EP1104607A1 - Verfahren und vorrichtung zur authentifizierung mit hilfe eines symmetrischen algorithmus - Google Patents
Verfahren und vorrichtung zur authentifizierung mit hilfe eines symmetrischen algorithmusInfo
- Publication number
- EP1104607A1 EP1104607A1 EP99936740A EP99936740A EP1104607A1 EP 1104607 A1 EP1104607 A1 EP 1104607A1 EP 99936740 A EP99936740 A EP 99936740A EP 99936740 A EP99936740 A EP 99936740A EP 1104607 A1 EP1104607 A1 EP 1104607A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- xor
- faire
- secret key
- array
- alg
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an authentication method using a symmetric algorithm having the main characteristic that, each time two parts are authenticated, commonly called A and B, a cryptographic calculation with a variable key, called K ', is carried out.
- the invention relates more precisely to the cryptographic calculations cited above during an authentication of the two parties, called A and B, independent of each other in the context of data exchange.
- This can be between a PC and a server, a reader and a server, a smart card and a smart card reader such as, for example, a cash dispenser when using a credit card.
- chip called A by a user who, wishing to obtain a few banknotes, goes to a place with an ATM, called B.
- the two parts A and / or B can be considered as a smart card and / or a reader.
- A who has a secret key K, chooses a random R or random number also called a message.
- A sends this hazard R to B, which also has the same secret key K.
- r is the result of the encryption of the message R with the algorithm ALG and the secret key K.
- the algorithm called ALG is a symmetric encryption algorithm. This can be the DES (Data Encryption Message), the triple DES, the IDEA, etc.
- the authentication of B by A is carried out in this way.
- this operation is not sufficient because it is vulnerable to current measurements and therefore to attacks by a possible hacker.
- An attacker, or hacker measures the electrical current consumption of the chip. According to the curve obtained, it can deduce information on the operations and the data used by the processor. In order to make precise measurements, the attacker must make several measurements and filter them.
- the hacker To obtain a relevant measurement, the hacker must perform several measurements and filter them to extract the relevant information. Due to the use of the same constant key K, all the measurements use the same key K and therefore the filtering result is characteristic of the key K.
- the invention proposes a first feature which consists of a brief modification which is carried out in the formula for calculating r ′ of the authentication protocol which is the subject of the invention.
- Part A which has the secret key K, sends a random number chosen randomly] _, to part B.
- the latter also has the same secret key K.
- B chooses a random number R2, then calculates the number K ', which is also a secret key from the following formula:
- the impossibility of attack to date stems from the fact that, since K ′ changes with each authentication, the current consumption of the calculation of r and r ′ is different with each execution of the authentication. However, the calculation of K 'remains vulnerable to attacks in current consumption.
- the invention therefore provides a second feature not related to the first described above, concerning the calculation of K '.
- K k ⁇ _ xor k2 xor ... xor k n .
- a first table k called below in the description by k [], is used; this table contains the values of the n under keys kj_.
- the first step, or step a consists in that as long as there remains an element of the array a_ette [] at the value "T", then a random number i, between 1 and n, is chosen.
- step b is the equality test of the element i of the array a_excellent [] and the value "T”, called below in the description and in the figure.
- step b If the equality test in step b is false, then the calculation system returns to the first step, or step a.
- This algorithm is not in constant time because it is possible to execute more loops than there are sub-keys k-j_.
- the invention also relates to an authentication system with a symmetric encryption algorithm between two entities or parts A and B, having the same secret key K, which implements the method described above.
- n number of sub-keys
- n ⁇ 2 number of sub-keys
- the initialization remains identical to the general case described above; it is mentioned in FIG. 2 by the reference A or 10.
