EP1170691A1 - System und Verfahren für eine leistungsfähige und dynamische Auktion von mehreren Gegenständen - Google Patents

System und Verfahren für eine leistungsfähige und dynamische Auktion von mehreren Gegenständen Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP1170691A1
EP1170691A1 EP01305804A EP01305804A EP1170691A1 EP 1170691 A1 EP1170691 A1 EP 1170691A1 EP 01305804 A EP01305804 A EP 01305804A EP 01305804 A EP01305804 A EP 01305804A EP 1170691 A1 EP1170691 A1 EP 1170691A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
bids
price
bidders
auction
items
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP01305804A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Lawrence Ausubel
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of EP1170691A1 publication Critical patent/EP1170691A1/de
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/08—Auctions

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to improving computer-implemented auctions and, more particularly, to computer implementation of an efficient dynamic multi-unit auction.
  • Auction formats in the art tend generally to be of the sealed-bid or ascending-bid variety.
  • bidders - in one single bidding round - simultaneously and independently submit bids to the auctioneer, who then determines the auction outcome.
  • bidders - in a dynamic bidding process submit bids in real time until no more bids are forthcoming.
  • An ascending-bid format offers the advantage that there is feedback among participants' bids: each bidder is able to infer other bidders' information about the value of the item(s) as the auction progresses and incorporate this information into his subsequent bids. This feedback tends to result in more efficient auction outcomes as well as in more aggressive bidding, resulting in higher expected revenues for the seller.
  • the present invention aims to provide a system and method for implementing on a computer a dynamic multi-unit auction in which the price paid or received by bidders tends to be independent of their own bids, in which participants may be provided with information concerning their competitors' bids as the auction progresses, and in which the confidentiality of high values is maintained.
  • This provides the advantage of improving the economic efficiency of the auction design over the prior art.
  • the present invention usefully enables a seller or buyer to efficiently auction multiple types of goods or services, and to efficiently auction items with complex possibilities for substitution.
  • the present invention aims to provide a computer or computer system that receives bids from a plurality of bidders for a plurality of items in a dynamic bidding process and usually determines an allocation of the items among bidders.
  • the present invention is also a computer-implemented method for receiving bids from a plurality of bidders for a plurality of items in a dynamic bidding process and usually determining an allocation of the items among bidders.
  • the present invention is also a machine-readable medium having stored thereon data representing sequences of instructions, which when executed by a computer or computer system, cause said computer or computer system to receive bids from a plurality of bidders for a plurality of items in a dynamic bidding process and usually to determine an allocation of the items among bidders.
  • the invention comprises a bidding information processor (BIP) together with an auctioneer terminal (AT) and a plurality of bidder terminals (BT's) which communicate with the bidding information processor via a network.
  • BIP bidding information processor
  • AT auctioneer terminal
  • BT's bidder terminals
  • Bidders at the bidder terminals enter bids in multiple rounds, and may observe displayed auction information.
  • the auctioneer at the auctioneer terminal controls the progress of the auction.
  • the BIP, the AT, and the BT's communicate and process information in order to conduct an auction.
  • An auction in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention proceeds as follows.
  • the auctioneer i.e., the auctioneer terminal
  • the auctioneer communicates the price vector to the auction computer (i.e., bidding information processor), which in turn communicates it to bidders (i.e., bidder terminals).
  • bidders i.e., bidder terminals.
  • plural bidders respond with bid vectors indicating the quantity of each respective type of item that the bidder wishes to transact at the current price vector.
  • the auction computer determines, based on the received bids, whether the auction should continue. Typically, the starting price vector is selected such that the aggregate quantity of each type of item desired by all the bidders (i.e., ) is greater than the quantity of each type of item being auctioned (i.e., Q k ).
  • the auction computer determines that the auction will continue, and either the auction computer or the auctioneer will establish a revised price vector (which is typically larger in each of its m components than the initial price vector).
  • the auction computer then sends to one or more bidders the revised price vector.
  • plural bidders respond with bid vectors indicating the quantity of each respective type of item that the bidder wishes to transact at the revised price vector.
  • the aggregate quantity of each type of item desired by all the bidders will not equal the available quantity, and a determination is again made that the auction should continue. Nevertheless, one or more items of a particular type may be credited with a particular bidder.
  • the item(s), if any, will be credited at a price in a closed interval between the price contained in the (previous) price vector and the price contained in the revised price vector.
  • items are credited at the price contained in the revised price vector; in another embodiment, items are credited at the price contained in the (previous) price vector; and in a third embodiment, items are credited at the average of the price contained in the revised price vector and the price contained in the (previous) price vector.
  • the determination of whether a particular bidder is credited with a selected type of item is based on whether the sum of the bids of other bidders at the revised price vector is different from the sum of the bids of other bidders at the (previous) price vector.
