EP2162866A1 - Carte intelligente sans contact avec reconnaissance faciale - Google Patents
Carte intelligente sans contact avec reconnaissance facialeInfo
- Publication number
- EP2162866A1 EP2162866A1 EP08790014A EP08790014A EP2162866A1 EP 2162866 A1 EP2162866 A1 EP 2162866A1 EP 08790014 A EP08790014 A EP 08790014A EP 08790014 A EP08790014 A EP 08790014A EP 2162866 A1 EP2162866 A1 EP 2162866A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- card
- data
- owner
- holder
- points
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
- G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V40/00—Recognition of biometric, human-related or animal-related patterns in image or video data
- G06V40/10—Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
- G06V40/16—Human faces, e.g. facial parts, sketches or expressions
- G06V40/172—Classification, e.g. identification
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
- G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
- G07C9/257—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition electronically
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
- G07F17/0014—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for vending, access and use of specific services not covered anywhere else in G07F17/00
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
Definitions
- This invention refers in general to the problem of the recognising of the possession by people, of the qualification required for the access a service, an area, at a generic security level.
- qualification is identified as the possessing of a valid "contactless" card or badge.
- the final analysis it is the secure recognition of the card's authenticity and the data contained in it.
- this invention provides a method for secure data exchange between qualification and detection -reading- system in order to make the use of cards or badges suitable for those services requesting recharge or prepayment, enabling access to services subject to unitary or time taxation or in any case conditioned to complex logics, or for services that to be circulated have difficulty in referring to centralised management systems for verification of data authenticity and for which it is necessary that the data and relative security keys be transported inside the card.
- Another limitation of these RFID devices is that the maximum detection distance is limited: the greater this distance is, the more limited the data processing capability is.
- the object of the innovation is to supply an intelligent contactless card or badge which we will call TICL, that due to its onboard available intelligence is able to guarantee security and exclusive data access, therefore it is suitable for sensitive transactions where security is the first requirement.
- the TICL device has good memory and data processing availability and can provide a variety of functions.
- An important object of the innovation is the use of authentication and known encryption algorithms, in particular the "one-time password" and challenge type or even with an asymmetric key for data protection and security.
- Another object of the innovation is being able to selectively increase the maximum detection and writing distance of the card, in order to exchange data between system and cards within the whole area of the service.
- the aim of this invention is to verify that an authentic card or badge is being held by the legitimate owner. This verification is carried out by comparing an image of the face of the holder, taken by a camera, with data stored within the intelligent card which corresponds to that of the legitimate owner.
- a further aim of this invention besides providing criteria for recognising the authenticity of a card or badge, is to implement an exchange of secure data between the badge and the reading system. In this way it will be possible to use cards or badges for services that require recharge or prepay functions in order to authorise access to services subject to taxes or time limits or, in any case, conditioned by complex logic.
- the aim of this invention is to create a card using standard hardware and software technologies in order to make the development of subsidiary products feasible for any developer and make each system component economical and easy to maintain.
- the scope of the invention is to introduce onto the market an intelligent, wireless, contact-less model of a card or badge comprising an internal memory.
- a file is downloaded onto the memory containing data produced by an algorithm that, starting from a photograph of the badge owner's face, carries out a series of measurements on a limited series of areas and characteristic points and transforms them into a corresponding series of coded data.
- the choice and codification of the points is such that any other photograph of the owner produces the same code, disregarding a proportionality factor. If another photograph does not produce the same series of data, disregarding the proportionality factor, within a probability range of 90%, it may be assumed it does not belong to the same person.
- Increasing the number of points taken into consideration the possibility that the facial photographs of two different people produce the same series of data, disregarding the proportionality factor, asymptotically tends to be 0.
- the data deriving from the above code of the photograph of the card owner's face is stored only in the card held by its legitimate owner, thereby respecting the owner's privacy.
- a camera films the owner's face, codifies it and compares it with the data stored in the card. If the two series of numeric data (one stored on the card corresponding to the description of the legitimate owner, and the other measured by the camera) are compatible, the verification is positive and the transaction may continue, otherwise it will be stopped.
