EP1059001B1 - Procede de protection des donnees audiovisuelles par l'interface des normes de securite nationales renouvelables (nrss) - Google Patents

Procede de protection des donnees audiovisuelles par l'interface des normes de securite nationales renouvelables (nrss) Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP1059001B1
EP1059001B1 EP98965985A EP98965985A EP1059001B1 EP 1059001 B1 EP1059001 B1 EP 1059001B1 EP 98965985 A EP98965985 A EP 98965985A EP 98965985 A EP98965985 A EP 98965985A EP 1059001 B1 EP1059001 B1 EP 1059001B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signal
smart card
key
seed value
generating
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP98965985A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1059001A1 (fr
Inventor
Ahmet Mursit Eskicioglu
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Thomson Licensing SAS
Original Assignee
Thomson Licensing SAS
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Thomson Licensing SAS filed Critical Thomson Licensing SAS
Publication of EP1059001A1 publication Critical patent/EP1059001A1/fr
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1059001B1 publication Critical patent/EP1059001B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
    • H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00—Television systems
    • H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H04N7/163—Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only

Definitions

  • This invention concerns a system for enhancing the security of the interface between a consumer electronic device and a removable security device such as the interface defined by the National Renewable Security Standard (NRSS).
  • NRSS National Renewable Security Standard
  • Security is enhanced by protecting the audio/visual (A/V) stream that is descrambled by the removable security device, such as a smart card, coupled to the consumer electronic device.
  • the removable security device such as a smart card
  • consumer electronic devices employing the NRSS smart cards include digital television receivers, digital video cassette recorders as well as separate devices or "boxes'' that may be located on top of, or coupled to, a television receiver, i.e., set-top boxes.
  • NRSS National Renewable Security Standard
  • CE digital consumer electronics
  • a conditional access (CA) device e.g., an NRSS smart card
  • CA conditional access
  • A/V audio/visual
  • the host device for example, a display device or a set top box
  • EP-A-0 658 054 discloses a secure communication system using a smart card receiving a scrambled signal, portions of which are used in generating a descrambling key for descrambling the received scrambled signal.
  • the present invention defines a method for protecting the output audio/visual (A/V) stream of a smart card by receiving, by the smart card, a scrambled signal from a source external to said smart card, generating a descrambling key in response to said received signal, descrambling said received signal using said descrambling key to generate a descrambled signal, receiving data from said external source, generating a scrambling key in response to said received data, scrambling said descrambled signal using said scrambling key to generate a rescrambled signal, providing said rescrambled signal to said external source.
  • A/V audio/visual
  • the received data is a scrambling key encrypted using a public key associated with said smart card and wherein the step of generating said scrambling key comprises decrypting said encrypted scrambling key using a private key associated with said smart card, said private key being stored in said smart card.
  • the scrambling key comprises a seed value and the step of scrambling the descrambled signal generating a random sequence in response to the seed value, and generating the rescrambled signal by exclusive ORing said random sequence and said descrambled signal.
  • the received scrambled signal comprises video, audio and control packets and the seed value is generated, in the external source, in a unique manner in response to said video, audio and control packets.
  • the smart card verifies the seed value by comparing the seed value to a subsequent seed value generated in the unique manner in response to the video, audio and control packets.
  • the seed value is generated utilizing one of the hash of video, audio and control packets or by exclusive ORing said video, audio and control packets together.
  • a first seed value is generated in the smart card and the received data is a second seed value.
  • the step of generating said scrambling key comprises generating said scrambling key in response to said first and second seed values.
  • a system for managing access between a service provider and a host device having a smart card coupled performs the steps of: receiving a scrambled signal from the service provider, sending, to the smart card, a seed value generated in the host device and encrypted using a public key of the smart card, coupling the received scrambled signal to the smart card, and receiving from the smart card the rescrambled signal.
  • the smart card has a means for access control processing, comprising means for generating a descrambling key in response to the received scrambled signal, means for descrambling the received signal using the descrambling key to generate a descrambled signal, means for decrypting the encrypted seed value using a private key of the smart card to provide the seed value, means for generating a random sequence in response to the seed value and means for scrambling the descrambled signal using the random sequence and the descrambled signal to generate the rescrambled signal.
  • CA conditional access
  • SC smart card
  • NRSS National Renewable Security Standard
  • CE digital consumer electronics
  • STB set-top boxes
  • a potential problem with the NRSS architecture is that the audio/visual (A/V) stream is not scrambled when it leaves the smart card. This provides a point in which the security of the CA system could be breached because one could monitor and tap the output of the smart card and use a data capturing device to record all the plaintext data.
  • the present invention provides an improvement to protect the connection between the smart card and the CE device.
