EP1374131A4 - System and method for conducting secure payment transactions - Google Patents
System and method for conducting secure payment transactionsInfo
- Publication number
- EP1374131A4 EP1374131A4 EP02723747A EP02723747A EP1374131A4 EP 1374131 A4 EP1374131 A4 EP 1374131A4 EP 02723747 A EP02723747 A EP 02723747A EP 02723747 A EP02723747 A EP 02723747A EP 1374131 A4 EP1374131 A4 EP 1374131A4
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- payment
- authorization
- authorization request
- request message
- sending
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q30/00—Commerce
- G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/12—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/14—Payment architectures specially adapted for billing systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3823—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/385—Payment protocols; Details thereof using an alias or single-use codes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/403—Solvency checks
Definitions
- SETTM Secure Electronic Transaction
- user software receives a set of Web page data to be used for displaying a Web page.
- the user software determines whether the Web page includes one or more hidden fields. If the Web page includes the hidden fields, the user software selects a first payment procedure to be performed.
- the first payment procedure includes filling the hidden fields with hidden data, in order to send the hidden data to a merchant. If the Web page does not include the hidden fields, the user software selects a second payment procedure to be performed.
- the second payment procedure includes filling one or more visible fields of the Web page with purchase data, in order to send the purchase data to the merchant.
- user software receives a set of Web page data to be used for displaying a Web page which includes one or more hidden fields.
- the user software receives authentication data from a payment account issuer, the authentication data being for authenticating the identity of an account holder of a payment account issued by the payment account issuer.
- the user software fills the hidden fields with the authentication data, in order to send the authentication data to a merchant.
- user software receives a first set of web page data to be used for displaying a first Web page.
- the user software determines whether the first Web page includes a first hidden field.
- the first hidden field is for indicating that the Web page is capable of being used for performing a single-click payment procedure.
- the user software fills the first hidden field with data for informing a merchant that the user software is being used for performing at least one payment transaction.
- FIG. 1 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary procedure for conducting a payment transaction in accordance with the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary payment procedure for use in the procedure illustrated in Fig. 1;
- Fig. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating an additional exemplary payment procedure for use in the procedure illustrated in Fig. 1;
- Fig. 4 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary system for conducting a payment transaction in accordance with the present invention
- Fig. 5 is a block diagram illustrating an additional exemplary system for conducting a payment transaction in accordance with the present invention
- Fig. 6 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary authorization request message verification procedure for use in the procedures illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3;
- Fig. 7 is a flow diagram illustrating an additional exemplary authorization request message verification procedure for use in the procedures illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3;
- Fig. 8 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary account holder authentication value (AAV) in accordance with the present invention.
- Fig. 9 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary computer system for conducting a payment transaction in accordance with the present invention
- Fig. 10 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary processing section for use in the computer system illustrated in Fig. 9.
- Fig. 4 illustrates an exemplary system for performing secure payment transactions in accordance with the present invention.
- the system includes user software 402, a merchant 404 selling goods and/or services, a payment organization 408 such as the MasterCard ® payment organization, and a payment account issuer 406.
- the user software 402 runs on an access device operated by a purchaser — i.e., the purchaser is the user of the software 402.
- the access device can be, for example, a computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), or a mobile telephone.
- PDA personal digital assistant
- the access device runs a Web browser in addition to, or as part of, the user software 402.
- the Web browser preferably supports name-based addressing of Web page fields, in order to enable identification of hidden and visible fields using names which are uniform for multiple merchants and account holders.
- the issuer 406 is typically a bank which has issued, to the purchaser, a credit card account or other payment account being used to purchase the goods and/or services from the merchant.
- the purchaser can be referred to as an account holder of the account.
- the system uses authentication data 414 which effectively travels in a loop from the issuer 406, to the user software 402, to the merchant 404, to the payment organization 408, and back to the issuer 406, as is discussed in further detail below.
- the data 420 received by the issuer 406 should be derived from the original authentication data 414, provided that no improper operations have been performed upon the authentication data 414 during its trip around the loop.
- Fig. 8 illustrates an example of a data structure 802 - referred to herein as an Account Holder Authentication Value (AAV) - which can be used as the authentication data 414 illustrated in Fig. 4.
- the AAV 802 comprises 24 bytes of binary data representing 32 Base-64-encoded characters.
- the first 14 bytes 808 can generally be referred to as system data, and include a control byte 804 and other system data 806.
- the remaining 10 bytes 810 of data are defined by the issuer 406.
- the control byte 804 provides information regarding the type of authorization being performed.
- control byte 804 has a hexadecimal value of "82" for an initial authorization or pre-authorization of account holder, and a value of "02" for subsequent authorizations of the account holder. Additional authentication approaches are assigned their own control byte values. For example, a biometrics- based authentication procedure would have its own value for the control byte 804. Table I describes the various portions of the AAV 802.
- Sale Amount 2 Bytes Consists of the left-most 4 decimal digits of the 12-digit sale amount with up to eight leading zeroes deleted. For example if the 12-digit transaction amount presented by the merchant consists of 000008765432, the four digits are 8765.
- Truncation Field data can exclude some of the right-most digits of the original 12-digit amount. This field indicates how many such digits are so excluded. For example, if the 12-digit transaction amount consists of 000008765432, so that the four selected digits are 8765, then the three right-most digits of "432" would be excluded. In this case the Truncation Field would contain the value "3".
- Merchant Name can first be edited as discussed below.
- Issuer-defined Data 10 Bytes Contains issuer-generated account holder 810 authentication data. Preferably these data uniquely relate the transaction to the account holder. As is indicated in Table I, data element no. 1, a/k/a the control byte 804, is set to hexadecimal "82" for all AAVs associated with initial authorizations, including pre-authorizations. Elements 2-6 are the system data 806, which are transaction-specific details provided by the merchant's Web site. Element number 7 comprises the issuer-defined data 810. This element contains data that links the account holder to the particular transaction.
- the system data 806 and the issuer-defined data 810 of the AAV 802 are generated and linked to a particular payment account by an AAV-generation processor 440 operated by the issuer 406.
- the AAV-generation processor 440 Upon receiving a request 412 for authentication of an account holder's identity, the AAV-generation processor 440 generates the system data 806 and the issuer-defined data 810 in binary format.