  • the particular bidder is credited with a number of the selected type of items equal to the change in the sum of the bids of other bidders. This process continues until a determination is made that the auction should not continue.
  • the items are allocated to bidders according to their final bid vectors, and the payments of bidders are based on the cumulative sequence of credits that occurred during the course of the auction.
  • One exemplary constraint is an activity rule which constrains a bidder not to increase his quantity, summed over the m types of items, from one bid in the auction to the next.
  • Another exemplary constraint is a more stringent activity rule which constrains a bidder not to increase his quantity, summed over a group of types of items, from one bid in the auction to the next.
  • a third exemplary constraint is a more stringent activity rule which constrains a bidder not to increase his quantity, individually on each of the m types of items, from one bid in the auction to the next.
  • a fourth exemplary constraint is a reduction rule which constrains a bidder not to decrease his quantity, for any single type of item, beyond the point where the sum of the quantities bid for this type of item by all bidders equals the sum of the quantities being auctioned. (If, in a given round, two or more bidders simultaneously attempt to decrease their quantities, for any single type of item, having the effect of reducing bids beyond the point where the sum of the quantities bid for this type of item by all bidders equals the sum of the quantities being auctioned, the auction procedure will resolve this discrepancy. For example, the auctioneer may honor these attempts to decrease in order of time priority, or may ration these simultaneous attempts to decrease in proportion to the attempted reductions.)
  • computerized conduct of the auction allows the auction to be conducted with all bidding information taken into account, while controlling the degree to which the information itself is disclosed to the participants.
  • Computerized conduct of the auction also allows the auction to be conducted swiftly and reliably, even if bidders are not located on-site. The amount of information which is transmitted to the bidder terminals and/or actually displayed to the bidders may be carefully controlled.
  • all bidding information is displayed to the bidders.
  • no bidding information is displayed to the bidders; only the results of the auction are displayed.
  • a number of intermediate embodiments are also possible, in which some but not all bidding information is displayed to the bidders.
  • the auctioneer disclose only the aggregate quantity bid for each type of item in each round, as opposed to disclosing each individual bid.
  • My prior patent 6,026,383 treats auctions for multiple, identical objects and close substitutes.
  • the earlier application's efficient auction with one price clock exploited features of the homogeneous-good environment to construct an eminently-simple dynamic procedure.
  • My other prior patents, "Computer Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions” U.S. Patent Number 5,905,975, issued 18 May 1999, and U.S. Patent Number 6,021,398, issued 1 Feb 2000, describe other auction designs for multiple, dissimilar items.
  • the current auction design appears likely in practice to be simpler and to run more swiftly, as well as placing lower computational demands on bidders.
  • the present invention extends my auction design described in U.S. patent 6,026,383 to treat ⁇ in a simple way ⁇ the case of auctioning a set of items which includes two (or more) items that are neither identical nor perfect substitutes to one another, so that two or more price clocks are required.
  • heterogeneous items auctioned together will bear some relationship to one another: for example, they may be licenses or rights to perform essentially the same activity at different geographic locations; or they may be securities issued by the same entity but with different durations to maturity; or they may be related goods with slightly different characteristics that render them only imperfect substitutes.
  • the present invention may also be better suited than previous auction designs for treating the case of identical objects or perfect substitutes which exhibit "increasing returns" for bidders.
  • "Increasing returns” refers to a situation where the extra value that a bidder derives from an ( N +1) st unit is greater than the extra value that a bidder derives from an N th unit. For example, this would include a situation where the utility from two units is strictly more than double the utility derived from one unit.
  • the present invention is useful for conducting auctions involving items offered for sale by the bidders, as well as items offered for sale to the bidders.
  • terms such as “vector of quantities demanded” (by a bidder) and “demand curve” (of a bidder) are used to describe the present invention
  • the terms “vector of quantities offered” (by a bidder) and “supply curve” (of a bidder) are equally applicable. In some cases, this is made explicit by the use of both terms, or by the use of the terms “vector of quantities transacted” (by a bidder) and “transaction curve” (of a bidder).
  • quantities transacted includes both "quantities demanded” and "quantities offered”.
  • bid includes both offers to sell and offers to buy.
  • transaction curve includes both “demand curve” and “supply curve”.
  • any references to "quantities being offered” includes both “quantities being sold” by the auctioneer, in the case this is an auction for selling items, as well as “quantities being bought or procured” by the auctioneer, in the case this is an auction for buying items or procuring items.
  • the present invention may utilize prices that ascend and/or descend.
  • One useful situation in which the price would be allowed to descend is a procurement auction or "reverse auction," an auction to buy.
  • inventive system may be used both for tangible objects, such as real or personal property, and intangible items, such as telecommunications licenses or electric power.
  • inventive system may be used in auctions where the auctioneer is a seller, buyer or broker, the bidders are buyers, sellers or brokers, and for auction-like activities which cannot be interpreted as selling or buying.
