EP1669115A1 - Systeme permettant d'executer un jeu de hasard au moyen d'un reseau de communication - Google Patents

Systeme permettant d'executer un jeu de hasard au moyen d'un reseau de communication Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1669115A1
EP1669115A1 EP03818388A EP03818388A EP1669115A1 EP 1669115 A1 EP1669115 A1 EP 1669115A1 EP 03818388 A EP03818388 A EP 03818388A EP 03818388 A EP03818388 A EP 03818388A EP 1669115 A1 EP1669115 A1 EP 1669115A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
agent
game
player
players
impartial
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Application number
EP03818388A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Andreu Riera Jorba
Jordi CASTELLÀ ROCA
Joan Borrell Viader
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Kinamik Data Integrity SL
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Scytl Online World Security SA
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Publication date
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Priority to EP06015875A priority Critical patent/EP1741477A3/fr
Publication of EP1669115A1 publication Critical patent/EP1669115A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/32—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for games, toys, sports, or amusements
    • G07F17/3202—Hardware aspects of a gaming system, e.g. components, construction, architecture thereof
    • G07F17/3223—Architectural aspects of a gaming system, e.g. internal configuration, master/slave, wireless communication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/32—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for games, toys, sports, or amusements
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/32—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for games, toys, sports, or amusements
    • G07F17/3225—Data transfer within a gaming system, e.g. data sent between gaming machines and users
    • G07F17/3232—Data transfer within a gaming system, e.g. data sent between gaming machines and users wherein the operator is informed
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/32—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for games, toys, sports, or amusements
    • G07F17/3241—Security aspects of a gaming system, e.g. detecting cheating, device integrity, surveillance
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
    • G07F17/32—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for games, toys, sports, or amusements
    • G07F17/326—Game play aspects of gaming systems
    • G07F17/3272—Games involving multiple players
    • G07F17/3276—Games involving multiple players wherein the players compete, e.g. tournament

Definitions

  • This invention describes a system for implementing games of chance over a communication network, so that the activity developed in said games, in other words the relevant information or data, can be registered securely using cryptographic operations.
  • the electronic gaming system of the invention includes the elements necessary for being able to audit the game actions, whereby it is possible to verify the honesty of said actions.
  • Computer networks and particularly the system of networks connected together on a worldwide basis called the Internet, have made it possible for certain common activities, such as buying goods, searching for information, or playing games to be carried out remotely.
  • the term game as used herein includes either usual casino games, such as roulette, dice, cards, fruit machines or other less well known games, played with a finite number of elements.
  • Gaming remotely or online gaming offers players a series of advantages, since it gives them independence in terms of location (they do not need to be physically on the casino), and time (the availability of an online casino - i.e., an Internet Casino - can in most cases be uninterrupted and in any case greater than the availability offered by a conventional casino). Owing to these advantages, the deployment of remote gaming has increased rapidly. However, at present the remote gaming poses a series of security, honesty and auditing problems that must be resolved.
  • Roulette, dice, cards or fruit machines are some of the elements used in the games in a conventional casino.
  • the players see on site all the actions taking place during the game and Legislative authorities periodically audits all the elements used for the gaming. This auditing guarantees that there are no mechanisms altering the random nature of the result.
  • the results are usually generated by the online casino using a pseudo random generator. However, the online casino can discard the result of said generator and choose a result that benefits it. Should the players suspect fraudulent behaviour, they have no evidence to prove the fraud.
  • Some online casinos in order to inspire confidence in their honesty, entrust their profits auditing them by well known firms. This audit is based on the fact that in most casino games the players play against the casino's bank, which has a mathematical probability of wining in each game.
  • the casino If the casino is honest, its game winnings must be approximately equivalent to the total amount of money betted in the game due to the probability of the casino of winning said game. With the information provided by the online casino, the auditing companies check that the profits are approximate to the above-mentioned amount. However, said auditing firms cannot determine the accuracy of the information provided by the online casino (i.e., whether the online casino has previously altered the information in order to adjust it to the regular expected margin). The audit would only be valid if the gaming event registers could remain unmodified without the active co-operation of the players.
  • the online casinos are not the only ones who can commit fraudulent practices, as well players can do.
  • the players exchange their money for casino chips.
  • the players once the game has finished and if they have lost, cannot claim to not have played and demand their money back.
  • the players deposit a certain amount of money in a casino account so as to be able to play.
  • Most players use credit cards to carry out this operation, because it is an easy, fast payment method.
  • the players using this payment method can reject the payment transactions carried out to the casino account. Therefore, once the players have played, if they loose, they can reject the credit transaction made for the online casino account. This action implies losses for credit card entities and online casinos.
