EP2082518A2 - Access control system based on a hardware and software signature of a requesting device - Google Patents
Access control system based on a hardware and software signature of a requesting deviceInfo
- Publication number
- EP2082518A2 EP2082518A2 EP07871324A EP07871324A EP2082518A2 EP 2082518 A2 EP2082518 A2 EP 2082518A2 EP 07871324 A EP07871324 A EP 07871324A EP 07871324 A EP07871324 A EP 07871324A EP 2082518 A2 EP2082518 A2 EP 2082518A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- service
- access
- software
- digital signature
- authentication server
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the identification of a variety of devices and methods for authorizing access to services.
- the present invention relates to controlling and authorizing access to sensitive and confidential information and services on a network or the Internet, including bank account information, corporate information, and commercial transactions and other forms of e-commerce.
- the mobile data market is not readily adaptable to the networks, applications, and devices used within existing wired solutions, due to fundamental differences between wired and wireless networks.
- wired networks there are standard device platforms, operating systems, and browsers, where data and content reside largely in databases, and data is extracted by the user on a simplified query basis using search engines — the user must either find or know where to get the information for which he or she is looking.
- Mobile, wireless networks currently have not such standards for client platforms, operating systems, or user interfaces.
- Mobile devices may be a PDA, a two-way pager, intelligent mobile device, or a smart phone.
- the system and method should be fully functional for wireless networks as well as wired networks.
- the system should provide a strong two-factor authentication tool that is scalable and cost effect for mass use in online environments.
- the present invention is a system and method to substantially improve the security involved in an authentication process to access an Internet page, an Intranet page, or any other type of computer server or computer-based service or network that requires secure authentication. Any of these services will be cited hereinafter as a "SERVICE.”
- the authentication process includes a process related to the creation of a unique signature (a "SIGNATURE") based on the hardware and software configuration profile of a device.
- the SIGNATURE resulting from the hardware and software configuration of the device from or through which the user is attempting to use or access the SERVICE is received, verified and compared to a list of authorized device signatures. If the current device's SIGNATURE matches one of the previously-registered signatures from this list, the user is allowed to access the SERVICE. If not, the user will either be directed to extended positivation or will be denied access to the SERVICE, depending on the previously chosen security options.
- the invention can be used as a complementary authentication process to a separate authentication process, such as, but not limited to, an authentication method based on user/password pairs, so as to improve or increase the security related to a SERVICE.
- the invention also may be used independently to access less sensitive applications, such as logging onto a web portal or ISP.
- the invention is capable of performing authentication and identification without need for any other hardware or software components, such as smart cards, identification cards, or the like.
- the invention allows the recognition of a SIGNATURE for a device simply from the device's hardware and software components.
- the specification herein offers a more in-depth description of possible applications of the invention; however, any application of the invention described herein is offered as an example, and should not be construed as a limitation to the scope of the claims.
- Figure 1 is a diagram that illustrates the basic operation of one exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 2 is a diagram that shows the process of SIGNATURE deletion in accordance with one exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 3 is a diagram that represents the deactivation of the invention's security system triggered by a user in accordance with another exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 4 is a diagram that shows the steps of initializing one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram that shows the steps of using one embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 6 shows examples of embodiments of the present invention in use on mobile devices.
- the present invention is a strong form of authentication that does not need external hardware devices.
- the invention associates a user or user account with a trusted device (or devices).
- Each device has unique hardware and/or software characteristics, similar to the human genome. These unique characteristics, which may be thought of as the "digital DNA" of the device, are linked by the invention to a user or user account, creating a unique system of secure, reliable identification and authentication.
- the present invention operates or is used in a distributed computational environment to provide secure access to a SERVICE 2 in, located on, or accessed through that environment. Examples of such an environment include, but are not limited to, the Internet, a local area network, or an internal computational network. Examples of SERVICES 2 include an Internet page, Intranet page, a banking or financial system, a corporate database, or any other type of computer server or computer-based service or network that requires secure authentication.
- a user attempts to access a SERVICE 2 by means of or through a device 4.
- devices 4 include, but are not limited to, a personal computer, network terminal, cell phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a two-way pager, intelligent mobile device, or a smart phone.