  • the inventive system may be used for items including, but not restricted to, the following: public-sector bonds, bills, notes, stocks, and other securities or derivatives; private-sector bonds, bills, notes, stocks, and other securities or derivatives; communication licenses and spectrum rights; clearing, relocation or other rights concerning encumbrances of spectrum licenses; electric power and other commodity items; rights for terminal, entry, exit or transmission capacities or other rights in gas pipeline systems; airport landing rights; emission allowances and pollution permits; and other goods, services, objects, items or other property, tangible or intangible. It may also be used for option contracts on any of the above. It may be used in initial public offerings, secondary offerings, and in secondary or resale markets.
  • the network used can be any system capable of providing the necessary communication to/from BIP, BT, and AT.
  • the network may be a local or wide area network such as, for example, ethernet, token ring, the Internet, the World Wide Web, the information superhighway, an intranet or a virtual private network, or alternatively a telephone system, either private or public, a facsimile system, an electronic mail system, or a wireless communications system.
  • the computer system consists of multiple clients 20a-n and 30 communicating with the server 10 over a network 40.
  • the clients 20a-n are the bidders
  • the client 30 is the auctioneer
  • the server 10 is the auction computer.
  • the server 10 consists of a CPU 11, memory 12, a data storage device 13, a communications interface 14, a clock 15, an operating system 16, and an auction program 17.
  • FIG. 2 is another graphical depiction of an exemplary computer system in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the auction system of Figure 2 includes an auction computer 60 (sometimes also referred to as a Bidding Information Processor or BIP), a plurality of user systems 70a, 70b and so on (sometimes also referred to as Bidder Terminal or BT), each user system 70a-n representing an individual bidder, and a user system 80 (sometimes also referred to as an Auctioneer Terminal or AT).
  • BIP Bidding Information Processor
  • BT Bidder Terminal
  • each user system 70a-n representing an individual bidder
  • a user system 80 sometimes also referred to as an Auctioneer Terminal or AT.
  • the systems 60, 70a-n, and 80 communicate over a network 90.
  • the network represents any system capable of providing the necessary communication to/from BIP, BT, and AT.
  • the network may be a local or wide area network such as, for example, ethernet, token ring, the Internet, the World Wide Web, the information superhighway, an intranet or a virtual private network, or alternatively a telephone system, either private or public, a facsimile system, an electronic mail system, or a wireless communications system.
  • Each of the systems 60, 70a-n, and 80 may include a typical user interface 65, 75a-n, 85 for input/output which may include a conventional keyboard, display, and other input/output devices.
  • the user interface (65, 75a-n, 85) is coupled to a network interface (64, 74a-n, 84), which in turn communicates via the network 90.
  • Both the user interface and network interface connect, at each system, to a CPU (62, 72a-n, 82).
  • Each system includes a memory (66, 76a-n, 86).
  • the BIP 60 also includes a clock 61 and a data storage device 63, which will ordinarily contain a database. (However, in some embodiments the database might instead be stored in memory 66.)
  • the memory 66 of the BIP 60 can further be broken down into a program 67, data 68 and an operating system 69.
  • the memory (76a-n, 86) of the BT's 70a-n and the AT 80 may include a web browser (for example, Internet Explorer or Netscape) (79, 89) or other general-purpose software, but not necessarily any computer program specific to the auction process.
  • the CPU (62, 72a-n, 82) represents a source of intelligence when executing instructions from the memory (66, 76a-n, 86) so that appropriate input/output operations via the user interface and the network interface take place as is conventional in the art.
  • the particular steps used in implementing the inventive auction system are described in more detail below.
  • each of the systems are personal computers or workstations.
  • FIG. 3 is a more detailed illustration of an exemplary BIP 60 showing details of the database.
  • the database is ordinarily stored on a data storage device 63, although in some embodiments it might instead be stored in memory 66.
  • the database includes provision for creating, storing, and retrieving records representing Items in the Auction 63-1, Status of the Items in the Auction 63-2, Auction Schedule 63-3, Current Price(s) 63-4, List of Bidder ID's 63-5, List of Passwords 63-6, Bidding History 63-7, and Constraints on Bids 63-8.
  • the particular set of data required for any particular auction and the format of that datum or data is more particularly specified by the detailed description of that auction.
  • a type of item is defined so that two units of the same type are identical items or close substitutes, while two units of different types exhibit significant differences in time, location or any other product characteristics. Typically, there are multiple units of each type of item. Items or commodities are defined to be heterogeneous when there are two or more types of items.
  • An auction in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention proceeds as follows.
  • the auctioneer i.e., the auctioneer terminal
  • the bidding information processor determines a starting price vector, ( P 1 , ... , P m ), and transmits it to the bidding information processor, which in turn transmits it to bidders (i.e., bidder terminals).
  • a bidder responds with a bid vector indicating the quantity of each respective type of item that the bidder wishes to transact at the current price vector.
  • the bid vector for bidder i is denoted by ( Q 1 i , ... , Q m i ).
  • the following definitions are helpful in describing the process associated with a first embodiment of the present invention.
  • the available quantities ( Q 1 , ... , Q m ) refer, in the case of an auction to sell, to the quantities of the m respective types of items offered to be sold in the auction or, in the case of an auction to buy (i.e., a procurement auction or a "reverse auction"), to the quantities of the m respective types of items offered to be bought in the auction.
