EP1710760B1 - Activation sécurisée de dispositifs - Google Patents

Activation sécurisée de dispositifs Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1710760B1
EP1710760B1 EP05007519.1A EP05007519A EP1710760B1 EP 1710760 B1 EP1710760 B1 EP 1710760B1 EP 05007519 A EP05007519 A EP 05007519A EP 1710760 B1 EP1710760 B1 EP 1710760B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
code
determined
parameter
pin
control centre
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Not-in-force
Application number
EP05007519.1A
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German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1710760A1 (fr
Inventor
Norbert Miller
Erwin Busch
Josef Lowis
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Scheidt and Bachmann GmbH
Original Assignee
Scheidt and Bachmann GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Scheidt and Bachmann GmbH filed Critical Scheidt and Bachmann GmbH
Priority to PL05007519T priority Critical patent/PL1710760T3/pl
Priority to EP05007519.1A priority patent/EP1710760B1/fr
Publication of EP1710760A1 publication Critical patent/EP1710760A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1710760B1 publication Critical patent/EP1710760B1/fr
Not-in-force legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/205—Housing aspects of ATMs
    • G07F19/2055—Anti-skimming aspects at ATMs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/207—Surveillance aspects at ATMs

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for releasing at least one device in which the release is at least partially controlled by at least one first code. Moreover, the invention relates to a device and a system for calculating a release code. Moreover, the invention relates to a computer program product and a computer program with instructions executable on a processor such that at least one device is released, wherein the release is at least partially controlled by a first code.
  • Such codes may be, for example, personal identification numbers (PIN).
  • PIN personal identification numbers
  • the PIN can be linked to other parameters via an encryption method.
  • This is, for example, the 3DES encryption method, which is also used in the banking industry.
  • 3DES encryption method using two secret keys in a three-step process, the parameter is encrypted with the first key, decrypted with the second key, and finally encrypted with the second key.
  • the result is a PIN that is uniquely linked to the parameter.
  • a comparison PIN can then be calculated using the parameters in the device using the identical, secret key.
  • the comparison PIN is compared with the entered PIN. If they match, they can be released.
  • the publication BE 1006817 A6 generally relates only to a release system in which release keys are communicated in a bidirectional communication between the devices.
  • the publication EP 1 260 659 describes a method for controlling an electronic lock. From her is known that a lock can be easily adjusted to the requirements of a user, without the need for a bespoke manufacture of the appropriate locks is required.
  • a method for personalizing a key memory in an ATM during commissioning by the service technician using a portable personalization device is known.
  • the personalization device is connected to a security module on site.
  • a secure connection is established between the security module and the personalizer to unlock.
  • the security module sends a public key of a module key pair, whose private key is stored in a secret key memory, to the personalizer.
  • the public key of the module key pair is signed by the security module by means of a private key of a signing key pair and transmitted back to the security module.
  • the signed, certified key, which is transmitted back to the security module represents a code. After transmission of the code, the connection between personalizer and security module is disconnected and the security module is released and in normal operating condition.
  • the WO 03/014858 A2 relates to a method for activating a vending machine.
  • a customer identifies the vending machine and, if necessary, the desired product.
  • at least the unique serial number of the vending machine is transmitted to a central office.
  • a number is calculated using the serial number, a time and a secret mathematical function. This result is transmitted by the control center to the customer. He enters the solution in the vending machines.
  • the vending machine knows both his own Serial number, the time as well as the magic mathematical function.
  • the vending machine compares the entered result with the result calculated by the vending machine. If the result of the comparison is positive, the vending machine is activated.
  • the document DE 100 05 487 A1 describes a method for user identity control at a service terminal.
  • a terminal for example a mobile telephone, has a code generation device. With the help of the mobile phone, the payment is made at a service terminal.