- PDA personal digital assistant
- a software agent 10 is used to detect hardware and/or software configuration information about the device 4.
- the hardware and/or software configuration information is used to create a SIGNATURE 20 for the device 4.
- the SIGNATURE 2 ⁇ may then be compared to a list or set of authorized signatures for access to the
- the software agent 10 maybe deployed in a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, an Internet Explorer plug-in, a Netscape/Mozilla-Firefox plug-in, or Apple WebKit plug-in used by Safari.
- plug-ins can be downloaded and installed by the browser (as a signed cab file or signed xpi file), or they can be downloaded as executable files.
- the configuration information that may be collected and used to create a SIGNATURE 20 include, but 'are not limited to, hard drive serial number, CPU type and clock speed, memory type and physical location, physical MAC address, and other unique features of the device.
- the number of data items collected can be any number, including, but not limited to, ten items.
- the invention gathers this information directly from its source, and thus the software agent 10 should have direct access to necessary portions of a device's 4 internal systems. This may be only possible through an onboard agent.
- the invention uses a "self-protected" software agent 10 or plug-ins.
- the agent is a key part of the system and implemented as an executable object, allowing for the device to protect sensitive information while giving access to "hardware level” configuration data.
- the agent of the present invention remains inert until called by the application using the present invention.
- each element or component of this configuration information may be acquired and converted into a hash string.
- the hash strings may then be encrypted.
- the hash string is wrapped in a onetime 128-bit encryption.
- the encrypted elements may be arranged in a unique pattern for each Web session or access attempt. A different encryption key may be used for each transmission.
- the calling of the agent 10 is conducted during a session initiated by the user and using a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connection.
- SSL Secure Socket Layer
- the resulting inbound call to a specific port results in the agent 10 executing its program.
- the SSL session protects the invocation of the agent 10, as it is extremely difficult for an outside party to interject themselves into the transmission to try to exploit the agent 10.
- the agent is asked to execute, it is loaded into memory, determines the SIGNATURE 20, and then opens an outgoing HTTP or HTTPS connection.
- the connection may be directly with an authentication server 30 or with the site using the invention.
- the agent 10 sends the SIGNATURE 20 and then closes the connection. Typically, this delivery takes less than one second. This behavior does not permit an outside party to exploit the agent 10.
- the actual agent 10 may be constructed in such a manner that makes any attempt to reverse-engineer the agent extremely difficult.
- the agent 10 is approximately 150 KB in size.
- the agent 10 may be developed in C/C++ with a portion written in assembler and proprietary languages.
- an authentication server 30 receives the SIGNATURE 20 created fay the software agent l ⁇ , and compares it to the authorized signature list to determine whether or not access to the SERVICE 2 may be authorized.
- the authentication server 30 should be in electronic communication, which may be wireless, with the device 4.
- the invention may thus be considered, in one embodiment, as an online authentication system.
- the authentication server 30 may serve both as the means for interacting with the software agent 10 and the SERVICE 2 for determining whether access should be permitted, and as storage means. With regard to the latter, the authentication server 30 may serve as a repository of the list or set of registered or authorized SIGNATURES, as well as storing the history of access attempts by various users or putative users. In another exemplary embodiment, the list of registered SIGNATURES and access attempt history may be stored, separately or together, on some other server or in some other location.
- the invention is compatible with any form of database, including but not limited to, Oracle, MySQL, DB2, SQL Server, and the like.
- the database may be encrypted, which preserves the security of the data from anyone gaining unauthorized access to the database server. In another exemplary embodiment, the data is kept in a database indexed by user identification and a realm.
- the software agent 10 is installed on the device 4.
- the software agent 10 may be downloaded by standard means onto the device 4, including by means of web distribution techniques capable of downloading and executing a program in a single step or as a single process, such as, but not limited to, ActiveX or browser plug ins.
- the software agent 10 may be loaded onto the device 4 prior to or during the first attempt to access the SERVICE 2, during the setting up of an account with the SERVICE 2, or at some subsequent time for SERVICES 2 where a user already has access.
- the invention recognizes the browser or device type, and downloads the appropriate form of the agent 10.
