EP2119091A2 - Content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management with encrypted multicast - Google Patents
Content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management with encrypted multicastInfo
- Publication number
- EP2119091A2 EP2119091A2 EP08825886A EP08825886A EP2119091A2 EP 2119091 A2 EP2119091 A2 EP 2119091A2 EP 08825886 A EP08825886 A EP 08825886A EP 08825886 A EP08825886 A EP 08825886A EP 2119091 A2 EP2119091 A2 EP 2119091A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- prime
- blocks
- block
- drm
- content
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
- H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
- H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
- H04L2209/601—Broadcast encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
- H04L2209/603—Digital right managament [DRM]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
Definitions
- Access control in restricted multicast/broadcast can be achieved by a key distribution mechanism such that only the parties currently belonging to the premium group can receive the content decryption keys, which are then used to decrypt the encrypted multicast/broadcast content.
- key distribution mechanisms that support access control in restricted multicast/broadcast are needed.
- a content object is usually encrypted with a single encryption key to avoid the complexity of key generation and management.
- the first straightforward solution saves encryption blocks received via multicast/broadcast directly to local storage.
- a user needs to acquire a license from a license server to play the saved content.
- a license according to this conventional technique has to contain all the content encryption keys associated with all the possible combinations of the saved encryption blocks. This means that a license may contain multiple, even a substantial number of content encryption keys.
- the license server has to store and track all the content encryption keys used in multicast/ broadcast in order to deliver necessary keys required for DRM protection across all the users.
- the second straightforward solution referred to as the transcryption technique, works in a similar manner as a transcoder to compression: a recipient transcrypts the encrypted multicast/broadcast content into DRM encrypted content.
- the recipient first decrypts the encrypted multicast content, using multiple content decryption keys, and then re-encrypts the content using DRM encryption, in which a single content encryption key is used for each saved file.
- the security of the system is also compromised.
- the recipient is required to perform the content packaging that a content publisher normally does in a conventional DRM system. Since users are not trusted in the threat model of DRM applications, more client modules have to be protected against hacking and reverse engineering.
- a conventional DRM content encryption key also needs to be acquired from the license server by the recipient before re-encryption.
- DRM as applied to the conventional "direct recording” technique of storing encrypted multicast content introduces the drawback of requiring complex key management and the drawback of sending a cumbersome number of keys per license to a client.
- DRM as applied to the conventional "transcryption" technique of storing encrypted multicast content into a DRM format necessitates the drawbacks of requiring prior possession of the DRM key, intensive computational overhead, and introducing the user's machine as an essential middleman in what is supposed to be a secure DRM process for managing the digital rights of the same user.
- Systems and methods provide a content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management (DRM) in a multicast/broadcast encryption system.
- an exemplary integrated key schema provides content encryption keys that can be employed by a multicast process, while providing DRM protection of recorded multicast content via a single DRM decryption secret.
- the integrated key schema provides high security and allows encrypted multicast content to be saved directly to local files.
- a license server can efficiently manage and generate DRM keys to be delivered to clients because only a single key needs to be delivered per license to a client.
- the integrated key schema can be applied together with conventional broadcast or multicast encryption techniques.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram of an exemplary system integrating DRM with encrypted multicast.
- Fig. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary multicast/DRM engine.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram of exemplary multicast content production.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram of an exemplary client-side content player.
- FIG. 5 is a flow diagram of an exemplary method of integrating
- Described herein is a content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management (DRM) with a multicast/broadcast encryption system.
- the exemplary encryption schema provides content encryption keys to be used by a multicast/broadcast system and facilitates subsequent DRM protection of multicast content that has been saved.
- the exemplary encryption schema generates a secret and then a prime number for each block of data content.
- the schema derives a content encryption key for each block from the secret and each corresponding prime number.
- the exemplary schema subsequently derives a single decryption secret to grant access to a user's particular saved recording of the multicasted/broadcasted content.
- the single decryption secret is derived from the corresponding prime numbers of the collection of stored blocks that constitute the user's recording.
- the prime numbers generated for each individual block enable production of content encryption keys usable by a multicast/broadcast system and also enable a single decryption key to be created for subsequent DRM of saved content.
- the content encryption keys can be used by a multicast/broadcast system when rekeying occurs, but should not be confused with the multicast system's own key distribution techniques for controlling access.
- the exemplary integrated key schema described herein can be applied together with conventional restricted broadcast or multicast encryption techniques.