  • WO 2005/022474 A1 a method for performing electrical online transactions is described.
  • a bank customer logs in to an authentication server with a password. This happens via a first communication channel.
  • the customer then receives an encrypted unique identifier from a security server via a second communication channel. This identifier is sent back to the authentication server via the first communication channel for authentication, which has also received the identifier from the security server. If the comparison result is positive, the transaction is completed.
  • the US 2004/0022542 A1 includes a method and system for wirelessly activating a target object.
  • the system includes a target object, a communication device, an activation device, and a central network device.
  • the target object used is, for example, a CD or a DVD.
  • a user sends a PIN and an identification number of the target object to the central network device. These checks the received data, for example. In the case of a positive check, the central network device sends an activation signal to the communication device. The target object is activated via the activation device.
  • a secret PIN known only to the customer
  • PINPad a keyboard
  • a customer card is used to read a customer number or an account number by means of a card reader, with the aid of which the PIN was generated.
  • the PIN is checked in the chip of the customer card or online by querying a central office for accuracy.
  • the four-eyes principle is pursued. This principle is based on the fact that two local technicians install and activate the card reader together with the PinPad if necessary. The two service technicians install the card reader in the front panel and connect it to the PinPad. To activate the card reader, the security-relevant data must be fed into the card reader.
  • the PIN and the personnel number of the two service technicians are queried in accordance with the four-eye principle.
  • a first service technician enters his PIN and personnel number into the PinPad.
  • a comparison PIN can be calculated with the help of the personnel number and a partial release can be made if there is a match.
  • the second service technician can also enter his PIN and personnel number into the PinPad.
  • a check is performed in the PinPad. In the event that both PINs belong to the entered personnel numbers, a release of the PinPad can take place.
  • the security-relevant data can then be transmitted to the card reader in order to activate it.
  • Facilities may include PinPads, card readers, ATMs, ticket machines, access barriers, Lockers, parking machines, track systems or other technical facilities.
  • the release of such a device may be that actions are triggered, data released or transmitted.
  • a code is generated which is determined by parameters of at least two entities. These parameters together with the code can be entered into the device and checked there. If the code is suitable for releasing the device, it is released.
  • At least two of the entities are spatially separated.
  • the spatial separation of the entities and the dependence of the first code on the two entities can ensure that the release of the device is secure. It is not possible that, for example, a person on site alone generates the first code and thus releases the device. Rather, two spatially separated entities must be involved in the generation of the code, which prevents a manipulation by only a single person on the device allows the release.
  • At least one entity is a person and the parameters determined by this entity are personal parameters.
  • the first code is generated with parameters of at least two persons, which are spatially separated.
  • the personal parameters may be, for example, personal data, personnel numbers, names, addresses, dates of birth or other parameters.
  • the personal parameters can be specified by the persons themselves.
  • At least one entity is the device to be released, and the parameters determined by this entity are device-related parameters.
  • Device-related parameters may be, for example, station identifications, manufacturer information or station names.
  • the device-related parameters can be determined with the help of the device itself. For example, these can be read on the device or the device outputs this automatically.
  • the device is formed of a PinPad and a card reader.
  • the device related parameters may be related to both the PinPad and the card reader.
  • the parameters related to the card reader may be transferred from the card reader to the PinPad and output from the PinPad.
  • a release can be designed particularly reliably if, according to an advantageous exemplary embodiment, the parameters determined by an entity are time-related parameters.
  • the time-related parameters may be the current date, the current time, or the number of days since a key date.
  • the time-related parameters it is possible that the first code has only a certain validity period.
  • a time related parameter may represent a particular day. The code generated with this time-related parameter can then only release on that one day.