  • Such smart cards include ISO 7816 cards having a card body with a plurality of terminals arranged on a surface in compliance with National Renewable Security Standard (NRSS) Part A or PCMCIA cards complying with NRSS Part B.
  • NRSS National Renewable Security Standard
  • FIG 1 a system 10 for protecting the A/V stream of CE device 100 which employs NRSS smart card (SC) 200 is depicted.
  • CE or host devices 100 include DTVs, DVCRs or STBs.
  • Smart Card 200 is inserted into, or coupled to, a smart card reader 105 included in, or coupled to, host device 100; bus 150, internal to host device 100, interconnects host device 100 and SC 200 thereby permitting the transfer of data therebetween.
  • Host device 100 is connected to a cable, satellite or broadcast service provider (SP) 300 via a link 350.
  • SP broadcast service provider
  • A/V data processing in accordance with this invention include rescrambling the plaintext A/V data in the smart card.
  • a requirement of consumer electronic manufacturers for the design of a CA system is to avoid the permanent storage of any secrets in the host device.
  • the rescrambling key cannot be exchanged using an architecture where a private or a shared secret key is embedded in the host.
  • the rescrambling key should be dynamically established without modifying the present smart card architecture drastically.
  • a dynamic key is one that is generated on-the-fly in real-time and is not fixed. Periodic (for example, every ten seconds) generation of new keys is normally needed to increase the robustness against cryptanalytic attacks.
  • the key that is shared between the smart card and the host can be used in a number of ways to scramble the A/V stream before it is sent back to the host.
  • block ciphers may be considered for rescrambling. Since the DES algorithm is typically used for descrambling the incoming A/V stream, it could be used for rescrambling the signal. However, such a complex cipher engine in the host device would increase the manufacturing cost and complexity.
  • Synchronous stream ciphers are appropriate for rescrambling.
  • a synchronous stream cipher is one in which the key stream is generated independently of the plaintext and ciphertext messages.
  • LFSRs linear feedback shift registers
  • the key generator 110 can be initialized with the shared key to obtain the random sequence.
  • the frequency of renewing the seed is an implementation dependent parameter.
  • the seed will, in general, be different for each renewal, thus resulting in dissimilar random sequences for discouraging cryptanalytic attacks.
  • the general architecture of such a system is shown in Figure 2.
  • this invention provides for the dynamic generation of a key within the host device 100 utilizing an RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adelman) engine.
  • This key is shared with SC 200 and is used to rescramble the audio/visual (A/V) stream prior to it leaving the SC 200.
  • Both the host device 100 and SC 200 contain RSA engines for encryption and decryption.
  • An RSA engine may be implemented using a co-processor (i.e. a microprocessor). Since the public key of the smart card is available to the host device as well as to the service providers, it can be used by the host to encrypt a scrambling key before it is sent to the smart card.
  • the protocol using the RSA public key system involves the encryption of the dynamic key in host device 100 using the public key of smart card 200.
  • the encrypted dynamic key is transmitted to smart card 200 and is decrypted using the private key of the smart card.
  • This is an asymmetric key system, wherein only public keys are stored in the STB or DTV or DVCR. That is, the device does not store or contain any secrets (i.e., private keys).
  • the foundation of public-key cryptography is the use of two related keys, one public and one private; the private key being computationally unfeasible of being deduced from the public key which is publicly available.
  • anyone with a public key can encrypt a message but only the person or device having the associated and predetermined private key can decrypt it.
  • both host device 100 and SC 200 have Diffie-Hellman engines to generate a shared key. Neither host device 100 nor SC 200 can alone generate the key. A first seed value generated in SC 200 is sent to host device 100 and a second seed value generated in host device 100 is sent to SC 200. Together, host device 100 and SC 200 generate the shared key.
  • Both of the key establishment protocols are subject to attacks if the host device participating in the key generation is not authenticated.
  • An improvement is possible by generating the shared seed as a function of the transport stream transmitted to the card in an initial time period.
  • the audio/video packets are scrambled, and the Entitlement Control Messages (ECMs) are encrypted, they can be used as functional arguments. This can provide implicit key authentication.
  • both host device 100 and smart card 200 have RSA engines, and the host has a copy of the card's public key, K puSC , the host can construct the seed using a function of the video, audio, and ECM packets: Shared seed: (random number I f(A, V, ECM))
  • the smart card 100 computes the same functional value independently and compares it with that sent by the host. This effectively provides host authentication, preventing the intruders from impersonating the host.
  • a one-way hashing algorithm such as MD5 developed by Ron Rivest or SHA-1 developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) may be used to determine the hash function "f".
  • the seed needs to be renewed periodically. Renewal is possible by recomputing the function for each time interval. For example, the first packet encountered in each of the A, V, and ECM substreams in every 30 seconds can be used in generating a new key stream for scrambling. Alternatively, packets can be numbered for synchronization between the host and the card.
  • This invention provides protection against copying of copyrighted A/V streams in transmission to the host.
  • the modified key establishment protocols can be used to prevent active attacks.
  • the key is defined to be a function of the MPEG-2 transport stream (i.e., service packets and ECMs)
  • the hacker would also need to access the stream and extract the required data out of it.

