EP0982688B1 - Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem - Google Patents

Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0982688B1
EP0982688B1 EP99810764A EP99810764A EP0982688B1 EP 0982688 B1 EP0982688 B1 EP 0982688B1 EP 99810764 A EP99810764 A EP 99810764A EP 99810764 A EP99810764 A EP 99810764A EP 0982688 B1 EP0982688 B1 EP 0982688B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
code
transponder
information
serial number
additional information
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP99810764A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0982688A1 (de
Inventor
Peter A. Dr. Stegmaier
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Datamars SA
Original Assignee
Datamars SA
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Datamars SA filed Critical Datamars SA
Priority to EP99810764A priority Critical patent/EP0982688B1/de
Publication of EP0982688A1 publication Critical patent/EP0982688A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0982688B1 publication Critical patent/EP0982688B1/de
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/28—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence

Definitions

  • This invention relates to a method according to the preamble of claim 1.
  • Identification systems of this type are known, for instance from US-patent 5 028 918.
  • the objects to be identified by such systems may be of any kind, but they often are animals.
  • the additional information transmitted by the transponder is not specified in detail, and it usually comprises data received by the transponder from a data module. No specific means are disclosed in the patent specifications mentioned above for preventing or at least detecting fraud by copying transponders wherein the identification code of some valuable object such as an animal is stored.
  • the transponders usually make use of integrated circuits (chips) as active elements.
  • chips integrated circuits
  • Fraud by copying the code of a specific transponder into an OTP or R/W transponder in order to obtain two identical transponders can occur and needs to be made impossible.
  • One well known approach is to use a secret key and some cryptographic algorithm (symmetric or asymmetric) to generate a cyphrate out of a random number sent to the transponder as challenge. The cryphrate is sent back from the transponders to the reader. Often the code of the transponder is also used as input to the cryptographic algorithm. Knowing algorithm and secret key (or public key in asymmetric systems) the reader can authenticate the transponder at any time. This method, however needs to make use of at least one secret key which needs to reside within the transponder memory and therefore requires sophisticated key handling.
  • EP-A-0 689 150 discloses a somewhat less sophisticated system, wherein a radio time signal received at reading time as well by the transponder as by the interrogating station. This time signal is combined with the identification code and retransmitted from the transponder to the interrogating station where the information retransmitted is analysed for reading the code.
  • transponders are often passive elements without power source, the power for retransmission of the information being provided by the interrogating signal received by the transponder. It is impossible under these circumstances to continuously run a time clock in the transponder, and it is hardly possible to receive a radio time signal without power source in the transponder. Further, without cryptographic treatment of the time signal and code it would be possible for foreigners to determine the addition of a time signal and the code from the response signal of the transponder and thus to copy the transponder.
  • This invention aims in providing security against copying without reaching the level of cryptography and without increased power requirement.
  • This security is obtained by the characterising features of claim 1.
  • the advantage of this method is that it is not requiring complicated and error prone key handling and requires almost no computing power. The latter in contrast to cryptographic methods.
  • the method makes use of a chip serial number that makes the combination of the code and the chip serial number almost unique as long as the respective chip manufacturer never produces two identical serial numbers.
  • a database can be used at identification set-up time when the code/serial number pair is stored into the database. At this moment, the database can be searched for double serial numbers and/or codes.
  • a chip manufacturer identification may also be associated to the chip and made part of the serial number using the above method.
  • checksum type information e.g. CRC
  • CRC checksum type information
  • This identification of the manufacturer or the user of the chip may be a trademark such as the registered trademark RID of applicant.
  • a geographic information etc. can be stored into the database along with time and date of the read operation to facilitate plausibility checks.
  • Other and additional information may be stored in the memory of the transponder. A possible method is described below, whereby additional information mentioned therein may be omitted or replaced by other specific information.
  • the code, the die serial number, and the die manufacturer-ID are combined into a consistency check number using a specific method, e.g. a CRC scheme.
  • the resulting number is programmed into the memory of the transponder, e.g. in the trailer bits and needs to be stored in the respective database or marked down in the animals passport, etc. for subsequent consistency check.
  • the code, the die serial number, the die manufacturer-ID, and the consistency check number are read and the same method is applied to check consistency of all respective numbers. Then comparing the consistency check number (i.e. the number stored in the trailer bits) with the respective number in the database, in the animals passport, etc. the tag (transponder) can be authenticated.
  • This method can prevent from copying transponders as long as no OTP dies are available that allow the programming of die serial number and die manufacturer-ID at code programming time.
  • the previous registration at identification set-up time may be compared to the information retrieved from the transponder at code-read time to discover fraud by modification of said information or fraud by copying the transponder using blank chips and copying the code leading to different serial numbers. This allows explicit authentification at any time.
  • a checksum type information may additionally be stored in a database not accessible by fraudulent personnel.
  • the method for generation of a checksum type information may be a hashing function calculated from any portion of the transponder memory.
  • the method for the generation of the checksum type information may also be a cryptographic function calculated from any portion of the transponder memory and making use of symmetric or asymmetric keys and where only the results of the respective calculations are stored in the memory of the transponder but not said keys.
  • it is of importance that no key has to be stored in the transponder.
  • Another possibility is to store any additional information in the memory of the transponder in such a way that the boundaries of the individual numbers of the stored additional information are not distinguishable to the not knowing. In this way the boundary between the checksum type information and the remaining information shall be obliterated in order to protect the checksum type information from fraudulent analysis.

