Classifications

• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
  • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
  • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
  • G07F7/0866—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means by active credit-cards adapted therefor

Definitions

• the present invention relates to methods for securely storing units of value in a smart card and to monetary transaction systems using these cards.
• the invention applies more particularly to smart cards comprising an unprotected EEPROM type memory area.
• an unprotected EEPROM area of a card is accessible by any individual having a simple card reader and read and write commands in memory. This type of memory area does not allow sensitive data to be saved since anyone can read and modify it.
• the method also applies to smart cards with protected memory in order to raise the level of security.
• Microprocessor cards are capable of containing and prohibiting access to units of value. Only the operating system of the card can access these units and increase or decrease their number. Secure commands managed by the operating system therefore allow the management of the area containing the value units, allowing the use of these value units as well as their safe reloading.
• a memory card does not include a microprocessor, let alone an operating system, but simply a few commands allowing access to the memory areas of the card.
• certain areas of the map may have characteristics allowing the secure storage of value units. This is the case for certain memory cards having an area protected by a secret code. Only a payment terminal with this secret code will be able to access the zone containing the value units and may modify the number of units with write commands in memory. By definition, a fraudster does not know the secret code, so he is not able to reload a card in value units. Other card-related features can allow secure storage of valuable units.
• An application or recommendation note describes the mechanisms to be implemented at the card and terminal level and defines how the terminal must use the card.
• application note means a particular definition of the state of the memory in the card and in the terminal, called "mapping" in English terminology, this mapping being obtained by computer software taking into account the application note.
• the mechanism to be implemented consists in including in the calculation of this certificate data varying with each transaction.
• transaction is meant a change in the number of value units of a card.
• a first mechanism implemented is the use of a certificate associated with the number of units. This certificate guarantees the integrity of the information to which it relates.
• a terminal of a payment application can read the number of value units present in a smart card. The certificate present in the card and associated with the number of value units stored must be read and verified. This certificate is calculated using a mathematical function. It is calculated from the number of units present in the card, from data identifying the card and with a secret only known by the terminal. The terminal is therefore capable of verifying or calculating such a certificate. Another solution is to share the secret between the cards and a central server. The application terminals will therefore have to connect to the server for any verification.
• This mechanism consists in including in the calculation of this certificate data varying with each transaction.
• This data which can be a transaction counter makes it possible to guarantee that we have a different certificate each time.
• a card has a number of value units at a given time t.
• time t + n that is to say after a certain number n of transactions, if this card again contains the same number of value units as at time t, the associated certificate will still be different.
• the value of the transaction counter must be changed for each transaction.
• Mechanism 3 This mechanism consists of duplicating sensitive information before a transaction takes place. The duplicated data is stored in the card, in the unprotected EEPROM memory.
• the unprotected EEPROM memory is therefore divided into two areas which we will call throughout the active area and copy area. These two zones contain a number of value units and the corresponding certificate.
• the card In the event of the card being torn off, if the data being modified in the active area is corrupted or altered, the duplicated data in the copy area will be recovered and transferred to the active area. The card thus remains in a stable state.
• the certificate present in the copy area must correspond to the value of the card's transaction counter. This makes it possible to verify the authenticity of the certificate of the copy zone and therefore the integrity of the number of units of value of the copy zone. This is why, the card transaction counter must be modified at the end of the transaction.
• fraud In the case of value units present in a memory zone not protected by the card chip, fraud consists in modifying the number of units present into the card and try different certificate values.
• a fraudster with a small number of units present in the card will therefore replace it with the maximum number of units that his card can contain.
• the probability of finding the certificate corresponding to the number of card units by chance is high.
• the card cannot be considered from a cryptographic point of view as a secure value unit holder. This fraud makes it possible to illegally reload a card in value units.
• 2nd case of fraud In the case of a debit of valuable units in the card, and in the event of tearing, the card is left with an active zone possibly corrupted and a copy zone containing a certain number of units valuable. In addition, the copy area contains the number of value units preceding the debit.
• a fraudster can also read the contents of his card before a transaction. He writes the content of the active area on a sheet of paper without even understanding its meaning. Then it executes a transaction. In the event of a card being torn off, the transaction will not be completed. The value of the card transaction counter will not be changed. The fraudster can simply rewrite the data written on his sheet of paper in the active area of his card. This fraud also makes it possible to recover the value units used.