- the two sets of data 806 and 810, as well as the control byte 804, are combined to form a 24-byte binary version of the 802.
- Base 64 encoding of the 24-byte binary version produces a 32-character, Base 64 version of the AAV 802.
- the system data 806 are created based on the control byte 804 and on information supplied from the merchant's confirmation page.
- the data 806 are generated using the following procedure:
- a control byte 804 is created for the AAV 802.
- the control byte 804 can be, for example, a binary-coded decimal representation of the hexadecimal value "82.”
- the Sale Amount is created by the following steps: a) Up to 8 leading zeros are deleted from the Sale Amount
- Step 2b The number of right-most digits of the Sale Amount that were excluded in Step 2b is determined. This number, which is a single, binary-coded decimal digit, is placed in the Sale Amount Truncation Field. 4. The 3-digit decimal Currency Code is converted to binary, and the resulting 10 bits are right-justified in a 12 bit field and padded to the left with binary "00.”
- the Merchant Name which is represented by a set of hexadecimal Unicode control values, is edited using the following rules, but only if the name is expressed as a Latin- 1 character set. All other character sets require no editing. a) All Latin- 1 control characters are deleted. These are Unicode characters in the hexadecimal range 0000 through 001F, and 007F through 009F.
- any remaining Latin- 1 non-alphanumeric character is replaced with a space character (hexadecimal 0020).
- the Unicode non- control and non-alphanumeric characters are those in the sets
- the MTS from the merchant's payment screen is inserted into the MTS field as a binary coded decimal.
- the resulting 14-byte binary value is the system data 806 which will be combined with the issuer-defined data 810 and then Base 64 encoded to create the AAV 802.
- the procedure used to generate the issuer-defined data 810 depends on which approach will ultimately be used to verify the AAV 802.
- the issuer-defined data element 810 is generated by encrypting a number, text string, or other data selected by the issuer 406.
- the data to be encrypted can be a concatenation of the merchant name, the transaction amount, the date, and the account number of the account being used to make the purchase.
- the data is encrypted using a secret key — discussed in further detail below — to generate a cryptographic Message
- the MAC is generated by an ISO-approved encryption algorithm.
- the MAC is incorporated into the issuer-defined data 810 which is combined with the system data element 804 and 806 to form the AAV 802.
- the issuer 406 cryptographically verifies the issuer-defined data element 810 to verify its authenticity.
- the cryptographic approach is particularly beneficial for systems in which the AAV 802 is created by one facility and verified by a different facility, and the two facilities are not in real-time communication.
- the issuer-defined data 810 in the AAV 802 includes the data elements described in Table II.
- the issuer-defined data 810 is limited to 10 binary bytes, it may be sufficient to include only a portion of each of the above data elements.
- the data 810 include four bytes of the MAC, four bytes of the Transaction Sequence Number, one byte of the Key Identification Data, and one byte total from the combination of the AAV Format Indicator and the AAV-Generation Processor Identifier.
- the MAC serves as a cryptographic check to detect fraudulent alteration.
- Both the AAV-generation processor 440 and the AAV- verification processor 442 used to verify the transaction have access to the secret cryptographic key used to generate the MAC.
- the AAV-generation processor 440 performs the following steps for each transaction:
- AAV Format Number AAV Format Number
- AAV Generation Facility Identifier and Key Identification Data.
- the Transaction Sequence Number used in the previous AAV is incremented by a predetermined amount selected by the issuer 406. One or more of the right-most bits of the incremented value are used as the AAV Transaction Sequence Number data element.
- a MAC is created by concatenating and encrypting the following data: (1) the account number provided to the merchant, (2) the entire AAV excluding the MAC sub-field itself, and (3) any other issuer-selected data.
- the left-most portion of the cryptographically computed MAC is issued as the AAV MAC data element.
- the AAV- verification processor 442 determines the secret cryptographic key used by the AAV-generation processor 440 to generate the MAC.
- the two processors 440 and 442 share a secret, cryptographic Key-Generation Key from which many (hundreds, thousands, or even millions) of MAC-generation keys can be derived.
- the Key-Generation Key can be used for years, whereas the MAC-Generation Key is preferably changed relatively frequently, depending upon the requirements of the MAC-generation algorithm and the issuer's key-management policy. In any case, however, the Key-Generation Key should be changed if there is any suspicion that it has been compromised.
- the shared Key-Generation Key can, for example, be created by the AAV- verification processor 442 and conveyed to the AAV-generation processor 440 as one or more key components, using multiple control (preferably triple control) and split knowledge.
- the generation and distribution of cryptographic keys should conform to ISO security standards.
- the mechanism by which a MAC- Generation Key is derived from a Key-Generation Key should also conform to ISO security standards.
- any cryptographic key stored within a storage medium connected to an AAV-generation processor 440 or an AAV- verification processor 442 preferably resides solely within physically secure hardware that protects the key against physical compromise in accordance with ISO standards.
- any cryptographic key that the verification processor shares with one AAV-generation processor should not be related to any key it shares with another AAV-generation processor.
- FFFFFFF Source 3 1 9 8 B E 3 0 1 F B D 7 4 F 0 A B Binary:
- FFFFFFF Source 3 1 9 8 B E 3 0 1 F B D 7 4 F 0 A B Binary :
- G - Issuer-defined Data - 10 bytes of issuer-defined data represented as BCD A comparative approach is preferred for systems in which the AAV creation and verification facilities are in real-time communication with each other - e.g., via a common data storage system.
- the issuer- defined data 810 are generated using a random number or any other algorithm selected by the issuer 406.
- the resulting value 810 is combined with the system data 806 to form the AAV 802.
- the AAV 802 is then saved to a common database that is used by the AAV- verification processor 442 to verify transaction authenticity.
- the issuer 406 verifies the authenticity of a transaction by comparing the AAV received in the authorization request 420 to the AAV stored in the database.
- the AAV for the comparative approach is generated and stored according to the following procedure:
- the issuer-defined data 810 are stored in a database linking them at least to a particular Account Number.
- the merchant hidden field data are stored in a database linking them at least to the issuer-defined data 810.
- the database is made available to the AAV-verification processor 442.
- the issuer-defined data component 810 is combined with the system data component 808 to form a 24-byte binary value.
- the 24-byte binary value is Base 64 encoded to generate the 32 character 702.
