EP2195793A1 - Verfahren zum erzeugen von masken in einem kommunizierenden objekt und entsprechendes kommunizierendes objekt - Google Patents

Verfahren zum erzeugen von masken in einem kommunizierenden objekt und entsprechendes kommunizierendes objekt

Info

Publication number
EP2195793A1
EP2195793A1 EP08803273A EP08803273A EP2195793A1 EP 2195793 A1 EP2195793 A1 EP 2195793A1 EP 08803273 A EP08803273 A EP 08803273A EP 08803273 A EP08803273 A EP 08803273A EP 2195793 A1 EP2195793 A1 EP 2195793A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
mask
communicating object
data
communicating
diversified
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP08803273A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Frédéric Amiel
Laurent Gauteron
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Thales DIS France SA
Original Assignee
Gemalto SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Gemalto SA filed Critical Gemalto SA
Priority to EP08803273A priority Critical patent/EP2195793A1/de
Publication of EP2195793A1 publication Critical patent/EP2195793A1/de
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/602Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/357Cards having a plurality of specified features
    • G06Q20/3576Multiple memory zones on card
    • G06Q20/35765Access rights to memory zones
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2153Using hardware token as a secondary aspect

Definitions

  • the field of the invention is that of communicating objects, such as in particular smart cards, mobile phones or PDAs. More specifically, the present invention relates to a method of generating masks in a communicating object.
  • the term "mask” will be used to denote a digital function intended to mask sensitive data or instructions of a program that is to be kept secret in the communicating object.
  • data is for example a key, a code, an identifier of the owner of the card or an algorithm or instructions that we do not wish to disclose to a possible attacker.
  • This data is not stored "in the clear” in the map.
  • it is known to apply a mathematical function to this sensitive data item. The resulting data is then a masked data stored in the memory of the card. Subsequently, if one wishes to read this sensitive data, an inverse mathematical function of the previous one is applied to the masked data and the sensitive data can then be recovered for its use, for example for the execution of a program.
  • the mathematical function is for example an exclusive-Ou.
  • FIG. 1 represents the masking of a data item comprising i bytes do to d ,.
  • the mask used to mask the data item 10 is denoted 1 1 and also comprises i bytes bo to h ,.
  • the masking function here is an exclusive-or-function 12.
  • the masking therefore consists in producing an octet-oriented Exclusive-O.
  • the data 10 is regenerated, the exclusive-or-function being reversible.
  • the present invention aims to overcome this disadvantage.
  • one of the objectives of the invention is to propose a data masking method for a communicating object making it possible to mask a very large number of data without the need to memorize more than one mask or at least a number of masks important.
  • the application of diversifiers to the master mask thus makes it possible to obtain diversified masks which are used to mask the data.
  • the reversible function used is an exclusive function.
  • the application of a diversifier to the master mask consists in applying a rotation to the master mask.
  • the generation of diversified masks consists of simple rotations of the master mask.
  • a master mask of 256 bytes it will be possible to generate 256 different masks if the rotation is oriented bytes. It is of course also possible to perform rotations at the bit level, which further increases the number of different masks that can be generated.
  • the diversifier is preferably generated pseudo-randomly in the communicating object. This has the advantage of being able to hide data on the fly.
  • the masks masters are diversified from one object communicating to another. Thus, even if an attacker manages to discover the master mask of a communicating object, he will not be able to unmask the data stored in another communicating object since their masks are different.
  • the invention also relates to a communicating object comprising means for implementing such a method.
  • the communicating object preferably consists of a smart card.
  • FIG. masking a data, according to the state of the art FIG. 2 represents a preferred mode of implementation of the method according to the invention.
  • Figure 1 has been described above with reference to the state of the art.
  • FIG. 2 represents a preferred mode of implementation of the method according to the invention.
  • a mask 11, called master mask is used.
  • the master mask 1 1 is stored in the communicating object.
  • the invention proposes applying a diversifier D to the master mask 11 in order to generate a diversified mask 14.
  • the diversifier D is a simple pointer which marks the byte of the master mask 1 1 which will be used to mask the first byte of the data item 10.
  • the other bytes are taken one after the other, in a simplified implementation mode. This produces a diversified mask 14 whose first byte is b, _i and the last byte is b ,. So we have simply applied a rotation to the bytes of the master mask 11. It is also possible to apply rotations to the bits of the master mask 1 1, the rotation then being oriented bits.
  • the bytes d 0 to d of the data 10 are masked using the bytes of the diversified mask 14 to provide the masked data item 15.
  • the masked data item 15 In order to be able to unmask the masked data item 15, it is stored in the object communicating with the diversifier D which was used to generate the diversified mask 14, that is to say with the diversifier having made it possible to obtain it.
  • the masked datum 15 is therefore associated with the diversifier D.
  • another diversifier When writing or creating another data in the card, another diversifier will be generated, preferably in a random manner, to generate another diversified mask that will be used to hide this other data.
  • the advantage of the invention is that it is possible to generate as many diversified masks as there are bytes (or bits) in the master mask 11.
  • the storage of the diversifier D is little greedy in memory, typically one byte.
  • the diversifier D1 will be applied to the first master mask and the diversifying D2 to the second master mask.
  • Each byte of a datum to be masked will be masked, for example by means of the exclusive-or-function, by a byte of the first diversified mask and by a byte of the second diversified mask.
  • the diversifiers D1 and D2 will then be stored with the masked data.
  • For a master mask of 256 bytes it is then possible to generate 256 2 different masks.
  • the invention is particularly applicable in a Java environment, diversifiers can be stored with the header of Java objects.
  • the reversible or exclusive function is not the only one that can be used: it is possible to use a DES function or a simple rotation. Any reversible function is suitable for the invention.
  • the diversifier D is preferably generated randomly or pseudo-randomly when the data item 10 is written / created in the communicating object or at each restart of the communicating object.
  • the master masks 1 1 are preferably diversified. This ensures that in the event of a successful attack on a communicating object, the attacker in possession of a master mask can not unmask the hidden data in another communicating object.
  • the invention applies to any communicating object, such as for example mobile phones and preferably to smart cards, for example to multi-application smart cards.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
EP08803273A 2007-09-28 2008-08-27 Verfahren zum erzeugen von masken in einem kommunizierenden objekt und entsprechendes kommunizierendes objekt Ceased EP2195793A1 (de)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08803273A EP2195793A1 (de) 2007-09-28 2008-08-27 Verfahren zum erzeugen von masken in einem kommunizierenden objekt und entsprechendes kommunizierendes objekt

