EP0318097B1 - Systèmes de signature indéniable - Google Patents

Systèmes de signature indéniable Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0318097B1
EP0318097B1 EP88202620A EP88202620A EP0318097B1 EP 0318097 B1 EP0318097 B1 EP 0318097B1 EP 88202620 A EP88202620 A EP 88202620A EP 88202620 A EP88202620 A EP 88202620A EP 0318097 B1 EP0318097 B1 EP 0318097B1
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EP
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Prior art keywords
message
party
key
blinding
challenge
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EP0318097A1 (fr
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David Prof. Dr. Chaum
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SECURITY Tech CORP
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SECURITY Tech CORP
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
    • G06Q20/3678—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes e-cash details, e.g. blinded, divisible or detecting double spending
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3257—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using blind signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response

Definitions

  • This invention relates to cryptographic systems, and more specifically to multiparty authentication systems like public key digital signatures.
  • a secret seed is first chosen, typically at random from some suitable distribution. This secret seed is then used as the input to a public key creating algorithm. The resulting public key need not be kept secret; because of the "one-way" nature of the creating algorithm, deriving the secret seed from the public key is thought to be infeasible.
  • An often necessary aspect of public keys is their authenticity. There may be many users of a particular public key, and each must be ensured that they have its true value. If a bogus value were to be accepted as authentic by a particular user, then that user's security might be violated by the bogus key's creator.
  • An example solution to this problem, which is often suggested, is to publish and widely distribute a directory of public keys.
  • public key digital signatures which are called "digital signatures" here for clarity.
  • the message to be signed by a digital signature is represented as a number.
  • the digital signature itself is also a number. It is formed from the massage by a signing algorithm which uses a private key derived from the secret seed.
  • a digital signature can be checked as corresponding to a particular message and public key combination, by applying a checking algorithm. Because the corresponding private key is thought to be needed in forming digital signatures, they are thought to be resistant to forgery.
  • digital signatures can be checked by anyone knowing the corresponding public key. Thus, if you were to give a digital signature to someone, then they could show it to anyone else. Not only would each person seeing the signature be able to check it, but they could in turn supply it to others, who could also check and distribute it. Whereas this might be an advantage in some applications, it could be undesirable in others. For example, the issuer may wish to retain some monitorability or control over the showing of signatures.
  • RSA does, however, allow blind signatures, as described in EP-A-0139313, titled “Blind signature systems.” by the present applicant
  • These first disclosed blind signatures required computation during blinding to anticipate all possible signature types. This amounted to more than a single multiply per signature type anticipated.
  • the so called “unanticipated blind signatures” require only a fixed amount of computation during blinding to anticipate an unlimited number of kinds of signatures that might potentially be applied by a signer.
  • Such systems were described in EP-A-0218305, titled “Unanticipated blind signature systems", also by the present applicant.
  • a remaining difficulty with the exemplary embodiments of both schemes is that the signer must be fixed at the time of blinding and cannot be changed, even for so called "re-blinding”.
  • Another object of the present invention is to allow public key creation algorithms having a computational requirement comparable to that of signing.
  • a further object of the present invention is to allow a kind of blind signature in which blinding does not have to anticipate the type of signature nor who the signer will be.
  • Yet another object of the present invention is to allow signature schemes based on discrete log in groups for which nobody need know the order of the group, and for which there may be no harm if anyone learns it.
  • Still another object of the present invention is to allow efficient. economical, and practical apparatus and methods fulfilling the other objects of the invention.
  • An undeniable signature is verified by a cryptographic protocol conducted between the checker and the signer.
  • the protocol of the exemplary embodiments consist of a challenge number formed by the checker and given to the signer, followed by a response number returned by the signer.
  • the checker After the exchange of this challenge and response, the checker performs a checking procedure.
  • the inputs to the procedure are the response from the signer as well as the suitably-chosen random values used by the checker in forming the challenge. If the procedure's result is positive, then the checker has high certainty that the signature is valid, and consequently the verification of the signature can be regarded as completed.
  • the checker may wish to distinguish between two cases: (a) the signature is not valid; or (b) the signer is responding improperly to challenges, presumably in an effort to falsely deny a valid signature.
  • the checker can learn which of the two cases applies--in spite of the signer's efforts to mislead the checker--by a further round of challenge and response.
  • the second challenge and response can be formed in the same way as the first ones were, but both sets of independent random choices and both responses allow the checker's second procedure to determine which case above, (a) or (b), holds.
