EP2260609A1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von nachrichten in echtzeit - Google Patents
Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von nachrichten in echtzeitInfo
- Publication number
- EP2260609A1 EP2260609A1 EP09729803A EP09729803A EP2260609A1 EP 2260609 A1 EP2260609 A1 EP 2260609A1 EP 09729803 A EP09729803 A EP 09729803A EP 09729803 A EP09729803 A EP 09729803A EP 2260609 A1 EP2260609 A1 EP 2260609A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- transmitter
- receiver
- checksum
- message
- encrypted
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and a device for transmission between subscribers in a closed network of a vehicle.
- Vehicles in particular also rail-bound vehicles, have a multiplicity of components, such as a brake control, a drive control, a sanitary system control or an air-conditioning control, which are connected to a server or a central control via a vehicle bus. Each of these components or components sends and receives data.
- the components are interconnected via an Ethernet bus, for example.
- the data that is transmitted via the vehicle bus may not be falsified. A falsification of the data could lead to a train wreck.
- the invention has for its object to provide a method and apparatus for transmitting a message in real time between participants in a closed network of a vehicle, in which a corruption of the messages is prevented.
- the invention provides a method for transmitting a message between subscribers in a closed network of a vehicle, comprising the following steps:
- the transmitter calculates a transmission check sum over the security-relevant real-time data to be transmitted, including the transmitter ID of the transmitter.
- the sender encrypts the calculated send checksum with a private key of the sender to generate an encrypted checksum.
- the transmitter transmits the encrypted send checksum together with the security-relevant real-time data including the transmitter ID to the receiver via the vehicle bus.
- the receiver decrypts the encrypted transmission checksum received via the vehicle bus by means of a public key of the transmitter designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID for determining a first reception check sum.
- the receiver calculates a second receive check sum via the received security-relevant real-time data, including the transmitter ID of the transmitter.
- the receiver recognizes a correct transmission of the security-relevant data and the transmitter ID if the first receive check sum and the second receive check sum are identical.
- the transmitter transmits the encrypted transmission checksum together with the security-relevant real-time data, including the transmitter ID, and together with the unencrypted transmission check sum to the receiver via the vehicle bus.
- the receiver decrypts the encrypted transmission checksum received via the transmission channel by means of an official key of the transmitter designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID for determining a first reception check sum.
- the receiver receives the transmitted unencrypted transmit check sum as the second receive check sum and compares this with the determined first receive check sum.
- the receiver recognizes a correct transmission of the security-relevant data and the transmitter ID if the first receive checksum and the second receive check sum match.
- the checksums are formed by means of a CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) method.
- the vehicle is formed by a rail-bound vehicle.
- the transmitter is formed by a control unit within the vehicle.
- the receiver is formed by a central control unit within the vehicle.
- a plurality of control units are connected to the central control unit via a common vehicle bus.
- control unit is formed by a brake control, a drive control, a sanitary system control or an air-conditioning control.
- the real-time data output by the control units has different priority levels.
- a key length of a key for encryption of the real-time data is set as a function of the respective priority level of the real-time data.
- the real-time data are encrypted with a high priority level and with a small allowable reaction time to minimize the time required for encryption and decryption with a key of short key length.
- the key length (L) ⁇ 128 bits.
- the key length (L) is ⁇ 56 bits.
- the invention further provides a system for transmitting messages in real time between subscribers in a closed network of a vehicle having the features specified in claim 24.
- the invention provides a system for transmitting messages in real-time between subscribers in a closed network of a vehicle with: (a) at least one transmitter that encrypts real-time security-relevant data to be transmitted of a message, including a sender's transmitter ID, with a sender's private key to generate an encrypted message;
- the invention further provides a transmitter within a closed network of a vehicle having the features specified in claim 25.
- the invention provides a transmitter within a closed network of a vehicle which, for the secure transmission of a message, encrypts real-time security-relevant data of the message, including a transmitter ID of the transmitter with a private key of the sender for generating a closed message, and the encrypted message together with the unencrypted transmitter ID of the transmitter via a vehicle bus to a receiver sends.
- the transmitter calculates a transmit check sum for the security-relevant real-time data to be transmitted, including the transmitter ID of the transmitter. In one embodiment of the transmitter according to the invention, the transmitter encrypts the calculated transmit check sum with a private key of the transmitter for generating an encrypted transmit check sum.
- the transmitter transmits the encrypted transmit check sum to the receiver via the vehicle bus.