- the deployment of the invention thus may vary from client to client, and may be voluntary or compulsory depending upon the environment.
- the SIGNATURE creation process can be initiated at any time. In one exemplary embodiment, the process is initiated when the software agent 10 is downloaded and installed.
- the invention may be used as the sole means of access to a SERVICE 2, although it may also be used to complement other authentication methods or security procedures.
- the invention may be used to deny the user access to the SERVICE 2 from a device whose SIGNATURE 20 is not registered or recognized. This may be used even though pre-identif ⁇ cation could be successfully accomplished by means of other co-existing authentication processes (i.e., access may be denied even if a user/password pair are correct).
- the invention may be the last test of authentication for a web application. The scripting for the deployment and authentication calls may be placed on the web login page, as well as other pages that may be deemed to be high risk.
- the invention is invoked only after all other authentication processes (e.g., user name and password) have been completed.
- the providers of the SERVICE may elect to insure the identity of the user via additional methods, including challenge/response questions, or requiring the user to contact a call center or use a one-time password previously acquired. Once the existing authentication standards are met, the invention is called via scripting.
- the agent 10 Upon installation on the device, the agent 10 collects the first set of configuration data and returns it to the authentication server, where it is maintained as the original SIGNATURE of that device. In some embodiments, the installation and collection of configuration data averages approximately 7 to 9 seconds, depending upon the connection and device processing speeds.
- future login sessions may be seamless to the user. For example, a web login page would receive the user name and password, and upon confirmation of that information, and prior to opening the SERVICE application, the invention causes a request to be sent to open a session.
- the authentication server opens the session, and sends to the application server a session ID and token, the token containing the seed number for both the one-time encryption key and shuffling mechanism.
- the token is passed to the device 4 via the connection (such as a SSL connection) established at the beginning of the session.
- the agent 10 collects the configuration information, and hashes each of the configuration components.
- the items are hashed using SHA256 hashing digest.
- the token information is used to encrypt the string of hashed component items, which also may be shuffled in a random order. This happens each and every time a request for authentication occurs, and thus may prevent replay attacks.
- the resulting encrypted string is sent to the authentication server, where it is decrypted and checked against the original SIGNATURE for a "pass" or "no pass” decision, which is passed back to the web server where it is then applied to the current session. This process may take less than a second from login to authentication.
- the call for authentication may be invoked at any time during the session, thus making the present system particularly effect for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.
- This can be controlled by embedding scripting on the application pages that contain high risk transactions, such as movement of money or adding bill payees.
- the authentication server 30 may have a set of rules that allows some changes to the device, whether in software or hardware, without the device becoming unauthorized.
- L A user attempts to access a SERVICE through a device.
- the present invention is used in conjunction with other authentication processes or security procedures (e.g., pre-identification), such as, without limitation, username/password pairs, verification of authorized IP address ranges, answering of specific questions, optical character recognition or similar services that protect against "software robots", or the like, then the user may be required to pass or satisfy those other authentication processes or security procedures first.
- those other authentication processes or security procedures may be implemented subsequent to the authentication system of the present invention, or in cases where multiple procedures are used, some may occur before and some may occur after the authentication system of the present invention.
- the user may be prompted to download the software agent in order to initiate the process of the present invention.
- the user may be directed to a web page or software window as a part of this process, where the user is given information about how the invention works and/or describing the registration process required for access.
- this step may be implemented so as to be optional, when the provider of the SERVICE desires to offer the user the option of accessing the SERVICE through means of the invention as one of several authentication processes or means.
- the user may also have the option of deactivating or reactivating the use of the invention when desired.
- a user desiring to reactivate the present invention may be required to identify themselves in some way (e.g., user/password pair, answering questions, and the like) prior to reactivation.
- deactivating the use of the present invention by a user may be permitted only from the device that has the oldest SIGNATURE registered for the user's account, based on the presumption that the oldest SIGNATURE is likely to be the most trustworthy SIGNATURE.
- the software agent collects data sampled from the device's hardware or software components, or both.
- the software agent then creates a SIGNATURE for the device from the sampled data, and submits it for registration with the SERVICE, or for authentication, as appropriate.