• the present invention overcomes these problems.
• the subject of the present invention is a method of storing value units in a smart card for carrying out transactions from a terminal, the card comprising a non-volatile memory of EEPROM type comprising, an active area capable of containing information relating to the number of value units of the card for a given application and a certificate calculated, in particular from this number, of a mathematical function and of a data item which varies with each transaction, and also comprising a zone copy intended to contain backup information of the active area, mainly characterized in that the recording of the information in the active area and in the copy area following a transaction is only carried out after having carried out an encryption operation on this information, the encrypted information then being recorded in these zones.
• the encryption operation is carried out by means of an algorithm of encryption E ⁇ and a secret key K by the transaction terminal.
• the information representative of the number of value units and the information of the balance of value units corresponds to a coding on a first constant number of bits, and the information representative of the certificate is coded on a second constant number of bits.
• the coding consists in taking as value for the number of value units of the card, a maximum number of value units defined for the given application, minus the number of value units of the card, the terminal transaction capable of determining the number of value units of the card by subtracting from the maximum number, the code read from the card.
• the method generally consists in calculating a certificate in an active area using a first function, and in calculating the certificate in a copy area, using another function.
• the certificate of the copy zone is copied in the active zone, it will no longer be valid.
• the method consists in: - calculating from a first mathematical function FA; a first CA certificate stored in the active area and guaranteeing the integrity of the points in this area;
• the method further comprises the steps consisting in: - perform a first encryption operation of a data item formed by the number of value units and the first corresponding certificate CA,
• the calculation of a first certificate is carried out from the number of units of value, but also the value of a transaction counter.
• a certificate is calculated from the number of value units present in the active area and from a value of the transaction counter incremented to its next value, the data obtained is encrypted and recorded in the area of copy, the transaction counter is then incremented to this new value so that at this instant, the certificate of the active area is no longer in agreement with the value of the counter, only the backup data being correct. In this way, the terminal marks without the card the start of a transaction.
• a card is accidentally torn from a card torn off fraudulently by checking the parity of the transaction counter at the start of the transaction. Indeed, if by convention we choose that an odd transaction counter value indicates that the card was torn off before the end of the transaction. So in start of a new transaction, the terminal checks the parity of the transaction counter. An odd value from the transaction counter therefore indicates that the card has been removed. The terminal does not check the integrity of the active area and directly checks the integrity of the copy area. The fraudster has no way of testing the random values he writes in the active area.
• the parity of the value of the transaction counter used in the calculation of the certificates is identical at the start and at the end of the transaction, and the value of the transaction counter is incremented twice during the transaction, each increment being of one single unit.
• the value of the transaction counter used in the calculation of the certificates is even, then at the start of a transaction, we read the value of the transaction counter on the card, the value read is even, we read the information in the active area (ZA), the integrity of the information in the active area is checked, the integrity of the information in the active area is checked, the value units are stored in the smart card.
• the invention also relates to a money transaction system using smart cards comprising an unprotected memory with an active area for containing data relating to the balance of the card and a copy area for containing backup data; the active zone and backup data being stored securely.
• FIG. 1 represents the diagram of a transaction system
• FIG. 2 represents a structure of the data of the memory 103 of the smart card according to an exemplary embodiment
• FIG. 3 represents the steps relating to a transaction implemented by a terminal
• FIG. 4 represents the steps implemented during the verification of the integrity of the data of the active area or of the copy area
• FIG. 5 represents the steps prior to a transaction described in FIG. 3,
• FIG. 6 shows the steps for updating the balance after a transaction and the end of the transaction.
• the content of the active zone ZA and copy zone ZC of the unprotected EEPROM memory 103 represented in FIG. 1 is encrypted.
• This encryption is carried out by a terminal 100 of the application using the cards, using an encryption algorithm E ⁇ and a terminal key K.
• This encryption key is known by the terminals accepting the cards of the application.
• a terminal that knows how to encrypt will also be able to decrypt the content of the card using a decryption algorithm D ⁇ .
