EP1847091A1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur kontrolle von netzelementen in einem dezentralen netzwerk - Google Patents

Verfahren und vorrichtung zur kontrolle von netzelementen in einem dezentralen netzwerk

Info

Publication number
EP1847091A1
EP1847091A1 EP06707910A EP06707910A EP1847091A1 EP 1847091 A1 EP1847091 A1 EP 1847091A1 EP 06707910 A EP06707910 A EP 06707910A EP 06707910 A EP06707910 A EP 06707910A EP 1847091 A1 EP1847091 A1 EP 1847091A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
network element
network
parameters
response message
request message
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP06707910A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Jens-Uwe Busser
Gerald Liebe
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Solutions and Networks GmbH and Co KG
Original Assignee
Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG filed Critical Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH and Co KG
Publication of EP1847091A1 publication Critical patent/EP1847091A1/de
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01Protocols
    • H04L67/10Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/104Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01Protocols
    • H04L67/10Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/104Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks
    • H04L67/1061Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks using node-based peer discovery mechanisms
    • H04L67/1068Discovery involving direct consultation or announcement among potential requesting and potential source peers
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/101Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measures for digital rights management

Definitions

  • Decentralized networks are known in the prior art in which a majority of connected network elements offer functions and services to other network elements and, on the other hand, can use functions and services offered by other network elements without the need for a central controlling entity.
  • a considered network element takes on a case by case role as a server or server over another network element. a role as a client.
  • a network element connected to the decentralized network is often referred to as a "peer" in contrast to a conventional client-server classification.
  • peer-to-peer networks or, in short, as P2P networks.
  • decentralized network does not generally exclude the existence of centralized instances. Also on mixed forms of networks, where certain tasks on a central instance or. Server are relocated, is called decentralized network or. P2P network, as far as in these networks, no server is maintained over which any communication relationship between two network elements is to lead.
  • DHTs distributed Hash Tables
  • resource encompasses data of all kinds, such as information, files, services, etc.
  • a hash function is used to form the distributed hash tables. The application of this hash function to a resource or to a key term provides a unique hash value resp. Index value for indexing the resource.
  • resources are stored locally on derj enigen network elements whose "P2P address", so for example, formed from the IP address (Internet Protocol) and port number of the network element hash value best with the index value of the resource (eg B. Hash value of a search term etc.).
  • P2P address so for example, formed from the IP address (Internet Protocol) and port number of the network element hash value best with the index value of the resource (eg B. Hash value of a search term etc.).
  • the network elements of this decentralized network authenticate themselves and the data exchange initiated by you with digital signatures and certificates. These certificates are issued in advance by a trusted central certification authority (CA) and kept as a resource in the decentralized network.
  • CA trusted central certification authority
  • Servers are required to provide created and stored certificates during operation.
  • the presence of a valid certificate further serves as a proof of authorization, which is awarded by the certification authority to authorized network elements.
  • An authorized network element is, for example, a computer system used by a paying customer.
  • a procedure for the revocation of allowances was proposed in the application filed with the European Patent Office on 12 August 2004 with the application number 04019230.4 and entitled "Procedure for ensuring authenticity and / or confidentiality in a P2P network".
  • the local procedure is characterized by the provision of certificate revocation lists as resources in a decentralized network.
  • data such. B. a user profile of a network element or messages to absent network elements are introduced as resources in the decentralized network, they must be digitally signed by the generating network element.
  • the network element calculates an index value (for example hash value) of this data and then signs it with a private key which corresponds to the public key from the certificate of the network element. In addition to the integrity protection, this ensures that only authorized and authenticated network elements can store data in the decentralized network.
  • This data record can also be transferred to a collection point for billing.
  • a method for collecting accounting data was filed in the filed with the German Patent and Trademark Office on August 23, 2004 application with the registration file 10 2004 040 766.5 and the title »Procedure and arrangement for billing in a decentralized network « submitted. If a network element has certain resources, such as a foreign user profile, messages stored for it, etc. from another network element, it must make a signed request to authorize and authenticate itself. This request can also be used for billing. This allows both access control to the network and consumption-based charging.
  • a disadvantage of such a decentralized architecture is that decentralized network elements can be manipulated.
  • a manipulation is particularly in the case of purely software - based peers through an examination and modification of the machine - readable instructions of the software or software. Reverse engineering is easily possible. Some possible malicious manipulations are shown below.
  • the peer continues to provide its data and services to third parties but does not generate billing information or forwards it.
  • a peer authorizes third parties without verification, d. H . without exercising access control to the network, services are available, although they may not be eligible to receive the services.
  • a peer suppresses a notification or forwarding of noise and logging information when it receives invalid requests or other problems. Turning off logging itself does not interfere directly with the network, but can be used to prepare for further manipulation. An automatic detection of a peer software manipulated in this respect is complicated since the entire data exchange of a network element would have to be logged.
  • a solution of the object is achieved in a communication system with the features of patent claim 1 with regard to its method aspect by a method having the features of the claim and with respect to its device aspect by a network element having the features of claim 14.
  • the object is further achieved by a computer program product with the features of Patent claim 15 solved