Landscapes

  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Pinball Game Machines (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Radar Systems Or Details Thereof (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
  • Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
  • Geophysics And Detection Of Objects (AREA)

Claims (18)

  1. Verfahren zum Verhindern oder Erkennen von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem, wobei ein Transponder, welcher einen Speicher hat, der einen Identifiziercode aufweist, mit einem Objekt vereint bzw. verbunden ist, das zu identifizieren ist, wobei dieser Transponder durch ein Aufforderungssignal zur Übertragung des Codes aktiviert wird, der so erhaltene Code durch Registrieren des Codes zusammen mit der Objektinformation für die Identifikation des Objektes genutzt wird und zusätzliche Information zusammen mit dem Code übertragen wird,
    dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass
    wenigstens ein Teil der zusätzlichen Information, welche zur Bestimmung der Einzigartigkeit des Transponders dient und welche sich für jeden Transponder unterscheidet, unveränderlich in dem Speicher gespeichert wird, wobei eine Authentifizierung bzw. Beglaubigung der Identifikation des Objektes auf der Kombination des Codes und der zusätzlichen Information basiert und einen Vergleich des Codes und der zusätzlichen Information mit den korrespondierenden Daten umfasst, die in einer geheimen Datenbank gespeichert sind.
  2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei die zusätzliche Information zusammen mit dem Code registriert wird, wobei die Authentifizierung einen Vergleich des gespeicherten Codes und der zusätzlichen Information mit dem registrierten
    Code und der zusätzlichen Information umfasst.
  3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei die zusätzliche Information während des Herstellens des Transponderchips als eine einzigartige Chip-Seriennummer gespeichert wird, welche nicht durch den Programmierer des Transpondercodes geändert werden kann.
  4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 3, welches während der Identifikations-Initialisierungszeit das Durchsuchen der Datenbank, wo der Code und die Seriennummer registriert sind, nach Doppelseriennummern umfasst, um Betrug zu erkennen, indem Chips genutzt werden, welche programmierbare Seriennummern zulassen oder ermöglichen bzw. freigeben.
  5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 4, welches das Vergleichen der vorherigen Registrierung während der Identifikations-Initialisierungszeit mit der rückgesendeten Information von dem Transponder während der Code-Lesezeit umfasst, um Betrug durch Modifikation der Information oder Betrug durch Kopieren des Transponders, indem leere Chips genutzt werden und indem der Code kopiert wird, was zu verschiedenen Seriennummern führt, zu erkennen.
  6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 3 oder 4, welches das Integrieren einer Chip-Herstelleridentifikation (ID) in die Seriennummer umfasst, um Doppelseriennummern von verschiedenen Herstellern zu vermeiden.
  7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 3, welches das Benutzen einer Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ umfasst, welche aus der Seriennummer gemacht wird, z.B. um Zeit beim Lesen der kürzeren Prüfsumme anstatt der Seriennummer zu gewinnen.
  8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 7, welches das Nutzen einer Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ umfasst, welche aus der Seriennummer und einer Herstelleridentifikation (ID) gemacht wird, z.B. um Zeit beim Lesen der kürzeren Prüfsumme anstatt der Seriennummer und Hersteller-ID zu gewinnen.
