EP0845760A2 - Verfahren zum Überprüfen der erwarteten Frankiersicherheitsvorrichtung in einem Zentralrechnersystem - Google Patents

Verfahren zum Überprüfen der erwarteten Frankiersicherheitsvorrichtung in einem Zentralrechnersystem Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0845760A2
EP0845760A2 EP97120456A EP97120456A EP0845760A2 EP 0845760 A2 EP0845760 A2 EP 0845760A2 EP 97120456 A EP97120456 A EP 97120456A EP 97120456 A EP97120456 A EP 97120456A EP 0845760 A2 EP0845760 A2 EP 0845760A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
psd
message
key
host system
verifying
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP97120456A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0845760A3 (de
Inventor
Frederick W. Ryan, Jr.
Robert A. Cordery
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Pitney Bowes Inc
Original Assignee
Pitney Bowes Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Pitney Bowes Inc filed Critical Pitney Bowes Inc
Publication of EP0845760A2 publication Critical patent/EP0845760A2/de
Publication of EP0845760A3 publication Critical patent/EP0845760A3/de
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00314—Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00314—Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
    • G07B2017/00322—Communication between components/modules/parts, e.g. printer, printhead, keyboard, conveyor or central unit
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/0075—Symmetric, secret-key algorithms, e.g. DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, Skipjack, CAST, AES
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/00758—Asymmetric, public-key algorithms, e.g. RSA, Elgamal
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/00758—Asymmetric, public-key algorithms, e.g. RSA, Elgamal
    • G07B2017/00766—Digital signature, e.g. DSA, DSS, ECDSA, ESIGN
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00959—Cryptographic modules, e.g. a PC encryption board
    • G07B2017/00967—PSD [Postal Security Device] as defined by the USPS [US Postal Service]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to a system and method for postage metering security and, more particularly, to systems and methods for verifying authorized postal security devices.
  • the Information-Based Indicia Program is a distributed trusted system proposed by the United States Postal Service (USPS).
  • USPS United States Postal Service
  • the IBIP is expected to support new methods of applying postage in addition to, and eventually in lieu of, the current approach, which typically relies on a postage meter to mechanically print indicia on mailpieces.
  • the IBIP requires printing large, high density, two dimensional (2-D) bar codes on mailpieces.
  • the Postal Service expects the IBIP to provide cost-effective assurance of postage payment for each mailpiece processed.
  • the USPS has published draft specifications for the IBIP.
  • the INFORMATION BASED INDICIA PROGRAM (IBIP) INDICIUM SPECIFICATION defines the proposed requirements for a new indicium that will be applied to mail being processed using the IBIP.
  • the INFORMATION BASED INDICIA PROGRAM POSTAL SECURITY DEVICE SPECIFICATION dated June 13, 1996, defines the proposed requirements for a Postal Security Device (PSD) that will provide security services to support the creation of a new "information based" postage postmark or indicium that will be applied to mail being processed using the IBIP.
  • PSD Postal Security Device
  • the INFORMATION BASED INDICIA PROGRAM HOST SYSTEM SPECIFICATION defines the proposed requirements for a host system element of the IBIP.
  • the specifications are collectively referred to herein as the "IBIP Specifications".
  • the IBIP includes interfacing user (customer), postal and vendor infrastructures which are the system elements of the program.
  • the user infrastructure which resides at the user's site, comprises a postal security device (PSD) coupled to a host system.
  • PSD postal security device
  • the PSD is a secure processor-based accounting device that dispenses and accounts for postal value stored therein.
  • the host system may be a personal computer (PC) or a meter-based host processor.
  • PC personal computer
  • meter-based host processor a meter-based host processor.
  • the host system verifies that the coupled PSD is "the expected PSD".
  • U.S. Patent No. 5,510,992 discloses a method whereby the host PC verifies that a storage means that is coupled to the host PC and has postal value stored therein, is authorized for use with the host PC.
  • the method comprises the steps of storing a unique identifier, such as a serial number in the storage means when the storage means is filled with postal value, and sending the unique identifier to the host PC when postage value is requested for dispensing.
  • the host PC then verifies that the storage means is authorized for use with the host PC by confirming that the unique identifier retrieved from the storage device is the same as one stored in the host PC.
  • the storage means is the expected storage device
  • the storage means is not a PSD because it is not a processor-based accounting device that dispenses and accounts for postal value stored therein.
  • the verification of the serial number in the host PC is subject to fraud.
  • the present invention provides a more secure and reliable system and method for verifying the expected PSD is coupled to the host PC. It has further been found that the present invention provides a secure and reliable system and method for verifying the expected host PC is coupled to the PSD.
  • the present invention provides a secure and reliable method for verifying in the host system that the expected PSD is coupled to the host system.
  • a message such as a random number
  • the PSD encrypts the number and transmits it to the Host system.
  • the Host system decrypts the encrypted number and ensures it corresponds with the number originally generated and transmitted to the PSD.
  • the random number is signed in the PSD.
  • the signed number is transmitted to the Host where the signature is verified.
  • the generated message may include data indicating status of the PSD based, for example a checksum of PSD transaction records stored in the host system.
  • a postage metering system includes a Host PC 20 coupled to a PSD 30, a Data Center 40 and a manufacturer 50.
  • the manufacturer 50 initializes PSD 30 with an identification number, such as PSD ID 32, and a cryptographic key, such as PSD private key 34.
  • the manufacturer 50 also sends the PSD ID 32 and a cryptographic key corresponding to the key in the PSD 30, such as PSD public key 36, to the Data Center 40.
  • the Data Center 40 then sends the PSD ID 32 and the public key 36, to the Host PC 20.