  • the available quantities may be allowed to depend on the prices, or otherwise be contingent on the progress of the auction.
  • the current prices comprise a vector, ( P 1 , ... , P m ), whose components represent the prices for the m respective types of items.
  • the current bid of bidder i comprises a vector, ( Q 1 i , ... , Q m i ), whose components represent the quantities that bidder i is willing to buy (in the case of an auction to sell) or to sell (in the case of an auction to buy) at the current prices for the m respective types of items.
  • the bidding history comprises the current prices and the current bids associated with the present time and all earlier times in the current auction.
  • a clock auction is a dynamic auction procedure whereby: the auctioneer announces the current prices to bidders; the bidders respond with current bids; the auctioneer determines whether the auction should continue based on the bidding history; the auctioneer updates the current prices based on the bidding history and the process repeats, if it is determined that the auction should continue; and the auctioneer allocates the items among the bidders and assesses payments among the bidders based on the bidding history, if it is determined that the auction should not continue.
  • a "clock auction" differs from a standard ascending-bid electronic auction in the following important sense.
  • standard ascending-bid electronic auctions such as in the Federal Communications Commission auctions for radio communications spectrum or in eBay auctions ⁇ the bidders name prices (and, perhaps also, quantities) that they propose to pay for the items being auctioned, in an iterative process.
  • the auctioneer sets the pace for price increases, and bidders respond only with quantities in an iterative process. (However, in the discussion of Intra-Round Bids, below, it will be seen that there still may be a role for bidders naming prices ⁇ to a limited extent ⁇ in a clock auction.)
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a clock auction in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • the process starts with step 102, in which memory locations of a computer are initialized.
  • the appropriate memory locations of the bidding information processor (auction computer) are initialized with information such as the items in the auction, the available quantity of each type of item in the auction, the initial price vector, the auction schedule, a list of bidder ID's, and a list of passwords.
  • a computer outputs auction information, including the starting price vector ( P 1 , ... , P m ).
  • the bidding information processor outputs the auction information through its network interface and transmits it via the network.
  • the bidder terminals then receive the auction information through their network interfaces and display the information to bidders through their user interfaces.
  • a computer receives bids ( Q 1 i , ... , Q m i ) from bidders.
  • a bidder inputs his bids through the user interface of the bidder terminal, which then outputs the auction information through its network interface and transmits it via the network.
  • the bidding information processor then receives the bids through its network interface for use in the next step.
  • a computer applies constraints, if any, to the received bids, and enters only those bids that satisfy said constraints. This process is illustrated in greater detail in Figures 6a and 6b.
  • the constraints are applied at the bidding information processor, although they may also easily be applied at the bidder terminals.
  • a computer calculates changes, if any, to bidders' payment accounts, based on the entered bids. This process is shown in more detail in Figure 5. In one preferred embodiment, the changes to bidders' payment accounts are calculated at the bidding information processor.
  • a computer determines whether the auction should continue. An exemplary process of step 112 is illustrated in greater detail in Figures 7. In one preferred embodiment, this determination occurs at the bidding information processor.
  • step 114 in which a computer updates the price vector ( P 1 , ... , P m ), and step 116, in which a computer updates other auction information, if any.
  • An exemplary process of step 114 is illustrated in greater detail in Figure 8.
  • the bidding information processor automatically generates a suggested revised price vector, outputs the suggested revised price vector through its network interface, and transmits it via the network.
  • the auctioneer terminal receives the suggested revised price vector through its network interface and displays it to the auctioneer through its user interface.
  • the auctioneer either approves or modifies the revised price vector through the user interface of the auctioneer terminal, which then outputs the revised price vector through its network interface and transmits it via the network.
  • the bidding information processor then receives the revised price vector through its network interface for use in subsequent steps. The process then loops to step 104.
  • step 118 a computer outputs a final message, including the allocation of items among bidders and the payments of the bidders.
  • the bidding information processor takes the allocation of items among bidders to be their final bids and takes the payments of the bidders to be the final amounts in their payment accounts, and outputs the allocation and payment outcome through its network interface and transmits it via the network.
  • the bidder terminals and auctioneer terminal then receive the allocation and payment outcome through their network interfaces and display the information to bidders and the auctioneer through their user interfaces. The process then ends.
  • FIG. 5 is a flow diagram of the subprocess of step 110 in which a computer calculates changes, if any, to bidders' payment accounts.
  • the embodiment of the present invention shown in Figure 5 makes bidders' payments as independent as possible of their own bids, and so a bidder has little incentive to manipulate the auction process even if the bidder possesses market power.
  • An auction that utilizes the process of Figure 5 will henceforth be referred to as the "Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities.”
  • bidders have purely private values for the commodities in the auction, and suppose that their utility functions are concave in the commodities and quasilinear in money. For any initial price vector and for any initial value in bidders' payment accounts:
  • the present invention will tend to yield fully-efficient outcomes, if bidders bid optimally.
  • FIG. 5 is a flow diagram of a subprocess of step 110. It begins with step 110-1, in which a bidder i who has not yet been considered is selected.
  • step 110-2 a "payment-account-calculation indicator" for bidder i is examined. This indicator is set equal to 1 if changes to bidder i 's payment account are supposed to be calculated at this step of the auction; and this indicator is set equal to 0, otherwise. In the preferred embodiment of the present invention that yields the theorem stated above, this indicator is always set equal to 1 (and so the steps 110-3 and 110-4 are always performed). However, in other embodiments of the present invention, the payment-account-calculation indicator is initially set equal to 0 and is changed to 1 only when specific criteria are satisfied, or never at all.
  • ⁇ i,t / k is calculated as follows: for each type k of item in the auction and for each opposing bidder j ⁇ i , the computer takes the difference between bidder j 's demand at time t for items of type k and bidder j 's demand at time t -1 for items of type k . Summing this, over all opposing bidders j ⁇ i, yields ⁇ i,t / k .
  • step 110-4 in which the payment account value for bidder i is updated.
  • the payment account value for bidder i can initially be set to any arbitrary constant.
  • P 0 / k denotes the initial price for the commodity of type k
  • Q j ,0 / k is opposing bidder j 's initial demand for the commodity of type k .
  • An updated payment account value denoted A i,t , is computed by the following equation:
  • This equation for updating the payment account value has the following interpretation: bidder i is credited with the quantity - ⁇ i,t / k of items of type k . Effectively, every time bidder i 's opponents change their aggregate quantity demanded by - ⁇ i,t / k units, the auction process implicitly assumes that - ⁇ i,t / k units will be awarded to bidder i , and the auction process charges bidder i the current price vector of P k t for each of these units.
  • the previous price vector, P t -1 / k , or some price in the interval between P t -1 / k and P t / k is used.
  • the process then proceeds to step 110-5, where it is determined whether all bidders have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 110-1. If all bidders have been considered, the process goes to step 112 of Figure 4.
  • step 110-6 it is determined whether the payment-account-calculation indicator should be set equal to 1. As stated earlier, in the preferred embodiment of the present invention that yields the theorem stated above, this step is never reached, as the indicator is always set equal to 1. However, another exemplary embodiment of the present invention would only have the indicator set equal to 1 for bidder i when the aggregate demand of bidder i 's opponents drops to less than the available quantity. Yet another exemplary embodiment of the present invention would only have the indicator set equal to 1 when the aggregate demand of all bidders drops to less than a predetermined percentage of the available quantity, for example when the aggregate demand of all bidders first becomes less than 120% of the available quantity.
  • step 110-7 If the payment-account-calculation indicator for bidder i should be set equal to 1, the process goes to step 110-7, where the indicator for bidder i is set equal to 1. The process then continues with steps 110-3 and 110-4, where changes to bidder i 's payment account value are calculated. If the payment-account-calculation indicator for bidder i should not be set equal to 1, the process loops directly to step 110-5 without changing the payment account value for bidder i .
  • 1 unit of commodity A and 0 units of commodity B can be thought of as becoming available to Bidder 3 at the current price.
  • the auction algorithm takes this literally, by crediting 1 unit of commodity A at a price of 4, and 0 units of commodity B at a price of 5, to Bidder 3.
  • Bidders 1, 2 and 3 are allocated the quantity vectors of (4,2), (3,4) and (3,2), respectively, that they demanded at the final price.
  • Bidders 1, 2 and 3 are charged payments of 34, 41 and 31, respectively, the amounts accrued in their payment accounts at the end of the auction. Since many of the credits and debits in the sequence occurred at earlier prices, bidders' payments do not generally equal their final quantity vectors evaluated at the final prices.
  • the bidders' payments are related to those derived from a Vickrey auction (also known as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism). I develop this result elsewhere.
  • FIGS. 6a and 6b are flow diagrams of two exemplary subprocesses of step 108.
  • the process of Figure 6a begins with step 108a-1, in which a bidder i who has not yet been considered is selected.
  • step 108a-2 a bid ( Q i,t / k ) k ⁇ G by bidder i which has not yet been considered is selected.
  • G is defined to be a group of item types.
  • G is a nonempty subset of ⁇ 1, ..., m ⁇ , the set of all item types.
  • step 108a-4 it is checked whether the selected bid is consistent with bidder i 's initial eligibility, that is, whether: where bidder i 's initial eligibility, Q i / G , for group G may, for example, be determined by the level of financial guarantee posted by bidder i . If the selected bid is consistent with bidder i 's initial eligibility, the process goes to step 108a-5, where bidder i 's most recent previously-processed bid for group G, denoted ( Q i,t -1 / k ) k ⁇ G , is recalled. In step 108a-6, it is checked whether the selected bid is consistent with the auction's activity rule, that is, whether the constraint: is satisfied.
  • step 108a-7 the selected bid ( Q i,t / k ) k ⁇ G is entered as a valid bid by bidder i on group G.
  • bidder i is sent a message confirming to him that the bid is valid.
  • step 108a-8 it is determined whether all bids by bidder i have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108a-2. If all bids by bidder i have been considered, the process continues to step 108a-9, where it is determined whether all bidders have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108a-1. If all bidders have been considered, the process goes to step 110 of Figure 4.
  • step 108a-10 a message is outputted to bidder i that the selected bid is invalid.