  • the parameters determined by an entity are order-related parameters.
  • order numbers are generated. Each individual release order can thus be assigned a unique number. This allows the release of facilities to be traced back. With the order number can be traced, by means of which entity the code was generated and for which device this code was used. This allows a preservation of evidence in the event of fraud.
  • At least one parameter determined by a device-side entity is transmitted to a center remote from the device.
  • Device-side entities may be, for example, the device itself, devices connected to the device, or persons working on the device.
  • parameters can be determined which can only be determined directly on site at the device. If these parameters, which can only be detected on site, are transmitted to a remote control center and used there to generate a code, it is ensured that no code can be generated in the control center which is not intended directly for a specific device.
  • At least one parameter determined by a central-entity and at least one parameter determined by the device-side entity are used for the calculation of the first code.
  • the central entity can be a technician in the central office or any device in the central office. This ensures that the first code is dependent on both central and device-side entities. This ensures that the first code can only be calculated by the interaction of the locally separated entities.
  • the parameter determined by the central-entity is transmitted to the device.
  • the release can only be made with the help of institution-side and central-entity entities. It is no longer possible, for example, for two service technicians to look over the shoulder when entering the personnel number and PIN and thus to spy on each other's PIN in order to be able to manipulate other card readers.
  • the at least one parameter determined by the central entity be at least partially encrypted. This prevents the parameter from being made known by the central entity in plain text outside the central.
  • the centrally calculated first code is transmitted to the device.
  • the centrally calculated first code is entered into the device together with the parameters determined by the central entity in order to be able to check the correctness of the first code.
  • the centrally calculated first code is checked on the device side, at least with the aid of the at least one central-side parameter transmitted by the center.
  • the first code is entered into the device together with the parameters transmitted by the center.
  • the device can then calculate a comparison code and compare it with the first code.
  • the first code be calculated on the central side and the device side with the same calculation rule.
  • the first code is calculated using the parameters from the central entity and the parameters from the device-side entity.
  • the first code is entered together with the parameters determined by the central-entity and the parameters determined by the device-side entity.
  • a comparison code can be calculated with the same calculation rule to check whether the first code is actually in the center with the same Information was created. If the first code and the comparison code match, a release can at least partially take place.
  • At least the first code is calculated by means of a symmetric encryption method.
  • a DES encryption method can be used. It is also possible to use a 3DES encryption method.
  • the encryption methods may have key lengths of 56 bits and 112 bits, respectively.
  • encryption methods according to the CAST-128 algorithm, the Twofish algorithm, the Blowfish algorithm and the asymmetric IDEA algorithm are possible.
  • the release of the device be controlled at least by the first code and a second code.
  • the second code may be a PIN entered by a device-side entity as well as a corresponding device-side entity parameter. It is understood that the second code serves as a further safeguard against manipulation attempts. However, release can be done with only the first code, if so specified.
  • the second code is determined with the aid of personal parameters.
  • a PIN can be generated as a second code.
  • the second code can be entered into the facility along with the personal parameters.
  • In the device can be a comparison code with the help of personal parameters are compared with the entered second code.
  • the names of the codes as the first code and the second code do not specify their order. Rather, the order of the two codes is arbitrary for a release. Also, in addition to the first and the second code even more codes may be necessary for release.
  • the first code be transmitted via a direct electronic communication link between the device and the center.
  • the electronic communication connection can be wired or wireless, packet-switched or circuit-switched.
  • the transmission can be done for example via mobile, wireless LAN, Internet, ISDN or DSL.