- the transmitter transmits the encrypted transmit check sum together with the safety-relevant real-time data and together with the unencrypted transmit check sum to the receiver via the vehicle bus.
- the invention further provides a receiver within a closed network of a vehicle, which decrypts a received encrypted message by means of a public key, which is designated by an unencrypted transmitter ID, which is received together with the encrypted message, for recovering the unencrypted message and the compares the received transmitter ID with the transmitter ID contained in the retrieved message to determine if the transmission of the message has occurred correctly.
- the receiver decrypts the encrypted send checksum received via the vehicle bus by means of a public key of the transmitter designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID for determining a first receive check sum.
- the receiver calculates a second receive check sum via the received security-relevant real-time data including the transmitter ID of the transmitter. In one embodiment of the inventive receiver, the receiver recognizes a correct transmission of the security-relevant real-time data and the transmitter ID, if the first receive check sum and the second receive check sum are identical.
- the receiver decrypts the encrypted transmission check sum received via the vehicle bus by means of a public key of the transmitter designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID for determining a first receive check sum.
- the receiver receives the transmitted unencrypted transmit check sum as a second receive check sum and compares this with the determined first receive check sum.
- the receiver recognizes a correct transmission of the security-relevant real-time data and the transmitter ID, if the first receive check sum and the second receive check sum match.
- the invention further provides a computer program for carrying out a method for transmitting a message in real time between subscribers in a closed network of a vehicle with the following steps:
- the invention further provides a data carrier for storing such a computer program.
- Figure 1 is a block diagram of a possible embodiment of the inventive system for the transmission of messages in real time between participants in a closed network of a vehicle according to the invention RETg;
- FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram of a possible embodiment of the method according to the invention in a closed network of a vehicle according to the invention
- FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of a possible embodiment of a transmitter according to the invention and of a receiver according to the invention.
- a vehicle 1 for example a rail-bound vehicle, has an internal vehicle bus 2.
- the vehicle 1 may be a train with a drive carriage and several wagons.
- the Wagons are coupled with each other and attached to the train carriages.
- the coupling of the wagons and the towing vehicle takes place mechanically and electrically, so that the vehicle bus 2 also connects transmitters and receivers in different wagons.
- the vehicle bus 2 within the vehicle 1 connects a plurality of electronic components connected thereto. These electronic components are, for example, control units.
- the control units within a rail vehicle 1 are z.
- B. Brake control units, drive and air conditioning controls. These various control units can be connected to a server, which is located for example in a drive carriage.
- the control units exchange data with one another via the vehicle bus 2, which data are transmitted, for example, by means of data packets. In an alternative embodiment, predetermined time slots are assigned to the various control units.
- a transmission unit 3 transmits data via the vehicle bus 2 to a receiver 4 within the vehicle 1.
- the data can be security-relevant real-time data that is exchanged in a message between the users 3, 4.
- the transmitter 3 encrypts the security-relevant real-time data D of a message N including a transmitter ID A-ID of the transmitter 3 with a private key K priv of the transmitter 3 for generating an encrypted message N '.
- This encrypted message N ' is subsequently transmitted by the transmitter 3 via the vehicle bus 2 together with the unencrypted transmitter ID A-ID of the transmitter 3.
- the receiver 4 decrypts the received encrypted message N 'by means of a public key K pub i ic of the transmitter 3 designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID A-ID for retrieving the unencrypted message N.
- the receiver 4 compares the unencrypted transmitted and received Sender ID A-ID with the sender ID contained in the retrieved message N to determine if the message N has been transmitted correctly. Recognizes the receiver 4 that the message N has not been transferred correctly, an error treatment is performed.
- FIG. 2 shows a flow chart of a possible embodiment of a real-time data transmission between subscribers.
- a starting step S0 which takes place at regular time intervals or in response to an event
- a first step S1 the security-relevant real-time data D of a message N, including the sender ID A-ID of the sender 3, within the closed network with a private key K privA of the transmitter 3 for generating an encrypted message N 'encrypted.
- step S2 the encrypted message N 'together with an unencrypted transmitter ID A-ID of the
- Transmitter 3 transmitted from the transmitter 3 via the vehicle bus 2 to the receiver 4 within the closed network.
- the received encrypted message N ' is decrypted by the receiver 4 by means of a public key (K pub i ic ) of the transmitter 3 designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID for the recovery of the unencrypted message N.