  • the selected bid then is not entered as a valid bid.
  • step 108a-8 it is determined whether all bids by bidder i have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108a-2. If all bids by bidder i have been considered, the process continues to step 108a-9, where it is determined whether all bidders have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108a-1. If all bidders have been considered, the process goes to step 110 of Figure 4.
  • step 108b-1 a bidder i who has not yet been considered is selected.
  • step 108b-2 a bid ( Q i,t / k ) k ⁇ G by bidder i which has not yet been considered is selected.
  • step 108b-3 it is checked whether each quantity Q i,t / k in the selected bid satisfies the constraint: where C i,t / k and C i,t / G are arbitrary constants. If the constraint of step 108b-3 is satisfied, the process goes to step 108b-4.
  • step 108b-4 it is checked whether each quantity Q i,t / k in the selected bid satisfies the constraint: where C i,t / k and C and i,t / k are arbitrary constants. If the constraint of step 108b-4 is satisfied, the process goes to step 108b-5, where it is checked whether the selected bid was submitted at a time no earlier than the starting time of the current round. If it was, the process goes to step 108b-6, where it is checked whether the selected bid was submitted at a time no later than the ending time of the current round.
  • step 108b-7 the selected bid ( Q i,t / k ) k ⁇ G is entered as a valid bid by bidder i on group G.
  • bidder i is sent a message confirming to him that the bid is valid.
  • step 108b-8 it is determined whether all bids by bidder i have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108b-2. If all bids by bidder i have been considered, the process continues to step 108b-9, where it is determined whether all bidders have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108b-1. If all bidders have been considered, the process goes to step 110 of Figure 4.
  • step 108b-10 a message is outputted to bidder i that the selected bid is invalid.
  • the selected bid then is not entered as a valid bid.
  • step 108b-8 it is determined whether all bids by bidder i have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108b-2. If all bids by bidder i have been considered, the process continues to step 108b-9, where it is determined whether all bidders have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 108b-1. If all bidders have been considered, the process goes to step 110 of Figure 4.
  • Figure 7 is a flow diagram of a subprocess of step 112 of Figure 4. It illustrates an exemplary process by which a computer may determine whether the auction should continue. (Related to this will also be Figure 9b, below, which illustrates an exemplary process by which a computer determines whether the auction should continue, in a system where bidders are permitted to submit Intra-Round Bids.)
  • Figure 7 begins with step 112a-1, in which an item type k not yet considered is selected.
  • step 112a-2 If the inequality of step 112a-2 is satisfied, the process then goes to step 112a-3, where it is determined whether all item types k have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 112a-1. However, if all item types k have already been considered, then it has been found that all item types k have cleared within a tolerance of C k , and so the auction should not continue. The process proceeds to step 118 of Figure 4, where the final message is generated.
  • Figure 8 is a flow diagram of a subprocess of step 114 of Figure 4. It illustrates an exemplary process by which a computer may update the current price vector.
  • Figure 8 begins with step 114-1, in which an item type k not yet considered is selected.
  • step 114-2 a computer calculates the excess demand, denoted Z k , for item type k :
  • the excess demand, Z k has the interpretation of being the amount by which bidders in aggregate are bidding for quantities of item type k , in excess of the available quantity.
  • C k is any arbitrary positive constant.
  • the price for item type k is raised if bidders bid for more than the available quantity, and the price for item type k is reduced if bidders bid for less than the available quantity.
  • step 114-4 it is determined whether all item types k have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 114-1. However, if all item types k have already been considered, then updated prices for all item types have been generated, and the process proceeds to step 116 of Figure 4.
  • bidders submit bids in a sequence of discrete rounds.
  • the following would be a typical bidding schedule for an auction:
  • a discrete round structure has desirable information properties.
  • the auction can be easily structured so that the results of Round t are disseminated to bidders before the bids of Round t +1 need to be submitted.
  • a discrete round structure is especially conducive to enforcing "activity rules," in which a bidder is required to be active (i.e., either be the standing high bidder or place a new high bid) on a given number of items in an earlier round of the auction in order to continue to bid on a given number of items in a later round of the auction.
  • One embodiment of the present invention is a system and method for "Intra-Round Bids."
  • a discrete round structure ⁇ with all of its many advantages is preserved.
  • the auction system and method permits bidders to submit bids at prices between the price associated with Round t and the price associated with Round t +1.
  • Bidders have every incentive to utilize Intra-Round Bids, and to the extent that bidders utilize them, the seller should be expected to attain higher auction revenues and to reduce the probability of undersell.
  • a system and method for Intra-Round Bids improves upon the prior art for auction systems and methods, and has immediate practical application for dynamic auctions of radio communications spectrum, securities and other financial products, electric power, etc.
  • Intra-Round Bids is framed largely in terms of regular auctions to sell (where bidders are buyers), the invention is equally applicable for reverse or procurement auctions to buy (where bidders are sellers).
  • this specification will not run through the process a second time with the roles of selling and buying reversed, but it should be clear to anybody skilled in the art that the technology can be equally used in both situations.