  • the pair of challenges and corresponding responses may be thought of as in effect allowing the checker to learn whether the signer is answering consistently or not.
  • the signer's response should be the result of raising the challenge to the power y , where y is the multiplicative inverse of x modulo p .
  • the signer responds with m a g b , which V can readily construct for comparison. If the comparands are equal, then V is believed to know that with probability 1- p -1 the signature is valid.
  • the signing party 601 includes two transformations, signer 602 and responder 603, both of which depend on the secret seed value created by random generator 604.
  • the initial output of a public key message (message [10] in Fig. 1, to be described) is not shown here for clarity and also because in some embodiments, like the preferred embodiments to be presented, a distinguished public key is not needed, since any undeniable signature (together with its corresponding unsigned message) can serve as such a public key, as will be obvious those of ordinary skill in the art.
  • the provider 605 When the provider 605 provides an original message for signing, it may first optionally be blinded by blinder 606, which depends on random generator 607, before being input to signer 602, already mentioned.
  • blinder 606 which depends on random generator 607
  • the signed output of signer 602 is then input to optional unblinder 608, which also depends on random generator 607, and which is used only when optional blinder 606 has been used.
  • unblinder 608 is then returned to provider 605.
  • both the signed and unsigned message are individually blinded by blinder 609, depending on random source 610, before they are provided as input to a part of checking party 611 which is shown as challenger 612.
  • Challenger 612 is dependent on random generator 613, also shown as part of checking party 611, and provides its challenge message(s) optionally to blinder 614, which depends on random source 615.
  • the output of the optional blinder 614 is input to responder 603, which depends on random source 604 as already mentioned, and responder 603 provides its output to unblinder 616, which is used only when blinder 614 has been used and also depends on the random source 615.
  • unblinder 616 provides its output to tester 617, a final part of checking party 611, responsive to random source 613 already mentioned and to challenger 612, and which produces the final three valued output (indicating whether the undeniable signature is valid, the signature is invalid, or the response is improper).
  • Signer 602 of signing party 601 is shown as box 103, and also as box 402 or 502 when optional blinding 606 is used. When blinding 402 or 502 are used, then unblinding 607 is shown in box 403 and 503, respectively.
  • the optional blinding of signed and unsigned messages before they are used in the protocols of Fig. 2 or Fig. 3 is shown as performed by blinder 609. This blinder produces a blinded and unblinded message pair, as already mentioned, which is shown in box 404 and 504, depending on wether the blinding of Fig. 4 or that of Fig.
  • the challenger 612 and tester 617 both depending on random source 613 as mentioned, are both either of the type shown in Fig. 2 or that shown in Fig. 3.
  • challenger 612 is shown in both boxes 201 and 204; in the case of Fig. 3, it is in boxes 301 (supported by 303) and 306 (supported by box 308).
  • blinder 614 which as mentioned is responsive to random source 615, such blinding being as shown in box 401 or box 501.
  • responder 603 transforms each challenge, responsive to the output of random source 604 already mentioned, using the same choice of Fig. 2 or Fig.
  • the responses are shown formed in box 202 and 205; for Fig. 3 they are formed in boxes 302 combined with 304 and in 307 combined with 309. These responses are unblinded by optional unblinder 616, only when optional blinder 614 has been used as mentioned.
  • the tester 617 responsive to random source 613 as mentioned, checks the responses using the same choice of Fig. 2 or Fig. 3 as described previously for challenger 612 and responder 603. For Fig. 2, the checking is shown spanning boxes 203 and 206; for Fig. 3, it is shown in boxes 305 and 310. The results of these tests determine the output of the tester 617.
  • blinding of blinder 606 and its corresponding unblinding by blinder 608 will be used or not used as a whole; similarly for that of 614 and 616; and the blinding of the signed and unsigned message pairs by blinder 609 may be omitted or kept in its entirety.
  • the blinding and unblinding operations shown are transparent and just pass their inputs through without change to their outputs, as might also happen if certain values are produced by the random sources involved.
  • the lines in Fig. 1-6 imply the transfer of messages. These may be held initially or delayed on their way, encoded and decoded cryptographically or otherwise to provide their authenticity and/or secrecy and/or error detection and/or error recovery. Thus the particular means or methods whereby messages are transferred are not essential to the present invention, and it is anticipated that any technique may be employed in this regard.