- K pub i ic a public key of the transmitter 3 designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID for the recovery of the unencrypted message N.
- the receiver 4 compares the received transmitter ID A-ID with the transmitter ID contained in the retrieved message N to determine whether the transmission of the message has been made correctly or not.
- FIG. 3 clarifies the procedure for a possible one
- a message N to be transmitted which contains security-relevant real-time data D and a transmitter ID A-ID, is to be transmitted from the transmitter 3 to the receiver 4.
- the transmitter ID A-ID of the message N to be transmitted addresses a memory cell within a memory 3A for reading out a private key K privA of the transmitter 3.
- the security-relevant real-time data D of the transmitted data N including the sender ID A-ID of the sender 3, are encrypted with the sender's read private key K privA to generate an encrypted message N '.
- the encryption of the real-time data D and the transmitter ID of the transmitter 3 is effected by an encryption unit 3B within the transmitter 3.
- the transmitter 3 subsequently transmits the encrypted message N 'together with the unencrypted transmitter ID of the transmitter 3 via the vehicle bus 2 to the receiver 4.
- the receiver 4 decrypts the encrypted message N 'received via the vehicle bus 2 by means of a public key (K pub i lcA ), which is designated by the received unencrypted transmitter ID A-ID.
- K pub i lcA a public key
- the received unencrypted transmitter ID addresses a memory cell or memory area in a memory 4A of the receiver 4 for reading out the associated public key K pub i ICA .
- a decryption unit 4B of the receiver 4 decrypts the received encrypted message N 'to recover the unencrypted message N and to retrieve the sender ID A-ID contained in the encrypted message N'.
- This retrieved transmitter ID A-ID ' is compared by a comparison unit 4C within the receiver 4 with the unencrypted transmitted transmitter ID A-ID to determine whether the transmission of the message has been made correctly or has not been done correctly. If the unencrypted transmitter ID A-ID deviates from the transmitter ID A-ID 'retrieved from the decrypted message N', an error has occurred during the transmission of the message. In this case, an error handling is initiated.
- the transmitter 3 calculates a transmission checksum C on the security-relevant real-time data D including the transmitter ID of the transmitter 3.
- the encryption unit 3B of the transmitter 3 encodes the calculated transmission checksum C by means of the read private key K privA of the transmitter 3 for generating an encrypted checksum C '.
- This encrypted transmission checksum C ' is transmitted from the transmitter 3 together with the security-relevant real-time data D including the transmitter ID A-ID of the transmitter 3 via the vehicle bus 2 to the receiver 4.
- the decryption unit 4B of the receiver 4 decrypts the received via the vehicle 2 encrypted transmit checksum C by means of the read from the memory 4A public key K pub i LCA of by the received unencrypted transmitter ID designated Neten transmitter 3 for determining a first reception
- the receiver 4 calculates a second receive checksum C2 via the received security-relevant real-time data D and the decrypted message including the transmitter ID of the transmitter 3. The first receive checksum Ci and the second receive checksum C2 are then compared with each other. The receiver 4 recognizes a correct transmission of the safety-related data D and the transmitter ID if the first reception checksum Ci and the second reception checksum C2 are identical.
- the transmitter 3 transmits the encrypted transmission checksum C together with the security-relevant real-time data D including the transmitter ID and together with the unencrypted transmission checksum C to the receiver 4 via the vehicle bus 2 .
- the decryption unit 4B within the receiver 4 decrypts the received via the vehicle 2 encrypted transmit checksum C by means of the read-out public key K pub i LCA of by the received unencrypted transmitter ID a-ID designated transmitter 3 for determining a first receive checksum Ci.
- the receiver 4 receives the transmitted unencrypted transmission checksum C as the second reception checksum C2 and compares these with the determined first reception checksum Ci.
- the receiver 4 recognizes a correct transmission of the security-relevant data and the transmitter ID if the first receive checksum Ci and the second receive checksum C2 match.
- the checksums are formed by means of a CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) method.
- the inventive method uses an asymmetric encryption method as a proof of security or as proof of a correct transmission of a message. In this case, a proof of the correctness of the data D of the transmitter 3 and thus an ap plicative backup is possible.
- Each communication subscriber connected to the vehicle bus 2 receives a public and a private secret key for this purpose.
- the security-relevant data portion of the message or the telegram including the sender ID of the transmitter 3 is encrypted with the private key K priv of the transmitter 3 and transmitted as a message together with the unencrypted information who is the sender.