  • the first code can be transmitted directly from the center to the device without, for example, a service technician is involved in the field in the transmission.
  • the on-site service technician could trigger the generation of the first code at headquarters by entering his personal code along with his personal information. After entering his personal code with his personal parameters, the institution may review the personal code. If the check is correct, the center can be automatically prompted by the facility to generate the first code, for example, by the on-site service engineer's personal parameters and facility-related Parameters are transmitted to the control center. In the center then the first code with the personal parameters of the service technician on site, the facility-related parameters and central parameters can be generated and transmitted back to the device.
  • the central-side parameters may include, for example, a personnel number and a PIN of an employee in the central office.
  • the parameters used to generate the first code are transmitted.
  • the device is enabled to generate a comparison code that can be compared to the first code. If there is a match then the complete release can take place.
  • a further subject of the invention is a device comprising input means for inputting parameters from at least two entities and for inputting at least one first code, and release means for at least partially releasing the device upon positive verification of at least the first code determined using parameters from at least two entities ,
  • An additional subject matter of the invention is a system for calculating a release code, having a previously described device and a control center, characterized in that the control center is set up to calculate at least one first code with the aid of parameters from at least two entities.
  • Another aspect of the invention relates to a computer program product and a computer program with instructions executable on a processor such that at least one device is released, wherein the release is at least partially controlled by at least one first code and the first code is determined by means of parameters of at least two entities.
  • Fig. 1 shows a vending machine 2 with a housed in a housing 4 PinPad 6 and accommodated in a housing 8 card reader 10.
  • the vending machine 2 may for example be a ticket machine or ATM.
  • a microprocessor 12 and a memory area 14 are arranged in the housing 4.
  • the housing 4 is a "temper responsive" housing, which means that the housing 4 can not be opened nondestructively. When opening the housing 4, all data stored in the microprocessor 12 and memory area 14 is lost.
  • a card reader 10, a microprocessor 16 and a memory area 18 are arranged in the vending machine 2 in the housing 8.
  • the housing 8 is also a "temper responsive" housing.
  • the interfaces may be conventional communication interfaces, such as Firewire (IEEE1394), RS232 or USB.
  • the card reader 10 has a chip contacting unit 24 and a card slot 26.
  • the housing 8 is designed so that in the vending machine 2 in a front panel only the card reader 10 can be seen and the microprocessor 16 and the memory area 18 are arranged invisibly inside the vending machine 2.
  • a customer with a chip card 28 can actuate the vending machine 2.
  • the chip card 28 is inserted into the card slot 26 and the chip contacts of the chip 30 contacted by means of the chip contacting unit 24.
  • Customer data for example an account number, can be read out via the chip contacts of the chip 30.
  • the read-out account number can be transmitted via the microprocessor 16, the interface 22, the data line 24 and the interface 20 to the microprocessor 12.
  • the customer can use the PinPad 6 to enter their personal PIN.
  • it is encrypted after the input with the aid of the microprocessor 16 and at least one stored in the memory area 14 secret key and sent via a network operator computer to an authorization point.
  • the authorization center can verify the PIN online with the help of the account number and correct the action desired by the customer at the vending machine 2 also via the network operator computer.
  • An offline PIN check can be carried out in the chip 30 of the chip card 28.
  • the PIN entered by a customer into the PinPad 6 is transmitted via the microprocessor 12, the interface 20, the data line 24 and the interface 22 to the microprocessor 16. Since the PIN is transmitted outside the housing 4, 8, and thus is no longer within the "temper responsive" areas, the PIN entered into the PinPad 6 is encrypted in the microprocessor 12 and decrypted after transmission via the data line 24 in the microprocessor 16.
  • 16 secret keys are stored in the memory areas 14, 18.
  • the decrypted PIN is applied via the chip contacting unit 24 directly to the chip contacts of the chip 30.
  • the PIN is applied to the chip contacts of the chip 30 unencrypted.
  • a PIN check is performed, and in the case of a positive check, a desired action by the customer at the vending machine 2 is effected via the microprocessor 16.