- Fig. 1 illustrates an exemplary procedure for operating the payment transaction system illustrated in Fig. 4 using authentication data 414 which includes the AAV 802 described above.
- the account holder browses the various pages of a Web site available on a server 448 operated by the merchant 404 (step 132). The purchase finds and selects goods and/or services that (s)he would like to purchase from the merchant 404 (step 114). Once the goods and/or services have been selected, the account holder initiates the merchant's checkout procedure (step 116). For example, in the commonly used "shopping cart" method, a shopper selects goods and/or services to be placed in a virtual shopping cart - i.e., a list of items that the shopper tentatively plans to purchase.
- a virtual shopping cart i.e., a list of items that the shopper tentatively plans to purchase.
- the shopper initiates checkout by clicking on a visible "checkout” button on the merchant's Web page, at which point the checkout procedure begins with respect to the items in the shopping cart.
- Another possible method employs a single-click checkout procedure in which the merchant 404 stores account holder information and then uses the information for multiple transactions.
- the stored information can include the account holder's billing and shipping addresses, e-mail address, account number, and account expiration date.
- the account holder can then immediately initiate checkout with respect to an item (step 116) by clicking on a visible "purchase” button associate with the item.
- each of the merchant's web pages on which single-click purchasing is offered includes a particular hidden field which can be referred to as the "UCAF Enabled Indicator" field, and is described in further detail below.
- the presence of this hidden field on a Web page notifies the user software that the Web page is configured for single-click shopping.
- the user software 402 requests and receives additional Web page data 410 from the merchant 404 through a portion 426 of a network 434 (step 102).
- the network 434 can, for example, be the Internet.
- the Web page data is used to display a "checkout" Web page (a/k/a an "order confirmation" Web page) on the account holder's computer screen.
- the account holder and/or user software 402 provides billing address, shipping address and/or payment account details to the merchant 404 by entering some or all of this information into fields on the confirmation page (step 130).
- the billing and shipping address information can be entered manually by the account holder, filled in automatically by the user software 402, or filled in automatically by the merchant's server based on information stored in the merchant's server for the particular account holder.
- the merchant's order confirmation page will contain one or more hidden fields, including: (1) hidden fields for delivering infomiation to the user software 402; and (2) hidden fields for receiving information such as an AAV from the user software 402.
- the hidden fields which are collectively referred to herein as the "Universal Cardholder Authentication Field" (UCAF), are described in further detail below.
- the user software 402 receives some or all of the following information:
- the merchant provides its name in a hidden field that is 88 characters in length. These 88 hexadecimal characters (0-9, A-F) consist of 22 sets of 4 hexadecimal digits. Each set corresponds to a control character in the Unicode character set table (www.unicode.org).
- Card Acceptor The merchant provides its Card Acceptor City in a hidden field City which is 13 characters in length.
- Card Acceptor The merchant provides its Card Acceptor State or Country code (if State/ Country not US) in a hidden field that is 3 characters in length. If Country Code Code, the 3 character, alphabetic country code is supplied.
- Sale Amount This represents the amount of the sale as mutually agreed upon by the merchant and the account holder and reflects the amount presented to the account holder during the checkout process. This amount may differ than the actual authorization amount due to processing issues such as split payments, split shipments, currency conversion, etc. Sale Amount displayed by the SPA wallet uses the currency format indicated by the Currency Code.
- This field is a value generated by the merchant between
- Account Number A hidden field that the merchant uses to provide up to 5 digits of the stored account number registered with the merchant and expected to
- UCAF structure For merchants who wish to receive recurring payments from a particular account holder, the following information is collected within the UCAF structure:
- Transaction Frequency - indicates the frequency of recurring payments.
- the valid values that can be assigned by a merchant are "W” for weekly, "M” for monthly, and “Q” for quarterly or "A” for annually.
- Number of Payments - in order to determine the total number of recurring payments between an account holder and merchant. This field preferably does not have a default maximum limit. Each Brand that utilizes this recurring payment function may set its own implementation limits. For example, a suitable maximum number of payments is 260.
- First Payment this field conveys whether the account holder acknowledges entering a recurring payment relationship and the date expressed as DDMMYYYY of the first recurring payment.
- Merchant Cancellation Policy this field notes whether the account holder can cancel the recurring payments. Value is either "1" for Yes or "0" for No.
- the recurring payment elements can optionally be combined into a single hidden field defined for UCAF.
- This additional hidden field is named Ucaf_Recur_Payment, and includes the following portions:
- F - is the frequency of the recurring payment. Valid values are: W- weekly, M- monthly, Q- quarterly, A- annually
- NNN - is the number of recurring payments.
- DDMMYYYY - is the date of the first recurring payment. For example March 29, 2002 is expressed as "29032002.”
- C - is the merchant cancellation policy. This denotes whether the cardholder can cancel the recurring payment. Valid values are “1” for yes and "0" for no.
- the merchant 404 can optionally include a Merchant Transaction Stamp (MTS) in one of the hidden fields on the merchant's payment page.
- MTS Merchant Transaction Stamp
- the MTS is unique to each transaction and can therefore be used as an added form of security.
- the MTS can be used to show that the account holder has actually visited the merchant's Web site, thereby providing evidence that the transaction is legitimate and not a retransmission by a fraudulent merchant or other party posing as an authentic merchant.
- the order confirmation page also includes visible fields for displaying to the account holder information such as the Merchant Name and Sale Amount.
- the fact that the merchant's name and the transaction amount are visible on the confirmation page before the shopper clicks the confirmation button (step 210 discussed below with respect to Fig. 2) provides additional evidence that the account holder has indeed confirmed and accepted the transaction. This feature helps the issuer 406 to challenge any repudiation of the transaction by the account holder.
- step 104 if the order confirmation Web page of the merchant 404 includes the above-described hidden fields (step 104), then the purchase is made using an authorization procedure 106 which utilizes the aforementioned technique of sending authentication data 414 in a loop from the issuer 406, to the user software 402, to the merchant 404, to the payment organization 408, and back to the issuer 406.
- the order confirmation Web page does not include the hidden fields (step 104)
- the user software 402 performs a conventional payment procedure 108 which includes filling visible fields of the Web page with purchase data such as a credit card number, expiration date, etc. (step 110), and using the filled Web page fields to send the purchase data to the merchant 404 for authorization (step 112).
