Classifications

• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
  • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
  • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
  • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
  • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
  • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
  • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/06—Authentication
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
  • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
  • H04W88/02—Terminal devices

Definitions

• the telephone operator marketing SIM cards is unable to foresee, when they are configured, the introduction of all the mother keys in each SIM card, relating to the different additional cards or to the applications which they contain. It is therefore impossible to memorize all the mother keys of the additional cards in the SIM identity cards.
• the terminal TE also includes a speech coding and decoding circuit 31 connected to a microphone 310 and a loudspeaker 311, a microprocessor 32 associated with a non-volatile memory of EEPROM programs 33 and a RAM data memory 34 , and an input-output interface 35 serving the SIM and CA smart cards, a keyboard 36 and a graphic display 37.
• the microprocessor 32 is connected by a bus BU to the interface 30, to the circuit 31, and to the memories 33 and 34 and " by another bus BS at the input-output interface 35.
• the SIM card and the SO short message server communicate through a bidirectional short message service (SMS) channel.
• SMS short message service
• the first authentication A1 assures the additional card C1 that the "daughter" key KA of the selected application AP has indeed been determined by the network RR, that is to say by the server SO.
• the first authentication A1 includes steps Ail to A16. Following step E8, the SIM card transmits a random number request message to the card CA in step Ail.
• the card CA reads a random number NC from its non-volatile memory 22, or else supplies this random number NC thanks to a pseudo-random generator included in the processor 20, in step A12.
• the random number NC is transmitted from the CA card to the SIM card which stores it temporarily.
• an encryption key KC is determined by applying the random numbers NC and
• the encrypted key KAC which is decrypted into the initial key KA in step E15.
• the key KA is then stored in the RAM memory 13 of the SIM card so to use it for mutual authentication of the SIM and CA cards according to the algorithm shown in FIG. 4, or for the determination of the data unit encryption key according to the algorithm shown in FIG. 5.
• the determined number NCi is then transmitted to "first "controller in the SIM card so that the latter selects the set of parameters [NCi, SSi, NSi, RSi] in the quadruplet table received as a function of the determined number NCi transmitted in step al3.
• the invention has been described above with respect to securing data exchange between the controllers of two SIM and CA smart cards, the invention applies generally to securing between any first controller and any second controller having to communicate with each other, the term controller covering a data processing means or unit, such as a microprocessor, or even more completely an entity, such as a terminal, a server, etc.
• the first controller may be a point of sale terminal and the second controller a credit card, the telecommunications network to which the terminal is connected then being the switched telephone network.
• the first and second controllers are those of a dual-mode radiotelephone terminal.

Landscapes

• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Publications (1)

Family

ID=8850755

Family Applications (1)

Country Status (6)

Families Citing this family (28)

Family Cites Families (8)

• 2000
  • 2000-05-26 FR FR0006880A patent/FR2809555B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
• 2001
  • 2001-05-25 EP EP01938340A patent/EP1290646A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
  • 2001-05-25 US US10/296,547 patent/US20030119482A1/en not_active Abandoned
  • 2001-05-25 CN CNB018133568A patent/CN1185586C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
  • 2001-05-25 WO PCT/FR2001/001621 patent/WO2001093215A1/fr not_active Application Discontinuation
  • 2001-05-25 AU AU2001264025A patent/AU2001264025A1/en not_active Abandoned

Non-Patent Citations (2)

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