- the exemplary integrated encryption key schema described herein facilitates the two conventionally diverse multicast/broadcast and DRM schemata that have different purposes and goals.
- the exemplary integrated key schema works well for supplying content encryption keys to a multicast/broadcast process while simultaneously facilitating subsequent DRM protection of the saved content via a single DRM key that can be sent in a license.
- the exemplary key schema is secure to collusion attacks in which clients with knowledge of different content encryption keys work together attempting to derive new keys.
- the exemplary key schema has the additional advantage that multiple recorded files can be merged together directly into a single file by the client, and only a single secret needs to be delivered in a license to decrypt the merged file, regardless of whether the merged file contains consecutive encryption blocks or not.
- the term "encryption block” or simply "block” means a segment of data encrypted under the same content encryption key in broadcast or multicast. Auxiliary data assisting decryption of the encrypted data such as the encryption block ID may also be included in the encryption block. In restricted multicast or broadcast, distributed content consists of a sequence of encryption blocks.
- restricted multicast/broadcast and “encrypted multicast/broadcast” denote examples of information transfer in which the transferred information is encrypted to allow only selected recipients, who possess a secret or an access right, to decrypt the information. Restricted broadcast/multicast will be referred to herein by the representative term “restricted multicast” or just “multicast.”
- FIG. 1 shows an exemplary system 100 that integrates DRM with encrypted multicast.
- a content delivery server 102 hosts one or more components of an exemplary multicast/DRM engine 104.
- the multicast/DRM engine 104 sends content, such as multimedia content, to a select recipient 106 over a network, for example, the Internet 108.
- the content is divided into blocks (e.g., corresponding to multicast rekeying intervals) and encrypted by numerous content encryption keys, one for each block, in order to limit access to the content to current subscribers and other intended recipients.
- a license and payment server 110 may also host one or more components of the exemplary multicast/DRM engine 104'.
- the recipient 106 has a client-side content player 112 that can play live multicast or can use a DRM secret granted by the license and payment server 110 to play saved content.
- the exemplary multicast/DRM engine For each block of content, the exemplary multicast/DRM engine
- the content delivery server 102 For facilitating subsequent DRM, the content delivery server 102 also transmits the corresponding prime numbers of the transmitted blocks to the client-side content player 112 to be stored when the content itself is stored.
- the corresponding prime numbers may be transmitted and stored separately from the content to be stored. Alternatively, the corresponding prime numbers may be embedded, e.g., in an auxiliary field of each content block, and sent as a part of the content blocks (shown in Fig. 3).
- the corresponding prime numbers are used in regenerating the decryption keys for saved blocks at the client side when used with a secret in a license delivered from the license server.
- the multicast/DRM engine 104' of the license and payment server 110 generates a single DRM secret that allows the recipient 106 to replay an arbitrary collection of the stored content blocks, upon request.
- the single DRM secret enables the client-side content player 112 to generate decryption keys for and only for the specified arbitrary collection of stored content blocks.
- the license and payment server 110 simply includes the single DRM secret customized to meet the recipient's request in a license to the recipient 106.
- FIG. 2 shows the exemplary multicast/DRM engine 104 of Fig. 1, in greater detail.
- the illustrated implementation in Fig. 2 is only one example configuration, for descriptive purposes. Many other arrangements of the illustrated components or even different components constituting an exemplary multicast/DRM engine 104 are possible within the scope of the subject matter.
- Such an exemplary multicast/DRM engine 104 can be executed in hardware, software, or combinations of hardware, software, firmware, etc.
- the multicast/DRM engine 104 includes a pseudo-random prime number generator 202, a content encryption key generator 204, and a DRM secrets generator 206.
- the multicast/DRM engine 104 in the content delivery server 102 includes the pseudo-random prime number generator 202 and the content encryption key generator 204
- the multicast/DRM engine 104' in the license and payment server 110 includes the DRM secrets generator 206.
- the versions of the multicast/DRM engine 104 and 104' are different in general but share some information such as s, n, p, and q, (to be described below) and the prime numbers associated with the saved blocks that a client requests to replay.
- the pseudo-random prime number generator 202 includes a prime number generator 208 to produce large prime numbers 210, such as "p" and "q.”
- the prime number generator 208 is included in a prime number multiplier 212, which in one implementation multiplies the large prime numbers 210 together to obtain product n 214.
