EP1044435B1 - Procede et dispositif de traitement de codes confidentiels - Google Patents
Procede et dispositif de traitement de codes confidentiels Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1044435B1 EP1044435B1 EP98964554A EP98964554A EP1044435B1 EP 1044435 B1 EP1044435 B1 EP 1044435B1 EP 98964554 A EP98964554 A EP 98964554A EP 98964554 A EP98964554 A EP 98964554A EP 1044435 B1 EP1044435 B1 EP 1044435B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- code
- function
- entitlement
- fact
- verifying
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
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Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
Definitions
- the invention relates to the field of code devices and code processing methods. More specifically, the invention relates to the domain of systems with confidential access code, in particular, devices and methods for securing access to certain operations such as transactions, in particular electronic banking.
- An object of the invention is to simplify this type of device and procedures, while minimizing the risks incurred by the holder of a code, victim of such attacks and retaining the protection of functions at protect.
- the victim can reveal to the aggressor a second code; thanks to the method according to the invention, this second code is distinguished from a first code, empowered to access a first function; there is then no access to the first function which remains protected; but second code can be enabled to trigger a second function which can serve as a decoy, intended to divert the aggressor from the project to access to the first function.
- the aggressor diverted from his project will not seek to further threaten the victim for whom the risks involved are found therefore reduced.
- this process remains simple to implement. work, since the verification stage of the first authorization is common to testing the code entered directly into the function system secure and to the test of the code obtained after the second transformation.
- the first function of the method according to the invention is a bank transaction.
- the steps of the method according to the invention consisting in verifying the first and second authorizations, involve a microprocessor card.
- said first simple transformation of the process according to the invention is carried out by an elementary shift of one character of the first code.
- the method according to the invention further comprises an invalidation step, if the step of verifying the first clearance has been tested more than a specified number of times without success.
- the second function, of the method according to the invention consists in displaying a message randomly chosen from several messages indicating that access to the first function is not possible, without however specifying that the code is not the one allowing to obtain the first authorization.
- the second simple transformation of the process according to the invention is a function of parameters accessible on the card to microprocessor.
- the invention is a control device access to secure functions, with confidential code.
- the device according to the invention is a terminal for Bank card.
- the device according to the invention is used for secure a bank transaction.
- the steps consisting in verifying the first and second authorizations involve a registered user profile numerically.
- the means of the device according to the invention for check the first and second authorizations, involve a credit card microprocessor.
- said simple transformation of the device according to the invention is carried out by an elementary shift of one character of the first code.
- the device according to the invention further comprises means of invalidation implemented if the first authorization has been tested more than a specified number of times without success.
- the second function of the device according to the invention is carried out by means which display a message chosen at random among several messages indicating that access to the first function is not not possible, without however specifying that the code is not the one allowing to obtain the first authorization.
- the second simple transformation of the device according to the invention is a function of parameters accessible on the card to microprocessor.
- this is an automatic cash dispenser.
- a central unit 1 which processes and exchanges information with a reader 2 bank cards 10, and a keyboard 3 (or any other interactive device for entry), to control a mechanism for dispensing 4 banknotes, the reader 2 of bank cards 10 and produce messages displayed on a screen 5.
- Information processing and control of mechanisms composing the device according to the invention by the central unit 1, is based on exchanges with a memory unit 6.
- a card 10 is provided with a microprocessor. This microprocessor corresponds to a holder profile authorized to hold a first code.
- the holder also holds a second code which will be used as emergency code in the manner which will be explained below.
- the user therefore has two codes.
- the first code is his code confidential usual, authorized to access a first function, in the occurrence, for the example described here, of an electronic payment transaction of the type automatic ticket distribution.
- the second code is a backup code. It can be revealed by a user threatened by an attacker instead of his confidential code.
- This second code is easily memorized and is obtained by a first simple arithmetic transformation from the first.
- the second code differs from the first code only by a digit, which digit is advantageously modified only by plus 1 or minus 1 compared to the number of the same rank in the first and second codes.
- the device according to the invention is implemented work according to the following process, described with reference to FIG. 2.
- the central unit 1 then begins at the start 100 a procedure for test, with successive steps as shown below.
- An indicator 110 testifying to the fact that the code has not yet been transformed is generated.
- the code is tested, by a code 120 test to verify a first empowerment.
- test 120 gives a negative result, it means that the code supplied to the device according to the invention does not correspond to the first code held by the user, ie his confidential code.
- a first indicator test 130 is then performed. If the indicator shows that the code has not still been transformed, central unit 1 initiates a second test empowerment and proceeds to a derivation 140 of a second transformation, reverse of a simple first transformation allowing the holder of a first code to obtain a second code (its backup code) from the first code.
- This code obtained by derivation 140 is used to reproduce the first authorization verification step, at the code test level 120. If after the derivation 140, the code obtained still does not correspond to the first code (usual confidential code), is that the code introduced to early 100 was not the second code (backup code). It can be, by example of a typing error on the part of the user.