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP07301410A EP2053568A1 (de) 2007-09-28 2007-09-28 Verfahren zur Erzeugung von Masken in einem Kommunikationsobjekt und entsprechendes Kommunikationsobjekt
EP08803273A EP2195793A1 (de) 2007-09-28 2008-08-27 Verfahren zum erzeugen von masken in einem kommunizierenden objekt und entsprechendes kommunizierendes objekt
PCT/EP2008/061242 WO2009040204A1 (fr) 2007-09-28 2008-08-27 Procede de generation de masques dans un objet communiquant et objet communiquant correspondant

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2195793A1 true EP2195793A1 (de) 2010-06-16

Family

ID=39167270

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP07301410A Withdrawn EP2053568A1 (de) 2007-09-28 2007-09-28 Verfahren zur Erzeugung von Masken in einem Kommunikationsobjekt und entsprechendes Kommunikationsobjekt
EP08803273A Ceased EP2195793A1 (de) 2007-09-28 2008-08-27 Verfahren zum erzeugen von masken in einem kommunizierenden objekt und entsprechendes kommunizierendes objekt

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP07301410A Withdrawn EP2053568A1 (de) 2007-09-28 2007-09-28 Verfahren zur Erzeugung von Masken in einem Kommunikationsobjekt und entsprechendes Kommunikationsobjekt

Country Status (3)

Country Link
US (1) US20100239091A1 (de)
EP (2) EP2053568A1 (de)
WO (1) WO2009040204A1 (de)

Families Citing this family (3)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US9118441B2 (en) 2013-01-25 2015-08-25 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. Layout-optimized random mask distribution system and method
CN104598829B (zh) * 2013-10-31 2018-08-07 上海复旦微电子集团股份有限公司 数据处理方法、装置及防攻击方法和装置以及存储装置
EP3499788B1 (de) * 2017-12-15 2020-07-29 Secure-IC SAS Dynamische maskierung

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP2053568A1 (de) 2009-04-29
US20100239091A1 (en) 2010-09-23
WO2009040204A1 (fr) 2009-04-02

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