- Fig. 1 shows a general outline of the card or badge according to what exists at present.
- FIG. 2 schematically shows the various component sections cooperating to implement detection and an optimised control of the flow of people and relative taxation.
- - Fig. 3 is a general block layout of the system sections according to another preferred embodiment of this invention.
- - Fig 4 is a sequential block diagram of the phases that comprise the authentication and face recognition procedure according to the invention.
- the innovation consists in forming a card or badge on a laminate support 7 containing an electronic circuit described below, built with surface mount device (SMD) components.
- the electronic circuit is made up, as shown in figure 1, of: a microprocessor I 5 a SIM 2 with relative algorithms and encryption keys in memory, a photovoltaic cell 3, with a supply circuit and capacitative circuits and/or rechargeable battery 4, one or more transceivers (RFID) 5, with relative antennas 6.
- RFID transceivers
- the microprocessor 1 is the intelligence of the card 10 that must process the firmware algorithms stored in the internal program memory, for producing the encrypted data exchange with a remote access device.
- the microprocessor always operates in an energy saving mode, and switches over to the active state only when the RFID circuit is activated and only for the time necessary for the transaction.
- the microprocessor activates the encrypted data exchange with known encryption algorithms and furthermore the encryption key is protected and resident in the SIM that makes up the circuit.
- the SIM 2 has the encryption key in memory, which cannot be read outside the SIM.
- the SIM 2 in turn is protected by a local code memorised in the processor firmware and used by it to activate the functions. An attempt to read the SIM with an incorrect code blocks the SIM permanently.
- the SIM 2 contains various files that preserve sensitive data to be protected and which are transferred encrypted one way or another, during the exchange between card 10 and remote access device.
- a photovoltaic cell 3 is placed on the TICL surface to extract energy from environmental illumination, which will be stored inside it.
- a feed regulation circuit 4a takes the energy produced by the photovoltaic cells 3 to store it in the capacitative circuits or in the rechargeable batteries 4b.
- An RFID transceiver 5 with a serigraphy antenna 6 on the badge surface must alert the microprocessor when it is interrogated, and activate the radio frequency data transceiving.
- the transceiving circuit recognises the command and transmits its identifying registration number.
- the detection system that has become aware of the presence of a card in its area can decide to start an exchange of protected data with the card.
- the transceiver circuit recognises the command and alerts the microprocessor for the encrypted exchange of messages.
- the microprocessor powers down.
- the reader system When the reader system has guaranteed the security of the data correctly deciphered, it can update the data contained in the card, deducting or updating more or less sophisticated consumption or calculations.
- a possible application referred to public transportation, for example, is using this card as a travel pass. Authentication and deduction of the number of trips or credit time will be automatically be calculated when the passenger is on board the vehicle.
- the innovation introduces three distinct systems, which when working together can be considered logically integrated in a single system.
- the first one is the TICL 10 card system, which is the authorization title to the vehicle or reserved public place;
- the second one is the reader to display insufficient credit or residual credit, possibly connected to a host;
- Fig. 2 shows a generic barrier that can be passed using three access doors: 11, 11' and 11" - which could be three ordinary entry / exit bus doors or a reserved public area.
- a reader device with an insufficient credit display is placed at each 12, 12', 12" door and a credit purchase device 13 is available either inside or outside the vehicle.
- the device When entering the vehicle, the device checks the TICL card validity and whether there is enough credit. A display shows GO or insufficient credit. The detection -reading- device continually checks the cards inside the vehicle to calculate them or to tax them if necessary for the time of the journey or stay in the public place. If device 13 is present, the user can purchase credit inside the vehicle.
- the detection device memorises all the cards validated to expedite manual checks for verification of offences.
- the travel card we have invented for transportation is a card 10 with onboard electronics.
- Transponder badges have existed for a long time, but in this invention the card 10 has the following innovative features: 1
- the card is the title of travel or of right to the service and can be recharged with transactions that use encryption algorithms.
- the type of recharge can be for one journey, for several journeys, for a period of journeys with time limits, etc.
