EP2180488A1 - Constructive device introduced into a security keyboard for information and secret processes stored by electronic means - Google Patents

Constructive device introduced into a security keyboard for information and secret processes stored by electronic means Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2180488A1
EP2180488A1 EP09172841A EP09172841A EP2180488A1 EP 2180488 A1 EP2180488 A1 EP 2180488A1 EP 09172841 A EP09172841 A EP 09172841A EP 09172841 A EP09172841 A EP 09172841A EP 2180488 A1 EP2180488 A1 EP 2180488A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
circuit
keyboard
security
information
electronic means
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP09172841A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Inventor
Wagner Dias Rodrigues
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
TECVAN INFORMATICA Ltda
Original Assignee
TECVAN INFORMATICA Ltda
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by TECVAN INFORMATICA Ltda filed Critical TECVAN INFORMATICA Ltda
Publication of EP2180488A1 publication Critical patent/EP2180488A1/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H01ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01HELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H13/00Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch
    • H01H13/70Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch having a plurality of operating members associated with different sets of contacts, e.g. keyboard
    • H01H13/702Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch having a plurality of operating members associated with different sets of contacts, e.g. keyboard with contacts carried by or formed from layers in a multilayer structure, e.g. membrane switches
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H01ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01HELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H13/00Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch
    • H01H13/70Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch having a plurality of operating members associated with different sets of contacts, e.g. keyboard
    • H01H13/702Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch having a plurality of operating members associated with different sets of contacts, e.g. keyboard with contacts carried by or formed from layers in a multilayer structure, e.g. membrane switches
    • H01H13/704Switches having rectilinearly-movable operating part or parts adapted for pushing or pulling in one direction only, e.g. push-button switch having a plurality of operating members associated with different sets of contacts, e.g. keyboard with contacts carried by or formed from layers in a multilayer structure, e.g. membrane switches characterised by the layers, e.g. by their material or structure
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H01ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01HELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H2239/00Miscellaneous
    • H01H2239/032Anti-tamper

Definitions

  • the point of sale terminals allow the clients to pay their bills using several payment methods, such as credit cards, debit cards, smart cards and others.
  • the keyboard in question the object of this report, is assembled in a way as to guarantee the inviolability of its internal content, setting off an intruder alarm at any attempt at front, rear or side manipulation or mechanical perforation of any internal part of the keyboard or of the circuits activated by its keys.
  • the referred intrusion alarm sets off a security mechanism, which destroys stored information, going back to the security concept of the former cryptex.
  • the standard activating mechanism of a keyboard system consists of a rigid printed circuit board containing a demarcated area, two open exposed terminals, connected to an electronic circuit which, for its turn, detects the closing of these contacts.
  • Each keyboard is connected to a conducting element in the face around the contacts, in such a way, when pressing the key, the conducting element touches the two contacts closing them in a circuit, allowing the keyboard processor to decode any key operated.
  • One of the objectives of this Utility Model is to provide a constructive device for a keyboard in order to impede the insertion of unauthorized access devices into their internal circuits, guaranteeing the internal inviolability of installed equipment at the point of sale and providing a significant increase in security of the keyboard system.
  • the security keyboard objective of this Utility Model, is made up of a rigid printed circuit (1), having an insulating flexible membrane (2), of a determined thickness, with holes (3) located over the position of the two exposed contacts (4), with the function of a spacer over which the malleable electronic circuit is placed (5) with some conductive material, in the lower face, aligned with the exposed contacts (4) of the rigid printed circuit (1), being the keyboard (8) separated from the rest of the assembly by a malleable electronic protection board (6), which indicates any break in its circuit.
  • the conducting material does not close the contacts, in spite of the hole present in that position.
  • the mechanical key in this case, does not have the capability of closing the contact, but presses the conducting material of the malleable electronic circuit on the membrane spacer, deforming it until the conducting material enters into contact with the two exposed contacts(4) and closes the circuit, signaling to the processor element that the contact was closed.
  • the first mechanism additional to the traditional system refers to the insertion of a malleable electronic protection circuit (6), between the keyboard (8) and the malleable electronic circuit of the contacts (5), as illustrated in figure 1 , in a way so as to create a physical barrier against mechanical attacks of the perforating, obliteration, cutting or short circuiting chemicals types.
  • the said malleable electronic protection circuit (6) has on both faces, multiple electronic circuits in a coil form, with a random design, running through the circuit surface in a dense physical mesh.
  • On each face of the malleable circuit there are two independent circuits, positioned near each other, whose terminals are linked in a security circuit which when detecting any anomaly sets off a security alarm which will generate the protection and security procedures of the Point of Sale terminal.
  • each circuit From each of these circuits is transmitted a digital electronic signal in a waveform and univocal frequency, generated by the security circuit which is monitored by the security circuit receiver.
  • each circuit has a signature permanently monitored by the security circuit.
  • the alarm will be set off, because there are two circuits with different signatures and the security circuit is not capable of distinguishing the signatures of each circuit in the case of a short circuit in the mesh.
  • the protection circuits have very complex random designs, in order to make it difficult for a violator to check the circuit visually and find its respective terminals.
  • the malleable protection circuit has a larger size than the keyboard activating circuits, seeking to completely cover physically the lower keyboard circuits, in a way to impede side attacks to the keyboard system.
  • independent monitoring circuits are positioned, starting at the lower rigid printed circuit and connecting to the upper invasion monitoring circuit, at the ends of this circuit, returning to the lower rigid circuit, in a position diametrically opposite the input.
  • each circuit has a digital signature with its own frequency and waveform, impeding a crossover short circuit.
  • the mechanical contact between the upper and lower circuits occurs through projections in the keyboard or the lid of the device, which exert enough mechanical pressure to maintain the circuits closed. In an attempt to separate the diverse elements in the keyboard system, these contacts are opened, activating security sensors in the point of sale terminal.
  • the separation detection circuits between the keyboard system components can be provided with an intermediate conductor circuit, which stays closed by mechanical pressure between the mechanical keyboard and the device lid. If an invasion occurs in this secure area, the sensor activating communicates to the processor which then destroys all the secret information stored in the electronic memory.
  • the microprocessor inside the microprocessor there is a true random number generator.
  • the random numbers of this generator are used to create signal forms of amplitude, frequency and phase parameters for the sensor. These signals pass through the sensor group and return to the microprocessor, whose comparing circuits check the referred parameters of the original signals.
  • the invasion alarm circuit is activated and immediately secret information is destroyed turning the equipment inoperable and making it impossible to recuperate the information.

