EP1344137A1 - Method and device for making secure data processing - Google Patents
Method and device for making secure data processingInfo
- Publication number
- EP1344137A1 EP1344137A1 EP01996790A EP01996790A EP1344137A1 EP 1344137 A1 EP1344137 A1 EP 1344137A1 EP 01996790 A EP01996790 A EP 01996790A EP 01996790 A EP01996790 A EP 01996790A EP 1344137 A1 EP1344137 A1 EP 1344137A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- data
- dedicated area
- length
- offset
- memory
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 38
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 18
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 claims description 13
- 230000002265 prevention Effects 0.000 claims 2
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005265 energy consumption Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005457 optimization Methods 0.000 description 1
- 229920001690 polydopamine Polymers 0.000 description 1
- 230000005855 radiation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/75—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
- G06F21/755—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/77—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in smart cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
- G06Q20/10—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems
- G06Q20/105—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems involving programming of a portable memory device, e.g. IC cards, "electronic purses"
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0806—Details of the card
- G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
- G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
Definitions
- the present invention relates to electronic devices. More particularly, the present invention relates to a method for securing an internal processing of electronic devices.
- the present invention relates to electronic devices. More particularly, the present invention relates to a method for securing an internal processing of electronic devices. Technological background of the invention
- Chip cards as a particular embodiment of electronic devices, were originally designed to improve the security of distributed systems.
- Smart card applications include, for example, phone cards, identification cards, medical cards, transaction cards (debit / credit bank cards, department store or restaurant loyalty cards, etc.) and security cards. All of these applications require that certain sensitive and confidential data be processed inside the smart card.
- an electronic device 10 traditionally includes a Central Processing Unit (CPU) 12, which is the main processor / controller of the electronic device 10.
- the CPU 12 can optionally include a large number of internal registers 13, such as, for example, in reduced instruction set computers (RISC).
- RISC reduced instruction set computers
- the electronic device 10 also includes a volatile memory in the form of a RAM
- RAM Random Access Memory
- ROM Read only memory
- EEPROM Electrically Erasable
- Cache a Cache 15 which are all coupled to the CPU 12.
- volatile memory can include RAM, Internal Registers and / or the Cache.
- An input / output (I / O) device such as a terminal 20, allows a smart card 10 to share data with a distributed system (not shown), by controlling the inputs / outputs to and from the electronic device 10 , via the CPU 12.
- the smart card 10 includes an I / O port (not shown) making it possible to transfer the data to and from the I / O device 20.
- the CPU 12 processes instructions for managing the data stored in the electronic device and includes a program which provides protection against access to sensitive and / or confidential data contained and processed in the smart card 10 by unauthorized entities, such as , for example, hackers.
- sensitive information and / or confidential contained or treated in the device have an important value (financial or other) for their holder.
- the power analysis is based on the measurement of the power consumption during the processing of confidential information encoded in binary in a smart card.
- RF analysis consists of intercepting and analyzing the radio frequency emitted during the transfer of confidential data. These two types of attack use either the variation in energy consumption or the variation in RF radiation emitted during the processing of confidential data. Knowing one of these variations allows mathematically to recover confidential data.
- conventional secure programs used in electronic devices include means for temporarily storing confidential data in volatile memory, in a given, predetermined location in memory, since it has been found to be preferable to for execution, to work with fixed memory locations. Therefore, only confidential data can change in the storage and reading process since the memory location do not change.
- hackers may attempt to retrieve confidential data, using "side scan” attacks Or similar attack.
- FIG. 2 which is entitled “prior art” illustrates a dedicated area 19 in which the confidential data 21, of size k, are stored.
- a method for securing the storage of data in a volatile memory of an electronic device comprising the following steps: definition of a dedicated area in the volatile memory; the length of the dedicated area being at least equal to the length of the data which must be stored; definition, at random, of an offset from the start of the dedicated area; and transferring the data to the area dedicated to the data at a location in the memory determined by the offset; which allows the data to be transferred to a random location in the memory in the dedicated area.
- a device for securing the storage of data in a volatile memory of an electronic device comprising: means making it possible to define a dedicated area in the volatile memory; the length of the dedicated area being at least equal to the length of the data which must be stored; means making it possible to define, at random, an offset from the start of the dedicated area; and means for transferring the data to the dedicated area for the data, in a memory location determined by the offset; which allows the data to be transferred to a randomly determined memory location in the dedicated area.
- a secure electronic device making it possible to process data received from an input / output device, this device comprising: an Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory (EEPROM) making it possible to receive the data from the input / output device; an input / output port for transferring data between the input / output device and the EEPROM; a volatile memory making it possible to transfer the data during the processing; volatile memory including a dedicated area; the length of the dedicated area being at least equal to the length of the data to be transferred; and a data processing CPU comprising means for determining a random offset and data transfer means responsive to the random offset and interposed between the data and a memory location of the dedicated area determined by the offset.