- the SIGNATURE identifies the device without the need of any supplementary identification device or means, such as a smart card. In some embodiments, the first registration may not require rigorous authentication.
- the device's identification is done by detecting and identifying essential hardware and software components of the device.
- the invention allows incremental changes to some of these components without modifying the device's SIGNATURE. However, if the device has undergone substantial modifications in its hardware or software configurations, its SIGNATURE likely will be changed. This means that the device will be considered as a new device and will not be recognized by the SERVICES accessed before the modifications. In this case, the user has to register the new device SIGNATURE. Minor changes of components that generally are not considered to be essential may be done without affecting the SIGNATURE.
- the SIGNATURE comprises one or more groups of information hashes generated based on the hardware and software components. These hashes cannot be reversed to recompose the information used to make the SIGNATURE, thereby preserving user privacy and security.
- the hashes be grouped in a different way for each transaction, and submitted .to several levels of cryptography. This procedure protects against anyone who attempts to intercept the communication between the user device and the authentication server or SERVICE, and may try, by simply reproducing the transmitted data, to pretend to be the original device.
- the invention will allow access only after application of extended positivation means (e.g., specific questions in addition to username/password pairs). In another embodiment, this access may be allowed only if there was at least one device previously registered with the SERVICE. If the extended positivation means is successfully passed, then the user will be allowed to access the SERVICE, with the option to register the present device's SIGNATURE. If the extended positivation means is not successfully passed, then access is denied.
- extended positivation means e.g., specific questions in addition to username/password pairs.
- this access may be allowed only if there was at least one device previously registered with the SERVICE. If the extended positivation means is successfully passed, then the user will be allowed to access the SERVICE, with the option to register the present device's SIGNATURE. If the extended positivation means is not successfully passed, then access is denied.
- the user may be limited to a determined quantity of SIGNATURES associated with his or her account (the quantity may be defined in accordance with the needs of the SERVICE). It thus is possible to create a closed group of devices and limit the SIGNATURE set that can access the SERVICE for a given account.
- the user may have the ability to choose the number of SIGNATURES able to access the SERVICE through his or her account, although this limitation may be set by the provider of the SERVICE. In the case where the user has reached this determined quantity of SIGNATURES, he or she may be able to choose whether or not the number of SIGNATURES should be limited to this quantity.
- SIGNATURES are not permitted to be registered, it may be possible to optionally access the SERVICE from a non-registered device by means of extended positivation, examples of which are described above.
- the SIGNATURE of this device cannot be added to the existing list of authorized signatures, although the SIGNATURE of this device may be stored as part of the history of access attempts.
- the SERVICE access from this device thus may be performed as a detached and temporary operation.
- the invention also allows for sessions where no SIGNATURE may be collected, such as cybercafe or business offices, multiple users on the same machine, and similar settings. hi yet another embodiment, it is possible to specify a maximum number of times a SIGNATURE can be present in the authorized signature lists of different users of the SERVICE.
- This maximum number may even be set to zero where the device creating the SIGNATURE is one to which access will be denied, such as when the device is considered to be a "malicious" device.
- the device thus may be included in a denial list for devices that are not authorized to authenticate.
- the user may delete one or more SIGNATURES registered for his or her account.
- the deletion process may be limited so that SIGNATURES may only be deleted through a device registered at an earlier time with the SERVICE, based on the presumption that the earlier devices are more secure and/or trustworthy.
- This creates, in effect, a hierarchy of devices (and concomitant SIGNATURES) based on chronology (i.e., the date of registration with the SERVICE).
- a hierarchy can also be based upon other factors, such as the type of device, or a combination of these factors.
- a user may only delete a given SIGNATURE if the user is using a device higher up in the hierarchy than the device associated with the SIGNATURE being deleted, or, in a variation of this embodiment, by the device associated with the SIGNATURE being deleted.
- the oldest SIGNATURE may be deleted only through the device creating that SIGNATURE.
- the invention stores (and thus is able to provide) historical information about all accesses or access attempts performed upon or through a user account. This history may be kept and stored even if the user decides to deactivate, even temporarily, the use of the present invention.
- the present invention works equally well in the wireless environment, such as with cell phones or smart phones.