  • the PIN is in plain text.
  • the chip contacting unit 24 is connected to the chip contacting unit of the dummy in the front wall of the vending machine 2 via a data line.
  • the PIN check in the chip 30 takes place without the customer noticing anything.
  • the PIN can be tapped in plain text. If this happens, the attacker can easily use the PIN in the future, possibly triggering a payment transaction with a compromised card at another vending machine.
  • the Card reader 10 without losing its functionality, can be removed from the front wall of the vending machine 2 and replaced by a dummy.
  • the Card reader 10 is provided with a sensor 32 which detects the removal of the card reader 10 from the front wall of the vending machine 2. In this case, all data stored on the microprocessor 16 and in the storage area 18 is cleared. Characterized in that the data in the microprocessor 16 and in the memory area 18 have been deleted, an encrypted PIN transmitted by the microprocessor 12 in the microprocessor 16 can no longer be decrypted and a plain text transmission of the PIN to the chip contacting unit 24 is impossible.
  • the secret information in particular the keys for the decryption of the PIN transmitted encrypted on the data line 24, must be loaded from the PinPad 6 into the card reader 10.
  • the 4-eyes principle is used for this.
  • a field service technician having installed the card reader 10 in the front wall of the vending machine 2, will be prompted to enter his personal PIN and personnel number into the PinPad 6.
  • a comparison PIN is calculated in the microprocessor 12 using at least one secret key and compared with the PIN entered by the service technician. If these two match, the service technician entered the correct PIN associated with his personnel number.
  • a second field service technician will then be prompted to enter his PIN and personnel number into the PinPad 6.
  • This second PIN is also checked by means of the microprocessor 12.
  • all security-relevant keys are loaded from the PinPad 6 in the card reader 10 via the interface 20, the data line 24 and the interface 22.
  • the data is encrypted to prevent a tap on the data line 24.
  • the keys After the keys have been transmitted, they are stored in the memory area 18 of the card reader 10 and can henceforth be used for the decryption of encrypted PIN.
  • the card reader is now again suitable for offline PIN verification.
  • a disadvantage of the described method is that two service technicians must be present on site to activate a card reader 10. This is associated with high costs. In addition, it is possible that the service technicians spy and spy on the PIN and personnel number of the other service technician. It would then be possible for a single field service technician to activate an activation of a card reader 10.
  • a method has been developed which allows to carry out the exchange and activation of the card reader on site with only one service technician, while maintaining the four-eye principle.
  • FIG. 2 shows a system for carrying out the method according to the invention.
  • a service technician 34 can service the activation of a card reader 10 in a vending machine 2 on site.
  • the service technician 34 or the vending machine 2 is connected via a communication link 36 to a communication network 38.
  • the communication link 36 may be, for example be a mobile connection.
  • a communication link 40 is made with a central 42.
  • a service technician 44 may accompany the activation of the ticket reader for vending machines 2.
  • a bidirectional data communication between the control center 42 and service technician 44 and vending machine 2 and service technician 34 is ensured via the communication link 36, the communication network 38 and the communication link 40.
  • Fig. 3 shows a flowchart of a method according to the invention.
  • a service technician 34 drives to a vending machine 2 to activate a card reader 10.
  • the card reader 10 After installation of the card reader 10 in the vending machine 2, this card reader 10 logs on via the data line 24 at the PinPad 6. At registration, for example, the card reader 10 may transmit its terminal identification (TID), station number (STAT_ID) and station issuer number (STAT_ISS) to the PinPad 6. In addition, a further identifier (S & B_ID) and a constant (K1) can be transmitted to the PinPad 6. This information is device-side parameter. The device-side parameters are transmitted from the card reader 10 or the vending machine 2 to the PinPad 6 (50).
  • TID terminal identification
  • STAT_ID station number
  • STAT_ISS station issuer number
  • K1 constant
  • This information is device-side parameter.
  • the device-side parameters are transmitted from the card reader 10 or the vending machine 2 to the PinPad 6 (50).
  • the PinPad 6 notifies (52) the service technician 34 that the card reader must be activated. It is also conceivable that the service technician 34 immediately on the PinPad 6 by entering a shortcut activation of a card reader 10 begins.