  • the method according to the invention for controlling network elements in a decentralized network in which at least a first part of the network elements at least temporarily provides a service for at least a second part of network elements, sees in a first step a selection of a second network element to be controlled by a first Network element before.
  • the first network element may be an otherwise normally operating network element, or else a decentralized control peer whose task is performed in a z. B. cyclic control of other network elements resp. Peers lies.
  • the second network element is the network element to be checked.
  • the selection of the second network element is z. B. after a cyclic control scheme or after processing a list containing suspiciously working network elements (black list) or also on a random basis. Incidentally, the selection is possible according to any criterion.
  • a definition of one takes place
  • Request message parameters are simulated parameters, for example a given to the intended control purpose sender address - alias address - the first network element, which does not necessarily have to match the actual sender address of the first network element.
  • Other parameters include z. B. a certificate, a request signature, a timestamp, etc.
  • An essential advantage of the method according to the invention is the fact that the automated analysis proposed according to the invention, based on request and response messages, has hitherto required time-consuming and labor-intensive ad hoc measures with an on-site inspection of manipulated peer-to-peer Software is unnecessary.
  • controlling peer may be an otherwise conventional and hierarchical peer, advantageously no changes in the architecture of the network and no further intervention in the software of other network elements are necessary to implement the method according to the invention.
  • an analysis takes place on the basis of the parameters previously stored in the first network element and the parameters contained in the at least one response message.
  • This storage is appropriate, in particular in the case of an embodiment of the request message explained below, with valid parameters in order to create an analysis based on contents of the response message in comparison with contents of the request message.
  • An advantageous embodiment of the invention relates to an embodiment of the request message with valid parameters, eg. B. proper signature, certificate, timestamp, etc.
  • the controlling first network element is entitled to execute these requests and expects a correspondingly correct response.
  • the network element to be checked sees this request message as correct and causes a correspondingly correct answer.
  • a simulated request for a paid service requires service provision.
  • the controlling network element checks this proper billing, which it from a collection point or.
  • Verification point confirms. If the first network element does not receive a valid response message or, in the case of a simulated request for a costly service, no confirmation of the charge point, then the peer-to-peer software of the checked second network element has been manipulated with high probability. The result of the analysis is negative in this case. If the data transport in the network is not reliable and messages (UDP packets etc.) can be lost, this check must be repeated several times if necessary.
  • An advantageous embodiment of the invention relates to an embodiment of the request message with invalid or erroneous parameters.
  • Erroneous parameters are, for example, an expired and / or revoked and / or invalid certificate or a certificate issued by other certification bodies not recognized in the decentralized network.
  • Incorrect parameters are furthermore an incorrect request signature, an outdated request with expired time stamp, etc.
  • An answer to such invalid request messages must deny a correctly working network element with non-manipulated peer-to-peer software. If the request is answered anyway, a network element with manipulated peer-to-peer software was found. If the request is but not answered, the controlling first network element additionally checks whether an alarm message from the tested network element arrives at a collection point, for example a so-called »logging system «. The absence of such an alarm message can similarly indicate a manipulated peer-to-peer software. Again, if necessary, a repetition of the review may be provided if messages can be lost.
  • the FIGURE shows a structure diagram for the schematic representation of a decentralized network.
  • a decentralized network P2P comprises a first network element PX and two further network elements Pl, P2.
  • Each of the aforementioned network elements Pl, P2, PX holds a certificate C1, C2, CX.
  • the certificate CX of the first network element PX can be adjusted for control purposes. changeable.
  • a first and a second collection point SV1, SV2 are either arranged outside the decentralized network P2P, as shown, or also-not shown-within the decentralized network P2P.
  • Network element Pl works correctly, meets at a subsequent time a valid response message VRP (»Valid Response ") on the testing network element PX.
  • the checking network element PX controls in a request REQ to a central billing point SVl a correct billing of requested by the network element to be checked service. If a response RSP from the charging point SV1 indicates that the charge is correct, the result of the analysis with respect to the network element C1 to be checked is positive. The result of the analysis is optionally transmitted to a collection point (not shown).
  • Another network element P2 to be checked is to be checked with an erroneous or invalid request message IRQ (»Invalid Request «) initiated by the checking network element PX.
  • the simulated request message IRQ contains z. B. an expired and / or revoked and / or invalid certificate or a CX certificate issued by other certification bodies not recognized in the decentralized network. Incorrect parameters are furthermore a wrong request signature, an outdated request with expired time stamp, etc. A positive response to the invalid request message IRQ would have to refuse a correctly working network element with non-manipulated peer-to-peer software.
  • a manipulated peer-to-peer software is brought to expiration on the network element P2 to be checked, which is why the invalid request message IRQ is nevertheless answered with a response message IRP (Invalid Response).
  • IRP Invalid Response
  • the controlling first network element PX additionally checks whether an alarm message from the tested network element arrives at a collection point, for example a so-called "logging system". The absence of such an alarm message indicates same way to a manipulated peer-to-peer software out.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
EP06707910A 2005-02-01 2006-01-30 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur kontrolle von netzelementen in einem dezentralen netzwerk Withdrawn EP1847091A1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102005004611A DE102005004611A1 (de) 2005-02-01 2005-02-01 Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Kontrolle von Netzelementen in einem dezentralen Netzwerk
PCT/EP2006/050534 WO2006082177A1 (de) 2005-02-01 2006-01-30 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur kontrolle von netzelementen in einem dezentralen netzwerk