- the secret generator 216 is included in a prime number collection generator 220, which generates a large collection of distinct prime numbers P 222.
- the pseudo-random prime number generator 202 further includes a number selection engine 224 that implements a selection schema 226 to produce the pseudo-random sequence 228 of distinct prime numbers pj, p 2 , ..., P 1 which are all co-prime to ⁇ n) 218.
- the pseudo-random sequence 228 of distinct prime numbers is generated by selecting pseudo-randomly those numbers from the collection P that are co-prime to ⁇ ) 218.
- the content encryption key generator 204 introduced above further includes an inputs manager 230, e.g., for inputting a current prime number p t 232 of the z-th prime number of the pseudo-random sequence 228 of prime numbers, to be used to generate an encryption key for a corresponding i- th content block.
- the content encryption key generator 204 further includes a random integer generator 234 for producing a random integer s 236 based on product n 214, which in one implementation is related to the product n 214 according to s e ( ⁇ , ⁇ ) and the integer s 236 is co-prime to the product n 214.
- the content encryption key generator 204 produces per-block content encryption keys for multicast content delivery 238 and readies the current prime number 232 for transmittal or for embedding in a corresponding content block, both for subsequent DRM.
- the DRM secrets generator 206 may include a block identity manager 240 to receive a list of identities of blocks in a recording — a collection of blocks — to be replayed from the client's local storage.
- the block identity manager 240 also coordinates obtaining from the system 100 the corresponding prime number for each block in the collection.
- the DRM secrets generator 206 may include a scalar multiplication engine 242 to produce a product K 1 244 consisting of the corresponding prime numbers ⁇ p, ⁇ 232 of the blocks constituting the locally stored collection to be replayed at the client-side content player 112.
- the DRM secrets generator 206 generates a single DRM secret sj 246 that can be used to derive the decryption keys for each block of the stored content to be replayed. It is worth noting that the blocks in the client's stored collection to be replayed (e.g., a saved computer file of multimedia content) do not have to be contiguous (e.g., blocks corresponding to an advertisement can be omitted) and do not have to be in temporal order (the user may wish to play the content in reverse, or jump around in the content).
- the single DRM secret 246 is sent to DRM licensing and payment 248, e.g., to a licensing and payment server 110.
- the DRM secrets generator 206 resides in the multicast/DRM engine 104' inside the license and payment server 110.
- the multicast/DRM engine 104 inside the content delivery server 102 and the multicast/DRM engine 104' inside the license and payment server 110 share the pair of numbers ⁇ n, ⁇ n) ⁇ (214, 218, respectively) as well as the collection P 222, the integer s 236, and the selection schema 226.
- the shared information is used to derive the single DRM secret sj 246 delivered in a DRM license to a client during license acquisition.
- the exemplary integrated key schema is based on the strong RSA assumption to generate content encryption keys for multicast.
- the exemplary key schema dramatically simplifies key management and delivery in DRM subsequently applied to multicast content that has been recorded.
- encrypted media from multicast is directly saved to a client's local storage. Only a single key, the DRM decryption secret 246, needs to be contained in a license for replaying a recorded content object.
- the exemplary key schema generates content encryption keys for multicast encryption by taking into account the specific requirements of the DRM applied subsequently to recorded contents.
- the exemplary key schema is based on the strong RSA assumption and in one implementation includes the four processing phases of setting up, multicasting, recording content, and playing back the recorded content.
- the prime number generator 208 first generates two large prime numbers p and q 210.
- the prime number collection generator 220 selects a collection P 222 of distinct prime numbers.
- a selection schema 226 is used by the number selection engine 224 to pseudo-randomly select numbers co-prime to ⁇ (n) 218 sequentially from P 222 to obtain the pseudo-random sequence 228 of prime numbers.
- P 222 is exclusive, i.e., a selected number will not be selected again in future selections.
- An example selection schema 226 directs the number selection engine 224 to pseudo-randomly permute the numbers in P 222, and then select the numbers that are co-prime to ⁇ n) 218 according to the resulting order.
- the equation p t P[i] denotes the i -th number of the numbers selected by the selection schema 226 from the collection P 222, which are relatively prime to ⁇ ) 218.
- the pseudo-random sequence p l ,p 2 ,p 3 ,- - - 228 is the sequence of numbers selected from P 222 by the number selection engine 224 that are all relatively prime to ⁇ n) 218, and no two numbers are equal.