- step 1208 the UCAF Enabled Indicator field is present on a Web page on which the account holder has clicked a "purchase” button
- the user software 402 fills the UCAF Enabled Indicator field with a code (e.g., "01") notifying the merchant 404 that the account holder is using UCAF-enabled user software 402 for performing the payment transaction (step 134).
- the Web page with the filled UCAF Enabled Indicator field is submitted to the merchant 404 (step 136).
- the merchant 404 sends confirmation page data to the user software 402 (step 138).
- Authentication procedure 106 is then performed. In any case, if authorization is granted by authorization procedure 106 or authorization procedure 108 (step 118), the good and/or services are shipped, delivered, or otherwise provided to the purchaser (step 120). Any conventional clearing and settlement procedure can be used to clear and settle payment between the issuer 406 and the payment organization 408 (step 122). If the merchant 404 has an account with an acquirer (item 514 in Fig. 5, discussed below), payment is cleared and settled between the issuer 406 and the acquirer 514 (step 122).
- step 118 if authorization is denied (step 118), then the account holder is notified of the denial (step 124), and the transaction is terminated (step 126).
- FIG. 2 An example of a procedure 106 for using the authentication data 414 to authorize a transaction is illustrated in Fig. 2.
- the user software 402 sends to the issuer 406 a request 412 for authentication of the identity of the account holder (step 202).
- the request 412 is sent through a portion 428 of the network 434.
- the issuer 406 sends authentication data 414 such as an AAV to the user software 402 through the network portion 428.
- the software 402 includes the authentication data 414 in hidden data 416 (step 206) and uses the hidden data 416 to fill the hidden fields on the Web page of the merchant 404 (step 208). For example, the AAV can be entered into a hidden Authentication Data field on the confirmation page.
- each account holder is authenticated for each transaction. If the identity of the account holder is not successfully authenticated, the account holder is notified of this failure. If the identity of the account holder has been confirmed, the issuer's AAV-generation processor 440 generates an AAV 802. The issuer 406 then includes the AAV 802 in the authentication data 414 and sends the data 414 to the user software 402. Other infomiation entered into hidden fields on the confirmation page by the user software 402 include the account holder's payment account details such his her account number, expiration date and, optionally, the card validation check (CVC2) value. In addition, the hidden fields preferably include the above-described UCAF Enabled Indicator field.
- the user software 402 can identify any difference between the account number supplied by the merchant (if the account holder was profiled) and the account number inserted into the hidden Account Number field.
- the user software 402 can alert the account holder of any difference and request confirmation.
- an account holder may have multiple accounts registered with the issuer 406. In such cases, the account holder selects which account number is to be used for payment.
- the page contains hidden data 416, including the authentication data 414 (which itself includes the AAV 802), the payment account information, and any other relevant information.
- the confi ⁇ nation page is submitted to the merchant 404 by clicking a "submit" button on the page (step 210). If this is, e.g., a shopping cart type transaction, the submit button is visible to the account holder, and is clicked by the account holder. However, for single-click transactions, the submit button is hidden, and is automatically clicked by the user software 402.
- the merchant 404 receives the hidden data 416 on the confirmation page, and validates the Control Byte 804 and the hash of the Merchant Name contained in the AAV 802. Optionally, the merchant 402 can also verify the Merchant Transaction Stamp (if generated by the merchant) and Sale Amount.
- the merchant 404 preferably captures and retains the AAV for future use in linking the account holder to a specific transaction.
- the data can also be used for performing subsequent authorizations of split-shipments, and may be of value to the merchant 404 during exception processing.
- control byte 804 is verified by confirming that its most significant bit is a "1.” This can be done by verifying that the left-most character of the Base 64 encoded AAV 802 is a lower case "g.”
- the Merchant Name is verified by confirming that the hash of the Merchant Name, as included in the AAV, exactly matches the hash of the Merchant Name that was included in one of the hidden fields. To accomplish this, the merchant 404 verifies that characters 7 through 16 of the Base 64 encoded AAV 802 exactly match a pre-computed value. This pre-computed value can be obtained by performing the SHA-1 hash process of the Merchant Name.
- an AAV may be: godlOEAxmL4wH7108KtVOQkAQASHRxlO
- the merchant 404 compares this value to the known SHA-1 hash of the Merchant Name. If the value is not successfully validated, the merchant 404 declines the transaction.
- the merchant 404 can also validate the AAV sale amount based on the sale amount presented in one of the hidden fields.
- the merchant 404 converts the Base 64 encoded AAV 802 to its 24 binary byte source and identifies the Sale Amount, Sale Amount Truncation Field and Transaction Currency Code.
- the merchant 404 validates the Sale Amount, Sale Amount Truncation Field and
- the merchant 404 can also validate the MTS contained in the AAV 802. When validating the MTS, the merchant 404 identifies the MTS component of the AAV 802 and compares it to the MTS presented in the Order confirmation page hidden field. If the value is not successfully validated, the merchant 404 declines the transaction, because the AAV 802 is likely to be fraudulent.
- the merchant 404 derives an authorization request message 418 from the hidden data 416 (step 222), and sends the authorization request message 418 to the payment organization 408 through an additional network or network portion 430 (step 212). Because the hidden data 416 includes the authentication data 414, the authorization request message 418 is ultimately derived from the authentication data 414.
- the authorization request message 418 preferably includes at least the following data elements:
- the hidden data 416 and authorization request message 418 contain sensitive, transaction-specific data and may be transmitted over a public network such as the Internet
- the hidden data 416 and the authorization request message 418 are preferably protected using a secure encryption method — e.g., 128- bit SSL or equivalent — in order to prevent the data from being compromised.
- the payment organization 408 sends an authorization request message 420 to the issuer 406 through yet another network or network portion 432 (step 214).
- the authorization request message 420 sent from the payment organization 408 to the issuer 406 is typically identical to, or derived from, the authorization request message 418 sent from the merchant 404 to the payment organization 408.
- the issuer 406 uses a verification procedure 216 to process the authorization request message 420, in order to generate an authorization response message 422.
- Fig. 6 illustrates an exemplary procedure 216 for use by an issuer 406 processing an authorization request message 420 to generate an authorization response message 422 such as is discussed above with respect to Figs. 1 and 2.
- the exemplary procedure 216 illustrated in Fig. 6 employs a cryptographic verification approach suitable for use with the cryptographically generated AAV 802 described above.