• a fraudster knowing the principles of the invention detailed below and who attempts to increase the number of value units of a card will no longer be able to fix the maximum number of value units. He can only try to reload his card randomly. He will therefore enter random data in the active area of his card. There is a probability that, by deciphering the active area of a randomly modified card, a terminal will obtain a number of value units and the corresponding certificate. However, the number of value units obtained may be less than the number of value units previously contained in the card. The greater the number of value units initially present in the card, the greater the number of value units initially present in the card. In order to make fraud even more difficult consisting in randomly finding a certificate corresponding to a large number of value units, the method provides for increasing the size of the certificate. The larger the size of the certificate, the more difficult it is to find the right value. However, as the memory sizes are relatively small in a smart card, it is not possible to have both a large number of units and a large certificate.
• the number of value units recorded in the card does not correspond to the number of value units for the application, but to the number of value units which have not been the subject of a transaction (zero for a card full of units).
• a zero number of value units in the card corresponds to the maximum value unit value for the application.
• the maximum value of value units in the card corresponds to a zero value of value units for the application.
• a terminal of the application reading the contents of a card obtains the number of value units by subtracting from the maximum number of value units of the application the number of value units contained in the card.
• the card when the card contains a zero, it will correspond to the maximum value.
• a zero in the card is coded on a single bit.
• the remaining bits of the coding area for the number of value units can be used to contain the certificate. The greater the number of value units, the lower the value encoded in the card, therefore the greater the memory size allocated to the certificate.
• the calculation of the certificate of the active area is carried out differently from the calculation of the certificate of the copy area.
• a terminal verifying a card whose content from the copy area has been transferred to the active area will be able to detect fraud.
• the certificate that the terminal will read in the active area will not correspond to the calculation made in the case of the active area, and will correspond to the calculation made for the copy area.
• the card transaction counter is also modified at the very beginning of the transaction.
• the copy zone is initialized with the number of value units contained in the active zone and with a certificate taking into account the next value of the transaction counter. Then, the transaction counter is changed to this new value.
• the content of the active area is no longer reusable, the transaction counter no longer corresponds to its certificate. However, the copy area is valid.
• the transaction counter is again modified at the end of the transaction to prevent this transaction from being able to be redone, as indicated above.
• the invention also relates to the verification of the parity of the data varying with each transaction.
• This data which can be a transaction counter, is incremented twice during a complete transaction, by one unit each time.
• the parity of the value of the transaction counter is therefore identical at the start of the transaction and at the end of the transaction. If the first value of the transaction counter is even, the value of the transaction counter is even at the start and end of the transaction.
• the parity of the transaction counter must be checked at the start of the transaction, the value of the transaction counter must be even. In the event that the value of the transaction counter is odd at the start of the transaction, the integrity of the information in the card copy area must be directly verified. If the verification is successful, the terminal transfers the data from the copy zone to the active zone.
• the terminal 100 being a monetary terminal and the card 103, an electronic purse card.
• the data structure of the memory 103 is as shown in FIG. 2. This structure or organization is of course given by way of example. Other organizations can be adapted while remaining in the spirit of the invention.
• the memory includes identification data comprising:
• circuit identification value silicon circuit
• card issuer reference zone banking organization
• This counter is formed by 3 bits according to the practical embodiment which has been made.
• this CTC counter is divided into 5 8-bit sub-counters (five counting stages) with an abacus type operation as described for example in patent FR 93 10477 published on March 10, 1995 under the No. 2,709,582.
• the five sub-counters are referenced Cl, C8, C64, C512, C4096.
• the first four stages are of the erasable type, that is to say that it is possible to erase bits written thereon and then rewrite in the same locations.
• the fifth stage C4096 is write only. Only 4 bits of this last stage are used for counting. Among the remaining 4 bits, 1 bit is used as a fuse and the other three bits as the fraud counter. Two bits are toasted per transaction. Thus, this type of counter will allow to count 10239 transactions [7 + 7x8 + 7x8 2 + 7x8 3 -r-4x8 4 l / 2.
• the memory also includes: - a certificate area.
• This zone cannot be erased and is used for the CER certification record allowing the authentication of the card.
• the authentication certificate is saved after the configuration of the circuit for the end user and is verified by the terminal each time the card is used.
• ID is for example the content of the card identification zones, circuit identification u of transmitter reference. - a user area.
• the active area contains, according to a characteristic of the invention, an encrypted datum of the balance Bal and the corresponding certificate Cert.
• the information on the balance of value units corresponds to a coding on a first constant number of bits, and the information representative of the certificate is coded on a second constant number of bits.