  • the service technician 34 enters his personal identification number (PIN_ST) and his personnel number (PNR_ST) in the PinPad 6 (54).
  • PIN_ST the entered PIN_ST is checked in microprocessor 12.
  • the operation PIN_ST ( ( 3 ⁇ OF e K SB_Key ( PNR_ST
  • the parameters x are encoded in a three-level DES method with two secret keys K SB_Key .
  • the PIN_ST entered by the service technician has already been determined with the same parameters and calculation rule. If the PIN_ST entered matches the calculated one, a first step of releasing a card reader 10 has taken place.
  • the PinPad 6 notifies the service technician 34 of the successful Partial Release (56) 56. In addition, the PinPad 6 displays the device-related parameters such as TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS, DAT, K1 to the service technician 34.
  • the service technician 34 transmits (58) the device-related parameters together with his own personnel number (PNR_ST) via a communication link to the control center 42.
  • the service technician also transmits a time stamp DAT the central office.
  • the timestamp can represent the current day and allows the release to be limited to a specific day.
  • the central 42 requests the service technician 44 in the center (60) to announce his personnel number (PNR_RM) and / or his PIN (PIN_RM).
  • the service technician 44 transmits (62) his personnel number and / or his PIN to a computer in the center 42.
  • the personnel number of the service technician 44 is encrypted in the center.
  • the personnel number of the service technician 44 (PNR_RM), the terminal number (TID), a second constant (K2), the additional identifier (S & B_ID) and the current date (DAT) are used for this purpose.
  • the current date (DAT) may also have been calculated using a number of days since a key date.
  • PNR_RM * ( ( 3 ⁇ OF e K SB_Key ( PNR_RM
  • the encrypted personnel number PNR_RM * is truncated to 3 decimal places using MOD 0xF000 and MOD 1000.
  • a unique order number (AUFT_ID) is generated in the control center 42.
  • AUFT_ID the order number
  • PNR_RM * the encrypted personnel number
  • DAT the date
  • the encrypted order number is truncated to two decimal places using MOD 0xF00.
  • the PIN_AT contains an encrypted 6-digit decimal value, which is generated by means of 3-DES from the personnel number of the service technician on site (PNR_ST), the encrypted order number (ORDER *), the terminal number (TID), the station number (STAT_ID) and the station issuer. Number STAT_ISS is formed.
  • the entire process of creating the PIN_AT with all associated parameters is archived in the control center 42 in terms of database technology. In cases of fraud or manipulation, it is always possible to comprehend the card reader commissioning completely.
  • the data is stored in the control center 42 for at least 3 years.
  • the parameters Personnel no. of the technician in the control center PNR-RM, personnel no. Service technician on site PNR_ST, terminal ID TID, order number AUFT_ID, station number STAT_ID, station error STAT_ISS, time stamp DAT.
  • the control center 42 transmits (64) to the service technician 34 via the communication network 38 the generated order number AUFT_ID and the PIN_AT containing the encrypted personnel number PNR_RM *.
  • the center 42 may also provide this information directly transferred to the PinPad 6.
  • a mobile connection for data transmission can be used.
  • the service technician 34 enters into the PinPad 6 the data just obtained (66).
  • the service technician 34 has already communicated his personnel number PNR_ST to the PinPad 6 (54).
  • PIN_AT ( ( 3 ⁇ OF e K SB_Key ( PNR_ST
  • the PIN_AT calculated in the PinPad 6 is entered with the PIN_AT entered into the PinPad 6 by the service technician 34 compared (6). In the case of a positive comparison, the service technician 34 is informed of the successful release (68).
  • keys (key) for decrypting PIN are transmitted from the PinPad 6 to the card reader 10 via the data line (70).
  • the keys (key) are transferred from the memory area 14 via the interface 20, the data line 24 and the interface 22 to the memory area 18.
  • the security-relevant data transmitted here, in particular the keys (key) for the offline PIN check, differ regularly from the keys (K SB_Key ) for carrying out the above-described 4-eyes principle by means of 3DES.
  • the 3DES encryption is based on the fact that the keys K SB_KEY are secret. If these keys are no longer secret for some reason, it is possible to load new keys K SB_KEY into the memory area 14 of the pin pad 6 by means of a remote transmission so that subsequent checks of the PIN are again safe.
  • the inventive method is characterized in particular by the fact that the costs for a second service technician can be saved on site.
  • the method according to the invention is further distinguished by the fact that the entities involved in the activation do not know each other and therefore can not spy on each other.