  • the PSD private and public keys are stored in PSD 30 and Host PC 20 respectively. It will be understood that a secret key shared by the Host PC and the PSD may be used in place of such key pair.
  • the Host PC 20 and PSD 30 each include a microprocessor and memory (not shown).
  • the Host PC 20 further includes a message generator 22 for generating a message.
  • the message may be a random number or may include data indicating status of the PSD, for example a checksum 24 of PSD transaction records stored a log files in Host PC 20.
  • checksums will be used.
  • the PSD records stored in Host PC 20 correspond to PSD records stored in PSD 30 for each transaction by PSD 30.
  • European Patent Application Serial Number 0780808 assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference.
  • Host PC 20 generates a secret key or a key pair.
  • the key or key pair is stored in Host PC 20, at step 105.
  • Host PC 20 the sends the secret key or one of the keys of the key pair to PSD 30, at step 110.
  • PSD 30 stores the key received from Host PC 20, at step 115.
  • the Host PC generates a message.
  • the message may be in the form of a random number or may be a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the Host PC.
  • the Host PC sends the message to the PSD. If a checksum has been sent, the at step 210, the PSD compares the message received with a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the PSD.
  • the checksum received is not the same as the checksum of the PSD transaction log, then an error is flagged, at step 215, indicating that there is a discrepancy between the PSD logs stored in the Host PC and the PSD. If the checksums are the same or if the message is a random number, at step 220, the PSD signs the message with the PSD private key. At step 225, the PSD sends the signed message to the Host PC.
  • the Host PC verifies the signature using the PSD public key stored in the Host PC. If the signature is not verified at step 235, the Host PC rejects the PSD from processing any further transactions, at step 240. If the signature is verified, at step 245, the expected PSD has been verified and the Host PC can begin request postal value from the PSD. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that other cryptographic processing, such as encryption or hashing may be used in place of signing.
  • the PSD verify that the expected Host PC is coupled to the PSD.
  • verification of the expected Host PC mirrors the process for verifying the expected PSD as set forth above.
  • the PSD generates a message.
  • the message may be in the form of a random number or may be a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the PSD.
  • the PSD sends the message to the Host PC. If a checksum has been sent, the at step 310, the Host PC compares the message received with a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the Host PC. If the checksum received is not the same as the checksum of the PSD transaction log, then an error is flagged, at step 315, indicating that there is a discrepancy between the PSD logs stored in the PSD and the Host PC. If the checksums are the same or if the message is a random number, at step 320, the Host PC signs the message with the Host PC private key. At step 325, the Host PC sends the signed message to the PSD.
  • the PSD verifies the signature using the Host PC public key stored in the PSD. If the signature is not verified at step 335, the PSD rejects the Host PC from processing any further transactions, at step 340. If the signature is verified, at step 345, the expected Host PC has been verified and the PSD is ready to accept transaction requests from the Host PC.
  • the Host PC generates a message, such as a random number or a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the Host PC.
  • the Host PC encrypts the message with the PSD public Key, at step 405, and sends the message to the PSD, at step 410.
  • the PSD decrypts the encrypted message received. If a checksum has been sent then, at step 420, the PSD compares the message received with a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the PSD.
  • the PSD sends the decrypted message to the Host PC.
  • the Host PC verifies that the message received from the PSD is the same as the message generated in the Host PC. If not the same at step 440, the Host PC rejects the PSD from processing any further transactions, at step 445. If the message received from the PSD is the same as the message generated in the Host PC, at step 450, the expected PSD has been verified and the Host PC can begin request postal value from the PSD.
  • FIG. 6 an alternate method for the PSD verifying that the expected Host PC is coupled to the PSD is shown which mirrors the process for verifying the expected PSD as shown in Fig. 5.
  • the PSD generates a message, such as a random number or a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the PSD.
  • the PSD encrypts the message with the Host PC public Key, at step 505, and sends the message to the Host PC, at step 510.
  • the Host PC decrypts the encrypted message received. If a checksum has been sent then, at step 520, the Host PC compares the message received with a checksum of a PSD transaction log stored in the Host PC. If the checksum received is not the same as the checksum of the PSD transaction log, then an error is flagged, at step 525, indicating that there is a discrepancy between the PSD logs stored in the PSD and the Host PC. If the checksums are the same or if the message is a random number, at step 530, the Host PC sends the decrypted message to the PSD.
  • the PSD verifies that the message received from the Host PC is the same as the message generated in the PSD. If not the same at step 540, the PSD rejects the Host PC from processing any further transactions, at step 545. If the message received from the Host PC is the same as the message generated in the PSD, at step 550, the expected Host PC has been verified and the PSD can begin to accept requests for postal value from the Host PC.
  • the present invention is suitable for use with any security device that is coupled to a host system in an unsecured manner.
  • the present invention could be used for a certificate metering system such as disclosed in European Patent Application Serial No. 0762692, filed August 21, 1996, assigned to the assignee of the present invention, and incorporated herein by reference.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Devices For Checking Fares Or Tickets At Control Points (AREA)
EP97120456A 1996-11-21 1997-11-21 Verfahren zum Überprüfen der erwarteten Frankiersicherheitsvorrichtung in einem Zentralrechnersystem Withdrawn EP0845760A3 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US75457096A 1996-11-21 1996-11-21
US754570 1996-11-21