  • a second group with the following representative examples, US 6.106.396, US 6.117.011, US 6.264.560 and WO9811686, only contemplate security measures at network level. Said inventions only aim to protect the privacy of the communication between those participating in the gaming process but do not provide any measures to guarantee the honesty of the gaming events. Neither do they define any method for recording the gaming events, so that when the game is over, there is tamperproof evidence of these events. This does not guarantee an honest audit in case of any conflict, because the evidence can be rigged.
  • the first invention relates to a game machine that allows playing on a casino without the need of an intermediary, also introducing the possibility that the machines can be connected remotely over a communication network such as the Internet.
  • the players hire the machines and all the prizes are distributed among the game participants. It does not describe the methods for generating the random factor, nor the security or honesty of the gaming system.
  • the second invention describes the architecture of an Online Casino which allows the game to be played with a central figure who distributes the messages without intervening in the game.
  • Said system encrypts the communications among the game participants to ensure their privacy. Also it does not describe any method for protecting the information generated during the game, so there is no tamperproof evidence that the game was played honestly. Players are vulnerable to the collaboration between the system operator and one of the players on their benefit.
  • the present invention relates to a game of chance system, preferably remote, which according to the distributions of its elements allows a gaming with or without an intermediary.
  • an intermediary When the game is implemented with an intermediary, the latter takes an active part in the game.
  • the intermediary would be an online casino.
  • the players play directly among themselves, according to a P2P model.
  • Both system architectures guarantee the honesty, auditability and security of the game by using an Activity Register 115 which stores gaming events, which are linked together securely by means of cryptographic processes and protocols during the game evolution..
  • This invention describes a system for implementing a game of chance over a communications network, which stores the gaming events and guarantees honestly and impartially of the game to the game players. It allows at least one Audit Authority to check that said gaming events have been honest and have not been manipulated.
  • the system includes an Activity Register 115 which securely stores said gaming events linked among them, and a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming a Player Agent 101 through which at least one of said players participates in said game.
  • the recommended system also includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming an Access Control Agent 105 which allows an Access Control Authority to verify said players via their credentials.
  • the preferred system includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming a Certification Agent 103 through which a Certification Authority issues and distributes authentication credentials available to at least one of said players.
  • the preferred system also includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming a Virtual Gaming Table 113, intended to centralise and distribute said gaming events among said players who have been verified by said Access Control Agent 105.
  • the invention also includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming an Audit Agent 111 whereby said Audit Authority verifies the honesty of the game by checking the gaming events, which are recorded in said Activity Register 115.
  • the preferred system also includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming a Bank Agent 123, through which a Trustworthy Entity, such as a Casino Bank or a Financial Entity, creates and provides, to at least one of said players, a proof of the credit available to said at least one player to take part in the game.
  • a Trustworthy Entity such as a Casino Bank or a Financial Entity
  • the recommended invention also includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming an Impartial Agent 107.
  • said Impartial Agent 107 makes said Player Agent 101 available to the players.
  • said Impartial Agent 107 generates gaming events such as a roulette wheel position, a card in a pack, or the face of a die.
  • the preferred system also includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms forming a Croupier Agent 109, intended to perform the actions corresponding to a Croupier in a casino game.
  • a distinctive aspect of the invention consists in using a data chain whereby said events are linked together securely, where each link in said data chain is composed of a first part describing one of said events, and a second part which is a digest calculated with a cryptographic hash function of said first part of said chain and the second part of at least a previous link of said data chain.
  • the authenticity of said second part of each link is guaranteed by a digital signature generated with the private component of at least one pair of asymmetric keys belonging to the author of said link, who can be said Player Agent 101, said Access Control Agent 105, a Certification Agent 103, an Audit Agent 111, a Bank Agent 123, an Impartial Agent 107, or a Croupier Agent 109.
  • the essence of games of chance is to obtain at least one event (a roulette position, a card in a pack, the face of a die, etc.) in a random way, determining the game result using at least this event.
  • the events are obtained by means of a roulette wheel, a pack of cards, or dice for example.
  • the honesty of the game depends directly on these elements, and how they are manipulated. For this reason, the games of chance regulators order specifications or a regulation which must be fulfilled by the game elements. An auditing company usually reviews and certifies these elements to ensure they are compliant with the regulation.
  • This regulation and certification of the game elements protects players against possible manipulations. As well as these measures, the players see these elements during the game. This visual contact, and in some cases the physical contact too, gives the players confidence as to the honesty of the game and, if during the game, they detect any irregular action they can report it. The rest of the players can help to solve the player's doubts, and if the casino has a video recording system that registers the game, this recording can solve any possible disputes.