Landscapes

  • Cash Registers Or Receiving Machines (AREA)

Abstract

Device characterized by including a protective mechanism for the keyboard system which makes attacks impossible by mechanical manipulation, mechanical perforation, part separation, chemical short circuits or the insertion of intrusive devices.
One of the objectives of this invention is to provide a constructive device for a keyboard in order to impede the insertion of unauthorized access devices into their internal circuits, guaranteeing the internal inviolability of installed equipment at the point of sale and providing a significant increase in security of the keyboard system.

Description

  • Referring to the present descriptive report of the Utility Model of a security keyboard, as the opportunity for its designation, in order to protect information and secret processes stored by electronic means against unauthorized access.
  • The point of sale terminals (POS, PDV, Pinpad, encrypted keyboard) allow the clients to pay their bills using several payment methods, such as credit cards, debit cards, smart cards and others.
  • To guarantee that the payment information is not intercepted from one of the sales point terminals until the center of payments, such information is normally encrypted and protected during transmission, using, for example, digital authentication technology. Therefore, the confidential payment information, keyed in by the user at a Point of Sale, could be intercepted by a physical violation of the Point of Sale
  • To impede any violation and consequent digital information interception, the keyboard in question, the object of this report, is assembled in a way as to guarantee the inviolability of its internal content, setting off an intruder alarm at any attempt at front, rear or side manipulation or mechanical perforation of any internal part of the keyboard or of the circuits activated by its keys.
  • The referred intrusion alarm sets off a security mechanism, which destroys stored information, going back to the security concept of the former cryptex.
  • The major part of the solutions found currently do not have a security mechanism for the detection of intrusion circuits inserted in the keyboard, based on circuits mounted externally to the printed circuit board where the keyboard buttons to be operated, close the exposed terminals.
  • The standard activating mechanism of a keyboard system consists of a rigid printed circuit board containing a demarcated area, two open exposed terminals, connected to an electronic circuit which, for its turn, detects the closing of these contacts. Each keyboard is connected to a conducting element in the face around the contacts, in such a way, when pressing the key, the conducting element touches the two contacts closing them in a circuit, allowing the keyboard processor to decode any key operated.
  • An observed disadvantage in the conventional solutions is that they allow the occurrence of frauds by the means of the introduction of a device between the circuit board and the keyboard button, detecting the keys and the pressing sequence of them, allowing the capture of personal identity numbers (PIN) and other secret information of the user.
  • One of the objectives of this Utility Model is to provide a constructive device for a keyboard in order to impede the insertion of unauthorized access devices into their internal circuits, guaranteeing the internal inviolability of installed equipment at the point of sale and providing a significant increase in security of the keyboard system.
  • Therefore, in order to allow a better clarification of the object in question, let's proceed to its detailed description with reference to the drawings below where:
    • Figure 1 illustrates in exploded perspective view the keyboard circuit layers;
    • figure 2 illustrates a front view of the upper face of the malleable security circuit;
    • figure 3 illustrates a front view of the lower face of the malleable security circuit;
    • figure 4 illustrates a front view of the lower face above the malleable contacts circuit;
    • figure 5 illustrates a front view of the upper face of the malleable contacts circuit;
    • figure 6 illustrates a front view of the lower face of the spacer.
  • In conformity with the illustrated figures mentioned above, the security keyboard, objective of this Utility Model, is made up of a rigid printed circuit (1), having an insulating flexible membrane (2), of a determined thickness, with holes (3) located over the position of the two exposed contacts (4), with the function of a spacer over which the malleable electronic circuit is placed (5) with some conductive material, in the lower face, aligned with the exposed contacts (4) of the rigid printed circuit (1), being the keyboard (8) separated from the rest of the assembly by a malleable electronic protection board (6), which indicates any break in its circuit.