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0845760A2 true EP0845760A2 (de) 1998-06-03
EP0845760A3 EP0845760A3 (de) 2000-07-26

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EP97120456A Withdrawn EP0845760A3 (de) 1996-11-21 1997-11-21 Verfahren zum Überprüfen der erwarteten Frankiersicherheitsvorrichtung in einem Zentralrechnersystem

Country Status (2)

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EP (1) EP0845760A3 (de)
CA (1) CA2221670A1 (de)

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4802218A (en) * 1986-11-26 1989-01-31 Wright Technologies, L.P. Automated transaction system
US5299263A (en) * 1993-03-04 1994-03-29 Bell Communications Research, Inc. Two-way public key authentication and key agreement for low-cost terminals
EP0623903A2 (de) * 1993-05-06 1994-11-09 Pitney Bowes Inc. System zum Wiederaufladen des Guthabens von Chipkarten

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4802218A (en) * 1986-11-26 1989-01-31 Wright Technologies, L.P. Automated transaction system
US5299263A (en) * 1993-03-04 1994-03-29 Bell Communications Research, Inc. Two-way public key authentication and key agreement for low-cost terminals
EP0623903A2 (de) * 1993-05-06 1994-11-09 Pitney Bowes Inc. System zum Wiederaufladen des Guthabens von Chipkarten

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
"Information Based Indicia Program Host System Specification ÄDraftÜ" 9 October 1996 (1996-10-09) , UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE XP002137990 * page 7, paragraph 3.1.2 * *
'Information based Indicia Program Host System Specification (Draft)', 09 October 1996, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE XP002137990 *

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Publication number Publication date
CA2221670A1 (en) 1998-05-21
EP0845760A3 (de) 2000-07-26

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