Abstract

On décrit un système qui permet d'améliorer la sécurité de l'interface entre un dispositif électronique de consommation et un dispositif de sécurité remplaçable. Cette sécurité s'obtient par la protection du flux audiovisuel (A/V) désembrouillé au niveau du dispositif de sécurité remplaçable. Ladite protection consiste à effectuer un calcul dynamique d'une clé partagée, puis à brouiller de nouveau le flux audiovisuel (A/V).

Claims (19)

  1. Un procédé de protection d'un flux de données audiovisuelles sortant d'une carte à puce (200) comprend les étapes de :
    (a) réception dans ladite carte à puce, d'un signal embrouillé provenant d'une source externe (100) à ladite carte à puce;
    (b) génération d'une clé de désembrouillage en réponse audit signal reçu ;
    (c) désembrouillage dudit signal reçu à l'aide de ladite clé de désembrouillage afin de générer un signal désembrouillé ;
    (d) réception de données provenant de la source externe ;
    (e) génération d'une clé d'embrouillage en réponse aux dites données reçues ;
    (f) embrouillage dudit signal désembrouillé à l'aide de ladite clé d'embrouillage afin de générer un signal à nouveau embrouillé ;
    (g) transmission dudit signal réembrouillé à la source externe.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel les données reçues constituent une clé d'embrouillage cryptée à l'aide d'une clé publique associée à la carte à puce et, dans lequel l'étape de génération de ladite clé d'embrouillage comprend le décryptage, à l'aide d'une clé privée associée à ladite dans la carte à puce, de la clé d'embrouillage cryptée, ladite clé privée étant stockée dans ladite carte à puce.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, dans lequel ladite clé d'embrouillage inclut une valeur de graine et dans lequel l'étape d'embrouillage dudit signal désembrouillé comprend les étapes de :
    (a) génération d'une séquence aléatoire en réponse à ladite valeur de graine ; et
    (b) génération du signal réembrouillé par application d'un OU exclusif à ladite séquence aléatoire et audit signal désembrouillé.
  4. Procédé selon la revendication 3, dans lequel ledit signal embrouillé reçu comprend des paquets vidéo, audio et de commande et ladite valeur de graine est générée, dans la source externe, de manière unique en réponse aux dits paquets vidéo, audio et de commande.
  5. Procédé selon la revendication 4 dans lequel ladite carte à puce vérifie ladite valeur de graine en la comparant à la valeur de graine suivante générée de manière unique en réponse aux dits paquets vidéo, audio et de commande.
  6. Procédé selon la revendication 5 dans lequel ladite valeur de graine est générée à l'aide d'une fonction de hachage des paquets vidéo, audio et de commande.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 5 dans lequel ladite valeur de graine est générée par application du OU exclusif à l'ensemble des paquets vidéo, audio et de commande.
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 1 dans lequel ladite carte à puce comprend un corps ayant une pluralité de bornes disposées sur une surface dudit corps de carte conformément aux normes de cartes ISO 7816 ou PCMCIA.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 1 comprenant en outre l'étape de génération, dans ladite carte à puce, d'une première valeur de graine et dans lequel lesdites données reçues constituent une seconde valeur de graine.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 9 dans lequel l'étape génération de ladite clé d'embrouillage s'effectue en réponse aux dites première et seconde valeurs de graine.
  11. Procédé selon la revendication 10 dans lequel ladite clé d'embrouillage comprend une valeur de graine et dans lequel l'étape d'embrouillage du signal désembrouillé comprend les étapes de:
    (a) génération d'une séquence aléatoire en réponse à ladite valeur de graine ; et
    (b) génération dudit signal réembrouillé par application d'un OU exclusif à ladite séquence aléatoire et audit signal désembrouillé.