- the agent is compatible with Symbian OS, which is the operating system on the majority of smart phones, as well as Windows Mobile 2003 and 2005.
- Symbian OS is the operating system on the majority of smart phones, as well as Windows Mobile 2003 and 2005.
- This use of the invention allows all online banking and ecommerce provides to extend their operations to the mobile market while still maintaining significant security.
- the embodiments and examples have been chosen and described in order to best illustrate the principles of the invention and its practical applications to thereby enable one of ordinary skill in the art to best utilize the invention in various embodiments and with various modifications as are suited for particular uses contemplated. Even though specific embodiments of this invention have been described, they are not to be taken as exhaustive. There are several variations that will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, it is intended that the scope of the invention be defined by the claims appended hereto.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11/591,885 US20070113090A1 (en) | 2004-03-10 | 2006-11-02 | Access control system based on a hardware and software signature of a requesting device |
PCT/US2007/083331 WO2008073606A2 (en) | 2006-11-02 | 2007-11-01 | Access control system based on a hardware and software signature of a requesting device |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2082518A2 true EP2082518A2 (en) | 2009-07-29 |
EP2082518A4 EP2082518A4 (en) | 2011-07-20 |
Family
ID=39512369
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP07871324A Withdrawn EP2082518A4 (en) | 2006-11-02 | 2007-11-01 | Access control system based on a hardware and software signature of a requesting device |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2082518A4 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2008073606A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102008054886B3 (en) * | 2008-12-18 | 2010-06-10 | Bv Zahlungssysteme Gmbh | Method for securing transaction data in context of online-applications, involves mapping utilized input values to comparison value that is known to background system by function implemented in multi-functional chip card reader |
US9047450B2 (en) * | 2009-06-19 | 2015-06-02 | Deviceauthority, Inc. | Identification of embedded system devices |
US8800057B2 (en) * | 2009-09-24 | 2014-08-05 | Samsung Information Systems America, Inc. | Secure content delivery system and method |
JP2014534514A (en) * | 2011-10-11 | 2014-12-18 | タンゴメ,インコーポレイテッド | Authenticating device users |
US9135436B2 (en) * | 2012-10-19 | 2015-09-15 | The Aerospace Corporation | Execution stack securing process |
US10389706B2 (en) * | 2016-08-01 | 2019-08-20 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Authentication based on telephone number recycling |
US10397215B2 (en) * | 2016-09-27 | 2019-08-27 | Visa International Service Assocation | Secure element installation and provisioning |
CN111832001B (en) * | 2020-07-20 | 2024-05-24 | 国家信息中心 | Identity management method and identity management system based on block chain |
Citations (3)
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US20030131115A1 (en) * | 1999-01-19 | 2003-07-10 | James Mi | System and method for using internet based caller ID for controlling access to an object stored in a computer |
EP1669833A1 (en) * | 2004-12-01 | 2006-06-14 | MobileGov France S.A.R.L. | Method of validating a trusted computer system |
US20060212407A1 (en) * | 2005-03-17 | 2006-09-21 | Lyon Dennis B | User authentication and secure transaction system |
Family Cites Families (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
AU2002951013A0 (en) * | 2002-08-27 | 2002-09-12 | Sunbay Software Ag | System for improved network data access |
US7475427B2 (en) * | 2003-12-12 | 2009-01-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Apparatus, methods and computer programs for identifying or managing vulnerabilities within a data processing network |
-
2007
- 2007-11-01 EP EP07871324A patent/EP2082518A4/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2007-11-01 WO PCT/US2007/083331 patent/WO2008073606A2/en active Application Filing
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20030131115A1 (en) * | 1999-01-19 | 2003-07-10 | James Mi | System and method for using internet based caller ID for controlling access to an object stored in a computer |
EP1669833A1 (en) * | 2004-12-01 | 2006-06-14 | MobileGov France S.A.R.L. | Method of validating a trusted computer system |
US20060212407A1 (en) * | 2005-03-17 | 2006-09-21 | Lyon Dennis B | User authentication and secure transaction system |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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See also references of WO2008073606A2 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2008073606A2 (en) | 2008-06-19 |
WO2008073606A3 (en) | 2008-08-07 |
EP2082518A4 (en) | 2011-07-20 |
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