- a cryptographic AAV-verification processor 442 operated by the issuer 406 performs the following steps for each authorization request message 420 received by the facility:
- security level indicator is set to a value of 1 (step 602)
- the verification processor 442 verifies that the account number is registered for the UCAF-based verification system (step 604). If the account is registered (step 604), the processor 442 declines the transaction (step 606) because such a scenario indicates that: (i) the account holder did not use his/her UCAF-enabled software 402 to process the payment transaction; or (2) an unauthorized third party has initiated the transaction. a) If the account is not UCAF-registered (step 604), the authorization request is forwarded to an authorization system configured for conventional (i.e, non-UCAF based) payment processing (step 608).
- step 602 the processor 442 proceeds with the AAV Verification process described below.
- the AAV is extracted from the authorization request message, Base 64 decoded, and interpreted based on the indicated data format (step 610).
- the verification processor 442 determines the cryptographic key to be used for MAC verification (step 612). 3. Using the appropriate MAC algorithm, the processor 442 attempts to verify the MAC within the AAV 802 (step 614). If the MAC is not successfully verified (step 616), the transaction is declined (step 618), because the AAV 802 is not valid and the transaction is therefore assumed to be fraudulent. 4.
- step 620 If the Control Byte of the AAV indicates that this is an initial authorization request (step 620): a) The processor 442 checks whether the same Transaction Sequence Number (from the AAV-generation processor 440) and Sale Amount has already occurred in a previous initial authorization that was received more than "n" seconds ago
- step 626 (where "n” is to be specified by the issuer, and typically equals 60) (step 626).
- This optional delay of, e.g., 60 seconds, is to allow for the automatic retransmission of an authorization request message if the corresponding authorization response message has been lost.
- the Transaction Sequence Number has already occurred in a previous authorization-request message that was received more than "n" seconds ago (step 626), then the transaction is declined; this Transaction Sequence Number from this AAV- generation processor 440 is a "detected duplicate" (step 628). The attempted transaction involves a fraudulent replay of a previously valid AAV.
- step 626 If the Transaction Sequence Number has not already occurred (step 626), then the AAV's Transaction Sequence Number is identified as "used” for future transactions (step 632). d) Optionally, after verifying the AAV 802 in this initial authorization request, the issuer 406 can check the registration status of the account holder and automatically register the account holder (step 634). e) The AAV is thus confirmed to be valid, and the transaction is therefore successfully verified (step 630). An indication of successful verification is included in the authorization response message 422. 5.
- step 620 If the AAV's Control Byte 804 indicates that this is a subsequent authorization request (step 620), and if the AAV's Transaction Sequence Number is a "detected duplicate" for the AAV-generation processor 440 being used (step 622), then the transaction is declined (step 624). This is a merchant-originated resubmission of an already replayed SPA transaction. 6. On the other hand, if the TSN is not a detected duplicate (step 622), then the AAV is valid, and the transaction is therefore successfully verified (step 630). An indication of successful verification is therefore included in the authorization response message 422.
- the AAV-verification processor 442 of the issuer 406 preferably maintains a record of every account number that has been registered for performing UCAF-based authentication.
- the AAV- verification processor 442 stores the Key-Generation Key (or keys) that it shares with each AAV-generation processor 440.
- the verification processor 442 also stores records indicating which AAVs it has already received, in order to detect a fraudulent replay of an account number and its associated AAV.
- AAV verification can also be performed using a comparative approach.
- the AAV- verification processor 442 performs the following steps for each authorization request message: 1. If security level indicator is set to "1 " (step 602): a) The processor 442 determines whether the account number is registered for the UCAF-based system (step 604). If the account is registered (step 604), the transaction is declined (step 606), because such a scenario indicates that the account holder did not use his/her UCAF-enabled software 402 to process the payment transaction, or that an unauthorized third party initiated the transaction.
- step 604 If the account is not UCAF registered (step 604), the authorization request is forwarded to the issuer's authorization system for conventional (i.e., non-UCAF-based) payment processing (step 608). 2. If the security level indicator is set to "2" (step 602): a) The processor 442 determines whether the account number has been registered for the UCAF-based system (step 702). If so (step 702), the issuer 406 extracts the AAV from the authorization request (step 706) and continues with further processing, discussed below. b) If the account is not registered (step 702), the transaction is declined (step 704). 3. If the account is registered (step 702), then after step 706, the AAV
- Control byte of the AAV indicates that this is an initial authorization request (step 710), the following AAV procedure is performed based on a comparison of AAV transaction information stored in the issuer's database with transaction data contained in the authorization request message 420: a) The processor 442 verifies that the AAV received in the authorization request matches an entry in the issuer's database
- step 712 If there is no matching entry (step 712), the transaction is declined (step 714).
- step 714 If the AAV received is determined to be valid based on a positive match (step 712), the processor 442 verifies that the issuer-defined data 810 have not been received in a prior transaction.
- step 716 if the issuer-defined data 810 have been received in a prior transaction more than "n" seconds ago (where "n” typically equals 60) (step 716), then the transaction is declined and the AAV 802 is labeled as a detected duplicate (step 718).
- step 716 If the issuer-defined data element has not been previously received (step 716) then the issuer-defined data 802 are labeled as "used” (step 720), and additional validation of the issuer- defined data 810 is performed (step 722).
- step 720 If the issuer-defined data element has not been previously received (step 716) then the issuer-defined data 802 are labeled as "used” (step 720), and additional validation of the issuer- defined data 810 is performed (step 722).
- the additional data validation can include comparing data captured from the merchant hidden fields with data contained in the authorization request message 420 (step 722). This allows the issuer 406 to validate additional fields such as the
- step 722 If the data are successfully validated (step 722), then the verification of the AAV 802 is successful (step 726). An indication of successful verification is therefore included in the authorization response message 422. If the data do not match (step 722), then the transaction is declined (step 724). 5. If the Control byte of the AAV indicates that this is a subsequent authorization request (step 710), the following steps are performed: a) If the issuer-defined data 810 are a "Suspected Duplicate" data set (step 728), the processor 442 declines the transaction (step 728).