- the algorithm loop is performed as follows:
- the probability of putting at the value "F” the two elements of the array a_ttle [] in two loops or tests is equal to half, or 1/2.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR9810591 | 1998-08-17 | ||
FR9810591A FR2782431B1 (fr) | 1998-08-17 | 1998-08-17 | Procede et dispositif d'authentification a algorithme symetrique |
PCT/FR1999/001995 WO2000010287A1 (fr) | 1998-08-17 | 1999-08-16 | Procede et dispositif d'authentification a algorithme symetrique |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1104607A1 true EP1104607A1 (de) | 2001-06-06 |
Family
ID=9529804
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP99936740A Withdrawn EP1104607A1 (de) | 1998-08-17 | 1999-08-16 | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur authentifizierung mit hilfe eines symmetrischen algorithmus |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1104607A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2002523923A (de) |
CN (1) | CN1323478A (de) |
AU (1) | AU5173199A (de) |
FR (1) | FR2782431B1 (de) |
MX (1) | MXPA01001783A (de) |
WO (1) | WO2000010287A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2804524B1 (fr) * | 2000-01-31 | 2002-04-19 | Oberthur Card Systems Sas | Procede d'execution d'un protocole cryptographique entre deux entites electroniques |
FR2819079B1 (fr) * | 2000-12-29 | 2003-02-14 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de protection contre les attaques par mesure de courant ou de rayonnement electromagnetique |
FR2819078B1 (fr) * | 2000-12-29 | 2003-02-14 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de protection contre les attaques par mesure de courant ou par mesure de rayonnement electromagnetique |
US6950517B2 (en) * | 2002-07-24 | 2005-09-27 | Qualcomm, Inc. | Efficient encryption and authentication for data processing systems |
CN1684411B (zh) * | 2004-04-13 | 2010-04-28 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种验证移动终端用户合法性的方法 |
CN100364262C (zh) * | 2004-08-04 | 2008-01-23 | 中国联合通信有限公司 | 一种用于ev-do网络的接入鉴权方法及装置 |
US7401222B2 (en) * | 2004-12-16 | 2008-07-15 | Xerox Corporation | Method of authentication of memory device and device therefor |
CN100405395C (zh) * | 2005-03-22 | 2008-07-23 | 刘普合 | 商品复合防伪码与对称验证防伪方法 |
CN1863042B (zh) * | 2005-12-13 | 2011-05-04 | 华为技术有限公司 | 对信息进行加解密的方法 |
CN102411692B (zh) * | 2010-09-25 | 2015-07-01 | 中国移动通信有限公司 | 一种运行终端的方法、系统及设备 |
CN101997880A (zh) * | 2010-12-01 | 2011-03-30 | 湖南智源信息网络技术开发有限公司 | 一种用于网络页面或接口的安全验证方法及其装置 |
CN102014136B (zh) * | 2010-12-13 | 2013-03-06 | 南京邮电大学 | 基于随机握手的p2p网络安全通信方法 |
FR2974694B1 (fr) * | 2011-04-27 | 2013-05-31 | Peugeot Citroen Automobiles Sa | Procede d'echange securise de messages cryptes symetriquement |
CZ2022127A3 (cs) * | 2022-03-17 | 2023-05-17 | Jan Topol | Způsob čištění komunálních odpadních vod a zařízení k provádění způsobu |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2530053B1 (fr) * | 1982-07-08 | 1986-04-25 | Bull Sa | Procede pour certifier la provenance d'au moins une information enregistree dans une memoire d'un premier dispositif electronique et transmise a un deuxieme dispositif electronique, et systeme pour la mise en oeuvre d'un tel procede |
FR2612315A1 (fr) * | 1987-03-13 | 1988-09-16 | Trt Telecom Radio Electr | Procede pour simultanement lire a distance et certifier une information presente dans une memoire d'un support electronique |
JP2531354B2 (ja) * | 1993-06-29 | 1996-09-04 | 日本電気株式会社 | 認証方式 |
FR2738972B1 (fr) * | 1995-09-15 | 1997-11-28 | Thomson Multimedia Sa | Procede de mise en gage de donnees pour un protocole d'echange de donnees securise |
DE19716111A1 (de) * | 1997-04-17 | 1998-10-22 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zur gegenseitigen Authentifizierung zweier Einheiten |
-
1998
- 1998-08-17 FR FR9810591A patent/FR2782431B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
1999
- 1999-08-16 CN CN99812286.6A patent/CN1323478A/zh active Pending
- 1999-08-16 EP EP99936740A patent/EP1104607A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 1999-08-16 MX MXPA01001783A patent/MXPA01001783A/es unknown
- 1999-08-16 AU AU51731/99A patent/AU5173199A/en not_active Abandoned
- 1999-08-16 WO PCT/FR1999/001995 patent/WO2000010287A1/fr active Application Filing
- 1999-08-16 JP JP2000565636A patent/JP2002523923A/ja active Pending
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO0010287A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
AU5173199A (en) | 2000-03-06 |
WO2000010287A1 (fr) | 2000-02-24 |
FR2782431B1 (fr) | 2000-09-29 |
CN1323478A (zh) | 2001-11-21 |
JP2002523923A (ja) | 2002-07-30 |
FR2782431A1 (fr) | 2000-02-18 |
MXPA01001783A (es) | 2002-07-22 |
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