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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)

Claims (17)

  1. Procédé d'activation sécurisée pour un dispositif technique (2, 6, 10), dans lequel l'activation sécurisée est contrôlée, au moins partiellement, par au moins un premier code (PIN_AT),
    - sachant qu'un paramètre relatif au dispositif (TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS), déterminé par le dispositif (2, 6, 10), est transmis à une centrale (42) spatialement éloignée du dispositif,
    - sachant que le paramètre relatif au dispositif (TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS) peut être déterminé au moyen du dispositif (2, 6, 10) lui-même,
    caractérisé en ce que
    - un paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST), déterminé côté dispositif, TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS), est transmis à la centrale (42) spatialement éloignée du dispositif,
    - le paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST), déterminé côté dispositif, est un paramètre relatif à une personne, lequel concerne une première personne (34), qui est présente sur les lieux du dispositif (2, 6, 10),
    - le premier code (PIN_AT) est calculé dans la centrale, au moyen d'un paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_RM), déterminé côté centrale, du paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST), déterminé côté dispositif, d'un paramètre (AUFT_ID) côté centrale, déterminé par la centrale (42), et du paramètre relatif au dispositif (TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS),
    - sachant que le paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_RM), déterminé côté centrale, est un paramètre relatif à une personne, lequel concerne une deuxième personne (44), qui est spatialement séparée de la première personne (34),
    - sachant que le paramètre côté centrale (AUFT_ID), déterminé par la centrale, est transmis au dispositif (2, 6, 10),
    - sachant que le premier code (PIN_AT) est transmis au dispositif (2, 6, 10), et
    - que le premier code est vérifié, côte dispositif, au moins au moyen du paramètre, côté centrale, déterminé par la centrale (42),
    - sachant que le dispositif (2, 6, 10) est activé, au moins partiellement, quand le résultat de la vérification du premier code (PIN_AT) est positif.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que le paramètre déterminé par le dispositif (2, 6, 10) est un paramètre relatif au temps (DAT).
  3. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 2, caractérisé en ce que le paramètre déterminé par le dispositif (2, 6, 10) est un paramètre relatif à un ordre.
  4. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé en ce que le paramètre déterminé par la centrale (42) est codé, au moins partiellement.
  5. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que le premier code (PIN_AT) est calculé, côté centrale et côté dispositif, selon la même règle de calcul.
  6. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 5, caractérisé en ce que le premier code (PIN_AT) est calculé au moyen d'un procédé de codage symétrique.
  7. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 6, caractérisé en ce que l'activation sécurisée du dispositif (2, 6, 10) est au moins contrôlée par le premier code (PIN_AT) et par un deuxième code (PIN_ST).
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 7, caractérisé en ce que le deuxième code (PIN_ST) est déterminé au moyen de paramètres relatifs à une personne (PNR_ST), qui concernent la première personne (34).
  9. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 7 ou 8, caractérisé en ce que le deuxième code (PIN_ST) est vérifié, côté dispositif, au moins au moyen d'au moins le paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST), qui concerne la première personne (34).
  10. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1 à 9, caractérisé en ce que le premier code (PIN_AT) au moins est transmis par l'intermédiaire d'une liaison de communication électronique, directe, entre le dispositif (2, 6, 10) et la centrale (42).
  11. Système de calcul d'un code d'activation sécurisée,
    - avec un dispositif technique (2, 6, 10), qui comprend :
    - avec des moyens de sortie d'un paramètre relatif au dispositif (TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS), qui est déterminé par le dispositif (2, 6, 10),
    - sachant que le paramètre relatif au dispositif (TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS) peut être déterminé au moyen du dispositif (2, 6, 10) lui-même,
    - avec des moyens d'entrée pour l'entré d'un paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST) déterminé côté dispositif,
    - sachant que le paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST), déterminé côté dispositif, est un paramètre relatif à une personne, lequel concerne une première personne (34), qui est présente sur les lieux du dispositif (2, 6, 10), et
    - avec une la centrale (42), qui est spatialement séparée du dispositif (2, 6, 10),
    - sachant que la centrale (42) est aménagés pour le calcul d'un premier code (PIN_AT) au moyen d'un paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_RM), déterminé côté centrale, du paramètre relatif à une personne (PNR_ST), déterminé côté dispositif, d'un paramètre (AUFT_ID), côté centrale, déterminé par la centrale (42), et du paramètre relatif au dispositif (TID, STAT_ID, STAT_ISS),
    - sachant que le paramètre relatif à une personne, déterminé côté centrale (PNR_RM) est un paramètre relatif à une personne, lequel concerne une deuxième personne (44), qui est spatialement séparée de la première personne (34),
    - sachant que les moyens d'entrée sont, de plus, aménagés pour l'entrée du premier code (PIN_AT), déterminé par la centrale, et du paramètre côté centrale (AUFT_ID), déterminé par la centrale (42), et
    - sachant que le dispositif (2, 6, 10) comprend, de plus, des moyens d'activation sécurisée, qui, lors d'un résultat positif de la vérification du premier code (PIN_AT), activent, au moins partiellement, le dispositif (2, 6, 10), au moyen du paramètre, côté centrale (AUFT_ID), déterminé par la centrale (42).
  12. Système selon la revendication 11, caractérisé par des moyens de calcul côté dispositif, destinés au calcul d'un code de comparaison, au moins au moyen des paramètres introduits.
  13. Système selon la revendication 11, caractérisé par des moyens de comparaison côté dispositif, pour la comparaison entre le code de comparaison calculé et le premier code.
  14. Procédé selon la revendication 11, caractérisé en ce que les moyens d'activation sécurisée sont aménagés pour activer, au moins partiellement, le dispositif en cas de concordance entre au moins le premier code et le code de comparaison.
  15. Système selon l'une des revendications 11 à 14, caractérisé en ce que les moyens de calcul sont aménagés pour le calcul du code au moyen d'une règle de codage symétrique.
  16. Programme d'ordinateur, qui peut être exécuté, avec des instructions, sur un processeur, de sorte qu'au moins un dispositif d'un système selon la revendication 11, puisse être activé de manière autorisée au moyen d'un procédé selon la revendication 1.
  17. Produit de programme d'ordinateur, qui comprend un programme d'ordinateur, qui peut être exécuté, avec des instructions, sur un processeur, de sorte qu'au moins un dispositif d'un système selon la revendication 11, puisse être activé de manière sécurisée au moyen d'un procédé selon la revendication 1.
EP05007519.1A 2005-04-06 2005-04-06 Activation sécurisée de dispositifs Not-in-force EP1710760B1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