- EEPROM Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory
- FIG. 1 which is entitled “prior art”, is a block diagram illustrating the main elements of an electronic device
- Figure 2 which is entitled “prior art”
- Figure 3 is a schematic illustration of a dedicated area in which confidential data has been stored, according to a first embodiment of the present invention
- Figure 4 is a flow chart of a method for randomly allocating a volatile memory area according to a first embodiment of the present invention
- Figure 5 is a schematic illustration of a RAM buffer, in which confidential data has been stored, according to a second embodiment of the present invention
- Figure 6 is a flowchart of a method for randomly allocating memory according to a second embodiment of the present invention. Description of the preferred embodiment
- the present innovation consists of a method for securing the processing of data from an electronic device using a random memory location for the storage of confidential data.
- the method according to the present invention prevents the recovery of confidential data by means, for example, of a side channel signal analysis during the processing of confidential data therein.
- the method of the invention also makes the lateral analysis during the secret processing more complex by adding an unknown parameter, that is to say, a random memory location, in a data area provided in the memory. volatile electronic device.
- This process can be carried out inside an electronic device 10, using, for example, digital software.
- the first embodiment of the method of the present invention involves a dedicated area in a volatile memory 22 having a length (2k) which is greater than the length (k) of the confidential data 24 which should be stored in it.
- the length of the dedicated zone 22 can also be predetermined.
- the length of the dedicated area 22 has been selected as being twice the length of the confidential data 24.
- the confidential data 24 are not necessarily stored at the start of the dedicated area 22, but start at a random memory location inside the dedicated area 22 which is determined by a offset value 26.
- the first step 28 consists in defining a dedicated area 22 in a volatile memory 14 of the electronic device 10.
- a dedicated area 22 in a volatile memory 14 is a RAM buffer.
- the dedicated area 22 has a predetermined length (in the present example, 2k).
- a random offset value 26 is defined for the address for storing the confidential data 24 inside the dedicated area 22.
- the data confidential 24 are stored in volatile memory 14 at the storage address defined by the starting address 23 of the dedicated area 22 plus the offset 26. It should be noted that, since all of the confidential data 24 must be stored in the dedicated area 22, the random offset 26 must be chosen randomly so as to prevent confidential data 24 from going beyond the dedicated area 22. This can be obtained by selecting a random number between zero and the difference between the length of the dedicated area 22 and the length of confidential data 24 minus 1.
- step 32 the confidential data 24 are transferred from the non-volatile memory 18 to the address defined by the starting address 23 of the dedicated area 22 in the volatile memory 14 plus the offset 26.
- the expression transferred aims, in this case, to include storage, access or any other operation carried out on confidential data 24.
- the confidential data 24 can then be processed or can access it directly from their location in the dedicated zone 22 in the volatile memory 14.
- the data 24 is transferred to a randomly determined memory location, in the dedicated data area 22, which makes analysis, and consequently attacks, more difficult (for example, lateral attacks).
- the dedicated area 22 defining step 28 can be omitted, for example, in the case of the management of the static memory when 'A dedicated area is defined during the compilation / linking of the program.
- FIGS. 5 and 6 A second embodiment of the method of the present invention will now be described with reference to FIGS. 5 and 6.
- the main distinction between the first and second embodiments lies in the approach used to store confidential data in the dedicated area.
- the dedicated area 100 has the same length as the confidential data 102 which must be stored there.
- each confidential data bit 102 has been illustrated separately, with its position in a memory location 104, 105, 106 and 110 in the dedicated area 100 represented in square brackets for example CD [0] for the first bit of confidential data 102 and CD [k-1] for the last.
- Confidential data 102 is stored in dedicated area 100 starting at a memory location 105 determined by the start of dedicated area 22 and by random shift 108. However, confidential data 102 is looped until the start 106 of the dedicated area 100 once the end 110 of the dedicated zone 100 has been reached. Consequently, depending on the value of the offset 108, each bit of the confidential data 102 can take any memory location in the dedicated area 100.
- FIG. 6 summarizes the method according to this second embodiment.
- a dedicated area 100 (RAM buffer) is defined in the volatile memory 14.
- the length of the dedicated area is advantageously the same as the length of the confidential data.
- a random offset 108 is defined for the address for storing the confidential data 102. Again, the value of the offset is between zero (0) and k-1.
- the first part of the confidential data 102 is transferred to the dedicated zone 100 at the address defined by the offset 108. The length of the first part of the confidential data 102 corresponds to the difference between the length of the zone dedicated and the offset 108.
- step 118 the last part of the confidential data 102 is transferred to the start of the dedicated area 100.
- the confidential data 102 can be processed or can be accessed directly from their location in the dedicated area 100.
- the offset value can be chosen, at random, at the start of a session instead of being chosen at the start of each storage operation.
- the nature of the electronic device is not limited to smart cards as described above.
- the method of the present invention could be advantageously implemented in other types of electronic devices such as, for example, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs and cell phones.
