to an attempt to tamper with the physical integrity of the document, and / or deleting or modifying , totally or partially, data contained in the integrated microcircuit device and / or in another device, including the external reader, in case of detection of a change corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document. The method may further include the step of: having the integrated microcircuit device automatically delete the data it understands without communication with the external reader, if detected by the integrated microcircuit device a change in the physico-chemical magnitude corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document.

Description of figures

The invention will be better understood on reading the description which follows, examples of non-limiting implementation thereof, and on examining the accompanying drawing, in which: FIG. schematically, an example of an electronic passport according to one aspect of the invention, Figure 2 shows schematically an electronic ticket according to another aspect of the invention, Figure 3 shows, schematically, an electronic card According to another aspect of the invention, FIG. 4 schematically represents an exemplary playing card according to another aspect of the invention, FIG. 5 schematically represents another example of a passport. according to another aspect of the invention, and FIG. 6 schematically represents an exemplary document and an external reader, making it possible to implement the security method according to the invention. Example 1: Detection of a change in magnetic properties.

Figure 1 shows a passport 1 according to an exemplary implementation of the invention.

The cover of the passport 1 comprises a laminated complex comprising an RFID device 2 consisting of a chip 4 and a film antenna 5, the chip being compensated in thickness in this laminated complex.

The cover of the passport 1 also comprises a detector 3 in the form of a magnetic sensor, connected to the chip 4 but not embedded on this chip 4. An adhesive layer 6 comprising magnetic particles 7 is also included in the cover of the passport 1 , this adhesive layer 6 serving to maintain the laminated complex comprising the RFID device 2 on the inside of the cover of the passport 1.

According to other embodiments of the passport 1, the adhesive layer 6 may be located at different interfaces of the passport cover 1, for example between the laminated complex and the cover page of the passport 1, without presenting disadvantages for the invention.

The assembly formed by the magnetic sensor 3 and the adhesive layer 6 constitutes, in this example, the physical integrity indicator of the passport 1. The magnetic property or properties of the magnetic particles 7 and in particular their remanent magnetization in the case of a magnetic glue comprising so-called hard magnetism particles constitute the physicochemical quantity or quantities whose change is detected by the sensor 3.

Initially, especially during the manufacture of the passport 1, the magnetic sensor 3 measures the magnetic properties of the magnetic particles 7 contained in the adhesive layer 6 and the result of this measurement is stored in the chip 4, or in an external memory, no represented.

The chip 4 may include an integrated microbattery, this micro battery used to feed in particular the Hall effect sensor. During the life of the passport 1, an attempt of intrusion or physical violation of the passport 1 is likely to modify the magnetic properties of the magnetic particles 7 contained in the adhesive layer 6. For example, a fraudster may proceed to a chemical immersion of the passport 1 in a solvent in order to recover the chip 4. In this case, the adhesive layer 6 is solubilized in the solvent. If the fraudster tries to replace the chip 4 with another device and uses a new layer of adhesive to reconstitute the passport 1, the magnetic properties of the magnetic particles 7 will be modified and this change will be detected by the sensor 3 during the measurements of the properties Magnetic particles of magnetic particles 7.

In particular, the sensor 3 can perform measurements of the magnetic properties of the magnetic particles 7 at regular intervals, for example weekly. As a result, any change in the value of the magnetic properties of the magnetic particles 7 with respect to the initial value stored in the chip 4 will be detected by the sensor 3.

When communicating with an external reader, the chip 4 will then be able to inform a user that there has been an attempt of intrusion or physical violation on the passport 1.

Example 2: Detecting a Change in Concentration in a Chemical Species

FIG. 2 represents, in an exploded view, an electronic ticket 1 comprising two paper layers 8 and 9, preferably opaque, glued together by means of a layer of thermoplastic film 10, preferably transparent or translucent.

The paper layer 8 comprises on its inner face an integrated microcircuit device 2 consisting for example of a chip 4 associated with a screen-printed antenna 5. The chip 4 is also connected to a detector 3 which is for example a chemical sensor 3 on thin layer. The chemical sensor 3 can also be included in the chip 4 without this being a drawback.

The chip 4 may also include a microbattery for feeding the chemical sensor 3. In this example, the physicochemical quantity corresponds to the level of chemical species detected by the chemical sensor 3. The chemical sensor 3 constitutes in this example the witness of physical integrity.

