EP1642205A1 - Authentifizierung zum zulassen von teilnehmern in ein netzwerk - Google Patents
Authentifizierung zum zulassen von teilnehmern in ein netzwerkInfo
- Publication number
- EP1642205A1 EP1642205A1 EP03818018A EP03818018A EP1642205A1 EP 1642205 A1 EP1642205 A1 EP 1642205A1 EP 03818018 A EP03818018 A EP 03818018A EP 03818018 A EP03818018 A EP 03818018A EP 1642205 A1 EP1642205 A1 EP 1642205A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- value
- recited
- network
- authenticating
- admitting
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/16—Obfuscation or hiding, e.g. involving white box
Definitions
- This application is related to the field of secure networks and more specifically to apparatus for authenticating and admitting parties to a secure network configuration.
- Background Of The Invention [0002] Since the introduction of the public network, such as the Internet, many businesses have changed their mode of operation considerably. Manufacturers and retailers, through the use of interactive dialogue pages, allow their consumers to buy products directly, using a conventional credit card. In this case, security of the credit card information is important to prevent theft of the credit card information and fraud. Conventionally, credit card information is transmitted over a secure socket layer (SSL) that encrypts the information using well-known encryption algorithms, such as RSA and digital certificates.
- SSL secure socket layer
- RSA refers to an encryption algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman that generates public key and private key information based on the mathematics of large prime numbers.
- each party generates a public/private key combination pair and makes the public key available to all other parties.
- a first party may then encrypt information items using another party's public key and another party may decrypt the information item using the corresponding private key.
- a party may digitally sign a document by encrypting information items using their private key and only another party having access to the corresponding public key is able decrypt the encrypted information.
- public/private encryption algorithms information items can be securely transmitted over networks while providing a level of assurance that the parties are authorized to transmit or receive the information items.
- Video conferencing is an example wherein secure communications among the parties is particularly important.
- each party may "sign-on" to the video conference using either a provided public key or by using their private key. The conference may then proceed as each party is able to participate in the conference.
- encryption codes may be compromised, cracked or hacked and the authentication of the parties network may be suspect and the information transmitted over the network could become available to parties that are not authorized to receive such information. The release of this information may cause significant social and/or economic damage.
- a system and device for authenticating and admitting parties located at remote sites to a secure communication network, wherein each remote site includes a device operable to execute code for determining a first authenticating value received from a second site, which is blinded with a value associated with the remote site, encrypting and transmitting the determined value and decrypting a second authenticating value and validating the transmitting site when the unblinded first authenticating value is equivalent to the second authenticating value.
- the transmitting site includes a devices operable to execute code for generating and transmitting a first authenticating value blinded by a value associated with a remote site, decrypting a value and validating the remote site when the authenticating value is equivalent to the decrypted received value.
- Figure 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system utilizing the principles of the invention for authenticating parties to a transaction
- Figure 2 illustrates a flow chart of a first process for authenticating parties in accordance with the principles of the invention
- Figure 3 illustrates a flow chart of a second process for authenticating parties to a transaction in accordance with the principles of the invention
- Figure 4 illustrates a flow chart of a process for admitting parties to a transaction in accordance with the principles of the invention
- Figure 5 illustrates a flow chart of a second process for admitting parties to a transaction in accordance with the principles of the invention
- Figure 6 illustrates the interactive communication between server and site for authenticating and establishing a link between parties in accordance with the principles of the invention
- Figure 7 illustrates a device for executing the processing shown in Figures 2 through 6.
- Figure 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system 100 for requiring a secure communication link among a plurality of available remote sites over a network in accordance with the principles of the invention.
- server 110 is in communication, via network 150, to remote sites 115, 120, 125, 130 and 135.
- Protocols e.g., TCP/IP, that provide for two-way communications over network 150 are well-known in the art and need not be discussed in detail herein.
- Server 110 further includes information, such as a value, code or label, that uniquely identifies each remote site. That is, each remote site is registered with server 110. For example, site 115 may be identified, associated or registered with a unique value, code or label, which in this case is depicted as "Identification No. 1.” Further, site 120 may be identified, associated or registered with a value, code or label unique to site 120. In this case, site 120 is depicted as being uniquely identified by the label "Identification No. 2.” Similarly, site 135 may be identified, associated or registered with a unique value, code or label, which is depicted as "Identification No. 5.” Similar identifications are made for remote sites 125 and 130.