- the number n 214 and the collection P 222 are publicly known, while the secret number ⁇ ) 218 and the selection schema 226 to select numbers from P 222 remain secret information.
- the reason that the selection schema 226 is kept secret is to prevent a hacker from knowing the numbers that may be selected from P 222 by the number selection engine 224 that are not relatively prime to ⁇ n) 218, since such information can be used to deduce the secret ⁇ (n) 218.
- the pair of numbers ⁇ n, ⁇ n) ⁇ (214, 218, respectively) as well as the collection P 222, the integer s 236, and the selection schema 226 are shared with the license server 110, which uses the information to derive content encryption keys during license acquisition.
- the content delivery server 102 for multicast also serves as the license server 110 for the DRM system. Multicasting
- the content encryption key generator 204 sets the first encryption key Jc 1 306 to be s Pl mod n .
- the number s 236 is also shared with the license server 110 in order to generate keys to deliver in licenses to clients 106 to replay saved contents.
- the integer s 236 is not kept as a secret, but is publicly available.
- the content encryption key generator 204 iterates this procedure whenever rekeying is needed, e.g., due to a change in membership of the multicast. [00036] In general, for the i -th rekeying, the content encryption key generator 204 generates the (z + 1) -th content encryption key Jc 1+1 to encrypt the
- the prime number e.g., p t 318
- the prime number p t 318 may be packaged into an auxiliary field 320 in the encryption block B 1 302 to be sent to clients.
- the prime number p t 318 can be multicast in-band to clients separately from the content delivery server 102.
- error correction or redundant transmission of the selected prime numbers 318 may be used to ensure that clients 106 receive all the transmitted prime numbers 318. It is worth reemphasizing that the transmitted prime numbers 318 are not used in live multicast decryption. Rather, the prime numbers 318 are used in generating keys by the client-side DRM module when decrypting saved content. Recording Content
- an exemplary client- side content player 112 has a live multicast player 402 and a saved content player 404 that includes a client-side DRM module 406.
- the exemplary client- side content player 112 has access to a local storage medium for content 410 recorded from the live multicast player 402.
- the client-side content player 112 simply saves the encrypted content 410 received from restricted multicast directly into local storage 408 for subsequent replays.
- the encryption blocks B t ,- - -,B l+J along with the prime numbers p t ,- - -,p l+J received from multicast are saved to the local storage 408.
- the saved files 410 can be distributed to other users or devices if desired, since as in a conventional DRM system, the protected content can be redistributed without restriction. Without a proper license, however, a user cannot play protected content.
- a live multicast program may contain some uninteresting content such as advertisements that a user 106 does not wish to replay.
- a user 106 may save nonconsecutive encryption blocks into a saved file 410.
- a saved file 410 containing nonconsecutive encryption blocks can also occur when multiple saved files are merged into a single file.
- the exemplary integrated key schema works with a saved file 410 containing nonconsecutive encryption blocks.
- the exemplary key schema works equally well when a saved file 410 consists of an arbitrary combination of encryption blocks [B 1 1 i e / ⁇ , where / is an arbitrary set of block indices.
- a valid license with appropriate rights is typically requested before a client-side content player 112 can consume the recorded content 410.
- a client 106 acquires a license from the license server 110. During license acquisition, the client 106 typically sends the license server 110 a list of the collection of block indices / that the saved file 410 contains, along with other identification information that may be present. A payment is sometimes required at this point in the process.
- the license server 110 authenticates the client 106, the DRM secrets generator 206 (Fig.
- This process can be applied to all the recorded encryption blocks ⁇ BJ i e l ⁇ contained in the saved file 410.
- the client-side content player 112 can derive only the content encryption keys 304 associated with the blocks [B 1 ⁇ i e l ⁇ , which is exactly the permission to decrypt granted by the license server 110 during the license acquisition.
- the client-side DRM module 406 cannot derive encryption keys associated with any other blocks.
- Fig. 5 shows an exemplary method 500 of integrating DRM with encrypted multicast.
- the exemplary method 500 may be performed by hardware, software, or combinations of hardware, software, firmware, etc., for example, by components of the exemplary multicast/DRM engine 104.
- a prime number is generated for each block of a data content to be multicast.
- a collection P of prime numbers is created.
- a selection schema produces a pseudo-random sequence of the distinct prime numbers, where each prime number p t in the sequence is co-prime to ⁇ (n) and is assigned to a block B 1 of content to be multicast.