  12. Procédé selon la revendication 11 dans lequel le signal embrouillé reçu comprend des paquets vidéo, audio, et de commande et lesdites première et seconde valeurs de graine sont générées, de manière unique, en réponse aux dits paquets vidéo, audio, et de commande.
  13. Procédé selon la revendication 10 dans lequel les première et seconde valeurs de graine sont générées à l'aide d'une fonction de hachage de ces paquets vidéo, audio, et de commande.
  14. Procédé (combinaison) selon la revendication 10 dans lequel les première et seconde valeurs de graine sont générées par application d'un OU exclusif à l'ensemble desdits paquets vidéo, audio et de commande.
  15. Système de gestion d'accès entre un fournisseur de services (300) et un dispositif hôte auquel une carte à puce (200) est couplée, ledit dispositif hôte effectuant les étapes de :
    (a) réception d'un signal embrouillé émanant du fournisseur de services ;
    (b) transmission, vers la carte à puce, d'une valeur de graine générée dans ledit dispositif hôte et cryptée à l'aide d'une clé publique de la carte à puce ;
    (c) couplage dudit signal embrouillé reçu à ladite carte à puce, ladite carte à puce ayant un moyen de traitement du contrôle d'accès, ledit moyen de traitement du contrôle d'accès comprenant des moyens pour générer une clé de désembrouillage en réponse audit signal embrouillé reçu, des moyens pour désembrouiller ledit signal reçu à l'aide de ladite clé de désembrouillage afin de générer un signal désembrouillé, des moyens pour décrypter, à l'aide de la clé privée de la carte à puce, ladite valeur de graine cryptée afin de fournir la valeur de graine, des moyens pour générer une séquence aléatoire en réponse à ladite valeur de graine et des moyens pour embrouiller ledit signal désembrouillé à l'aide de ladite séquence aléatoire et dudit signal désembrouillé afin de générer un signal réembrouillé ; et
    (d) réception du signal réembrouillé émanant de la carte à puce.
  16. Système selon la revendication 15 dans lequel ladite clé publique est stockée dans ledit dispositif hôte et ladite clé privée est stockée dans ladite carte à puce.
  17. Système selon la revendication 16 dans lequel ledit dispositif hôte est un téléviseur numérique, un magnétoscope numérique ou un décodeur numérique.
  18. Système de gestion d'accès entre un fournisseur de services (300) et un dispositif hôte (100) auquel une carte à puce (200) est couplée, ledit dispositif hôte effectuant les étapes de :
    (a) réception d'un signal embrouillé émanant du fournisseur de services ;
    (b) transmission, vers la carte à puce, d'une seconde valeur de graine ;
    (c) couplage dudit signal embrouillé reçu à ladite carte à puce, ladite carte à puce ayant un moyen de traitement du contrôle d'accès, ledit moyen de traitement du contrôle d'accès comprenant des moyens pour générer une clé de désembrouillage en réponse audit signal embrouillé reçu, des moyens pour désembrouiller ledit signal reçu à l'aide de ladite clé de désembrouillage afin de générer un signal désembrouillé, des moyens pour générer une première valeur de graine et pour envoyer ladite première valeur de graine audit dispositif hôte, des moyens pour générer une clé d'embrouillage en réponse aux dites première et seconde valeurs de graine et des moyens pour embrouiller ledit signal désembrouillé à l'aide de ladite clé d'embrouillage afin de générer un signal réembrouillé ; et
    (d) réception du signal réembrouillé émanant de la carte à puce.
  19. Système selon la revendication 18 dans lequel ledit dispositif hôte est un téléviseur numérique, un magnétoscope numérique ou un décodeur numérique.
EP98965985A 1997-12-10 1998-12-10 Procede de protection des donnees audiovisuelles par l'interface des normes de securite nationales renouvelables (nrss) Expired - Lifetime EP1059001B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US86567 1979-10-19
US6909097P 1997-12-10 1997-12-10
US69090P 1997-12-10
US8656798P 1998-05-21 1998-05-21
PCT/US1998/026296 WO1999030499A1 (fr) 1997-12-10 1998-12-10 Procede de protection des donnees audiovisuelles par l'interface des normes de securite nationales renouvelables (nrss)