  • the lines may for example be taken to represent communication means, in which case they might be realized in a variety of exemplary ways including as conductive paths, fibre optic links, or paths through a packet switched network; also suitable drivers, modems, or other appropriate interfaces may be required at the ends of such lines, as are well known in the art. Alternatively, the lines may be taken to stand for a message transfer step.
  • signing party 601 and checking party 611 are each shown as a collection of parts including two transformations and a random source.
  • Fig. 1-5 also show parties as a collection of flowchart boxes forming a vertical column.
  • the term "party” is used herein to indicate an entity with control over at least the secrecy of some information, usually at least one key. It is anticipated that a plurality of people may each know all or part of some key, and they might be thought of collectively as a party. In other cases, a key may be substantially unknown to people, and reside in some physical device, and then the device itself or those who control it from time to time may be regarded as parties.
  • any box or collection of boxes from the figures could be realized by hard-wired and dedicated combinatorial logic, or by some sort of suitably programmed machine, a microprocessor for instance, such as are well known to those of skill in the art, just so long as it is able to perform the storage, input/output and transformational steps (possibly apart from the random source functions) described by the corresponding box or boxes.
  • Random sources 604, 607, 610, 613, and 615 of Fig. 6 and the uses of the word "random" shown in Fig. 1-5 indicate the function of creating a value that should not be readily determined by at least some party.
  • Many means and methods are known in the art for generating such unpredictable quantities, often called keys. Some are based on physical phenomena, such as noise in semiconductors, or patterns detected in humans pushing buttons, or possibly deterministic cryptographic techniques sometimes called pseudorandom generators. It is well known in the art that these various techniques can often be combined, and that post-processing can often improve the results.
  • Signer 602 one transformation of signing party 601 already mentioned, is any transformation that is believed at least not readily performed without the private key output of random source 604 and which cooperates with the challenge, response, and testing to be described. Naturally, as a kind of signature, the signer's output should be resistant to forgery by those without the signer's private key.
  • Provider 605 is a source of original messages to be signed. Its particular nature is not essential to the invention, and any way to obtain messages for which undeniable signatures will be made is suitable. Examples of messages requiring signatures known in the art include agreements, numbers with redundancy properties that encode value, blinded forms of digital pseudonyms, any sort of messages transferred between parties, etc.
  • Blinder 606 cooperates with unblinder 608 and derives its blinding key from random source 607.
  • the blinding and unblinding function performed is to hide some message issued by the provider 605 by at least making is substantially unrecognizable to signer 602, and then to recover from the signature returned by signer 602 what would have been the signature had the signer signed the original message.
  • blinding makes it substantially infeasible for the set of blinded messages to be linked to the set of unblinded messages.
  • This blinder 606, as well as the other two blinders 609 and 614 may use for example the embodiments of Fig. 4 or those of Fig. 5, and this may be mixed for the same or for different original messages.
  • Blinder 609 blinds, as described above, a pair of values corresponding to a signed and unsigned form of a message. In this way, the pair can be tested, as will be described, without even the party performing the test knowing what the actual message bearing the signature is. Thus no corresponding unblinding is needed, as the unblinded form may be retained by the provider 605. By issuing more than one pair of differently blinded forms of the same input pair, so called "re-blinding" as described in the unanticipated blind signature reference may be realized.
  • Checking party 611 already mentioned comprising a key source as well as challenge creation and response testing parts may, but need not, be a distinct party from provider 605 already described.
  • the checking party 611 is shown in Fig. 2 and 3 as party V, which is the same symbolic name used for the provider and blinding parties in Fig. 1, 4, and 5, but such naming is only for clarity and does not imply that these parties are necessarily the same.
  • a signature may sometimes be verified immediately by the provider who has requested it, or it may be verified later by some third party who received it directly or indirectly and possibly in blinded form from the provider.
  • the checking party performs a cryptographic protocol in effect with signing party 601, although there may be intermediate blinding and unblinding of messages by blinder 614 and unblinder 616 to be described, which might possibly be controlled by yet another party. While the exemplary embodiments show some particular preferred patterns of interaction between the checking party 611 and the responder 603, any suitable protocol accomplishing the function of distinguishing the three cases described earlier would be appropriate. Furthermore, the preferred embodiments break the challenge and response sequence down into several parts, all or any of which could be combined (so long as for Fig.
  • Blinder 614 optionally blinds the challenge(s), responsive to random source 615, before it is received by the signing party.
