EP1454292A2 - Schutz gegen betrügerische reproduktion von chipkarten und leseendgeräten solcher chipkarten - Google Patents
Schutz gegen betrügerische reproduktion von chipkarten und leseendgeräten solcher chipkartenInfo
- Publication number
- EP1454292A2 EP1454292A2 EP02799808A EP02799808A EP1454292A2 EP 1454292 A2 EP1454292 A2 EP 1454292A2 EP 02799808 A EP02799808 A EP 02799808A EP 02799808 A EP02799808 A EP 02799808A EP 1454292 A2 EP1454292 A2 EP 1454292A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- card
- interface
- terminal
- smart card
- predefined
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
- G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
- G06K19/07372—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by detecting tampering with the circuit
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
Definitions
- the invention lies in the field of the fight against fraudulent reproduction of smart cards and of terminals for reading these cards.
- the invention relates to a device and a method of pairing a predefined type of authentic terminals with a predefined type of authentic smart cards in order to prevent a fraudulent card or a fraudulent terminal from being used. .
- the DVB Digital Video Broadcasting
- ECM Entitlement Control Message
- EMM Entitlement Management Message
- the smart card also contains calculation software for working with keys cryptographic, usually secret. This information can be recovered by reverse engineering techniques and duplicated in fraudulent cards (clone) which can be read in any decoder.
- the object of the invention is to prevent the reading of a falsified card in an authentic decoder.
- One of the phases of the fight against these frauds consists in characterizing the authentic cards and terminals and in performing a pairing of known authentic cards with known authentic terminals.
- a matching technique used in the prior art consists in materially associating the card and the terminal by welding, for example. This technique certainly makes it possible to limit the scale of fraud by delaying the activity of pirates, but nevertheless has a drawback stemming from the fact that once the pairing technique discovered by pirates, it is necessary to modify the type of card, type of terminal or both. These operations can be costly in terms of time and human resources.
- the object of the invention is to overcome the drawbacks of the prior art described above.
- Another object of the invention is to provide a reliable pairing, between a group of cards of a determined type and a group of terminals of a type also determined.
- Another object of the invention is to provide an apparatus which can be modified in a simple manner without requiring the replacement of cards and reading terminals in the event of fraud.
- the invention recommends making a dynamic pairing between a smart card of a predefined type and a card reading terminal of a predefined type.
- the fitting device comprises an interface intended to dynamically define the electrical signals exchanged between the terminal and the smart card.
- said interface is an analog ASIC type circuit.
- said interface is an analog FPGA (Field Programmable Gateway) type circuit.
- the interface defining the signals electrics exchanged between the terminal and the card is integrated into the terminal.
- said interface includes a memory in which is stored a remotely modifiable file.
- the electrical signals defined by the interface comprise at least one of the following signals: the operating frequency of the smart card, the supply voltage of the smart card or the power consumed by the smart card to perform a defined task or a card-terminal transmission parameter.
- the invention also relates to a method of pairing a genuine chip card to a predefined e tyP and an authentic terminal of a predefined type for reading the smart card.
- the method according to the invention comprises the following stages: determining the range of variation of at least one operating parameter of the authentic smart card,
- the particular electrical parameters can be modified remotely.
- these parameters are stored in a configuration file.
- FIG. 1 shows a device for pairing a smart card and a smart card reading terminal according to the invention.
- FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of an interface according to the invention.
- FIG. 3 schematically illustrates a method of pairing a smart card of a predefined type and a terminal of a predefined type according to the invention. Detailed description of specific embodiments
- the invention will be described in the context of a pay television application in which a program broadcaster transmits audiovisual data scrambled by a control word to all of the subscribers.
- the subscriber is equipped with a smart card containing a security processor and the access parameters defining the access rights to scrambled data and with a terminal for reading this card.
- the access control system can decrypt and provide the terminal with the control word necessary to descramble the data broadcast.
- FIG. 1 schematically represents a terminal 2 and a smart card 4 capable of being read by the terminal 2.
- the latter comprises a central unit 6 intended for processing the digital data received and an interface 8 which receives the useful data processed by the central unit 6 through a first data / control bus 10.
- This data / control bus 10 also transmits to the interface 8 the control signals of the smart card 4 (voltage, frequency, ... reset ).
- the interface 8 is connected to the smart card 4, by a second bus 12 intended to transmit to the latter operating signals defined according to the characteristics specific to this card 4.
- These signals can be a supply voltage particular in the voltage range supported by card 4, a clock signal having a particular frequency chosen from a range of operating frequencies specific to card 4, or an I / O signal (input-output), i.e. reset signal or any other signal required.
- FIG. 2 represents a block diagram of the interface 8.
- This comprises a memory 14 in which is stored a configuration file of the signals transmitted through the bus 12.
- the configuration file is transmitted directly to the interface 8.
- This file can also be downloaded by the interface 8 via a secure link from a site of the program broadcaster or delivered to subscribers on a recording medium. .
- the interface 8 also includes a computation stage 16 which receives the configuration parameters stored in the. memory 14 and defines the electrical values (voltage, frequency) of the signals to be delivered to the smart card 4 through a digital and / or analog interface stage 18.
- the configuration file can be modified at any time by the program broadcaster.