- information such as a value, code or label
- each associated identification value, code or label may be an arbitrarily selected value or combination of alpha-numeric values.
- each associated identification value, code or label may be selected to include known properties, e.g., a prime number of a known order or size.
- Server 110 may generate and maintain each unique value associated with each remote site and provide this information to the associated remote site. In another aspect, server 110 may be provided each unique value by the corresponding remote site. In either aspect of the invention, knowledge of the unique remote site code is retained by server 110 and the associated remote site only.
- server 110 includes a public key/private key encryption algorithm, e.g., RSA.
- a common server public key may be distributed to each of the remote sites.
- server 110 may generate and associate a public key/private key for each remote site. In this aspect, the remote site is provided an individualized server public key.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a flow chart of an exemplary process 200 maintained on server 110 for authenticating parties to a secure transaction or communication in accordance with the principles of the invention. For the sake of clarity, the novel aspects of the invention are now described with regard to a conference invitor and a conference invitee.
- server 110 responsive to a request to establish a secure communication between invitor, e.g., remote site 120 from Figure 1, and invitee, e.g., remote site 130, generates a random number for each party at block 205.
- the generated random numbers are encrypted, warped or blinded using the unique identification value associated with the sites at block 210.
- the generated random numbers are blinded using the following relation: R_ex ⁇ l XOR ID a ; and R_exp2 XOR IDb [1] where R_expl and R_exp2 are the two generated random numbers; ID a is the unique value associated with a first site; ID b is the unique value associated with a second site; and XOR is a conventional Boolean Logical function.
- the two blinded values are then encrypted using the private key associated with server 110. That is, server 110 encrypt, or scramble, the blinded values. As would be understood by those skilled in the art, the process of encrypting a value obscures or scrambles the value in a manner that render the value unintelligible, unclear or in near of translation by those not in possession of a comparable decrypting process.
- the encrypted blinded values are transmitted over network 150, shown in Figure 1.
- server 110 waits for a response from the remote sites. When a response is detected, the received message is decrypted using the private key of server 110 at block 230.
- a list of encryption algorithms available to each party is obtained at block 260.
- server 110 acknowledges that a secure connection between the parties is established and an encryption algorithm is selected.
- the encryption algorithm is present is present in at each party site.
- each party may provide a list of available encryption algorithms, from which server 110 may select comparable algorithms.
- server 110 may provide each party with a suitable encryption algorithm.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a flow chart of a process 300 operable on a remote site for authenticating the parties and establishing a secure communication link between the parties.
- a remote site e.g., site 130
- the message is decrypted using the public key of server 110.
- the decrypted message is then unblinded using the unique identification code associated with each remote site.
- the remote site having knowledge of the associated identification value, code or label is able to correctly determine the generated random number.
- the unblinded random number is then encrypted using the public key of server 110 and transmitted over the network at block 330.
- the remote site awaits a response from server 110.
- server 110 receives random numbers generated from each remote site capable of being authenticated, i.e., successfully complete the processing shown in Figures 2 and 3.
- the random numbers are arbitrarily generated. Preferably, there is no correlation between the random numbers generated.
- the random numbers may be received in an encrypted or scrambled form using a public key and may require decryption using a local key prior to subsequent usage.
- server 110 blinds the received random numbers using each of the unique remote site identification numbers.
- the random numbers are blinded using the logical function shown as: R_sitel XOR _D 2 ; and R_site2 XOR ID t [3] where R_sitel is the random numbers generated by a first site; R_site2 is the random numbers generated by a second site; ID a is the unique value associated with a first site; ID b is the unique value associated with a second site; and XOR is a conventional Boolean Logical function.
- the blinded values are then transmitted to the respective remote sites such that each remote site receives the blinded random number of another remote site.
- the random numbers are blinded using the logical function shown as: R_sitel XOR R_site2 [4]
- FIG. 5 illustrates a flow chart of an exemplary process 500 performed at each remote site for admitting authenticated parties to a secure network configuration.
- a random number is generated at block 510.
- the generated random number is encrypted using server 110 public key and transmitted over the network at block 520.
- the remote site waits for a response from server 110.
- the received value is unblinded.
- equation 3 a process similar to that shown in equation 2 may be used to unblind the values.