  • a game hand is the set of actions take by the players and the croupier in a game of cards to obtain the final result of the game. Said result and actions depend on each specific game.
  • a game throw is the set of actions taken by the players and the croupier to obtain the game result, which is based on obtaining a single random value.
  • This game throw group includes the roulette wheel, dice and fruit machines.
  • dice or fruit machines the player wins if the result has a predetermined prize assigned.
  • a game is a set of game hands, or game throws, performed by the player at a gaming table.
  • a player's game begins when he joins the gaming table, and ends when he leaves-it.
  • a player's credit is the maximum amount of money that the player can bet at a gaming table. In order to be able to play at a table, a player must have a minimum credit amount. Each player, independently, must be able to check that any other player can cover the bets he/she is making with his/her credit.
  • Player Agent 101 In order to participate in the game over a communications network, the players need a set of programs and/or implementing platforms.
  • this set of programs will be called Player Agent 101, which can be an application able to establish remote secure connections, or a Plug-In for the player's Internet browser.
  • the implementing platform allows the Player Agent 101 to be deployed, and is able to connect to a communication network.
  • the implementing platform can be a PC, a digital personal assistant, or a mobile telephone terminal, for example.
  • the Player Agent 101 In order to guarantee a better player security, the Player Agent 101 must be audited and certified by a trusted Audit Authority.
  • each player has a pair of asymmetric keys indicated as (P j , S j ).
  • the Player Agent 101 has access to this player pair of keys with the prior consent of said player.
  • the players In most cases, in order to access a conventional casino, the players show an identification card which has been issued by the government of the player's country. However, in a remote gaming system, it is difficult for the player to show his/her conventional credentials for them to be validated. These credentials are a digital certificate of a pair of keys of the player. If the player does not have a digital certificate, this invention includes a set of programs and/or implementing platforms called Certification Agent 103, for creating and providing these credentials with which the players can identify themselves remotely. The Certification Agent 103 is controlled by a Certification Authority which is responsible for ensuring the validity of the data provided by the player.
  • the Certification Authority has an asymmetric key pair referenced as (P R , S R ).
  • the Certification Agent 103 has access to this key pair corresponding to the Certification Authority, with the prior consent of said Certification Authority.
  • the functions controlling access to the remote gaming system are performed by a set of programs and/or implementing platforms called Access Control Agent 105.
  • Said Access Control Agent 105 validates the credentials issued by the Certification Authority.
  • the Access Control Agent has a pair of asymmetric keys referenced as (P E ,S E ), and the Access Control Agent 105 uses said pair of keys with the prior consent of said Access Control Authority.
  • the gaming regulation authorities do not participate in the game, but specify the requirements that must be fulfilled by the elements used in the game, who can access the game, the economics aspects of the game, the conditions that the game facilities must fulfil, etc.
  • the same control actions must be implemented over a communication network.
  • This invention considers the possibility of an Impartial Entity having a set of programs and/or implementing platforms so that it can take a more active part in the remote game, for example by generating the game events or by making the Player Agent 101 available to the players.
  • the term Impartial Agent 107 will be applied to this set of programs that preferably form an application that can provide a secure remote connection.
  • the associated implementing platform allows the Impartial Agent 107 to be implemented.
  • This implementing platform can be a computer, or a secure tamperproof module that can internally execute applications, such as Hardware Secure Module (HSM) nShield by the manufacturer of nCipher [http://www.ncipher.com/nshield, 16/06/2003].
  • HSM Hardware Secure Module
  • the Impartial Entity has a pair of asymmetric keys referenced as (P l ,S l ), which is used by the Impartial Agent 107 with the prior consent of the Impartial Entity.
  • the players play against the casino, and the croupier represents the casino at the gaming table and controls the development of the game.
  • the Croupier is just one more player playing on behalf of the casino.
  • CroupierAgent 109 the functions of the croupier can be automated by means of associated communication means and/or programs.
  • this set will be called CroupierAgent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 has a pair of asymmetric keys referenced as (P C , S C ).
  • the Impartial Agent 107 implements a cryptographic protocol to generate impartial game events, in combination with the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Impartial Agent 107 generates impartial game events.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 implements a cryptographic protocol to generate impartial game events, in combination with the Player Agent 101.
  • pseudo random values are obtained.
  • PRNG pseudo random number generation routines
  • Said routines use an initial value called a seed to generate a sequence of unpredictable values.