- step 730 If the issuer-defined data 810 were received in an initial authorization and are not a "Suspected Duplicate" data set (step 728), then the processor 442 performs additional validation checks by comparing data captured from the merchant hidden fields with data contained in the authorization request message 420 (step 722). This allows the issuer 406 to validate the Account Number and Merchant Name. If the data match (step 722), then the verification is successful (step 726), and an indication of successful verification is therefore included in the authorization response message 422. Regardless of whether a cryptographic or comparative verification approach is used to generate the authorization response message 422, the issuer 406 sends the authorization response message 422 to the payment organization 408 through network or network portion 432 (step 218).
- the payment organization 408 sends an authorization response message 424 to the merchant 404 through network or network portion 430 (step 220).
- the authorization response message 422 sent from the payment organization 408 to the merchant 404 is typically identical to, or derived from, the authorization response message 422 sent from the issuer 406 to the payment organization.
- the payment organization 408 can perfo ⁇ n the verification procedure 216 on behalf of the issuer 406, in which case the payment organization 408 includes its own verification processor 446 which processes the authorization request message 418 to generate authorization message 424.
- the payment organization 408 can "stand in" for the issuer 406 in the role of processing authorization request messages to generate authorization response messages.
- Such "stand-in processing" can be especially beneficial if the issuer's authorization system is temporarily unavailable, because it eliminates the need to send an authorization request message 420 to the issuer 406 to be processed for generating an authorization response message 422; the authorization response message 422 from the issuer 406 is unnecessary.
- the merchant 404 presents an HTML- based receipt page to the account holder in order to confirm completion of the transaction.
- This page preferably contains a reference number for use with customer inquiries.
- the receipt page hosts a hidden transaction identification field which is not visible to the account holder but which can be read by the user software 402 for the purpose of identifying completed transactions.
- the goods are then shipped and/or the services are provided (step 120). Any conventional clearing and settlement procedure can then be used to clear and settle the payment between the issuer 406 and the payment organization 408 (step 122).
- Fig. 5 illustrates an additional system for performing secure payment transactions in accordance with the present invention.
- the system illustrated in Fig. 5 includes user software 402, a merchant 404, a payment organization 408, and a payment account issuer 406.
- the system illustrated in Fig. 5 also includes an acquirer 514.
- the acquirer 514 is typically an acquiring bank with which the merchant 404 has an account.
- Authentication data 414 is included in data which travels in a loop from the issuer 406, to the user software 402, to the merchant 404, to the acquirer 514, to the payment organization 408, and back to the issuer 406, whereupon the issuer confirms that the authentication data 414 have not been improperly altered or otherwise tampered with.
- the system illustrated in Fig. 5 is operated in accordance with the procedure illustrated in Fig. 1.
- the payment procedure 106 used in conjunction with the system illustrated in Fig. 5 includes the acquirer 514 in the loop through which the authentication data 414 and the other data/messages travel, as is discussed in further detail below.
- Fig. 3 illustrates an exemplary payment procedure 106 for use with the system illustrated in Fig. 5.
- the user software 402 sends to the issuer 406, through network portion 428, a request 412 for authentication of the identity of the account holder making the purchase of goods and/or services from the merchant 404 (step 202).
- the issuer 406 sends authentication data 414 through network portion 428, and the authentication data 414 is received by the user software 402 (step 204).
- the user software 402 includes the authentication data 414 in hidden data 416 (step 206), and uses the hidden data 416 to fill the hidden fields in the Web page of the merchant 404 (step 208).
- the user software 402 sends the hidden data 416 to the merchant 404 through network portion 426 (step 210), as discussed above with respect to the procedure illustrated in Fig. 2.
- the merchant 404 derives an authorization request message 506 from the authentication data 416 (step 222), and sends the authorization request message 506 to the acquirer 514 through an additional network or network portion 502 (step 302).
- the acquirer 514 sends an authorization request message 508 to the payment organization 408 through yet another network or network portion 504 (step 304).
- the authorization request message 508 sent from the acquirer 514 to the payment organization 408 is typically identical to, or derived from, the message 506 sent from the merchant 404 to the acquirer 514.
- the payment organization sends an authorization request message 420 to the issuer 406 through network or network portion 432 (step 306).
- the authorization request message 420 sent from the payment organization 408 to the issuer 406 can be identical to, or derived from, the message 506 sent from the merchant 404 to the acquirer 514, and/or can be identical to, or derived from, the message 508 sent from the acquirer 514 to the payment organization 408.
- the issuer 406 uses a verification procedure 216 to process the authorization request message 420 received from the payment organization 408, in order to generate an authorization response message 422.
- the issuer 406 sends the authorization response message 422 to the payment organization 408 through network or network portion 432 (step 308).
- the payment organization 408 sends an authorization response message 510 to the acquirer 514 through network or network portion 504 (step 310).
- the authorization response message 510 sent from the payment organization 408 to the acquirer 514 is typically identical to, or derived from, the message 422 sent from the issuer 406 to the payment organization 408.
- the payment organization 408 can perform the verification procedure 216 on behalf of the issuer 406, as is discussed above with respect to the system illustrated in Fig. 4. If such stand-in processing is to be performed by the payment organization 408, then the payment organization 408 processes authorization request message 508 to generate authorization response message 510.
- the acquirer 514 sends an authorization response message 512 to the merchant 404 through network or network portion 502 (step 312).
- the authorization response message 512 sent from the acquirer 514 to the merchant 404 can be identical to, or derived from, the message 422 sent from the issuer 406 to the payment organization 408, and/or can be identical to, or derived from, the message 510 sent from the payment organization 408 to the acquirer 514.
- the account holder registers with the issuer 406 before downloading the user software 402 for use in AAV-based transactions.
- the registration process provides the following beneficial features:
- the account holder first accesses the issuer's online banking Web site which is accessible from the issuer's Web server 444. If the account holder has already registered for access to the issuer's online banking site, the account holder logs in using his/her existing access credentials. These credentials are verified using any conventional online banking account holder authentication method.
- the issuer 406 requires the account holder to register prior to obtaining the user software 402.
- the issuer 406 strongly authenticates the identity of the account holder before or during registration, in order to ensure the security of subsequent transactions performed with the user software 402.
- the registration process proceeds with account holder profile initialization.
- the account holder is presented with an option to continue registering for the user software 402. Selection of the continued registration option navigates the account holder's Web browser to the user software registration page.
- This page presents the account holder with a list of accounts that can be registered for the software 402, and requests various pieces of information from the account holder in order to set up the account holder's profile within the issuer's verification processor 442.