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1059001A1 EP1059001A1 (fr) 2000-12-13
EP1059001B1 true EP1059001B1 (fr) 2002-07-24

Family

ID=26749678

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP98965985A Expired - Lifetime EP1059001B1 (fr) 1997-12-10 1998-12-10 Procede de protection des donnees audiovisuelles par l'interface des normes de securite nationales renouvelables (nrss)

Country Status (13)

Country Link
US (1) US6409089B1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1059001B1 (fr)
JP (2) JP4510281B2 (fr)
KR (1) KR100564832B1 (fr)
CN (1) CN1150760C (fr)
AU (1) AU749748B2 (fr)
BR (1) BR9813407B1 (fr)
CA (1) CA2318936C (fr)
DE (1) DE69806821T2 (fr)
HK (1) HK1034627A1 (fr)
IL (1) IL136674A0 (fr)
NZ (1) NZ504971A (fr)
WO (1) WO1999030499A1 (fr)

Families Citing this family (61)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8300832B2 (en) * 1998-01-08 2012-10-30 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. System and method for copy protection for digital signals
US7778418B1 (en) 1998-01-08 2010-08-17 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. System and method for copy protection for digital signals
KR100605825B1 (ko) * 1999-09-14 2006-07-31 삼성전자주식회사 하드 디스크 드라이브를 구비하는 방송 수신 시스템의 복사 방지장치 및 방법
US6449719B1 (en) * 1999-11-09 2002-09-10 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Process and streaming server for encrypting a data stream
US8055894B2 (en) * 1999-11-09 2011-11-08 Google Inc. Process and streaming server for encrypting a data stream with bandwidth based variation
US6804357B1 (en) * 2000-04-28 2004-10-12 Nokia Corporation Method and system for providing secure subscriber content data
FR2812781A1 (fr) * 2000-08-04 2002-02-08 Thomson Multimedia Sa Methode de distribution securisee de donnees numeriques representatives d'un contenu multimedia
US7165175B1 (en) 2000-09-06 2007-01-16 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Apparatus, system and method for selectively encrypting different portions of data sent over a network
US7043473B1 (en) 2000-11-22 2006-05-09 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Media tracking system and method
US7150045B2 (en) * 2000-12-14 2006-12-12 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Method and apparatus for protection of electronic media
JP2002261747A (ja) * 2000-12-28 2002-09-13 Sony Corp 配信方法及び配信システム
US20020129378A1 (en) * 2001-03-08 2002-09-12 Cloonan Thomas J. Method and apparatus for controlling traffic loading on a cable modem termination system
US7418344B2 (en) * 2001-08-02 2008-08-26 Sandisk Corporation Removable computer with mass storage
US7594265B2 (en) * 2001-11-14 2009-09-22 Ati Technologies, Inc. System for preventing unauthorized access to sensitive data and a method thereof
US7328345B2 (en) 2002-01-29 2008-02-05 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Method and system for end to end securing of content for video on demand
US7299292B2 (en) * 2002-03-29 2007-11-20 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Process and streaming server for encrypting a data stream to a virtual smart card client system
US7469420B2 (en) 2002-05-21 2008-12-23 Thomson Licensing Key transport tamper protection
JP4932155B2 (ja) * 2002-05-21 2012-05-16 トムソン ライセンシング 鍵送信時の改ざん保護
US7594271B2 (en) * 2002-09-20 2009-09-22 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Method and system for real-time tamper evidence gathering for software
US7370212B2 (en) 2003-02-25 2008-05-06 Microsoft Corporation Issuing a publisher use license off-line in a digital rights management (DRM) system
US7007170B2 (en) * 2003-03-18 2006-02-28 Widevine Technologies, Inc. System, method, and apparatus for securely providing content viewable on a secure device
US7356143B2 (en) * 2003-03-18 2008-04-08 Widevine Technologies, Inc System, method, and apparatus for securely providing content viewable on a secure device
US20040199771A1 (en) * 2003-04-04 2004-10-07 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Method for tracing a security breach in highly distributed content
US7406174B2 (en) 2003-10-21 2008-07-29 Widevine Technologies, Inc. System and method for n-dimensional encryption
US20060242406A1 (en) 2005-04-22 2006-10-26 Microsoft Corporation Protected computing environment