- PDAs Personal Digital Assistants
- cell phones Cell phones
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Economics (AREA)
- Development Economics (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Read Only Memory (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CA2326036 | 2000-11-16 | ||
CA002326036A CA2326036A1 (en) | 2000-11-16 | 2000-11-16 | Method for securing electronic device data processing |
PCT/FR2001/003582 WO2002041151A1 (en) | 2000-11-16 | 2001-11-15 | Method and device for making secure data processing |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1344137A1 true EP1344137A1 (en) | 2003-09-17 |
Family
ID=4167673
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP01996790A Ceased EP1344137A1 (en) | 2000-11-16 | 2001-11-15 | Method and device for making secure data processing |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (2) | US8006058B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1344137A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN1484791A (en) |
AU (1) | AU2002220786A1 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2326036A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2002041151A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
TW554268B (en) * | 2001-12-28 | 2003-09-21 | Via Tech Inc | Data storage security method |
CN1293485C (en) * | 2003-07-23 | 2007-01-03 | 凌阳科技股份有限公司 | Processor unit and method for protecting data by data block confounding processing |
EP1612639A1 (en) * | 2004-06-30 | 2006-01-04 | ST Incard S.r.l. | Method for detecting and reacting against possible attack to security enforcing operation performed by a cryptographic token or card |
SG162825A1 (en) * | 2005-06-24 | 2010-07-29 | Research In Motion Ltd | System and method for managing memory in a mobile device |
EP1949292A1 (en) * | 2005-11-04 | 2008-07-30 | Gemplus SA. | Method for securely handling data during the running of cryptographic algorithms on embedded systems |
KR20090043823A (en) * | 2007-10-30 | 2009-05-07 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Memory system for sensing external attack |
EP2259488A1 (en) * | 2008-03-25 | 2010-12-08 | Mitsubishi Electric Corporation | Encryption operation device, encryption operation program, and recording medium |
US9449197B2 (en) * | 2013-06-13 | 2016-09-20 | Global Foundries Inc. | Pooling entropy to facilitate mobile device-based true random number generation |
CN104766117B (en) * | 2014-01-07 | 2019-04-26 | 国民技术股份有限公司 | Smart card and its data processing method |
US9418231B2 (en) | 2014-06-03 | 2016-08-16 | Empire Technology Development Llc | Perturbation of field programmable gate array code to prevent side channel attack |
CN116226673B (en) * | 2023-05-05 | 2023-07-07 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | Training method of buffer region vulnerability recognition model, vulnerability detection method and device |
Family Cites Families (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5081675A (en) * | 1989-11-13 | 1992-01-14 | Kitti Kittirutsunetorn | System for protection of software in memory against unauthorized use |
JP2933090B2 (en) * | 1990-04-25 | 1999-08-09 | 富士通株式会社 | Nonvolatile semiconductor memory device |
US5313582A (en) * | 1991-04-30 | 1994-05-17 | Standard Microsystems Corporation | Method and apparatus for buffering data within stations of a communication network |
JPH07503564A (en) * | 1992-05-12 | 1995-04-13 | インターナシヨナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーシヨン | Method and apparatus for reducing memory wear in computer systems |
US5969632A (en) * | 1996-11-22 | 1999-10-19 | Diamant; Erez | Information security method and apparatus |
US6115760A (en) * | 1998-08-24 | 2000-09-05 | 3Com Corporation | Intelligent scaleable FIFO buffer circuit for interfacing between digital domains |
JP2002529635A (en) | 1998-10-30 | 2002-09-10 | ポーレット メルモス ウォルターズ,クリストファー | Valve control mechanism |
FR2787216B1 (en) * | 1998-12-11 | 2001-07-27 | Bull Cp8 | METHOD FOR STORAGE AND OPERATION OF INFORMATION UNITS IN A SECURITY MODULE, AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY MODULE |
-
2000
- 2000-11-16 CA CA002326036A patent/CA2326036A1/en not_active Abandoned
-
2001
- 2001-11-15 WO PCT/FR2001/003582 patent/WO2002041151A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2001-11-15 AU AU2002220786A patent/AU2002220786A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2001-11-15 CN CNA018217729A patent/CN1484791A/en active Pending
- 2001-11-15 US US10/416,754 patent/US8006058B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2001-11-15 EP EP01996790A patent/EP1344137A1/en not_active Ceased
-
2011
- 2011-08-22 US US13/214,501 patent/US20110307650A1/en not_active Abandoned
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO0241151A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU2002220786A1 (en) | 2002-05-27 |
US8006058B2 (en) | 2011-08-23 |
CA2326036A1 (en) | 2002-05-16 |
WO2002041151A1 (en) | 2002-05-23 |
US20110307650A1 (en) | 2011-12-15 |
US20040093306A1 (en) | 2004-05-13 |
CN1484791A (en) | 2004-03-24 |
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