  • all the random number generation operations in this invention will use natural noise sources to obtain the seeds. Examples of said sources can be mouse movement or keyboard pulses made by the players, or the use of a device designed especially for this purpose.
  • pseudo random generators feature in [FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, http:/csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-2.htm, April 2003], [Appendix 3 of FIPS PUB 186: Digital Signature Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips 186-2/fips 186-2-change1.pdf , April 2003] and [RFC 1750: Randomness Recommendations for Security. http://www.ietf.org/rfclrfc1750.txt, April 2003].
  • the game elements in a conventional game are examined by an independent auditing company.
  • This auditing company checks that the elements comply with legislation. Once the auditing has been done, and it is satisfactory, the elements are certified. Before beginning the game, the participants can verify the certification of the game's elements, so that they are certain that said elements have not been altered after their certification, and do not tend to favour any party in particular.
  • an Audit Authority uses associated computer and/or program means called Audit Agent 111.
  • the Audit Authority uses the Audit Agent 111, checks and certifies the gaming system elements, and revises those gaming events that have been stored in a Database (BD) in the gaming system.
  • BD Database
  • the game elements are a set of programs and/or implementing platforms.
  • the certification of these elements depends on whether they are computer programs or implementing platforms.
  • the certification of a computer program consists on digitally signing the computer program with an Audit Authority pair of asymmetric keys, and represented as (P A ,S A ).
  • the public component P A of this pair of keys can be certified by a recognised Certification Authority, such as for example Verisign [www.verisign.com, 2003]. This public component is available to any party interested in validating the certification of the computer program.
  • the implementing platforms are certified by means of a physical seal that guarantees that they have not been altered after auditing.
  • the Gaming Table in a traditional casino is the place where the players and the croupier come together to develop the game.
  • the term Virtual Gaming Table 113 is given to a set of programs and/or implementing platforms that centralise, and distribute the messages generated by the players during the game. For example, when a player wants a card, the Player Agent 101 makes the request to the Virtual Gaming Table 113, which makes available said request to the other Player Agents 101.
  • a player can choose whether he wants to play just with the croupier, without any other player being able to access the Virtual Gaming Table 113, or whether he wants to join a Virtual Gaming Table 113 where there are several players.
  • the Virtual Gaming Table 113 is called a private Virtual Gaming Table 113
  • the second alternative it is called a shared Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • the known remote gaming systems store some of the gaming event in a BD, so that this information can be used in a remote gaming system audit.
  • the BD control by the BD administrator or an attacking external party could modify the data.
  • the Auditor must be certain that the data from a registered player have not been modified, and that the action sequence is correct. If the data in the BD are altered, an inconsistency should be revealed which clearly indicates that the data have been modified.
  • a typical aspect of this invention is the fact that the players' transactions during a game are stored in an Activity Register 115, said transactions being linked together securely. More particularly, said transactions are represented by the Player Agent 101 as a link in a DNC chain.
  • said transactions are represented by the Player Agent 101 as a link in a DNC chain.
  • the data field D k _ usually describes an action performed by the player, although it can also be a step in a game protocol carried out by the Player Agent 101 with other Agents.
  • a DNC chain corresponds to each game.
  • the set of DNC chains are stored in a BD called the Activity Register 115.
  • the Audit Authority and the Audit Agent 111 access the Activity Register 115 and can audit the games that have been played and all the events carried out during said games. These data can also be used for auditing the economic balances of the participants in the game.
  • the Bank Agent 123 (which is described later) accesses the Activity Register 115 to calculate a player's winnings in a game.
  • the information generated during the game is not the only data required for a complete audit, since it is also important to know who accesses the casino, the monetary transactions carried out by the players and their complaints in the event they raise a complaint.
  • the monetary transactions carried out by each player are also kept in the form of a DNC chain.
  • This chain is built by the Player Agent 101 and the Bank Agent 123, and it is similar to a bank cash book because it shows the player's credit and all his/her monetary transactions but without it being possible to alter them.
  • This chain is called the Monetary Register 117 and belongs to the player and the Bank Agent 123.
  • the data field of the DNC chain indicates whether the operation is a payment or a withdrawal, and links the operation to the reason for carrying out it.
  • the concept includes the following data:
  • This incident is a link in another DNC chain which is stored in a BD and which is called Incident Register 119. Evidence is attached to the link data field to show that an abnormal situation has really occurred.
  • the bank functions are carried out by a set of programs and/or implementing platforms called Bank Agent 123.
  • the Bank Agent 123 is managed by a Trustworthy Entity, such as the bank of an online casino, or a financial entity.