When a fraudster attempts to intrude or physically violate the ticket 1, for example by immersion of the electronic ticket 1 in a solvent, the latter is detected by the chemical sensor 3.

Thus, during the life of the ticket 1, the chemical sensor 3 evaluates the level of solvent present in its immediate environment and detects any change in this solvent level from its initial value.

In this way, during a communication of the chip 4 with an external reader, not shown, information is communicated to the user to indicate that an intrusion or physical violation of the ticket 1 has occurred.

In a variant not shown, it is possible to integrate in an intermediate jet of the electronic ticket microcapsules comprising inside a chemical species and whose envelope is sensitive to at least one solvent. The chemical species is released when the electronic ticket is falsified with solvents and then detected by the chemical detector. The advantage of this option is that the sensor only has to be sensitive to the chemical species released by the microcapsules, and not to all the falsification solvents, as in the previous example.

Example 3: Detection of an optical property change

FIG. 3 represents, in an exploded view, a card 1, for example of the gift card or loyalty card type, comprising two paper layers 12 and 15 inside which there are two other layers of paper 11 and 13. The four layers are laminated between them using layers with adhesive property not shown in the figure.

The paper layer 13 has on one of its faces an RFID device 2 consisting of a chip 4 associated with a screen-printed antenna 5, the chip being connected to a detector 3 which is an optoelectronic sensor. The paper layer 11 is provided with a through-hole 11a in the zone facing the chip 4, so that the chip is compensated for in thickness in the laminated paper 11 and paper 13 complex, the antenna being taken inside the complex. An optoelectronic sensor 3 is maintained between the paper layer 11 and the paper 13. The optoelectronic sensor produces, at the request of the RFID device, color measurements at a given time interval, the RFID device being supplied continuously, for example by a battery 14 also located on one of the faces of the paper layer 13. Optionally, the battery 14 and the sensor 3 can also be compensated in thickness in the paper complex 11 and 13 laminated paper through a through window or cavities made in papers 11 or 13.

The paper layer 11 has on all or part of one of its faces, for example that facing the sensor, a phase change substance 16 and more particularly a coloring substance which is in a solid state until at a certain temperature and which changes to the liquid state when exposed to a higher temperature. The four layers of paper are cold-rolled by means of one or more pressure-sensitive, therefore cold-rollable, adhesives so that the phase-change substance is not released prematurely. In this example, the physicochemical quantity corresponds to the colorimetric characteristics of the coloring liquid substance released by the substance with phase change under the action of temperature.

The optoelectronic sensor 3 and the phase change substance 16 constitute the physical integrity witness. During an attempt of intrusion or physical violation of the card 1 by a fraudster, in particular by heat input in order to soften the pressure-sensitive adhesive or adhesives used to laminate between them the different layers of paper, the phase change substance 16 present on one of the faces of the paper layer 11 becomes liquid and is thus released. The optoelectronic sensor 3 then measures or detects the color generated by the release of the liquid substance and then informs the user of a change in the physicochemical quantity during the communication of the RFID device 2 with an external reader. The user is thus alerted that an attempt to intrude or physically violate the card 1 has occurred, even if the color resulting from the intrusion is not detectable by a visual examination.

Alternatively, a second sensor 3 may be present between the paper layer 15 and the paper 13. Example 4: Mechanical stimulus causing a modification of the electrical properties of one of the layers

Figure 4 shows, in exploded view, a playing card 1 having two layers of paper 20 and 21 within which there is a layer of paper 22 and an aluminum layer 23, for example in the form of sheets. The four layers are laminated together through layers with adhesive properties, not shown in the figure. The paper layer 22 comprises a microcircuit device, for example

RFID, comprising a chip 4 and a wire antenna 5, the assembly being disposed on the face of the paper layer 22 opposite the paper layer 21.

As the aluminum foil 23 also acts as an electromagnetic shield, reading of the data stored in the RFID device can only be done on the side of the layers of paper 21 and 22.

The chip 4 comprises in this example a detector, not shown, in the form of an impedance sensor.

In this example, the physicochemical quantity corresponds to the impedance of the aluminum foil 23.

The aluminum foil 23 and the impedance sensor present in the chip 4 constitute the physical integrity witness. Initially, especially at the time of manufacture of the playing card 1, the impedance sensor of the chip 4 measures the impedance of the aluminum foil 23 and stores the result of this measurement in the memory of the chip 4.