- a second test 160 of the indicator is performed. If the indicator shows that the code has not not transformed, the user has access to protected function 180 (by example ticket distribution). If the indicator shows that the code has already been transformed, is that the code having successfully passed the first clearance test, had previously undergone bypass 140. The code entered at the beginning of 100 of the procedure was therefore the emergency code. The the procedure then continues with a second function 170, in this case, a rescue transaction 170, which can be a decoy function.
- the second function 170 corresponds for the example described here to a rescue transaction which can cover several solutions.
- a solution can consist in displaying on screen 3, a message randomly chosen from several messages indicating that access to the first function 180 is not possible, without however specifying that the code provided to the device according to the invention is not the one allowing to obtain the first clearance.
- the message will be of the type “momentary transaction unavailable “or” insufficient credit "or any of the other common messages used to indicate a malfunction an ATM or a malfunction of the bank account holder.
- the normal ticket distribution procedure will be initiated, for example by asking how much is desired, then if the user wants a receipt, but a failure will be simulated and the sum requested will not be issued.
- the second simple transformation 140 makes it possible to find the first code (usual confidential code) from the second code (code rescue).
- this simple second transformation 140 is variable, depending for example on parameters accessible on the card with microprocessor. For example, for a certain banking organization, the second transformation 140 can consist in incrementing by 1 the digit of second in the code, while for another organization, the transformation will consist in subtracting a unit from the figure of the last row.
- the second transformation 140, and in particular the direction of variation on a digit can also depend on the even or odd nature of the number constituting the "bank code", the "bank code”, etc.
- Another advantage of the invention in its form described above is that only one code needs to be tested at the microprocessor of card 10.
- the cards 10 currently used are therefore compatible with this embodiment of the invention and it is not no need to change the cards already in circulation.
- the second function 170 described above is a decoy function simulating a malfunction of the system to be protected. It might be considered in other cases, as a second function 170, the triggering of an alert signal, emission of defense gases, etc.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Compression, Expansion, Code Conversion, And Decoders (AREA)
- Communication Control (AREA)
- Record Information Processing For Printing (AREA)
Description
- recevoir un code ;
- vérifier une première habilitation, conditionnée par un premier code, pour accéder à une première fonction ;
- autoriser l'accès à la première fonction si la première habilitation est reconnue ;
- utiliser, si la première habilitation n'est pas reconnue, le code afin de vérifier une deuxième habilitation, conditionnée par un deuxième code distinct du premier code, pour déclencher au moins une deuxième fonction en ne révélant pas le fait que le code ne permet pas d'obtenir la première habilitation ;
- des moyens pour recevoir un code ;
- des moyens pour vérifier avec ce code une première habilitation, conditionnée par un premier code, pour accéder à une première fonction ;
- des moyens pour autoriser l'accès à la première fonction si l'habilitation est reconnue ; et
- des moyens pour utiliser, si l'accès à la première fonction est refusé, le code pour vérifier une deuxième habilitation conditionnée par un deuxième code distinct du premier code pour déclencher au moins une deuxième fonction en ne révélant pas le fait que le code ne permet pas d'obtenir la première habilitation ;
- la figure 1 est un diagramme représentant schématiquement les principales unités composant un dispositif particulier pour la mise en oeuvre de l'invention ; et
- la figure 2 est un synopsis de l'ensemble des étapes d'un exemple de mise en oeuvre du procédé selon l'invention.
Claims (16)
- Procédé de traitement de codes confidentiels dans un système à fonctions sécurisées (180) comprenant les étapes consistant à :recevoir un code ;vérifier une première habilitation, conditionnée par un premier code, pour accéder à une première fonction (180) ;autoriser l'accès à la première fonction (180) si la première habilitation est reconnue ;utiliser, si la première habilitation n'est pas reconnue, le code afin de vérifier une deuxième habilitation, conditionnée par un deuxième code distinct du premier code, pour déclencher au moins une deuxième fonction (170) en ne révélant pas le fait que le code ne permet pas d'obtenir la première habilitation ;
- Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que ladite première transformation simple est réalisée par un décalage élémentaire d'un caractère du premier code.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé par le fait que les étapes consistant à vérifier les première et deuxième habilitations font intervenir un profil d'utilisateur enregistré numériquement.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes caractérisé par le fait que la deuxième fonction (170) consiste à afficher un message choisi aléatoirement parmi plusieurs messages indiquant que l'accès à la première fonction (180) n'est pas possible, sans toutefois spécifier que le code n'est pas celui permettant d'obtenir la première habilitation.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé par le fait que la première fonction (180) est une transaction bancaire.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce qu'il comprend en outre une étape d'invalidation (200) si l'étape consistant à vérifier la première habilitation a été testée plus d'un nombre déterminé de fois sans succès.
- Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé par le fait que les étapes consistant à vérifier les première et deuxième habilitations, font intervenir une carte (10) à microprocesseur.
- Procédé selon la revendication 7 caractérisé par le fait que la deuxième transformation (140) simple est fonction de paramètres accessibles sur la carte (10) à microprocesseur.