  • the parameters corresponding to price indicate the price at which Bidder 1 wishes to change his quantity demanded as compared to his "previous" (that is, next lower price) bid.
  • Figure 9a is a flow diagram of a subprocess of step 106 of Figure 4. It illustrates an exemplary process by which a particular bidder i may submit Intra-Round Bids.
  • Figure 9a begins with step 106-1, in which bidder i selects a group, G, of item types on which he wishes to place a bid. G is a nonempty subset of ⁇ 1, ... , m ⁇ , the set of all item types.
  • bidder i selects price parameters for group G representing a price vector between the previous round's price vector for group G and the current round's price vector for group G .
  • step 106-3 bidder i selects quantities of the item types of group G that he would like to take effect as bids at the selected price parameters.
  • step 106-4 bidder i expresses whether he wishes to enter more bids. If so, the process loops back to step 106-1. If not, the process continues to step 106-5.
  • step 106-5 the computer determines whether bidder i has submitted at least one bid for each group G of item types. If not, the process loops back to step 106-1, and optionally the computer prompts bidder i to submit bids on the groups G of item types on which bidder i has not submitted at least one valid bid in the current round. If so, the process goes to step 108 of Figure 4.
  • Figure 9b is a flow diagram of a subprocess of step 112 of Figure 4. It illustrates an exemplary process by which a computer determines whether the auction should continue, in a system where bidders are permitted to submit Intra-Round Bids.
  • Figure 9b begins with step 112b-1, in which a group G of item types not yet considered is selected. G is a nonempty subset of ⁇ 1 , ... , m ⁇ , the set of all item types.
  • step 112b-2 a computer sorts all bids entered for group G in the current round. The sorting is done: first, by bidder ID; second, by price parameter in the entered bid (in descending order); and third, by time stamp of submission (in descending order).
  • step 112b-3 a computer selects, for each bidder i, the bid, Q i / G , for group G with the highest price parameter (and then the latest time stamp).
  • step 112b-4 a computer determines whether the aggregate quantity bid for group G is no greater than the available quantity, that is, whether: If this inequality is not satisfied, then group G of item types has not yet cleared, and so the auction should continue. The process thus jumps immediately to step 114 of Figure 4.
  • step 112b-4 If the inequality of step 112b-4 is satisfied, the process then goes to step 112b-5, where it is determined whether all groups G of item types have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 112b-1. However, if all groups G of item types have already been considered, then it has been found that all groups G of item types have cleared, and so the auction should not continue. The process proceeds to step 118 of Figure 4, where the final message is generated.
  • Figure 9c is a flow diagram of a subprocess of step 118 of Figure 4. It illustrates an exemplary process by which a computer determines final allocations and payments, in a system where bidders are permitted to submit Intra-Round Bids.
  • Figure 9c begins with step 118b-1, in which for each bid entered in the current round, a computer expresses the price parameter as a percentage of the distance from the previous round's price vector to the current round's price vector. For example, in the example discussed above, where the (end) price per unit associated with Round 4 was $1,000,000, and the (end) price per unit associated with Round 5 was $1,050,000, a bid with a price parameter corresponding to $1,020,000 would imply a percentage distance parameter of 40%.
  • a computer sorts the percentage distance parameters from smallest to largest, and denotes them ⁇ 1 ⁇ ⁇ 2 ⁇ ... ⁇ ⁇ N .
  • a computer initializes the percentage distance parameter under consideration, denoted ⁇ , to be the smallest value, ⁇ 1 .
  • a group G of item types not yet considered is selected.
  • a computer sorts all bids entered for group G in the current round. The sorting is done: first, by bidder ID; second, by percentage distance parameter in the entered bid (in descending order); and third, by time stamp of submission (in descending order).
  • step 118b-6 a computer selects, for each bidder i , the bid, Q i / G , for group G with the highest percentage distance parameter that is less than or equal to ⁇ (and then the latest time stamp).
  • step 118b-7 a computer determines whether the aggregate quantity bid for group G is no greater than the available quantity, that is, whether: If this inequality is not satisfied, then group G of item types has not yet cleared at percentage distance parameter ⁇ , and so ⁇ needs to be incremented. The process thus goes to step 118b-9, where ⁇ is advanced to the next percentage distance parameter among ⁇ 1 ⁇ ⁇ 2 ⁇ ... ⁇ ⁇ N . The process then loops back to step 118b-4, using the new higher value for ⁇ and starting over for groups G of item types.
  • step 118b-8 it is determined whether all groups G of item types have been considered. If not, the process loops back to step 118b-4. However, if all groups G of item types have already been considered, then it has been found that all groups G of item types have cleared at percentage distance parameter ⁇ . Thus, the percentage distance parameter ⁇ implies market-clearing prices for the auction. The process proceeds to calculate the price vector implied by percentage distance parameter ⁇ , to note the quantities bid by all bidders at this price vector, and to incorporate these computations into a final message that is outputted from a machine.
  • the present invention also provides a fast and effective way to run a dynamic clock auction with a discrete round structure and uniform prices, practical use of the present invention.
EP01305804A 2000-07-05 2001-07-05 System und Verfahren für eine leistungsfähige und dynamische Auktion von mehreren Gegenständen Withdrawn EP1170691A1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (8)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US21633800P 2000-07-05 2000-07-05
US216338P 2000-07-05
US22960000P 2000-09-05 2000-09-05
US229600P 2000-09-05
US29351001P 2001-05-29 2001-05-29
US293510P 2001-05-29
US29424601P 2001-05-31 2001-05-31
US294246P 2001-05-31