During an attempt to intrude or physically violate the playing card 1 by a fraudster, the aluminum foil 23 is deteriorated and the impedance sensor of the chip 4 measures an impedance different from that previously stored.

In this way, it is possible, at the time of communication of the RFID device 2 with an external reader, to know whether or not there has been an attempted intrusion or violation of the playing card 1.

Example 5 Mechanical Stimulus Driving Light Into an Opaque Complex Figure 5 shows another passport 1 according to an exemplary implementation of the invention.

The cover of the passport 1 can be manufactured from a structure for example as described in the application WO 2005/100021 of the Applicant. This structure can be located between an outer page of the cover and an inner page and fixed between these pages by means of a so-called cold-crosslinkable glue.

The structure comprises an integrated microcircuit device 2 and a light sensor 3, which may be a photodiode, a phototransistor or a photosensitive cell.

The light sensor 3 is continuously supplied with electricity by a microbattery 14 placed on the structure and connected to the light sensor 3.

Advantageously, the cover of the passport 1 and / or the structure is opaque, so that the integrated microcircuit device 2 placed in the structure is not visible and so that the amount of light reaching the structure is almost zero, even when the passport booklet is opened. The amount of light reaching the level of the light sensor 3 constitutes the physicochemical magnitude.

An intrusion or violation of the passport 1, in particular by peeling the cover of the passport 1, causes the penetration of light within the passport 1 and in particular at the level of the light sensor 3. This detects a change in the quantity of light reaching. The integrated microcircuit device 2 may inform the user, during a communication with an external reader, that an attempt at forgery has taken place.

Example 6: Mechanical stimulus causing a relative displacement of one layer with respect to another:

Figure 6 shows another passport 1 according to an exemplary implementation of the invention.

The cover of the passport 1 can be manufactured from a structure as described in the application WO 2005/100021 of the Applicant. The structure can be located between an outer page of the cover and an inner page and fixed between these pages via a so-called cold-crosslinkable glue. The structure comprises an integrated microcircuit device 2 and a motion sensor 3, which may be an accelerometer and / or an inclinometer.

The motion sensor 3 is for example continuously supplied with electricity by a microbattery 14 placed on the structure and connected to the motion sensor 3.

The speed and / or the peel angle of one of the constituent layers of the structure with respect to a reference layer, for example the cover, constitutes the physicochemical quantity measured by the motion sensor 3.

An intrusion or violation of the passport 1, in particular by peeling the cover of the passport 1, causes a relative movement of one of the constituent layers of the electronic cover with respect to another. The motion detector 3 then detects this relative change in speed and / or inclination. Then, the integrated microcircuit device 2 can be used to inform a user, during a communication with an external reader, that an attempt to falsify has taken place. Of course, the invention is not limited to the implementation examples which have just been described.

The expression "having a" shall be understood as being synonymous with "having at least one" unless the contrary is specified.

Claims

1. Document (1) comprising an integrated microcircuit device (2), in particular an RFID device, the document (1) comprising at least one detector (3) configured to detect a change of at least one physicochemical quantity, this detection being possible performed outside the reading field of an external reader (30) capable of obtaining at least one piece of information relating to said change from the integrated microcircuit device (2), the integrated microcircuit device (2) being configured to signal the reader external (30), in communication with it, an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document (1) following the detection of a corresponding change of said at least one physicochemical quantity.

2. Document (1) according to claim 1, the detector (3) being a constituent element of the integrated microcircuit device (2).

3. Document (1) according to claim 1, the detector (3) being distinct from the integrated microcircuit device (2).

4. Document (1) according to claim 3, the detector (3) and integrated microcircuit device (2) being connected by connection or by coupling.

5. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the detector (3) being powered by a battery present on the integrated microcircuit device (2).

6. Document (1) according to any one of claims 1 to 4, the detector (3) being powered by an external battery to the integrated microcircuit device

(2).

7. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the detector (3) being a sensor capable of measuring said at least one physicochemical quantity.

8. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the detector (3) being responsive to at least one external stimulus related to the attempt to undermine the physical integrity of the document (1) in which it is integrated this or these stimuli may be of a mechanical, thermal or chemical nature.

9. Document (1) according to claim 8, the external stimulus directly causing a variation of the physicochemical quantity or quantities associated with this stimulus.

10. Document (1) according to claim 8, the external stimulus indirectly causing a variation of at least one parameter associated with this stimulus, the variation of this at least one parameter itself causing a variation of the physicochemical quantity (s) associated at least one parameter.

11. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the integrated microcircuit device (2) being configured to detect a change of said at least one physicochemical quantity at predefined time intervals, in particular at least once a day. preferably at least once per half day, more preferably at least once an hour, more preferably continuously.

12. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the integrated microcircuit device (2) being further configured to proceed to the detection of a possible change of said at least one physicochemical quantity during its presence in the reading field of the external reader (30), in particular on command of the external reader (30).

13. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the integrated microcircuit device (2) being arranged to interrupt or prevent communication with the external reader (30) when detected by the integrated microcircuit device (2). ) one or more changes in the physicochemical quantity or quantities corresponding to one or more attempts to damage the physical integrity of the document (1).

14. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, the integrated microcircuit device (2) being arranged to automatically delete the data that it comprises without communication with the external reader (30), in case of detection by the integrated microcircuit device (2) of a change of said at least one physicochemical quantity corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the part or part of the document (1).

15. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, said at least one physicochemical quantity being relative to a parameter or property detectable and / or measurable by the integrated microcircuit device (2) by through the detector (3), this parameter or this property being modified during a physical attack of the document (1).

16. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, said at least one physicochemical quantity being an intrinsic characteristic parameter or property of the document or of an element present in or on the document.

17. Document (1) according to the preceding claim, said at least one physicochemical quantity being a parameter or a characteristic property of at least one predefined element of the document, in particular of a paper or plastic substrate, a film, a an adhesive, an ink or varnish, a powder, an outer coating or a security element, visible or not.

18. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, said at least one physicochemical quantity being modifiable only by a physical violation of the document (1).

19. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, said at least one physicochemical quantity being relative to a parameter or to a mechanical, magnetic, electrical, optical, including absorption and / or electromagnetic reflection, thermal property , chemical, acoustic or biological.

20. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, said at least one physicochemical quantity being other than an impedance or an electrical conductance.

21. Document (1) according to any one of the preceding claims, said at least one physicochemical quantity and the detector (3) being chosen from the following physicochemical-detector size associations (3): magnetic characteristic and inductive sensor, magnetic characteristic and Hall effect sensor, magnetic characteristic and magneto-resistive head sensor, magnetic characteristic and nuclear magnetic resonance sensor, motion characteristic and inclinometer, motion characteristic and gyrometer, motion characteristic and accelerometer, electrical characteristic and voltmeter, electrical characteristic and ammeter, electrical characteristic and ohmmeter, optical characteristic and optoelectronic sensor, colorimetric characteristic and optoelectronic detector, wave absorption characteristic in the visible and / or ultraviolet and / or infrared range and sensor optical, in particular photodiode, or phototransistor, wave absorption characteristic in the visible and / or ultraviolet and / or infrared range and photomultiplier type sensor, thermal characteristic and thermal sensor, biological characteristic and sensor biological, chemical characteristic and electrochemical sensor, quantity of light and light sensor, characteristic of a chemical compound and chemical compound measurement sensor, chemical species concentration and chemical sensor, in particular chemical thin layer sensor, gaseous species concentration and gas sensor, oxygen level and sensor measuring the oxygen level.

22. A method for detecting an attempt to impair the physical integrity of a document (1) comprising an integrated microcircuit device (2), in particular an RFID device, this integrated microcircuit device (2) being arranged to detecting by means of a detector (3) a change of at least one physicochemical magnitude corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document (1), the method comprising the steps of:

performing, by means of the integrated microcircuit device (2), at least one detection of said change, whereas the document (1) is outside the reading field of an external reader (30) able to receive from the integrated microcircuit device ( 2) at least one information relating to said change, - in case of detection of one or more changes corresponding to one or more attempts to damage the physical integrity of the document (1), signaling to an external reader (30) the or attempts during a communication with it.

23. The method of claim 20, including the step of: prohibiting or interrupting the communication with the external reader (30) in case of detection of a change corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document ( 1).

24. The method as claimed in claim 22, including the step of: deleting or modifying, totally or partially, at the instigation of the user, data contained in the integrated microcircuit device (2) and / or in another device, in particular the external reader (30), in case of detection of a change corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document

(1).

25. The method according to the preceding claim, comprising the step of: having the integrated microcircuit device (2) automatically delete the data that it comprises without communication with the external reader (30), in case detection by the integrated microcircuit device (2) of a change of said at least one physicochemical quantity corresponding to an attempt to damage the physical integrity of the document (1).