- the card 10 is validated and taxed electronically within a public mobile vehicle or place where there are a large number of similar cards, but with different data -identifier-.
- the algorithms for reading card data 10 without interaction errors, even if there are numerous cards close to each other, are resolved by the data exchange algorithm and are part of the reader software and the card firmware.
- An antenna system inside public buses or the public place, with organised distribution, allows to read simultaneously all the card transponders; the onboard reader 12 checks the authenticity of the encryption keys of the cards 10 and possibly provides for the subsequent authorisation or deduction or telematics debit, of the cost due by each card, rewriting the data on the card.
- Communication protocol phases can be summed up as follows: a- intervention of the recognition preamble and encrypted key validity; b- transmission of codes and encrypted data; c- validation procedure of data transmitted; d- data update in the relative archives and encryption keys.
- the security and authentication functions use the high reliability access technologies used in the GSM mobile telephony system and make use of the relative authentication and management protocols of user ID security and security of data exchanged.
- the season ticket, or more in general the ticket, is univocally identified by the SIM ID code and this code along with the personal Ki authentication key are the identification credentials.
- this information is never transmitted on a radio channel, but uses a challenge- response type of mechanism.
- the fundamental advantage of these security procedures comes from the distributed system characteristic that adapts specifically to the type of localised application, which is the aim of this invention.
- the system elements that intervene actively in realizing the procedures and where the information and resources relative to security are distributed are: the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module), the card, a register similar to an HLR and one similar to a VLR, which in the GSM transposition correspond, respectively, to: 1- the HLR to the general register of subscribers or owners of tickets (prepaid, free, etc.);
- VLR to a register of visitors (passengers) placed for example at each metro station, which records access temporarily after authentication.
- the card 10 includes, in the SIM 2, the personal authentication key Ki, the authentication algorithm A3, the encryption algorithm A5.
- each metro station or each public transportation vehicle is a VLR and a kind of Base Transceiver Station (BTS) operating in RFID capacity and where the algorithms A3 and A5 are also contained.
- BTS Base Transceiver Station
- At the base of the encryption and authentication processes is the Authentication Center functional unit that is provided with the codes, the Ki key and the standard encryption algorithms in addition to an algorithm for generating pseudo-casual numbers.
- the AuC Authentication Center
- the authentication procedure is started up each time the card 10 comes close and enters in the range of action of a radio base station (a bus stop sign or a metro station) by an activation, deactivation or interrogation procedure of the services contemplated.
- a radio base station a bus stop sign or a metro station
- the functional units involved in the authentication process are: the SIM in the terminal and the AuC (Authentication Center) at the HLR equivalent. Authentication is done by adopting the known challenge-response type of mechanism. Therefore when the AuC receives an authentication request, it recognises the likely user ID, generates and transmits a random number as a challenge, the card receives the challenge and transmits it to the SIM.
- the SIM calculates the response SRES to the challenge by inputting the random number (RAND) and the user's authentication key Ki, memorised in the SIM, to the authentication A3 algorithm (key-dependent one-way hash function).
- the SRES "signed" response is transmitted to the local network visited in that moment by the user, where it is compared to the value that the home network has calculated by applying the same algorithm A3 to the random number RAND and to the Ki key corresponding to the user's declared ID.
- the user is identified and access to the service is registered (for example, in the last analysis, the opening of the entry turnstile to the metro) if and only if the two values coincide: the SRES received and the calculated value (the SIM holds the exact identification key). Otherwise the connection is refused and an authentication failure message is notified, blocking access to the user holding it. In this case other ID verification instruments can intervene, such as a biometric identifier - as it will be showed into details subsequently- or personnel directly.
- detection, calculation and checking techniques of the people present and their circumscribed transit should be arranged for connection via GSM, GPRS or radio to a service centre for real time analysis and treatment of the data regarding the cards and/or passes.
- the AuC is the functional unit responsible for generating the group of parameters (RAND, SRES, Kc) that are usually referred to as a triplet. Therefore the AuC has two basic duties: secure, protected memorisation of the Ki keys of the users and their passes/cards - titles-, and generate and supply the HLR, upon request, with a number of triplets for each user.