US8074287B2 (en) * 2004-04-30 2011-12-06 Microsoft Corporation Renewable and individualizable elements of a protected environment
US7461259B2 (en) * 2004-06-30 2008-12-02 Nokia Corporation Method and apparatus to provide secure mobile file system
US9609279B2 (en) 2004-09-24 2017-03-28 Google Inc. Method and system for providing secure CODECS
US8347078B2 (en) 2004-10-18 2013-01-01 Microsoft Corporation Device certificate individualization
EP1662788A1 (fr) 2004-11-24 2006-05-31 Nagravision SA Unité de traitement de données audio/vidéo numériques et méthode de contrôle d'accès audites données
US7805611B1 (en) * 2004-12-03 2010-09-28 Oracle America, Inc. Method for secure communication from chip card and system for performing the same
US20080015999A1 (en) * 2005-02-04 2008-01-17 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Securely ingesting encrypted content into content servers
US8438645B2 (en) 2005-04-27 2013-05-07 Microsoft Corporation Secure clock with grace periods
US8725646B2 (en) 2005-04-15 2014-05-13 Microsoft Corporation Output protection levels
US7739505B2 (en) * 2005-04-22 2010-06-15 Microsoft Corporation Linking Diffie Hellman with HFS authentication by using a seed
US9436804B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2016-09-06 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Establishing a unique session key using a hardware functionality scan
US9363481B2 (en) 2005-04-22 2016-06-07 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Protected media pipeline
US20060265758A1 (en) 2005-05-20 2006-11-23 Microsoft Corporation Extensible media rights
US20090210701A1 (en) * 2005-06-23 2009-08-20 Junbiao Zhang Multi-Media Access Device Registration System and Method
US20070067643A1 (en) * 2005-09-21 2007-03-22 Widevine Technologies, Inc. System and method for software tamper detection
WO2007038245A2 (fr) 2005-09-23 2007-04-05 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Procede de mise au point de detecteurs en vue de la detection d'un comportement malin dans un systeme immunitaire artificiel
US7817608B2 (en) * 2005-09-23 2010-10-19 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Transitioning to secure IP communications for encoding, encapsulating, and encrypting data
US8065733B2 (en) * 2005-09-23 2011-11-22 Google, Inc. Method for evolving detectors to detect malign behavior in an artificial immune system
US8689016B2 (en) 2005-12-02 2014-04-01 Google Inc. Tamper prevention and detection for video provided over a network to a client
US8526612B2 (en) * 2006-01-06 2013-09-03 Google Inc. Selective and persistent application level encryption for video provided to a client
US20070180231A1 (en) * 2006-01-31 2007-08-02 Widevine Technologies, Inc. Preventing entitlement management message (EMM) filter attacks
US8621093B2 (en) * 2007-05-21 2013-12-31 Google Inc. Non-blocking of head end initiated revocation and delivery of entitlements non-addressable digital media network
US8243924B2 (en) 2007-06-29 2012-08-14 Google Inc. Progressive download or streaming of digital media securely through a localized container and communication protocol proxy
US8868464B2 (en) 2008-02-07 2014-10-21 Google Inc. Preventing unauthorized modification or skipping of viewing of advertisements within content
US9058491B1 (en) 2009-03-26 2015-06-16 Micron Technology, Inc. Enabling a secure boot from non-volatile memory
US9336410B2 (en) 2009-12-15 2016-05-10 Micron Technology, Inc. Nonvolatile memory internal signature generation
US8751800B1 (en) 2011-12-12 2014-06-10 Google Inc. DRM provider interoperability
CN103024476B (zh) * 2013-01-08 2018-08-03 北京视博数字电视科技有限公司 数字电视网关设备及内容安全保护的方法
US9888283B2 (en) 2013-03-13 2018-02-06 Nagrastar Llc Systems and methods for performing transport I/O
US9485533B2 (en) 2013-03-13 2016-11-01 Nagrastar Llc Systems and methods for assembling and extracting command and control data
USD759022S1 (en) 2013-03-13 2016-06-14 Nagrastar Llc Smart card interface
US9647997B2 (en) 2013-03-13 2017-05-09 Nagrastar, Llc USB interface for performing transport I/O
USD758372S1 (en) 2013-03-13 2016-06-07 Nagrastar Llc Smart card interface
USD729808S1 (en) 2013-03-13 2015-05-19 Nagrastar Llc Smart card interface
USD780763S1 (en) 2015-03-20 2017-03-07 Nagrastar Llc Smart card interface
USD864968S1 (en) 2015-04-30 2019-10-29 Echostar Technologies L.L.C. Smart card interface