  • the Bank Agent 123 provides evidence of the credit available to the player, which is made accessible to the other players so that they can know the credit level of the new player, and it is also stored in the Activity Register 115. Once a player leaves a Virtual Gaming Table 113, the Bank Agent 123 updates this player's credit by revising the Activity Register 115. Said Activity Register 115 indicates the initial amount that was available to the player and all his/her bets with the subsequent winnings or losses.
  • the Bank Agent has a pair of certified asymmetric keys, represented as ( P E , S E ). Preferably these keys are certified by a recognised certification authority.
  • the players know the credit level of the other players according to the value of the chips the other players have on the table.
  • the players know that the player placing the bet covers his/her bet because they can see the chips.
  • the digital chips should have similar properties to digital money.
  • Okamoto and Ohta T Okamoto and K. Ohta, Universal Electronic Cash, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Of Crypt'91, LNCS 576. pp. 324-337, Springer-Verlag, 1992] describe said problems and propose a complete solution.
  • the proposed solution has a high computational cost and the party acting as bank needs to participate in each monetary transaction between the players.
  • Player's Credit In order to know the credit available to each play in a game, a proof of credit is used, called Player's Credit.
  • the Player Agent 101 requests an amount from the Bank Agent 123. If the requested credit is available to the player, the Bank Agent 123 issues the corresponding Player's Credit. Said Player's Credit is valid for one single Virtual Gaming Table 113, and can only be used once.
  • the Player's Credit has a unique serial number and is linked to an instant in the game.
  • S J () is the encryption made with the private key of the player who makes the request for the Player's Credit.
  • T K is the instant of time when the player requests to enter the Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • C K is a description indicating that the player wants to join the Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • the description C K contains the identifier of the Virtual Gaming Table 113 Id M , and the last entry of the Activity Register 115 M k .
  • V k is the value corresponding to the credit which the player wants to have available for joining the Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • S B () is the encryption made with the private key of the Bank.
  • T K is the instant the credit is issued.
  • C K is the description indicating the table, the point that the player requests joining, the player's request Q K , and the serial number of the credit issued.
  • V K is the credit available to the player in the Virtual Gaming Table 113. The Bank makes this Player's Credit available to the Player Agent 101 and to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • this invention provides a set of programs and/or implementing platforms, preferably secure against evidence of manipulation, forming an Impartial Agent 107.
  • said Impartial Entity makes the Player Agent 101 available to said players by means of said Impartial Agent 107. Downloading the Player Agent 101 from a trustworthy place would be equivalent to opening a new pack of cards in front of the player.
  • the Impartial Agent 107 can generate gaming events, or participate with the Croupier Agent 109 in obtaining the gaming events by means of a combined generation cryptographic protocol of gaming events.
  • the players must have credentials with which to identify themselves in a remote way. If the players do not have these credentials, they must be issued by the Certification Authority with the Certification Agent.
  • the Certification Agent 103 receives the requests for credentials, and issues the credentials once the Certification Authority has validated the requests.
  • the players requests for the credentials by means of the Player Agent 101, and therefore the first step the players take is to download the Player Agent 101.
  • the Player Agent 101 is downloaded from the Impartial Agent 107, by means of a secure connection such as SSL, TLS, or WTLS in the case of mobile telephones.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes these player's details accessible to the Certification Agent 103, preferably by using a secure communication protocol, such as the above mentioned SSL, TLS or WTLS. If it is not possible to use a secure communication protocol, the privacy of the player's details can be protected by means of a digital envelope, as detailed below.
  • the digital envelope is generated with the Certification Authority's public key P R .
  • the details provided by the player in the credentials request are at least one of the following: name, surname, date of birth, parents name, place of birth, personal address, number of national identity documentation, social security number, telephone number, and e-mail address.
  • the identification credentials are digital certificates of a players' key pair. If the player does not have an asymmetric key pair, the Player Agent 101 generates an asymmetric key pair called (P J , S J ).
  • the private component S J is encrypted with a symmetric cryptosystem using a high entropy password. This protection prevents anybody, except the player, from being able to use it.
  • Some examples of symmetric cryptosystems are the old encrypting standard DES [National Bureau of Standards, NBS FIPS PUB 46-1, Data Encryption Standard U.S. Department of Commerce, January 1988], triple DES [ANSI X9.17 (Revised), American National Standard for Financial Institution Key Management (Wholesale), American Bankers Association, 1985], or Rijndael [Daemen, J.
  • the player can provide to the Certification Authority a secure copy of the encrypted key, with the certainty that nobody will have access to it because the password is only known by the player.