- the triplets must be generated in continuation (one is normally used at each access). What actually happens is that they are generated and memorised in the HLR and supplied, upon request, to the VLRs. This aspect fits perfectly with the operating conditions in which the same travel card is usually used several times, from the same point of entrance or access to public service.
- VLRs - as already specified, identifiable with the metro station or the bus stop sign or the bus itself- are themselves a characterising element, since it is a new type of VLR and radio base station operating in mobility, that actually function differently from the corresponding static ones in the GSM.
- the invention is also based on performing of an algorithm which starts from real time photographs of a face and then:
- the algorithm produces the same code from any other photo of the holder, disregarding a proportionality factor. If another photograph does not produce the same series of data, disregarding the proportionality factor, within a probability range of 90%, it may be assumed it does not belong to the same person. Increasing the number of points taken into consideration, the possibility that the facial photographs of two different people produce the same series of data, disregarding the proportionality factor, asymptotically tends to be 0.
- the N points selected from characteristic points of a human face are defined by processing the image with image treatment techniques that block out the face, eyes, nose and mouth.
- the selected points must correspond to points that are not influenced by movement of facial-jaw muscles.
- the image treatment techniques measure the standardised distances between the selected points and codify the chromatic differences.
- the number of points is increased until a percentage of secure recognition is achieved. This is assessed with compromise between the speed of the data processor and the size of the card's memory.
- the transmitter circuit recognises the command and transmits its identifying number. In this condition of protocol activation the reading distance should be short so that the user is forced to position him/herself in front of the camera.
- the system reader starts photographing the user and activates the algorithm which, from the photo, produces the series of data to compare with the data memorized in the card.
- a command is sent to the card requesting it to be read and to transmit its data.
- the transmitter circuit recognises the command and activates the microprocessor for the encrypted exchange of messages.
- the system reader verifies the congruence of the data and activates, or not, the requested service.
- the system reader can update the data contained in the card deducting or updating consumption or more sophisticated accounts.
- the microprocessor goes into power down mode.
- the recognition and authentication system as proposed in this invention works with three distinct pieces of equipment which work together and can be considered integrated in a single system.
- a- The intelligent, contact-less card which constitutes the right to access and contains the cryptographic data characterising the user's photograph.
- b- The reader which is generally linked to a host computer.
- c- The camera which photographs the user.
- Fig. 3 shows an area with three doors 11, 11' and 11", which could be three classic entrances to or exits from a protected area.
- a reading device 12, 12', 12" is placed on each door together with a corresponding camera 13,13',13".
- device 12 When a user tries to access the protected area through door 11, device 12 checks the validity of the intelligent, contact-less card and camera 13 photographs the user. The algorithm described in Fig. 4 is then applied to the photograph of the person who wishes to access the area and if the data that produce the algorithm are identical to those memorised in the card 10, door 11 opens otherwise an alarm is set off.
- the basic element for this invention is therefore an electronic card 10 with memorized data.
- Card 10 constitutes the right to access a place or service and contains the data for recognition and authentication of its owner. This data is encrypted and the key is kept in a SIM.
- the communication protocol provides for the use of three encryption keys that may coincide or increase depending on services requested of the intelligent, contact-less.
- the keys have the following functions:
- phase 3 Key to control or test the status of the card by the equipment assigned to the personnel authorised to manually verify the card.
- the phases of the communication protocol may be summarised as follows: a - preamble of recognition and validity of encoded keys b - transmission of encrypted data c - validation process of transmitted data d- data updating in relative archives and encoding keys.
- One of the advantageous aspects of this article is the reduction of the environmental impact caused by the considerable amount of cards and tickets, due to the re-use of the card that can be recycled at any time, and furthermore it is multi-use therefore a multi-service card.
- the method of reading cards inside the metallic vehicles is even more favoured by the reflections produced by the metallic masses, significantly aiding effectiveness of the detection proposed in public vehicles.