- the information preferably includes at least the following: • Account Number • Account Expiration Date
- the issuer 406 can automate the profile set-up based on account holder information which is available from the issuer's online banking site. Automating some or all of this process avoids requiring the account holder to re-enter this information, thus providing the account holder with a more convenient registration experience.
- the data collected from the account holder or from the automated interface are sent to the issuer's verification processor 442 as part of the account holder' s registration request.
- the request and its resulting response should be adequately protected during transmission between organizations. For example, the security of the request and response can be ensured by sending these messages over a protected, private network connection, or by encrypting the message prior to transmission over a public network such as the Internet.
- the issuer's verification processor 442 processes the registration request and responds with either: (a) a confirmation that the registration was completed successfully; or (b) an indication that the registration failed, along with a message describing the reason for the failure.
- Issuers should select a strong authentication mechanism that will ensure that the account holder being registered online can be properly identified and validated. When issuers implement the registration process, they should keep the following guidelines/preferences in mind when identifying shared secrets that can be used for authentication purposes: • Multiple pieces of information, rather than just one piece, should be used for the shared secret. For example, the account holder's mother's maiden name and the last four digits of his/her social security number can be used in combination with an issuer- generated password.
- the shared secret should be verifiable. For example, if the account holder's mother's maiden name is to be used, the authorization system should be able to verify this information.
- the issuer 406 can optionally use several pieces of information to determine the shared secret. For example, the following information can be used: • A bank-generated password sent to the billing address of the account holder in a mailer which is separate from the statement.
- a verifiable non-public number such as the last four digits of the account holder's social security number.
- the account holder can download and install the user software 402 onto his/her access device — typically a computer, PDA, or mobile telephone.
- the account holder's access device is preferably configured to run the user software 402 as a part of the initialization/startup sequence of the device, in order to cause the user software 402 to be activated automatically when the account holder navigates to a merchant's purchase page.
- the user software 402 Upon activation and display, the user software 402 requests the account holder's access credentials in order to authenticate the account holder's identity during purchase transactions.
- the access credentials are typically managed by the issuer 402 and preferably include some or all of the following:
- the issuer 406 can choose to store data that tracks AAV generation and account holder transactions. Tracking the history of AAV generation, including the AAV, Card City, Card State/Country and Brand can be of assistance to the issuer 406 in supporting dispute management and chargeback processes.
- the issuer 406 can challenge account holder repudiation based on its records of authentication events and account holder confirmations of transactions. Such a challenge is typically based on the AAV, Card City, Card State/Country and Brand associated with each transaction.
- the issuer 406 can also choose to make the sale history available online to the account holder, thereby reducing the number of customer service inquires.
- the merchant 404 In the case of a purchase involving a split shipment, the merchant 404 preferably requests and obtains authorization for each part of the shipment. When processing a subsequent authorization due to a split shipment, the merchant 404 modifies the Control Byte 804 contained on the initial authorization AAV 802 from hexadecimal "82" to hexadecimal "02." Failure to modify the Control Byte 804 for a subsequent authorization will result in a decline of authorization by the issuer 406.
- the merchant 404 may wish to re-transmit an authorization request after an initial issuer decline. If so, the AAV 802 is transmitted as a subsequent authorization with the Control Byte 804 modified from hexadecimal "82" to hexadecimal "02."
- the merchant 404 may generate, for a given transaction, a second authorization request having an AAV with the same value as the AAV in the original request.
- the second authorization request may not be bit- wise identical to the original request.
- the requests might have different system-trace ID numbers.
- the merchant 404 would typically generate a second authorization request if:
- the merchant 404 does not receive a response to the original authorization request within a pre-determined time-out period; or • The merchant 404 fully reverses the original authorization, but later decides to re-instate it.
- the merchant 404 preferably treats such authorization requests as subsequent authorization requests by flipping the most significant bit of the control byte 804. This will prevent such requests from being erroneously rejected by the issuer 406 as possible replay attacks.
- Figures 1-7 can be implemented on various standard computer platforms operating under the control of suitable software defined by Figs. 1-7.
- dedicated computer hardware such as a peripheral card in a conventional personal computer, can enhance the operational efficiency of the above methods.
- Figs. 9 and 10 illustrate typical computer hardware suitable for practicing the present invention.
- the computer system includes a processing section 910, a display 920, a keyboard 930, and a communications peripheral device 940 such as a modem.
- the system can also include a printer 960.
- the computer system typically includes one or more disk drives 970 which can read and write to computer-readable media such as magnetic media (i.e., diskettes) and/or optical media (e.g., CD-ROMS or DVDs), for storing data and application software.
- diskettes i.e., diskettes
- optical media e.g., CD-ROMS or DVDs
- other input devices such as a digital pointer (e.g., a "mouse" and the like can also be included.
- Computer hardware such as is illustrated in Figs.
- 9 and 10 can be used to run the user software 402 illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5, and/or can be used to perform the functions of the merchant 404, merchant's server 448, acquirer 514, payment and organization 408, verification processor 446, issuer 406, AAV- generation processor 440, verification processor 442, and/or issuer's server 444.
- FIG. 10 is a functional block diagram which further illustrates the processing section 910.
- the processing section 910 generally includes a processing unit 1010, control logic 1020 and a memory unit 1030.
- the processing section 910 can also include a timer 1050 and input/output ports 1040.
- the processing section 910 can also include a co-processor 1060, depending on the microprocessor used in the processing unit.
- Control logic 1020 provides, in conjunction with processing unit 1010, the control necessary to handle communications between memory unit 1030 and input/output ports 1040.
- Timer 1050 provides a timing reference signal for processing unit 1010 and control logic 1020.
- Co-processor 1060 provides an enhanced ability to perform complex computations in real time, such as those required by cryptographic algorithms.
- Memory unit 1030 can include different types of memory, such as volatile and non- volatile memory and read-only and programmable memory.
- memory unit 1030 can include read-only memory (ROM) 1031, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) 1032, and random-access memory (RAM) 1033.
- ROM read-only memory
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
- RAM random-access memory
- Different computer processors, memory configurations, data structures and the like can be used to practice the present invention, and the invention is not limited to a specific platform.
- the processing section 910 is illustrated in Figs. 9 and 10 as part of a computer system, the processing section 910 and/or its components can be incorporated into a PDA or a mobile telephone.