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1847091A1 true EP1847091A1 (de) 2007-10-24

Family

ID=36096445

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP06707910A Withdrawn EP1847091A1 (de) 2005-02-01 2006-01-30 Verfahren und vorrichtung zur kontrolle von netzelementen in einem dezentralen netzwerk

Country Status (9)

Country Link
US (1) US20080253292A1 (ja)
EP (1) EP1847091A1 (ja)
JP (1) JP2008529434A (ja)
KR (1) KR20070111506A (ja)
CN (1) CN101112066A (ja)
AU (1) AU2006210223A1 (ja)
DE (1) DE102005004611A1 (ja)
WO (1) WO2006082177A1 (ja)
ZA (1) ZA200705938B (ja)

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP2056563B1 (en) * 2007-11-05 2012-09-26 Alcatel Lucent Peer-to-peer network
KR102372718B1 (ko) * 2019-11-05 2022-03-11 한국전자통신연구원 발행인 익명성 인증서 시스템을 위한 분산화된 그룹 서명 방법

Family Cites Families (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6697806B1 (en) * 2000-04-24 2004-02-24 Sprint Communications Company, L.P. Access network authorization
US6931550B2 (en) * 2000-06-09 2005-08-16 Aramira Corporation Mobile application security system and method
AU2003223238A1 (en) * 2002-03-11 2003-09-29 Visionshare, Inc. Method and system for peer-to-peer secure communication
US20030174838A1 (en) * 2002-03-14 2003-09-18 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus for user-friendly peer-to-peer distribution of digital rights management protected content and mechanism for detecting illegal content distributors
US7130999B2 (en) * 2002-03-27 2006-10-31 Intel Corporation Using authentication certificates for authorization
US7478233B2 (en) * 2002-05-30 2009-01-13 Microsoft Corporation Prevention of software tampering
US7213047B2 (en) * 2002-10-31 2007-05-01 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Peer trust evaluation using mobile agents in peer-to-peer networks
US7254608B2 (en) * 2002-10-31 2007-08-07 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Managing distribution of content using mobile agents in peer-topeer networks
CA2413808A1 (en) * 2002-12-05 2004-06-05 Claude Fournier Method and system for protection against unauthorized distribution of copyrighted computer files over peer-to-peer networks