- the receiver 4 can then decrypt the message of the transmitter 3 by means of the public key K pub i ic of the transmitter 3.
- K pub i ic of the transmitter 3 With the method according to the invention, a data corruption on the communication path is identifiable as well as an erroneous pretranslation of the transmitter 3.
- the transmitted data are protected with the inventive method not only against technical distortions, but also against wanton hacker attacks.
- the inventive method allows communication between any number of participants and is thus suitable for communication in closed networks, which also have a relatively high number of communicating components.
- the real-time data D output by the components or control units have different priority levels.
- real-time data for the brake control has higher priority than real-time data for the sanitary facility control. Since only a very small delay time may occur in the case of particularly safety-critical real-time data, in one embodiment of the invention, sets the key length L of a key K for encryption of the real-time data D as a function of the respective priority level of the real-time data D. The shorter the key length L, the faster real-time data can be encrypted and decrypted. However, even keys with a relatively short key length L of, for example, less than 56 bits still provide sufficient protection against manipulation attempts by third parties.
- real-time data with a very high priority level ie real-time data which are particularly critical to security and time, are encrypted by means of a key K with a short key length L, while other data are encrypted with lower priority level with a key K larger
- Key length L are encrypted. Real-time data D having a high priority level and a low allowable response time is therefore encrypted with a key K of short key length L, for example, having a key length L of less than 128 bits to minimize the time required for encryption and decryption.
- real time data D having a high priority level and a low allowable response time is encrypted with a key K having a key length L of less than 56 bits.
- the transmitted real-time data D is any real-time data, such as sensor data generated by sensors or control data transmitted by a controller.
- the vehicle 1 is, for example, a rail-bound vehicle such as a train. However, the vehicle 1 may be other vehicles having an internal closed network, such as aircraft, ships or motor vehicles.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102008018001A DE102008018001A1 (de) | 2008-04-09 | 2008-04-09 | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Übertragung von Nachrichten in Echtzeit |
PCT/EP2009/052017 WO2009124803A1 (de) | 2008-04-09 | 2009-02-20 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von nachrichten in echtzeit |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2260609A1 true EP2260609A1 (de) | 2010-12-15 |
Family
ID=40627202
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09729803A Withdrawn EP2260609A1 (de) | 2008-04-09 | 2009-02-20 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur übertragung von nachrichten in echtzeit |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8577036B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP2260609A1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN101990748A (de) |
DE (1) | DE102008018001A1 (de) |
RU (1) | RU2459369C2 (de) |
TW (1) | TWI439102B (de) |
WO (1) | WO2009124803A1 (de) |
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DE102011109888B4 (de) * | 2011-08-10 | 2020-01-23 | Phoenix Contact Gmbh & Co. Kg | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum automatischen Erstellen einer ausführbaren Sicherheitsfunktion für ein Gerät |
JP5770602B2 (ja) | 2011-10-31 | 2015-08-26 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | 通信システムにおけるメッセージ認証方法および通信システム |
DE102012024818A1 (de) * | 2012-03-06 | 2013-09-12 | Conti Temic Microelectronic Gmbh | Verfahren zur Verbesserung der funktionalen Sicherheit und Steigerung der Verfügbarkeit eines elektronischen Regelungssystems sowie ein elektronisches Regelungssystem |
KR101371902B1 (ko) * | 2012-12-12 | 2014-03-10 | 현대자동차주식회사 | 차량 네트워크 공격 탐지 장치 및 그 방법 |
KR101519777B1 (ko) * | 2014-01-29 | 2015-05-12 | 현대자동차주식회사 | 차량 네트워크 내의 제어기간의 데이터 송신 방법 및 수신 방법 |
US20170164142A1 (en) * | 2015-09-10 | 2017-06-08 | "Billennium" Spolka Z Ograniczona Odpowiedzialnoscia | A trusted geolocation beacon and a method for operating a trusted geolocation beacon |
DE102015220227A1 (de) | 2015-10-16 | 2017-04-20 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und System für eine asymmetrische Schlüsselherleitung |