  • the Player Agent 101 With these player's details and the public component P J of his/her key pair , the Player Agent 101 generates a certificate request, which is sent to the Certification Agent 103. Said Certification Agent 103 stores the certificate requests until the Certification Authority has verified the details provided by the players. These details are verified by accessing an official BD, such as the police BD, and also optionally the player has to attend in person to submit his/her documentation. If the details are correct, the Certification Authority issues the digital certificate of the player public key, by means of the Certification Agent 103.
  • an official BD such as the police BD
  • the player can only use this pair of keys in the remote gaming system, or in a more secure implementation, he/she can create a pair of keys for each of the following functions:
  • Authenticating the players is a necessary step, because only the players who are registered can participate in the game. With this measure access to the game is denied to the players belonging to the above-mentioned restricted groups (underage players, dishonest players, or players from other areas).
  • the Access Control Agent 105 puts the authenticated players in contact and allows them to see existing Virtual Gaming Tables 113, and create new ones.
  • the player is authenticated in the Access Control Agent 105 by means of a strong authentication cryptographic protocol.
  • strong authentication protocols are included in the standard ISOIIEC 9594-8 (X.509)[ISO/IEC 9594-8 "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Overview of concepts, models, and services", International Organisation for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1995 (equivalent to ITU-T Rec. X.509, 1993)]. These protocols allow bilateral authentication of the two parts, with the optional exchange of keys. The term strong is used here to distinguish this authentication from the simpler version based on a password.
  • the Player Agent 101 uses the player's asymmetric key pair and the Access Control Agent 105 uses the asymmetric key pair corresponding to the Access Control Authority.
  • the Player Agent 101 uses the pair of keys ( P J , S J )
  • P A J , S A J ) the pair of Authenticating Keys
  • a player In a traditional casino, in order to participate in a game developing at a Gaming Table, a player must exchange his legal currency into chips.
  • the players obtain a Player's Credit for a Virtual Gaming Table 113, which is issued by the Trustworthy Entity.
  • the player must have opened an account with the Trustworthy Entity holding enough money to play, and when the player makes a request by means of the Player Agent 101, the Trustworthy Entity issues the Player's Credit.
  • the Player's Credit request is signed by the Player Agent 101 with the pair of keys corresponding to the player. If the pair of keys is duly certified and the private component is suitably protected, the digital signature can be legally binding, and afterwards the player cannot renounce the request. In addition, the digital signature also prevents the request amount from being modified.
  • the Player's Credit is included in the Monetary Register 117 and the Activity Register 115.
  • the Monetary Register 117 it is possible to have control over all the player's monetary transactions, and by being included in the Activity Register 115 it is possible for the other participants in the game to know the credit available for the player.
  • the number of Gaming Tables is limited, and in some cases the players must wait to join one of them.
  • the number of Virtual Gaming Tables 113 can vary according to the number of players and, as mentioned earlier, the player can choose whether he/she wants to play alone (Private Virtual Gaming Table 113), or with other players (Public Virtual Gaming Table 113).
  • the players can allow access only to the players who they want to join the game.
  • a player wants to create a new Virtual Gaming Table 113, he makes a request C K to the Access Control Agent 105 by means of the Player Agent 101.
  • the request C K details the type of Virtual Gaming Table 113 (public or private), the game in which the player wishes to play, and if he/she wants a Croupier Agent 109 to control the game.
  • the Access Control Agent 105 creates an identifier Id M for the Virtual Gaming Table 113, which enables a subsequent control of the Virtual Gaming Tables 113. It assigns the created identifier (Id M ) to an instance of the Virtual Gaming Table 113, and if the request indicates that a Croupier Agent 109 controls the game, the Access Control Agent 105 obtains an instance from the Croupier Agent 109 associated with the Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • the Access Control Agent 105 creates the game's DNC chain, where the data field of the first link contains the request N K to create the Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • the players cannot join the game whenever they want, as the game has certain rules and a player only can join at a point permitted by the game.
  • a player can request to join a Virtual Gaming Table 113 at any time, but he/she will only be admitted once the throw or game hand in progress at that time is finished.
  • the player's game begins at the instant said player joins a Virtual Gaming Table 113 .
  • the Player Agent 101 obtains the identifier Id M of the Virtual Gaming Table 113, and the last gaming entry of the Virtual Gaming Table 113. It requests a Player's Credit from the Bank Agent 123, for the Virtual Gaming Table 113, at a point in the game.
  • the Player Agent 101 creates a pair of game keys (P P J , S P J ) , and certifies the public component with the private component of its pair of keys (P J , S J ) . Finally, the Player Agent 101 makes the Player's Credit available to the Virtual Gaming Table 113 and if a pair of game keys has been created it also makes the certificate of said pair of keys available.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 or the Player Agent 101 performs the function of croupier, checks the Player's Credits and the player's certificates, and makes a new entry in the game's DNC chain.