- the values may be unblinded in accordance with: ⁇ [a XOR b] XOR b ⁇ [5] where a is representative of a random value of one site; and b is representative of a random value of another site
- each remote site possesses the random number generated by another remote site.
- an encryption key is formulated using the random numbers generated by each site conforming to the selected encryption algorithm.
- the blinded value received may further be encrypted using a private key.
- the received values are decrypted using a provided corresponding public key.
- the order of processing blinding and encryption information may be interchanged without affecting the scope of the invention.
- Figure 6 depicts a chronological sequence 600 of the transfer of information between a party requesting a conference, referred to as client 1, 610, and server 615 and an invitee to the conference, referred to as client 2, 620.
- client 1, 610 sends a request, 630, for a conference with invitee 620 to server 615.
- Server 610 transmits to client 1, 610 and client 2, 620, encrypts blinded random values, R_expl, i.e., E kr (R_expl XOR ID1) and R_exp2, i.e., E kr (R_exp2 XOR ID2), respectively.
- Client 1, 610 and client 2, 620 transmit to server 615 encrypted values representative of R_expl, i.e., E ⁇ _ u (R_expl), and R_exp2, i.e., E k _(R_exp2), respectively.
- Server 620 then transmits to client 1, 610 and client 2, 620, digitally signed, encrypted random values R_expl and R_exp2, i.e., E k r(R_expl ) and Ek_(R_exp2), respectively.
- Client 1 , 610 and client 2, 620 after successfully decrypting the transmitted values, then transmit and acknowledge a list of encryption algorithms, i.e., cipher suite, to server 615.
- Server 615 then provides an indication that a connection between the parties has been established and selects a cipher to secure the communications between the parties.
- Client 1, 610 and client 2, 620 in one aspect of the invention may then generate random values, Randl and Rand2, respectively, and transmit encrypted versions of Randl and Rand 2 to server 615.
- Server 615 then transmits digitally signed blinded value, Ei ⁇ Randl XOR Rand2) to both client 1, 610 and client 2, 620.
- Client 1, 610 and client 2, 620 may then use a known combination of Randl and Rand2 to form a session key suitable for the selected cipher.
- Figure 7 illustrates a system 700 for implementing the principles of the invention as depicted in the exemplary processing shown in Figures 1 and 2.
- input data is received from sources 705 over network 750 and is processed in accordance with one or more software programs executed by processing system 710.
- Processor 710 may be representative of a handheld calculator, special purpose or general purpose processing system, desktop computer, laptop computer, palm computer, or personal digital assistant (PDA) device, etc., as well as portions or combinations of these and other devices that can perform the operations illustrated in Figures 1-6.
- the results of processing system 710 may then be transmitted over network 770 for viewing on display 780, reporting device 790 and/or a second processing system 795.
- processing system 710 includes one or more input/output devices
- Processor 720 may be a central processing unit (CPU) or dedicated hardware/software, such as a PAL, ASIC, FGPA, operable to execute computer instruction code or a combination of code and logical operations.
- Input/output devices 740, processor 720 and memory 730 may communicate over a communication medium 725.
- Communication medium 725 may represent a communication network, e.g., ISA, PCI, PCMCIA bus, one or more internal connections of a circuit, circuit card or other device, as well as portions and combinations of these and other communication media.
- processor 720 may include code which, when executed, performs the operations illustrated herein.
- the code may be contained in memory 730, read or downloaded from a memory medium such as a CD-ROM or floppy disk represented as 783, or provided by manual input device 785, such as a keyboard or a keypad entry, or read from a magnetic or optical medium (not shown) which is accessible by processor 720, when needed.
- Information items provided by input device 783, 785 and/or magnetic medium may be accessible to processor 720 through input/output device 740, as shown. Further, the data received by input/output device 740 may be immediately accessible by processor 720 or may be stored in memory 730.
- Processor 720 may further provide the results of the processing shown herein to display 780, recording device 790 or a second processing unit 795 through VO device 740.
- processor, processing system, computer or computer system may represent one or more processing units in communication with one or more memory units and other devices, e.g., peripherals, connected electronically to and communicating with the at least one processing unit.
- the devices illustrated may be electronically connected to the one or more processing units via internal busses, e.g., serial, parallel, ISA bus, microchannel bus, PCI bus, PCMCIA bus, USB, wireless, infrared, radio frequency, etc., or one or more internal connections of a circuit, circuit card or other device, as well as portions and combinations of these and other communication media, or an external network, e.g., the Internet and Intranet.