Family Cites Families (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4694489A (en) 1983-12-22 1987-09-15 Frederiksen Jeffrey E Video transmission system
US5138659A (en) * 1991-05-02 1992-08-11 General Instrument Corporation Conversion of television signal formats with retention of common control data stream
IL107967A (en) * 1993-12-09 1996-12-05 News Datacom Research Ltd Apparatus and method for securing communication systems
US5880769A (en) 1994-01-19 1999-03-09 Smarttv Co. Interactive smart card system for integrating the provision of remote and local services
IL111151A (en) 1994-10-03 1998-09-24 News Datacom Ltd Secure access systems
MY125706A (en) 1994-08-19 2006-08-30 Thomson Consumer Electronics High speed signal processing smart card
KR100332743B1 (ko) 1994-11-26 2002-11-07 엘지전자주식회사 디지탈영상시스템의불법시청및복사방지방법및장치
US5758257A (en) 1994-11-29 1998-05-26 Herz; Frederick System and method for scheduling broadcast of and access to video programs and other data using customer profiles
KR0166940B1 (ko) * 1995-01-16 1999-03-20 구자홍 정보기록매체의 재생가능횟수제한장치 및 방법
US5621793A (en) 1995-05-05 1997-04-15 Rubin, Bednarek & Associates, Inc. TV set top box using GPS
US6035037A (en) 1995-08-04 2000-03-07 Thomson Electronic Consumers, Inc. System for processing a video signal via series-connected high speed signal processing smart cards
JPH1079730A (ja) * 1996-09-03 1998-03-24 Digital Vision Lab:Kk 復号化装置
PL339572A1 (en) * 1997-10-02 2000-12-18 Canal Plus Sa Method of and apparatus for transmitting encoded data sequences
US6101216A (en) * 1997-10-03 2000-08-08 Rockwell International Corporation Splitterless digital subscriber line communication system

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
IL136674A0 (en) 2001-06-14
CN1282489A (zh) 2001-01-31
BR9813407A (pt) 2000-10-03
CA2318936A1 (fr) 1999-06-17
KR100564832B1 (ko) 2006-03-30
JP2009153181A (ja) 2009-07-09
AU2199299A (en) 1999-06-28
CA2318936C (fr) 2004-04-06
EP1059001A1 (fr) 2000-12-13
DE69806821T2 (de) 2003-01-16
BR9813407B1 (pt) 2012-10-30
NZ504971A (en) 2002-02-01
JP2003517218A (ja) 2003-05-20
CN1150760C (zh) 2004-05-19
US6409089B1 (en) 2002-06-25
JP4510281B2 (ja) 2010-07-21
KR20010031722A (ko) 2001-04-16
DE69806821D1 (de) 2002-08-29
AU749748B2 (en) 2002-07-04
WO1999030499A1 (fr) 1999-06-17
HK1034627A1 (en) 2001-10-26