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1170691A1 true EP1170691A1 (de) 2002-01-09

Family

ID=27499042

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP01305804A Withdrawn EP1170691A1 (de) 2000-07-05 2001-07-05 System und Verfahren für eine leistungsfähige und dynamische Auktion von mehreren Gegenständen

Country Status (1)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1170691A1 (de)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7062460B1 (en) * 1999-10-12 2006-06-13 Enduse.Com Llc On-line auction method and system facilitating the sale of multiple product units at prices varying with volume
WO2007030873A1 (en) * 2005-09-13 2007-03-22 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Multiple option auction method and system
US7593885B2 (en) 2000-09-04 2009-09-22 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Materials supply contract system and method
AU2006292024B2 (en) * 2005-09-13 2010-11-25 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Multiple option auction method and system

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
No Search *

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7062460B1 (en) * 1999-10-12 2006-06-13 Enduse.Com Llc On-line auction method and system facilitating the sale of multiple product units at prices varying with volume
US7593885B2 (en) 2000-09-04 2009-09-22 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Materials supply contract system and method
US8412615B2 (en) 2000-09-04 2013-04-02 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Materials supply contract system and method
WO2007030873A1 (en) * 2005-09-13 2007-03-22 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Multiple option auction method and system
AU2006292024B2 (en) * 2005-09-13 2010-11-25 Ozb2B Pty Ltd Multiple option auction method and system

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US7165046B2 (en) System and method for an efficient dynamic multi-unit auction
US8335738B2 (en) System and method for a hybrid clock and proxy auction
US8566211B2 (en) System and method for a dynamic auction with package bidding
US8175956B2 (en) Method and apparatus for automated trading of equity securities using a real time data analysis
US8275687B2 (en) Allocation of commissions
US7343342B2 (en) System and method for an efficient dynamic multi-unit auction
US20180218449A1 (en) Bundles for an efficient auction design
US11915254B2 (en) Optimized batched projection
US20160232603A1 (en) Rationing rules and bidding formats for an efficient auction design
US7062461B1 (en) System and method for an efficient dynamic multi-unit auction
US20170046777A1 (en) Bidder system for efficient dynamic multi-unit auction
EP1170691A1 (de) System und Verfahren für eine leistungsfähige und dynamische Auktion von mehreren Gegenständen
US8447662B2 (en) System and method for an efficient dynamic multi-unit auction
EP1054336A2 (de) System und Verfahren für eine effiziente und dynamische Auktion für mehrere identische Güter
US20140195369A1 (en) System and method for a hybrid clock and proxy auction
US20110131126A1 (en) Trade Management System For Reducing Securities Positions
US20170243261A1 (en) Efficient Pricing System with Product Interdependencies

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR

AX Request for extension of the european patent

Free format text: AL;LT;LV;MK;RO;SI

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20020704

AKX Designation fees paid

Free format text: AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20060929

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED TO BE WITHDRAWN

18D Application deemed to be withdrawn

Effective date: 20070411