- the equipment for detecting and calculating the people present in a circumscribed environment is an economic system that totally changes the technique that checks the flow of people qualified to access a service.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
Abstract
L'invention concerne un système de détection, de calcul et de vérification de présence et de taxation de présence dans des zones délimitées sur la base de la possession d'une carte de type sans contact avec authentification, vérification et mise à jour des données du détenteur par le biais d'un traitement préliminaire de données relatives à la photographie du détenteur - à comparer avec les données incluses dans la mémoire de la carte-, et utilisation d'algorithmes de chiffrement avec une clé résidente SIM, comprenant les éléments suivants: i- système de recharge, achetant du crédit pour des cartes sans contact avec authentification, vérification et mise à jour des données de carte par le biais d'algorithmes de chiffrement avec une carte résidente SIM; ii - accès aux services sur la base d'une carte sans contact qui mémorise l'objet de l'autorisation; iii télécaméras, microprocesseurs et émetteurs-récepteurs utilisant des antennes installées à l'intérieur des zones délimitées pour le traitement des données acquises et l'exécution de transactions au moyen de telles cartes.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
ITRM20070355 ITRM20070355A1 (it) | 2007-06-26 | 2007-06-26 | Tessera intelligente contact less per transazioni complesse con riconoscimento immagine facciale |
ITRM20070407 ITRM20070407A1 (it) | 2007-07-25 | 2007-07-25 | Tessera intelligente contact less per transazioni complesse sicure |
PCT/IT2008/000425 WO2009001394A1 (fr) | 2007-06-26 | 2008-06-24 | Carte intelligente sans contact avec reconnaissance faciale |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2162866A1 true EP2162866A1 (fr) | 2010-03-17 |
Family
ID=39926892
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP08790014A Withdrawn EP2162866A1 (fr) | 2007-06-26 | 2008-06-24 | Carte intelligente sans contact avec reconnaissance faciale |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2162866A1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2009001394A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10504126B2 (en) | 2009-01-21 | 2019-12-10 | Truaxis, Llc | System and method of obtaining merchant sales information for marketing or sales teams |
US10594870B2 (en) | 2009-01-21 | 2020-03-17 | Truaxis, Llc | System and method for matching a savings opportunity using census data |
IT1400153B1 (it) * | 2010-05-21 | 2013-05-17 | Carnevale | Metodi di impiego di borsa per la spesa del tipo riutilizzabile con identificativo di tipo digitale. |
US9251330B2 (en) | 2014-04-09 | 2016-02-02 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure management of a smart card |
US20160098705A1 (en) * | 2014-10-02 | 2016-04-07 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Credit card with built-in sensor for fraud detection |
WO2017048148A1 (fr) * | 2015-09-17 | 2017-03-23 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Surveillance de flux d'objets au moyen d'un détecteur de cartes sim |
US11157908B2 (en) | 2017-07-14 | 2021-10-26 | The Toronto-Dominion Bank | Smart chip card with fraud alert and biometric reset |
US10460748B2 (en) | 2017-10-04 | 2019-10-29 | The Toronto-Dominion Bank | Conversational interface determining lexical personality score for response generation with synonym replacement |
US10339931B2 (en) | 2017-10-04 | 2019-07-02 | The Toronto-Dominion Bank | Persona-based conversational interface personalization using social network preferences |
CN110633765B (zh) * | 2019-04-04 | 2020-05-08 | 上海知火数据服务有限公司 | 自适应大数据处理平台 |
Family Cites Families (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2002229955A (ja) * | 2001-02-02 | 2002-08-16 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | 情報端末装置及び認証システム |
US7817013B2 (en) * | 2003-09-05 | 2010-10-19 | Honeywell International Inc. | Distributed stand-off ID verification compatible with multiple face recognition systems (FRS) |
US7325724B2 (en) * | 2004-07-01 | 2008-02-05 | American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. | Method for registering a biometric for use with a smartcard |
-
2008
- 2008-06-24 WO PCT/IT2008/000425 patent/WO2009001394A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2008-06-24 EP EP08790014A patent/EP2162866A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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See references of WO2009001394A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2009001394A1 (fr) | 2008-12-31 |
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