- a content encryption key is derived for each block from the corresponding prime number p t of each block.
- a random integer s is generated, wherein s is relatively prime to a product of the two large prime numbers. Then the content encryption key is defined as s Pl mod(n) .
- Each prime number secret p t may be packaged into an auxiliary field in the corresponding encryption block to be sent to clients. Or, the prime numbers can be multicast in-band to clients separately from the content.
- a single DRM decryption secret is derived from the corresponding prime numbers of a stored collection of the blocks. That is, a single DRM key can be derived from the identities of a stored, arbitrary collection of multicast content blocks.
- the single DRM key is typically transmitted to a client in a license requested by the client. During license acquisition, the client typically sends the license server a list of the block indices / in a collection of blocks constituting a saved recording. The single
- the i -th block B 1 can be decrypted. This process can be applied to all the recorded encryption blocks included in the client's recording.
- S 1 246 can be computed from the keys ⁇ k t
- / e / ⁇ . Since the integers ⁇ p t ⁇ i e l ⁇ 318 are different prime numbers, the integers [U 1 Ip 1 ⁇ i ⁇ I ⁇ are co-prime. Recall that scalar product ⁇ t 244 is calculated by U 1 ⁇ Y[ p t . Therefore there exists a set of integers ⁇ a t ⁇ i ⁇ I ⁇ such that ⁇ Ji£i ( ⁇ I /p ⁇ ) - a ⁇ 1 . The set of integers ⁇ a t
- Lemma The exemplary integrated key schema is equivalent to the strong RSA problem.
- A can ask B for k t , a times.
- the exemplary integrated key schema described above offers some major advantages over the conventional "direct” and “transcryption” straightforward methods described in the Background Section above.
- the exemplary integrated key schema has the same simplicity that only a single secret 246 is generated and transmitted to a client 106 in a license, yet without the computational overhead, the complexity of negotiating a conventional DRM encryption key with the license server for re-encryption, and the additional security requirements needed for the conventional transcryption technique. No transcryption is needed in the exemplary key schema. Content from live multicast can be saved directly to the local storage 408 for subsequent replays.
- the exemplary integrated key schema Compared with the conventional "direct" recording technique, the exemplary integrated key schema has the same efficiency in saving the content directly to local storage 408, yet without the burden of complex key management or a large number of keys being delivered per license to a client. In other words, the integrated key schema combines the advantages of both of the above straightforward methods. [00066]
- the exemplary integrated key schema has an additional advantage over the conventional transcryption technique when multiple recorded files needing to be merged into a single one. In the conventional transcryption method, yet another transcryption is required since the recorded files are encrypted with different content encryption keys and the merged content needs to be encrypted with a single encryption key so that a license server knows how to generate the key when a client acquires a license.
- Merging can easily be accomplished in the exemplary integrated key schema (just as it is for the conventional direct recording technique) by simply concatenating recorded files together according to the sequence numbers of the encryption blocks and removing duplicated blocks.
- the resulting merged file can contain an arbitrary collection of blocks. These blocks are not necessarily consecutive.
- a new license may be needed to play the merged file.
- the license server easily generates a new DRM secret 246 and delivers the single secret 246 to a client 106. But for conventional direct recording techniques, all the encryption keys associated with the encryption blocks contained in the merged file have to be delivered to the client. This means that the size of a conventional license in conventional DRM under the direct recording technique can be quite large.
Abstract
Description
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Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US11/621,445 US7978848B2 (en) | 2007-01-09 | 2007-01-09 | Content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management with encrypted multicast |
PCT/US2008/050649 WO2008150553A2 (en) | 2007-01-09 | 2008-01-09 | Content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management with encrypted multicast |
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EP2119091A2 true EP2119091A2 (en) | 2009-11-18 |
EP2119091A4 EP2119091A4 (en) | 2017-08-09 |
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EP08825886.8A Withdrawn EP2119091A4 (en) | 2007-01-09 | 2008-01-09 | Content encryption schema for integrating digital rights management with encrypted multicast |
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US (1) | US7978848B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2119091A4 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2008150553A2 (en) |
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WO2008150553A3 (en) | 2009-04-02 |
US7978848B2 (en) | 2011-07-12 |
EP2119091A4 (en) | 2017-08-09 |
US20080165956A1 (en) | 2008-07-10 |
WO2008150553A2 (en) | 2008-12-11 |
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