  • the data field contains the players joining the Virtual Gaming Table 113, their Player's Credits and their corresponding certificates.
  • casino type games have a common denominator which is the stages of the game: Start of Throw or Game Hand 401, Bets 403, Generation of impartial Game Events 405, and End of Throw or Game Hand 407.
  • stages of the game involve one, or several new links in the game's DNC chain.
  • These stages are detailed below as well as the links in the game's DNC chain implemented by the Player Agent 101 and/or the Croupier Agent 109, depending on the system proposed.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 or the Player Agent 101 performing this role, marks the Start of the Throw or Game Hand 401, and with this, marks the end of the players' entry.
  • the players can join the Virtual Gaming Table 113 in the period between the end and the beginning of the game hand or throw.
  • the data field of the link in the game's chain indicates that a new game hand has started. All the players know or can know the other participants in the game, and their credit.
  • each bet constitutes a link in the DNC chain, and therefore it is signed with the pair of keys corresponding to the player, and it is made available to the other members of the Virtual Gaming Table 113, in other words, the bet cannot be rejected, or modified.
  • the Player Agent 101 builds a link in the DNC chain, indicating in the data field the particular type of bet, and its value.
  • the bets 403 can be made in parallel by all the players, because a sequential order is not necessary. This operation implies expanding the game's DNC chain.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 or the Player Agent 101 performing the croupier functions, accepts the valid bets 403 with a new link in the game's DNC chain.
  • the data field includes an operation code indicating the end of the bets 403 and the starting of the game.
  • the game's DNC chain contracts at this point. With this measure, all the players can see the bets 403 placed, and they cannot modify them.
  • a bet is valid if it complies with the game rules, and the player has credit available to cover said bet.
  • casino games can be divided into the following groups: throwing games, uncovered card games and covered card games. In the first group we find roulette and dice. A typical example of the second group is Black Jack, while an important example of the third group is Poker.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 applies a cryptographic protocol for the Impartial Generation of Game Events 405, together with the Impartial Agent 107.
  • the embodiments use a commitment cryptographic protocol as a basic tool.
  • a first commitment protocol was introduced by Blum in 1982 [Blum M., Coin flipping by telephone: a protocol for solving impossible problems, Proc. IEEE Computer Conference, pages 133-137, IEEE, 1982].
  • a commitment protocol Cp is made up of two phases; a commitment phase followed by a commitment release phase.
  • the procedure can be described with the following physical example: In the first phase each participant places certain information in a box, which he locks and hands to the rest of the participants. In the second phase, he delivers the key for opening the box and recovering the information inside the initial box. The commitment verifiers cannot know anything about X from T , and the committed information X cannot be altered by its owner between the first and second stages.
  • a general overview of the state of the art related to commitment protocols can be found in [Schneier B., Applied Cryptography Second Edition: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996].
  • the player places a bet A by means of his/her Player Agent 101.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes this accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • Said Croupier Agent 109 obtains a value V 1 in a random manner from which the result of the game is derived, and makes V 1 accessible to the Player Agent 101.
  • Said first embodiment of the first option is securer if, in addition, the following steps are taken:
  • the player places a bet A by means of the Player Agent 101.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes T 1 accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes T 1 and T 2 accessible to the Impartial Agent 107.
  • the Impartial Agent 107 makes V 2 and X 1 accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes V 1 , V 2 and X 1 accessible to the Player Agent 101.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes A accessible to the Croupier Agent 109. In this instant, the Croupier Agent 109 and the Player Agent 101 obtains said game event from V 1 and V 2 .
  • the Player Agent 101 makes available a player's request to obtain a game event.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes T 1 accessible to the Player Agent 101 and to the Impartial Agent.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes a player's bet A accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Impartial Agent 107 makes V 2 and X 1 accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes V 1 , T 1 , V 2 and X 1 accessible to the Player Agent 101.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 and the Player Agent 101 obtain said game event from V 1 and V 2 .
  • the Player Agent 101 makes a player's bet A accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes T1 and A accessible to the Impartial Agent 107.
  • the Impartial Agent 107 makes V 2 and X 1 accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes V 1 , V 2 , T 1 and X 1 available to the Player Agent 101.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 and the Player Agent 101 obtain said game event from V 1 and V 2 .
  • the player places a bet A by means of the Player Agent 101.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes T 1 accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes T 2 accessible to the Player Agent 101.