  9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, wobei die Nummer vom Prüfsumme-Typ aus der Seriennummer, der Herstelleridentifikation (ID) und dem Code gemacht wird, um eine Konsistenzprüfung über den Code, die Seriennummer, die ID und die Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ zuzulassen.
  10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei eine Nummer vom Prüfsumme-Typ über irgendeinem Teil oder über den gesamten Speicher des Transponders berechnet wird, um eine Konsistenzprüfung zu ermöglichen.
  11. Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, 9 oder 10, welches das Speichern der Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ auch im Transponder umfasst, so dass vielfältige verschiedene Information erhalten wird: Code, Seriennummer, Herstelleridentifikation (ID) und Prüfsumme, und welches das Lesen aller vielfältigen Information sowie der Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ während der Authentifizierzeit umfasst, um eine Konsistenzprüfung zu erlauben.
  12. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 3, welches das Speichern des Codes und der Seriennummer in einer Datenbank umfasst, welche nicht für betrügerisches Personal zugänglich ist.
  13. Verfahren nach Anspruch 12, welches zusätzliches Speichern einer Herstelleridentifikation (ID) in einer Datenbank, die für betrügerisches Personal nicht zugänglich ist, umfasst.
  14. Verfahren nach Anspruch 7, 8, 9, 10 oder 11, welches ein zusätzliches Speichern der Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ in einer Datenbank, welche nicht für betrügerisches Personal zugänglich ist, umfasst.
  15. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 14, wobei der Code und die zusätzliche Information in einer Datenbank oder in einem Zertifikat, welche für nicht-autorisierte Personen nicht zugänglich sind, oder in einer Computer-Datenbank mit Schreibzugang nur für autorisierte Personen registriert werden, um das Suchen nach Doppelinformation oder inkonsistenter Information zuzulassen, um betrügerische Aktion zu jeder Zeit zu erkennen, während die Datenbank oder das Zertifikat genutzt wird.
  16. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 15, wobei das Verfahren für das Erzeugen der Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ eine Hash-Codierungsfunktion ist, welche aus irgendeinem Teil des Transponderspeichers berechnet wird.
  17. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 16, wobei das Verfahren für das Erzeugen der Information vom Prüfsumme-Typ eine kryptographische Funktion ist, welche von symmetrischen oder asymmetrischen Schlüsseln Gebrauch macht, und wobei nur die Ergebnisse der jeweiligen Berechnungen im Speicher des Transponders gespeichert werden, aber nicht die Schlüssel.
  18. Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 17, wobei jegliche zusätzliche Information, die in dem Speicher des Transponders gespeichert ist, in solch einer Weise gespeichert wird, dass die Grenzen bzw. Abgrenzungen der individuellen Nummern der gespeicherten zusätzlichen Information für einen Nichtwissenden bzw. Nichteingeweihten nicht erkennbar sind.
EP99810764A 1998-08-26 1999-08-25 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem Expired - Lifetime EP0982688B1 (de)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP99810764A EP0982688B1 (de) 1998-08-26 1999-08-25 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP98810845A EP0982687A1 (de) 1998-08-26 1998-08-26 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem
EP98810845 1998-08-26
EP99810764A EP0982688B1 (de) 1998-08-26 1999-08-25 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0982688A1 EP0982688A1 (de) 2000-03-01
EP0982688B1 true EP0982688B1 (de) 2002-05-29