- Dispositif de contrôle d'accès à des fonctions sécurisées (180), à code, comprenant :des moyens pour recevoir un code ;des moyens pour vérifier avec ce code une première habilitation, conditionnée par un premier code, pour accéder à une première fonction (180);des moyens pour autoriser l'accès à la première fonction (180) si l'habilitation est reconnue ; etdes moyens pour utiliser, si l'accès à la première fonction (180) est refusé, le code pour vérifier une deuxième habilitation conditionnée par un deuxième code distinct du premier code pour déclencher au moins une deuxième fonction (170) en ne révélant pas le fait que le code ne permet pas d'obtenir la première habilitation ;
- Dispositif selon la revendication 9 caractérisé par le fait que ladite première transformation simple est réalisée par un décalage élémentaire d'un caractère du premier code.
- Dispositif selon l'une quelconque des revendications 9 et 10, caractérisé par le fait qu'il est utilisé pour sécuriser une transaction bancaire.
- Dispositif selon l'une quelconque des revendications 9 à 11, caractérisé par le fait que la deuxième fonction (170) est réalisée par des moyens qui affichent un message choisi aléatoirement parmi plusieurs messages indiquant que l'accès à la première fonction (180) n'est pas possible, sans toutefois spécifier que le code n'est pas celui permettant d'obtenir la première habilitation.
- Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 9 à 12, caractérisé en ce qu'il est un terminal pour carte bancaire.
- Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 9 à 13, caractérisé en ce qu'il comprend en outre des moyens d'invalidation mis en oeuvre si la première habilitation a été testée plus d'un nombre déterminé de fois sans succès.
- Dispositif selon l'une des revendications 9 à 14, caractérisé par le fait que les moyens pour vérifier les première et deuxième habilitations, font intervenir une carte (10) à microprocesseur.
- Dispositif selon la revendication 15, caractérisé par le fait que la deuxième transformation (140) simple est fonction de paramètres accessibles sur la carte (10) à microprocesseur.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR9716786A FR2773250B1 (fr) | 1997-12-31 | 1997-12-31 | Procede et dispositif de traitement de codes confidentiels |
FR9716786 | 1997-12-31 | ||
PCT/FR1998/002918 WO1999035621A1 (fr) | 1997-12-31 | 1998-12-30 | Procede et dispositif de traitement de codes confidentiels |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1044435A1 EP1044435A1 (fr) | 2000-10-18 |
EP1044435B1 true EP1044435B1 (fr) | 2002-11-06 |
Family
ID=9515368
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP98964554A Expired - Lifetime EP1044435B1 (fr) | 1997-12-31 | 1998-12-30 | Procede et dispositif de traitement de codes confidentiels |
Country Status (9)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1044435B1 (fr) |
AT (1) | ATE227454T1 (fr) |
CA (1) | CA2316818A1 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE69809292T2 (fr) |
DK (1) | DK1044435T3 (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2186249T3 (fr) |
FR (1) | FR2773250B1 (fr) |
PT (1) | PT1044435E (fr) |
WO (1) | WO1999035621A1 (fr) |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2874440B1 (fr) | 2004-08-17 | 2008-04-25 | Oberthur Card Syst Sa | Procede et dispositif de traitement de donnees |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3633167A (en) * | 1970-05-25 | 1972-01-04 | Phinizy R B | Security system |
JPS59151261A (ja) * | 1983-02-18 | 1984-08-29 | Fujitsu Ltd | 取引保障方式 |
WO1993023830A1 (fr) * | 1992-05-08 | 1993-11-25 | Wesco Software Limited | Authentification de l'identite d'une personne autorisee |
US5354974A (en) * | 1992-11-24 | 1994-10-11 | Base 10 Systems, Inc. | Automatic teller system and method of operating same |
NL9202113A (nl) * | 1992-12-07 | 1994-07-01 | Nederland Ptt | Werkwijze voor het beveiligen van een smart card systeem. |
-
1997
- 1997-12-31 FR FR9716786A patent/FR2773250B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
1998
- 1998-12-30 PT PT98964554T patent/PT1044435E/pt unknown
- 1998-12-30 AT AT98964554T patent/ATE227454T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1998-12-30 EP EP98964554A patent/EP1044435B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-12-30 DE DE69809292T patent/DE69809292T2/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1998-12-30 CA CA002316818A patent/CA2316818A1/fr not_active Abandoned
- 1998-12-30 WO PCT/FR1998/002918 patent/WO1999035621A1/fr active IP Right Grant
- 1998-12-30 ES ES98964554T patent/ES2186249T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1998-12-30 DK DK98964554T patent/DK1044435T3/da active
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
FR2773250A1 (fr) | 1999-07-02 |
DK1044435T3 (da) | 2003-03-03 |
ATE227454T1 (de) | 2002-11-15 |
WO1999035621A1 (fr) | 1999-07-15 |
CA2316818A1 (fr) | 1999-07-15 |
EP1044435A1 (fr) | 2000-10-18 |
DE69809292D1 (de) | 2002-12-12 |
DE69809292T2 (de) | 2003-07-17 |
PT1044435E (pt) | 2003-03-31 |
FR2773250B1 (fr) | 2000-03-10 |
ES2186249T3 (es) | 2003-05-01 |
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