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1059001B1 (fr) Procede de protection des donnees audiovisuelles par l'interface des normes de securite nationales renouvelables (nrss)
US6550008B1 (en) Protection of information transmitted over communications channels
EP1155527B1 (fr) Protection de l'information dans un systeme
KR100898437B1 (ko) 통신 네트워크에서 대칭 키를 관리하는 방법, 통신 디바이스 및 통신 네트워크에서 데이터를 처리하기 위한 디바이스
US7466826B2 (en) Method of secure transmission of digital data from a source to a receiver
EP2461534A1 (fr) Protection de mot de contrôle
EP2362573A1 (fr) Dispositif et procédé pour établir une clé de confiance sécurisée
KR20100092902A (ko) 스마트카드로부터 조건부 액세스 모듈로 제어 워드를 확실하게 제공하는 방법
US6516414B1 (en) Secure communication over a link
Jiang et al. Secure communication between set-top box and smart card in DTV broadcasting
TWI477133B (zh) 控制字符之解密方法、傳送方法及接收方法以及用於這些方法之伺服器
US7224806B2 (en) Threshold cryptography scheme for conditional access systems
KR20040088530A (ko) 제1 도메인용으로 암호화한 데이터를 제2 도메인에 속한네트워크에서 처리하기 위한 디바이스 및 그 데이터를전송하는 방법
WO2002045337A2 (fr) Schema cryptographique a seuil destine a des systemes a acces conditionnel
Hou et al. Based on cryptosystem secure communication between set-top box and smart card in DTV broadcasting
US20050278524A1 (en) Local digital network, methods for installing new devices and data broadcast and reception methods in such a network
Kim Secure communication in digital TV broadcasting
US20040047472A1 (en) Threshold cryptography scheme for conditional access systems
EP2362574A1 (fr) Vérification de la correspondance de clés dans des systèmes à carte intelligente
Lee et al. Efficient and secure communication between set-top box and smart card in IPTV broadcasting
MXPA00005722A (en) Method for protecting the audio/visual data across the nrss inte rface

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 20000707

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A1

Designated state(s): DE FR GB IE IT

RAP1 Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred)

Owner name: THOMSON LICENSING S.A.

GRAG Despatch of communication of intention to grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOS AGRA

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 20010716

GRAG Despatch of communication of intention to grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOS AGRA

GRAG Despatch of communication of intention to grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOS AGRA

GRAH Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOS IGRA

GRAH Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOS IGRA

GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): DE FR GB IE IT

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: FG4D

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: FG4D

REF Corresponds to:

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Date of ref document: 20020829

ET Fr: translation filed
PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IE

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES

Effective date: 20021210

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: 746

Effective date: 20030108

PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

26N No opposition filed

Effective date: 20030425

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: IE

Ref legal event code: MM4A

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R082

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Representative=s name: HOFSTETTER, SCHURACK & PARTNER PATENT- UND REC, DE

Effective date: 20120202

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R082

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Representative=s name: ROSSMANITH, MANFRED, DIPL.-PHYS. DR.RER.NAT., DE

Effective date: 20120202

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R081

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Owner name: THOMSON LICENSING, FR

Free format text: FORMER OWNER: THOMSON LICENSING S.A., BOULOGNE, FR

Effective date: 20120202

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R081

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Owner name: THOMSON LICENSING, FR

Free format text: FORMER OWNER: THOMSON LICENSING S.A., BOULOGNE, CEDEX, FR

Effective date: 20120202

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 18

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 19

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R082

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Representative=s name: DEHNS, DE

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R082

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Representative=s name: HOFSTETTER, SCHURACK & PARTNER PATENT- UND REC, DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: FR

Ref legal event code: PLFP

Year of fee payment: 20

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FR

Payment date: 20171222

Year of fee payment: 20

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20171220

Year of fee payment: 20

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20171218

Year of fee payment: 20

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: IT

Payment date: 20171221

Year of fee payment: 20

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R071

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: PE20

Expiry date: 20181209

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF EXPIRATION OF PROTECTION

Effective date: 20181209

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R082

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Representative=s name: DEHNS, DE

Ref country code: DE

Ref legal event code: R081

Ref document number: 69806821

Country of ref document: DE

Owner name: INTERDIGITAL CE PATENT HOLDINGS SAS, FR

Free format text: FORMER OWNER: THOMSON LICENSING, ISSY-LES-MOULINEAUX, FR