- internal busses e.g., serial, parallel, ISA bus, microchannel bus, PCI bus, PCMCIA bus, USB, wireless, infrared, radio frequency, etc.
- an external network e.g., the Internet and Intranet.
- hardware circuitry may be used in place of, or in combination with, software instructions to implement the invention.
- the elements illustrated herein may also be implemented as discrete hardware elements or may be integrated into a single unit.
- Processor system 710 may also be in two-way communication with each of the sources 705.
- Processor system 710 may further receive or transmit data over one or more network connections from a server or servers over, e.g., a global computer communications network such as the Internet, Intranet, a wide area network (WAN), a metropolitan area network (MAN), a local area network (LAN), a terrestrial broadcast system, a cable network, a satellite network, a wireless network, or a telephone network (POTS), as well as portions or combinations of these and other types of networks.
- networks 750 and 770 may also be internal networks or one or more internal connections of a circuit, circuit card or other device, as well as portions and combinations of these and other communication media or an external network, e.g., the Internet and Intranet.
- the selected encryption algorithm may be selected from the group consisting of stream cipher encryption or fast block cipher encryption algorithms.
- the specific algorithm selected may be determined based on the overall performance of the application and the network configuration.
- the size of a random value generated or the keys used in the encryption algorithm may be dependent upon the estimated length of the session.
- the duration of the encryption key may be selected dependent upon a maximum number of packets that may be transmitted. For example, the duration of the encryption key may be set for 10000 packets for a 1-hour session or 20000 packets for a 2- hour session.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/US2003/021148 WO2005015409A1 (en) | 2003-07-07 | 2003-07-07 | Authentication for admitting parties into a network |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1642205A1 true EP1642205A1 (de) | 2006-04-05 |
Family
ID=34134584
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP03818018A Withdrawn EP1642205A1 (de) | 2003-07-07 | 2003-07-07 | Authentifizierung zum zulassen von teilnehmern in ein netzwerk |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1642205A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2007521525A (de) |
CN (1) | CN1791866A (de) |
AU (1) | AU2003261116A1 (de) |
IL (1) | IL172425A0 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2005015409A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP4818674B2 (ja) * | 2005-09-28 | 2011-11-16 | 株式会社三菱東京Ufj銀行 | サイト運営装置及びプログラム |
US9131316B2 (en) * | 2008-12-11 | 2015-09-08 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Sharing public addressing system using personal communication devices in an ad-hoc network |
CN113727059B (zh) * | 2021-08-31 | 2023-10-24 | 成都卫士通信息产业股份有限公司 | 多媒体会议终端入网认证方法、装置、设备及存储介质 |
Family Cites Families (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH0750664A (ja) * | 1993-08-04 | 1995-02-21 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | 識別情報に基づく暗号方式 |
JPH0981523A (ja) * | 1995-09-12 | 1997-03-28 | Toshiba Corp | 認証方法 |
US6073237A (en) * | 1997-11-06 | 2000-06-06 | Cybercash, Inc. | Tamper resistant method and apparatus |
JPH11187012A (ja) * | 1997-12-22 | 1999-07-09 | Nec Corp | 共有鍵交換方式 |
JP2001344214A (ja) * | 2000-05-31 | 2001-12-14 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | 端末の認証方法と暗号通信システム |
JP2003153353A (ja) * | 2001-11-13 | 2003-05-23 | Nec Access Technica Ltd | リモート設定方法および装置 |
-
2003
- 2003-07-07 JP JP2005507621A patent/JP2007521525A/ja active Pending
- 2003-07-07 CN CNA038267179A patent/CN1791866A/zh active Pending
- 2003-07-07 AU AU2003261116A patent/AU2003261116A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2003-07-07 EP EP03818018A patent/EP1642205A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2003-07-07 WO PCT/US2003/021148 patent/WO2005015409A1/en active Application Filing
-
2005
- 2005-12-07 IL IL172425A patent/IL172425A0/en unknown
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO2005015409A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1791866A (zh) | 2006-06-21 |
IL172425A0 (en) | 2006-04-10 |
JP2007521525A (ja) | 2007-08-02 |
AU2003261116A1 (en) | 2005-02-25 |
WO2005015409A1 (en) | 2005-02-17 |
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