  • Due to the presence of the flexible membrane (2) between the malleable electronic circuit (5) and the rigid printed circuit (1), the conducting material does not close the contacts, in spite of the hole present in that position. The mechanical key, in this case, does not have the capability of closing the contact, but presses the conducting material of the malleable electronic circuit on the membrane spacer, deforming it until the conducting material enters into contact with the two exposed contacts(4) and closes the circuit, signaling to the processor element that the contact was closed.
  • The first mechanism additional to the traditional system refers to the insertion of a malleable electronic protection circuit (6), between the keyboard (8) and the malleable electronic circuit of the contacts (5), as illustrated in figure 1, in a way so as to create a physical barrier against mechanical attacks of the perforating, obliteration, cutting or short circuiting chemicals types.
  • The said malleable electronic protection circuit (6) has on both faces, multiple electronic circuits in a coil form, with a random design, running through the circuit surface in a dense physical mesh. On each face of the malleable circuit, there are two independent circuits, positioned near each other, whose terminals are linked in a security circuit which when detecting any anomaly sets off a security alarm which will generate the protection and security procedures of the Point of Sale terminal.
  • From each of these circuits is transmitted a digital electronic signal in a waveform and univocal frequency, generated by the security circuit which is monitored by the security circuit receiver. In other words, each circuit has a signature permanently monitored by the security circuit.
  • If there is a perforating type violation attempt which breaks any segment of this circuit, it is immediately detected by the security circuit.
  • If there is a chemical violation attempt by short circuiting the mesh, seeking to make it possible to subsequently break the protection circuit, the alarm will be set off, because there are two circuits with different signatures and the security circuit is not capable of distinguishing the signatures of each circuit in the case of a short circuit in the mesh.
  • The protection circuits have very complex random designs, in order to make it difficult for a violator to check the circuit visually and find its respective terminals.
  • The malleable protection circuit has a larger size than the keyboard activating circuits, seeking to completely cover physically the lower keyboard circuits, in a way to impede side attacks to the keyboard system.
  • To impede the attempt at separating the many keyboard system components, usually seeking to insert electronic devices, independent monitoring circuits are positioned, starting at the lower rigid printed circuit and connecting to the upper invasion monitoring circuit, at the ends of this circuit, returning to the lower rigid circuit, in a position diametrically opposite the input.
  • Again, each circuit has a digital signature with its own frequency and waveform, impeding a crossover short circuit. The mechanical contact between the upper and lower circuits occurs through projections in the keyboard or the lid of the device, which exert enough mechanical pressure to maintain the circuits closed. In an attempt to separate the diverse elements in the keyboard system, these contacts are opened, activating security sensors in the point of sale terminal.
  • Preferably, the separation detection circuits between the keyboard system components can be provided with an intermediate conductor circuit, which stays closed by mechanical pressure between the mechanical keyboard and the device lid. If an invasion occurs in this secure area, the sensor activating communicates to the processor which then destroys all the secret information stored in the electronic memory.
  • Without this information, it is impossible to recuperate the secret information stored in the memory as well as carry out secret processes turning the equipment inoperable.
  • Regarding the signatures generated by each monitoring mesh circuit, inside the microprocessor there is a true random number generator. The random numbers of this generator are used to create signal forms of amplitude, frequency and phase parameters for the sensor. These signals pass through the sensor group and return to the microprocessor, whose comparing circuits check the referred parameters of the original signals.
  • Detecting differences in the parameters, the invasion alarm circuit is activated and immediately secret information is destroyed turning the equipment inoperable and making it impossible to recuperate the information.
  • The constructive disposition presented here is not limited to any specific format or to its constructive sequence, presuming there are numerous variations in the present constructive of a security keyboard for information and secret processes stored by electronic means without impairing the objective of this Utility Model.