CN105953381A (zh) * | 2016-06-14 | 2016-09-21 | 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 | 空调器通信数据的处理方法、装置和系统,以及空调器 |
IT201600116085A1 (it) * | 2016-11-17 | 2018-05-17 | Ansaldo Sts Spa | Apparato e metodo per la gestione in sicurezza di comunicazioni vitali in ambiente ferroviario |
DE102017213010A1 (de) | 2017-07-28 | 2019-01-31 | Audi Ag | Gesamtvorrichtung mit einer Authentifizierungsanordnung und Verfahren zur Authentifizierung |
DE102018203072A1 (de) * | 2018-03-01 | 2019-09-05 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Anordnung zum gesicherten Übertragen einer Nachricht von einer Sendeeinrichtung zu einer Empfangseinrichtung |
US11496445B2 (en) | 2018-05-23 | 2022-11-08 | Sideassure, Inc. | Electronic device for secure communications with an automobile |
CN111147479B (zh) * | 2019-12-25 | 2022-03-11 | 西安云维智联科技有限公司 | Trdp协议的数据加密传输系统 |
DE102020205583A1 (de) | 2020-05-04 | 2021-11-04 | Siemens Mobility GmbH | Transportsystem, Transportmittel und Datenverwaltungsverfahren |
FR3118844A1 (fr) * | 2021-01-13 | 2022-07-15 | Dassault Aviation | Systeme de transfert securise de donnees numeriques d'aeronef, systeme producteur de donnees, systeme consommateur de donnees, et procede de transfert assoscie |
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DE69327238T2 (de) | 1993-08-17 | 2000-09-07 | Entrust Technologies Switzerla | Verfahren zur digitalen Unterschrift und Verfahren zur Schlüsselübereinkunft |
CA2158290A1 (en) | 1994-09-29 | 1996-03-30 | Leon A. Pintsov | Postage evidencing system with secure summary reports |
DE19527541A1 (de) * | 1995-07-27 | 1997-01-30 | Siemens Ag | Vorrichtung zur Erzeugung von Steuersignalen |
US6307936B1 (en) * | 1997-09-16 | 2001-10-23 | Safenet, Inc. | Cryptographic key management scheme |
US6275165B1 (en) * | 1998-03-19 | 2001-08-14 | Westinghouse Air Brake Company | A.A.R. compliant electronic braking system |
US6487646B1 (en) * | 2000-02-29 | 2002-11-26 | Maxtor Corporation | Apparatus and method capable of restricting access to a data storage device |
FR2824210B1 (fr) * | 2001-04-27 | 2003-05-30 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de contre-mesure dans un composant electronique mettant en oeuvre un algorithme cryptographique du type a cle publique sur une courbe elliptique |
DE10141737C1 (de) * | 2001-08-25 | 2003-04-03 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Verfahren zur sicheren Datenübertragung innerhalb eines Verkehrsmittels |
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US20050033701A1 (en) * | 2003-08-08 | 2005-02-10 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for verifying the identity of a remote meter transmitting utility usage data |
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DE102004036810A1 (de) * | 2004-07-29 | 2006-03-23 | Zf Lenksysteme Gmbh | Kommunikationsverfahren für wenigstens zwei Systemkomponenten eines Kraftfahrzeugs |
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-
2008
- 2008-04-09 DE DE102008018001A patent/DE102008018001A1/de not_active Ceased
-
2009
- 2009-02-20 US US12/937,398 patent/US8577036B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2009-02-20 WO PCT/EP2009/052017 patent/WO2009124803A1/de active Application Filing
- 2009-02-20 EP EP09729803A patent/EP2260609A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2009-02-20 RU RU2010145270/08A patent/RU2459369C2/ru not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2009-02-20 CN CN2009801126042A patent/CN101990748A/zh active Pending
- 2009-03-19 TW TW098108904A patent/TWI439102B/zh not_active IP Right Cessation
Non-Patent Citations (3)
Title |
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"Chapter 1: Overview of Cryptography ED - Menezes A J; Van Oorschot P C; Vanstone S A", 1 October 1996 (1996-10-01), XP001525001, ISBN: 978-0-8493-8523-0, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/> [retrieved on 20170927] * |
MENEZES ET AL: "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", USA, 1 January 1997 (1997-01-01), USA, XP055103228, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/> [retrieved on 20170927] * |
See also references of WO2009124803A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE102008018001A1 (de) | 2009-10-22 |
CN101990748A (zh) | 2011-03-23 |
US8577036B2 (en) | 2013-11-05 |
US20110055564A1 (en) | 2011-03-03 |
TWI439102B (zh) | 2014-05-21 |
TW200952432A (en) | 2009-12-16 |
WO2009124803A1 (de) | 2009-10-15 |
RU2010145270A (ru) | 2012-05-20 |
RU2459369C2 (ru) | 2012-08-20 |
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