• the encrypted data corresponding to one of the two areas of the unit carrier can be written as follows:
• Cert B F ⁇ (Bal, CSN, CTC) for the wallet copy area.
• F A and F ⁇ being different functions held by the terminal.
• the recording of information relating to the balance and the certificate in the copy area and in the backup area is done as follows: - recording of the balance and its certificate
• This sequence makes it possible to avoid any loss of information in the event of the card being torn off or a power failure.
• the method includes a phase of initialization of the transaction and a phase corresponding to the transaction itself.
• the initialization phase includes a verification of the fraud zone corresponding to steps 50, 51, 52 detailed below.
• This initialization phase also includes a verification of the parity of the data varying with each corresponding transaction in the diagram of FIG. 3 in steps 400, 401, 203A, 204A, 205A, 207A. If the first value of the transaction counter is even, the value of the transaction counter is even at the start and end of the transaction. The parity of the transaction counter is checked at the start of the transaction steps 400, 401, the value of the transaction counter must be even.
• the terminal transfers the data from the copy area to the active area step 205A. Then the terminal marks the start of a transaction in the card by incrementing the CTC counter. Following this, the terminal returns to step 401. If the integrity check is negative, the terminal executes step 206, namely incrementing the card fraud counter and ejecting the card.
• the terminal After checking the parity, the terminal reads the content of the active area of the card (electronic purse PM) 150, which contains the data
• the terminal updates the balance in the card and calculates new encrypted data 301 and 302.
• the update is carried out according to steps 30 to 35 illustrated in FIG. 6. FR 7/00947
• the terminal reads the copy area which contains ⁇ Ball, Certl ⁇ > 203.
• the terminal verifies the integrity of the backup data 204 by decrypting this data by carrying out steps 20, 21 and 22 of FIG. 4 on this data.
• the terminal restores this backup data in the active area which contained nothing or an erroneous data 205.
• the terminal If the data contained in the copy zone is not intact, then the terminal writes a bit in the fraud zone 206.
• one or more fraud attempts may be accepted before definitively refusing the card.
• the card When the fraud zone is full, the card is swallowed.
• the fraud zone is checked during a step prior to the transaction at the very start of the initialization of the transaction 50, 51, 52.
• FIG. 5 illustrates the preliminary steps 200, 201 and 202 to the implementation of a transaction.
• different FA and FB functions can be used for calculating certificates.
• step 200 the terminal performs the operations developed in FIG. 4.
• the terminal operates the decryption of the content of the active area (or of copy). (20)
• step 200 In the case of step 200,
• step 201 It operates the integrity check. (22) In step 201:
• the terminal calculates the certificate (CertlB) for the backup area; (23) it encrypts the data (Bail, CertlB); (24) it saves the encrypted value in the card's copy area. (25) In step 202:
• the terminal calculates the Cert IB certificate corresponding to the Lease balance in this area (21). It operates the integrity check (22).
• the terminal calculates the Cert 1A certificate for the active area (23), it encrypts the Bail data, Cert 1A (24), it saves the encrypted value (25) in the active area of the card. Then the terminal increments the CTC counter (26) and erases the content of the copy area (27).
• FIG. 6 illustrates the steps for updating the balance after the balance after a transaction (301) and the end of the transaction (302).
• the old Bail balance is modified by a value x (more or less depending on the transaction made) to give the new Bal2 balance such as:
• Bal2 Lease ⁇ x (30), x being the value of the transaction.
• the terminal calculates a new certificate taking into account this new balance, and the new value of the transaction counter CTC + 1:
• the terminal records this new encrypted data in the active area of the card. (33)
• the card copy area contains the old data, i.e. ⁇ Ball, Certl ⁇ >.
• the terminal increments the card's CTC transaction counter by toasting a second bit to validate the transaction.
• the terminal clears the copy area (35) and controls the ejection of the card.

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• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Storage Device Security (AREA)
• Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

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• 1996
  • 1996-05-31 FR FR9606705A patent/FR2749413B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
• 1997
  • 1997-05-30 WO PCT/FR1997/000947 patent/WO1997045815A1/fr active IP Right Grant
  • 1997-05-30 EP EP97926064A patent/EP0910839B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 1997-05-30 ES ES97926064T patent/ES2212102T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 1997-05-30 DE DE69725723T patent/DE69725723T2/de not_active Expired - Fee Related

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