  • the Player Agent 101 makes A accessible to the Croupier Agent 109, which makes A and T 2 accessible to the Impartial Agent 107.
  • the Impartial Agent 107 makes V 2 and X 1 accessible to the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 makes V 1 , V 2 , and X 1 available to the Player Agent 101.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 and the Player Agent 101 obtain said game event from V 1 and V 2 .
  • the Impartial Agent 107 generates impartial game events. These events are impartially generated by means of a PRGN such as the ones described above.
  • the Impartial Agent attaches the digital signature of the game event. The digital signature is generated with the private component SI of the pair of keys of the Impartial Authority (PI, SI).
  • the Impartial Agent attaches the result of applying a keyed digest function to the game event. The key used is kept in secret and only the Player Agent 101 and the Impartial Agent possess it.
  • MAC The keyed digest functions are typically called MAC, the document [Menezes, A.J., Oorschot, P.C., Vanstone, S.A., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997] contains a detailed description of their different variants and properties.
  • the Player Agent 101 implements a cryptographic protocol for the Impartial Generation of Game Events 405, together with the Croupier Agent 109.
  • the Player Agent 101 and the Croupier Agent 109 carry out one of the protocols described in the International application [PCT/ES02/00485].
  • the Player Agent 101 and the Croupier Agent 109 carry out one of the protocols described in the Patent of Invention US 6.264.557.
  • the Player Agent 101 and the Croupier Agent 109 carry out one of the protocols described in the Patent of Invention US 6.165.072.
  • the messages sent between the Player Agents 101 and/or the Croupier Agent 109 during the cryptographic protocol of the game are links in the game's DNC chain.
  • the end of a time period set by the Croupier Agent 109, or the Player Agent 101 performing the croupier's functions, indicates the throw or game hand to be completed, with a new entry that contracts the game's DNC chain. At this point, the time period begins when the player can join or leave a Virtual Gaming Table113.
  • the Player Agent 101 When a player leaves a Virtual Gaming Table 113, he/she ends his/her game and collects his/her winnings. The players can only leave the Virtual Gaming Table 113 once the game hand or throw has been completed, and if they leave the table beforehand, without justification, they can be fined.
  • the Player Agent 101 performs the following actions: It builds a link in the chain with the data field indicating that the player wishes to abandon the Virtual Gaming Table 113. At this point, the DNC chain is expanded, because all the players can perform this operation at the same time.
  • the Croupier Agent 109 or the Player Agent 101 performing the croupier's functions, creates a new link in the game's DNC chain, and the chain contracts.
  • the chain's data field shows the player joins and exits in the Virtual Gaming Table 113.
  • the Player Agent 101 asks the Bank Agent 123 to pay the winnings.
  • the Bank Agent 123 accesses the Activity Register 115 and according to the Player's Credit and the bets of said player, calculates the player's winnings.
  • the Bank Agent 123 builds a link in the DNC chain of the Monetary Register 117, indicating in the data field that the payment is from a particular game, the amount to be paid, the Virtual Gaming Table 113, and a cryptographic summary of the game played. If the Player Agent 101 agrees with the link in the chain of the Monetary Register 117, it accepts the link, and if not, it makes a complaint that is stored in the Incidents Register 119.
  • Game Agents Some of the Agents described above can be grouped together forming a unit of more complex programs and/or platforms called Game Agents, and which is similar to online casinos currently in existence.
  • a first group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Bank Agent 123, and a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113.
  • a second group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Bank Agent 123, a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113, and the Certification Agent 103.
  • a third group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105 and a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113.
  • a fourth group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Certification Agent 103, and a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113.
  • a fifth group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Bank Agent 123, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109 and a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113.
  • a sixth group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Bank Agent 123, a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109, and the Certification Agent 103.
  • a seventh group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109, and a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113.
  • An eighth group forming a Game Agent is built by means of the Access Control Agent 105, the Certification Agent 103, a plurality of Croupier Agents 109 and a plurality of Virtual Gaming Tables 113.
  • any of the above-mentioned groups can include a filtering system of remote access ports, typically called a firewall, and an intrusion detection system.
  • the intrusion detection system monitors the system to detect possible non-authorised access, and registers the suspicious action taking place. By virtue of this registered information, measures can be adopted to eliminate the system weakness.

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  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Slot Machines And Peripheral Devices (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
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US6030288A (en) * 1997-09-02 2000-02-29 Quixotic Solutions Inc. Apparatus and process for verifying honest gaming transactions over a communications network
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AU2001294291A1 (en) * 2000-09-26 2002-04-08 Ezlotto Co., Ltd. Immediate lottery processing system via internet and method therefor

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