Claims (11)

  1. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS" characterized by a rigid printed circuit (1), having an insulating flexible membrane (2), of a determined thickness, with holes (3) located over the position of the two exposed contacts (4), with the function of a spacer over which the malleable electronic circuit is placed (5) with some conductive material, in the lower face, aligned with the exposed contacts (4) of the rigid printed circuit (1), being the keyboard (8) separated from the rest of the assembly by a malleable electronic protection board (6), which indicates any break in its circuit.
  2. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 1, characterized by including a protective mechanism for a keyboard system which makes attacks impossible by mechanical manipulation, mechanical perforation, part separation, chemical short circuits or the insertion of intrusive devices.
  3. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 1, characterized by the insertion of a malleable electronic protective circuit (6), between the keyboard and malleable electronic circuit with contacts (5) in a way as to create a physical barrier against attacks of the perforating mechanical type, obliteration, cutting or chemical short circuits
  4. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 3, characterized by the input and output of monitoring points of a same circuit to be positioned diametrically opposite, in a cross form or passed between the circuits, making it impossible to insert intrusive devices in various angles of attack.
  5. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 3 characterized by the fact said malleable electronic protection circuit (6) has on both faces, a double electronic circuit in a coil form, with a complex random design, running through the circuit surface in a dense physical mesh, there are each face of the malleable circuit, two independent circuits, positioned near each other, whose terminals are linked in a security circuit which when detecting any anomaly sets off a security alarm responsible for generating the protection and security procedures of the Point of Sale terminal.
  6. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 1, characterized by the use of a multiple monitoring circuit with a complex random design pattern which makes it difficult to follow the circuit logic, making it impossible to visually identify the input and output terminals of each circuit by possible fraudsters.
  7. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 1, characterized by the use of a monitoring circuit of larger dimensions than the lower circuits, forming a protective area, impeding side attacks on the keyboard system.
  8. ""CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 1, characterized by the use of a printed circuit below the keyboard, which has an internal layer with electric circuits in a coil form, responsible for the detection of invasion or attack attempts on the lower part of the keyboard.
  9. ""CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", characterized by the insertion of a flexible security circuit consisting of diverse traces that delineate circuits whose contacts are maintained closed by projections located in the terminal cabinet of the point of sale and in the mechanical keyboard, in a way so that any attempt to separate mechanically any component of the keyboard system causes these circuits to open, setting off a security system.
  10. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 9, characterized by the fact that the said monitoring traces are proof against chemical or mechanical attack that causes a short circuit in the monitoring mesh.
  11. "CONSTRUCTIVE DEVICE INTRODUCED INTO A SECURITY KEYBOARD FOR INFORMATION AND SECRET PROCESSES STORED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS", in agreement with Claim 9, characterized by the fact that each circuit has a digital signature with its own frequency and waveform, impeding a crossover short circuit.
EP09172841A 2008-10-21 2009-10-13 Constructive device introduced into a security keyboard for information and secret processes stored by electronic means Withdrawn EP2180488A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
BRMU0802356 2008-10-21

Publications (1)

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EP2180488A1 true EP2180488A1 (en) 2010-04-28

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EP09172841A Withdrawn EP2180488A1 (en) 2008-10-21 2009-10-13 Constructive device introduced into a security keyboard for information and secret processes stored by electronic means

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102013220338A1 (en) * 2013-10-09 2015-04-09 Castles Technology Co., Ltd Design of a security envelope for financial transaction devices

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4312905A1 (en) * 1993-04-16 1994-10-20 Krone Ag Protection device for protecting stored data
WO2005086546A2 (en) * 2004-03-04 2005-09-15 Lipman Electronics Engineering Limited Secure card reader
US7270275B1 (en) * 2004-09-02 2007-09-18 Ncr Corporation Secured pin entry device

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE4312905A1 (en) * 1993-04-16 1994-10-20 Krone Ag Protection device for protecting stored data
WO2005086546A2 (en) * 2004-03-04 2005-09-15 Lipman Electronics Engineering Limited Secure card reader
US7270275B1 (en) * 2004-09-02 2007-09-18 Ncr Corporation Secured pin entry device

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102013220338A1 (en) * 2013-10-09 2015-04-09 Castles Technology Co., Ltd Design of a security envelope for financial transaction devices
DE102013220338B4 (en) 2013-10-09 2019-05-16 Castles Technology Co., Ltd Security envelope for financial transaction devices

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