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
See references of WO2006082177A1 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
JP2008529434A (ja) 2008-07-31
ZA200705938B (en) 2008-04-30
KR20070111506A (ko) 2007-11-21
AU2006210223A1 (en) 2006-08-10
US20080253292A1 (en) 2008-10-16
WO2006082177A1 (de) 2006-08-10
DE102005004611A1 (de) 2006-08-10
CN101112066A (zh) 2008-01-23

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
DE102011108003B4 (de) Prozessleitsystem
EP3681102B1 (de) Verfahren zur validierung eines digitalen nutzerzertifikats
EP3951516A1 (de) System und verfahren zum verifizieren von komponenten eines industriellen kontrollsystems
EP3058701B1 (de) Verfahren, verwaltungsvorrichtung und gerät zur zertifikat-basierten authentifizierung von kommunikationspartnern in einem gerät
EP3985532B1 (de) Zertifikatsmanagement für technische anlagen
EP3734930A1 (de) Angriffserkennung auf computersysteme
EP3105898B1 (de) Verfahren zur kommunikation zwischen abgesicherten computersystemen sowie computernetz-infrastruktur
EP3785416B1 (de) Verfahren zur anbindung eines endgerätes in eine vernetzbare rechner-infrastruktur
WO2006082177A1 (de) Verfahren und vorrichtung zur kontrolle von netzelementen in einem dezentralen netzwerk
WO2020193136A1 (de) Intrusionserkennung bei computersystemen
DE112012000780T5 (de) Verarbeiten von Berechtigungsprüfungsdaten
EP1496664A2 (de) Vorrichtung und Verfahren sowie Sicherheitsmodul zur Sicherung eines Datenzugriffs eines Kommunikationsteilnehmers auf mindestens eine Automatisierungskomponente eines Automatisierungssystems
EP1784743A1 (de) Verfahren und anordnung zur vergebührung in einem peer-to-peer netzwerk
WO2005074189A1 (de) Schaltungsanordnung und verfahren zur kommunikationssicherheit innerhalb von kommunikationsnetzen
DE102014225418A1 (de) Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Überwachung einer Zertifizierungsstelle
DE102009031143B3 (de) Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Erstellen und Validieren eines digitalen Zertifikats
WO2022022997A1 (de) Kanalbasierte kommunikation in einem iot-netzwerk
WO2019096489A1 (de) Verfahren und vorrichtung zur behandlung von authentizitätsbescheinigungen für entitäten, insbesondere von personenbezogenen, dienstbezogenen und/oder objektbezogenen digitalen zertifikaten
DE102015210275A1 (de) Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Bereitstellen eines Teils einer Zertifikatsperrliste
WO2019115580A1 (de) Verfahren zum betreiben eines dezentralen speichersystems
EP2812840A1 (de) Verfahren zur initialisierung eines speicherbereichs, welcher einem smart-meter zugeordnet ist
EP3881486B1 (de) Verfahren zur bereitstellung eines herkunftsortnachweises für ein digitales schlüsselpaar
EP3832508B1 (de) Sperrung oder widerruf eines gerätezertifikats
EP4030321A1 (de) Authentifizierung von mindestens einem ersten gerät bei mindestens einem zweiten gerät
EP4174691A1 (de) Leitsystem für eine technische anlage und verfahren zum entfernen eines oder mehrerer zertifikate

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20070903

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR

RAP3 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORKS S.P.A.

RAP3 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORKS GMBH & CO. KG

DAX Request for extension of the european patent (deleted)
17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20090227

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED TO BE WITHDRAWN

18D Application deemed to be withdrawn

Effective date: 20090710