Landscapes
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Development Economics (AREA)
- Economics (AREA)
- Marketing (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (13)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US963274 | 1997-11-03 | ||
US28077601P | 2001-04-02 | 2001-04-02 | |
US280776P | 2001-04-02 | ||
US29563001P | 2001-06-04 | 2001-06-04 | |
US295630P | 2001-06-04 | ||
US09/886,485 US6990470B2 (en) | 2000-04-11 | 2001-06-22 | Method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network |
US886486 | 2001-06-22 | ||
US886485 | 2001-06-22 | ||
US09/886,486 US7177848B2 (en) | 2000-04-11 | 2001-06-22 | Method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network without a pseudo or proxy account number |
US30757501P | 2001-07-24 | 2001-07-24 | |
US307575P | 2001-07-24 | ||
US09/963,274 US20020042781A1 (en) | 2000-09-27 | 2001-09-26 | Universal and interoperable system and method utilizing a universal cardholder authentication field (UCAF) for authentication data collection and validation |
PCT/US2002/010356 WO2002079911A2 (en) | 2001-04-02 | 2002-04-02 | System and method for conducting secure payment transactions |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1374131A2 EP1374131A2 (en) | 2004-01-02 |
EP1374131A4 true EP1374131A4 (en) | 2007-04-18 |
Family
ID=27559554
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP02723747A Ceased EP1374131A4 (en) | 2001-04-02 | 2002-04-02 | System and method for conducting secure payment transactions |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1374131A4 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2004535619A (en) |
AU (1) | AU2002254513B8 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2442814A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2002079911A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1636680B1 (en) * | 2003-06-10 | 2016-04-13 | Mastercard International, Inc. | Systems and methods for conducting secure payment transactions using a formatted data structure |
AU2011239307B2 (en) * | 2003-06-10 | 2015-04-16 | Mastercard International Incorporated | Systems and methods for conducting secure payment transactions using a formatted data structure |
US7941755B2 (en) * | 2007-04-19 | 2011-05-10 | Art Technology Group, Inc. | Method and apparatus for web page co-browsing |
FR3030828A1 (en) * | 2014-12-22 | 2016-06-24 | Orange | METHOD FOR SECURING CONTACTLESS TRANSACTIONS |
US11120443B2 (en) * | 2015-11-11 | 2021-09-14 | Visa International Service Association | Browser extension with additional capabilities |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5960411A (en) * | 1997-09-12 | 1999-09-28 | Amazon.Com, Inc. | Method and system for placing a purchase order via a communications network |
WO2001007873A2 (en) * | 1999-07-21 | 2001-02-01 | E-Payments | A method for performing a transaction over a network |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5557518A (en) * | 1994-04-28 | 1996-09-17 | Citibank, N.A. | Trusted agents for open electronic commerce |
JPH0950465A (en) * | 1995-08-04 | 1997-02-18 | Hitachi Ltd | Electronic shopping method, electronic shopping system and document authentication method |
JP2000322486A (en) * | 1999-02-12 | 2000-11-24 | Citibank Na | Method and system for fulfilling bank card transaction |
FR2806858B1 (en) * | 2000-03-22 | 2002-05-03 | France Telecom | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION AGAINST FRAUD |
US20020083010A1 (en) * | 2000-12-11 | 2002-06-27 | Namsuk Kim | Electronic identification system |
-
2002
- 2002-04-02 AU AU2002254513A patent/AU2002254513B8/en not_active Ceased
- 2002-04-02 CA CA002442814A patent/CA2442814A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2002-04-02 JP JP2002577680A patent/JP2004535619A/en active Pending
- 2002-04-02 EP EP02723747A patent/EP1374131A4/en not_active Ceased
- 2002-04-02 WO PCT/US2002/010356 patent/WO2002079911A2/en active Application Filing
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5960411A (en) * | 1997-09-12 | 1999-09-28 | Amazon.Com, Inc. | Method and system for placing a purchase order via a communications network |
WO2001007873A2 (en) * | 1999-07-21 | 2001-02-01 | E-Payments | A method for performing a transaction over a network |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2002079911A3 (en) | 2003-07-03 |
JP2004535619A (en) | 2004-11-25 |
EP1374131A2 (en) | 2004-01-02 |
CA2442814A1 (en) | 2002-10-10 |
AU2002254513B2 (en) | 2008-01-31 |
WO2002079911A2 (en) | 2002-10-10 |
AU2002254513B8 (en) | 2008-02-21 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US6915279B2 (en) | System and method for conducting secure payment transactions | |
US7983987B2 (en) | System and method for conducting secure payment transaction | |
JP4880171B2 (en) | Authenticated payment | |
US6990470B2 (en) | Method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
AU2011201884B2 (en) | Systems and methods for conducting secure payment transactions using a formatted data structure | |
US7379919B2 (en) | Method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
US20020120584A1 (en) | Method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network without a pseudo or proxy account number | |
CA2406375C (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
AU2001257019A1 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
AU781671B2 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
AU2002254513B2 (en) | System and method for conducting secure payment transactions | |
AU2002254513A1 (en) | System and method for conducting secure payment transactions | |
AU2001270012B2 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network without a pseudo or proxy account number | |
AU2001270012A1 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network without a pseudo or proxy account number | |
ZA200307558B (en) | System and method for conducting secure payment transactions. | |
AU2007216920B2 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
AU2012201255B2 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
EP1921579A2 (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network | |
ZA200208248B (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network. | |
ZA200201382B (en) | An improved method and system for conducting secure payments over a computer network. |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20031009 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A2 Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: AL LT LV MK RO SI |
|
RIN1 | Information on inventor provided before grant (corrected) |
Inventor name: ORFEI, STEPHEN Inventor name: RUTHERFORD, BRUCE Inventor name: KRANZLEY, ARTHUR Inventor name: CAMPBELL, CARL Inventor name: HOGAN, EDWARD, J. |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: HK Ref legal event code: DE Ref document number: 1062719 Country of ref document: HK |
|
A4 | Supplementary search report drawn up and despatched |
Effective date: 20070321 |
|
17Q | First examination report despatched |
Effective date: 20070822 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN REFUSED |
|
18R | Application refused |
Effective date: 20081120 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: HK Ref legal event code: WD Ref document number: 1062719 Country of ref document: HK |