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PL05007519T PL1710760T3 (pl) 2005-04-06 2005-04-06 Bezpieczne zwalnianie urządzeń
EP05007519.1A EP1710760B1 (fr) 2005-04-06 2005-04-06 Activation sécurisée de dispositifs

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EP1710760B1 true EP1710760B1 (fr) 2013-11-27

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Cited By (1)

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DE102008021046A1 (de) 2008-04-26 2009-10-29 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Verfahren zur Inbetriebnahme einer Tastatur eines Selbstbedienungsterminals

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WO2003014858A2 (fr) * 2001-08-09 2003-02-20 Scott Edward James Garratt Procede d'actionnement de distributeur automatique
WO2004056030A2 (fr) * 2002-12-17 2004-07-01 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Personnalisation d'un module de securite

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BE1006817A6 (nl) * 1993-03-19 1994-12-13 Laureyssens Dirk Random slot.
US5668876A (en) * 1994-06-24 1997-09-16 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson User authentication method and apparatus
EP1260659A3 (fr) * 2001-05-23 2004-02-04 Burg-Wächter Kg Procédé de contrôle d'une serrure électronique

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DE10005487A1 (de) * 2000-02-08 2001-08-09 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur Nutzeridentitätskontrolle
WO2003014858A2 (fr) * 2001-08-09 2003-02-20 Scott Edward James Garratt Procede d'actionnement de distributeur automatique
WO2004056030A2 (fr) * 2002-12-17 2004-07-01 Wincor Nixdorf International Gmbh Personnalisation d'un module de securite

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
RU2810139C1 (ru) * 2020-07-01 2023-12-22 Сфинкс Электроникс Гмбх Унд Ко Кг Способ и система для запуска или администрирования офлайн-устройства управления

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EP1710760A1 (fr) 2006-10-11

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