- this modification is initiated remotely. It can also be performed by the subscriber from a recording medium provided by the broadcaster. To this end, the interface 8 is provided with a reading unit 20 intended to recover the configuration file from the recording medium.
- FIG. 3 represents a flow diagram schematically illustrating a method of pairing a smart card 4 and a terminal 2 for reading this card.
- This method includes a first phase 30 of electrical characterization of the smart card 4 and a second phase 32 of checking the authenticity of the smart card and of the terminal 2.
- the characterization phase 30 comprises a step 34 during which the smart card 4 is analyzed to determine the limits of one or more electrical operating parameters, and a step 36 during which one or more specific electrical parameters are defined within the operating limits determined in step 34. From this electrical characterization, a file will be created to be transmitted (step 38) then to the interface 8.
- the authentication phase includes a step
- Step 40 for comparing the electrical and temporal parameters of a card newly introduced in the terminal 2 with the electrical and temporal operating parameters memorized in step 38.
- Step 42 consists in authorizing the card-terminal dialog of the card if the compared parameters are identical, and step 44 consists in prohibiting all or part of the card-terminal dialogue if the compared parameters are different.
- a test operation is defined. for an authentic card and the power consumed by the authentic card is determined during this test operation.
- the interface 8 can be an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array).
- the configuration file of the FPGA or ASIC can be encrypted by a key. secret.
- the interface 8 is arranged on the smart card 4.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Time Recorders, Dirve Recorders, Access Control (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0116113 | 2001-12-13 | ||
FR0116113A FR2833737B1 (fr) | 2001-12-13 | 2001-12-13 | Lutte contre la reproduction frauduleuse des cartes a puce et des terminaux de lecture de ces cartes |
PCT/FR2002/004284 WO2003050756A2 (fr) | 2001-12-13 | 2002-12-11 | Lutte contre la reproduction frauduleuse des cartes a puce et des terminaux de lecture de ces cartes |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1454292A2 true EP1454292A2 (de) | 2004-09-08 |
Family
ID=8870433
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP02799808A Withdrawn EP1454292A2 (de) | 2001-12-13 | 2002-12-11 | Schutz gegen betrügerische reproduktion von chipkarten und leseendgeräten solcher chipkarten |
Country Status (8)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1454292A2 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2005512243A (de) |
KR (1) | KR20040063163A (de) |
CN (1) | CN1602500A (de) |
AU (1) | AU2002364446A1 (de) |
FR (1) | FR2833737B1 (de) |
MX (1) | MXPA04005621A (de) |
WO (1) | WO2003050756A2 (de) |
Family Cites Families (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2664724B1 (fr) * | 1990-07-12 | 1994-04-08 | Landis Gyr Communications France | Connecteur electrique pour carte contenant un circuit electronique et dispositif de detection de fraude en faisant application. |
FR2774195A1 (fr) * | 1998-01-27 | 1999-07-30 | Gemplus Card Int | Carte a microprocesseur comportant un circuit de communication cable |
FR2775090B1 (fr) * | 1998-02-13 | 2000-12-29 | Roland Moreno | Objet portatif de type carte a microcircuit comprenant des moyens de supervision des commandes qui lui sont appliquees |
FR2783624B1 (fr) * | 1998-09-21 | 2000-12-15 | Cit Alcatel | Carte a puce permettant d'acceder a une application distante, terminal et systeme de communication associes et procede pour acceder a l'application distante au moyen de cette carte a puce |
US6168077B1 (en) * | 1998-10-21 | 2001-01-02 | Litronic, Inc. | Apparatus and method of providing a dual mode card and reader |
FR2788187B1 (fr) * | 1998-12-30 | 2001-01-26 | Schlumberger Systems & Service | Procede de detection de fraude des cartes a circuit electronique utilisees en telephonie |
-
2001
- 2001-12-13 FR FR0116113A patent/FR2833737B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2002
- 2002-12-11 MX MXPA04005621A patent/MXPA04005621A/es unknown
- 2002-12-11 AU AU2002364446A patent/AU2002364446A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2002-12-11 WO PCT/FR2002/004284 patent/WO2003050756A2/fr not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2002-12-11 EP EP02799808A patent/EP1454292A2/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2002-12-11 CN CNA028247671A patent/CN1602500A/zh active Pending
- 2002-12-11 JP JP2003551739A patent/JP2005512243A/ja not_active Withdrawn
- 2002-12-11 KR KR10-2004-7008484A patent/KR20040063163A/ko not_active Application Discontinuation
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO03050756A2 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
MXPA04005621A (es) | 2005-03-23 |
AU2002364446A1 (en) | 2003-06-23 |
FR2833737A1 (fr) | 2003-06-20 |
FR2833737B1 (fr) | 2004-04-02 |
WO2003050756A3 (fr) | 2004-01-22 |
WO2003050756A2 (fr) | 2003-06-19 |
JP2005512243A (ja) | 2005-04-28 |
AU2002364446A8 (en) | 2003-06-23 |
CN1602500A (zh) | 2005-03-30 |
KR20040063163A (ko) | 2004-07-12 |
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Legal Events
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17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20041203 |
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Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED TO BE WITHDRAWN |
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18D | Application deemed to be withdrawn |
Effective date: 20050414 |