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Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP98810845A Withdrawn EP0982687A1 (de) 1998-08-26 1998-08-26 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem
EP99810764A Expired - Lifetime EP0982688B1 (de) 1998-08-26 1999-08-25 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP98810845A Withdrawn EP0982687A1 (de) 1998-08-26 1998-08-26 Verfahren zur Verhinderung oder Erkennung von Betrug in einem Identifikationssystem

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EP (2) EP0982687A1 (de)
AT (1) ATE218231T1 (de)
DE (1) DE69901589T2 (de)
DK (1) DK0982688T3 (de)
ES (1) ES2175917T3 (de)
HK (1) HK1026287A1 (de)

Families Citing this family (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CA2399092A1 (en) * 2000-02-04 2001-08-09 3M Innovative Properties Company Method of authenticating a tag
US7383864B2 (en) 2002-04-03 2008-06-10 3M Innovative Properties Company Radio-frequency identification tag and tape applicator, radio-frequency identification tag applicator, and methods of applying radio-frequency identification tags
DE502004009816D1 (de) 2003-11-19 2009-09-10 Authentidate Internat Ag Verfahren zum Authentifizieren eines Gegenstands
FR2884945B1 (fr) * 2005-04-21 2007-09-07 Agronomique Inst Nat Rech Dispositif et procede de recensement spatial et temporel d'animaux
US20070205864A1 (en) 2006-02-17 2007-09-06 Datamars S.A. Secure radio frequency identification system
EP1901468B1 (de) * 2006-09-13 2012-10-17 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur Kodierung eines berührungslosen Schaltsystems
EP3004834A4 (de) 2013-06-05 2017-01-04 Snpshot Trustee Limited Gewebeprobennehmer
WO2015056227A1 (en) 2013-10-18 2015-04-23 Snpshot Trustee Limited A biopsy collector with identifier
CN115546949B (zh) * 2022-11-25 2023-02-10 深圳市亲邻科技有限公司 一种基于智能手表的远程控制门禁方法及系统

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US2293399A (en) 1940-02-09 1942-08-18 American Stove Co Fastening device for walls of stove structures
JPS60171475A (ja) * 1984-02-15 1985-09-04 アイデンティフィケ−ション・デバイセス・インコ−ポレ−テッド 識別システム
GB2164825B (en) * 1984-09-19 1988-05-11 Satellite Video Systems Ltd Coded transponder for indentification system
US5211129A (en) 1986-02-25 1993-05-18 Destron/Idi, Inc. Syringe-implantable identification transponder
US5028918A (en) * 1989-12-18 1991-07-02 Dairy Equipment Company Identification transponder circuit
NL9202069A (nl) * 1992-11-30 1994-06-16 Nedap Nv Identificatiesysteem met verbeterde identificatie-algorithme.
DE59508079D1 (de) * 1994-06-23 2000-05-04 Alcatel Sa Verfahren sowie Einrichtung zur Identifikation beweglicher Objekte
DE19703999A1 (de) * 1997-02-04 1998-08-06 Bosch Gmbh Robert Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Zuordnen einer Berechtigungseinrichtung zu einer Basisstation

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DK0982688T3 (da) 2002-07-15
ES2175917T3 (es) 2002-11-16
DE69901589T2 (de) 2002-12-19
EP0982687A1 (de) 2000-03-01
EP0982688A1 (de) 2000-03-01
ATE218231T1 (de) 2002-06-15
HK1026287A1 (en) 2000-12-08
DE69901589D1 (de) 2002-07-04

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