  • Responder 603 receives the possibly blinded challenge(s) and issues corresponding response(s). Any sort of response or sequence of responses cooperating with and allowing the checking party to distinguish the three cases would be sufficient. In the preferred embodiments, these responses include exponentiation to powers derived from private key source 604, as shown in detail in Fig. 2 and 3.
  • Unblinder 616 also responsive to key source 615, unblinds the response. It cooperates with blinder 614 in keeping at least one of the signing party or the checking party from learning the actual messages issued and received by the other party.
  • Tester 617 responsive to random source 613 and challenger 612, tests the responses to the challenges in a way that allows it to distinguish between three cases: (a) the signed message validly corresponds to the unsigned message, (b) the signed message does not validly correspond to the signed message, and (c) the signer is responding to the challenges improperly.
  • Fig. 2 by the tests of boxes 203 and 206, and in Fig. 3 by those of boxes 305 and 310.
  • the output of the test may simply be an indication of which of the three cases is thought likely to hold. It should be pointed out that the first box for each figure mentioned alone actually distinguishes between case (a) and the other two cases taken together.
  • the signing party 601 may issue public key digital signatures authenticating its responses to inputs.
  • digital signatures are well known in the art, and would include both the input and the corresponding output, possibly all under a compressing one-way function or the like.
  • the third party is able to authenticate the digital signature and test the input and output as would have been done by tester 617, as would be obvious to those of skill in the art and will be described in detail for some examples later.
  • digital signatures might be obtained from the signing party and later provided to a third party so that the third party need not interact with the signing party. This might save a third party, who trusts the signing party, from having to communicate with the signing party in order to check an undeniable signature.
  • One general category of preferred exemplary embodiment would use a group of prime order. Such a group should preferably have a representation for which the already mentioned discrete log problem is believed difficult to solve in practice and for which the group operation and exponentiation are readily performed. Several exemplary such groups are now described.
  • a second and third exemplary class of suitable groups are defined based on the residue classes modulo a suitable large prime. It appears to be currently believed in the art that primes of sizes 2 512 to 2 1000 for example may provide security quite adequate for many applications in practice, though the present invention should in general not be interpreted as limited to groups of any particular size, since it can be applied using groups of any size allowing the requisite computations to be performed. Apparatus and methods for performing the group operation and exponentiation for such groups are by now well known in the art and available from several vendors.
  • Prime tests of various types are quite well known in the art, which are capable of yielding primes of the required size. It is believed that, while proofs that there are infinitely many primes q such that q -1 is twice a prime are not known, experimental results show that such primes seem to occur with substantially the density that might be expected for the sizes mentioned above. Thus a prime with this property may be created simply by trying random numbers of the desired size, discarding those that fail to pass a primality test, and then further requiring that half one less than a successful candidate also passes a primality test.
  • the group operation is ordinary multiplication modulo p , except that the result is normalized by taking either the product itself or its additive inverse, whichever has the smaller least positive representative.
  • all integers between 1 and p inclusive may be regarded as representing the members of the group, such membership being easy to check and such members being easy to map to from some original message space.
  • an element can be shown to be a square simply by showing its square root. Since every element apart from 1 in the group of squares, or any group of prime order, generates the group of squares, the generator g can readily be taken to be the square of some public number, which allows everyone to verify that g is in the group of squares just by checking that it results from squaring its public square root and that it is not 1.
  • the prime q and the generator g for this third exemplary embodiment can be readily created as described above in a way which allows anyone receiving them to verify that they have the proper form.
  • Some applications may require an efficient way to map from say small integers to elements m suitable for signing.
  • One way to accomplish this suggested by M. O. Rabin in "Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as factorization," which appeared as MIT technical report MIT/LCS/TR-212, January 1979, is to in effect multiply the input number by a small power of 2 and randomly change the low-order bits zeroed and test for membership in the group; If the test fails, simply replace the low order bits with randomly chosen bits and repeat until success.
  • Other applications may only require that elements in the group can be created; for these, the squaring of random values mentioned above would be sufficient. Finally, participants should test that the numbers they receive are in the group, which is also readily accomplished as already described.
  • Another exemplary embodiment uses a group with a known subgroup of small order (possibly with unknown subgroups of larger, and preferably only much larger, order). For example, consider the group of residues modulo a prime q such that q -1 is twice a prime, as already described. Instead of working with the group of squares or an isomorphic subgroup as already described, the entire group of residues could be used.
  • the inequalities tested by V in the protocols of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 i.e. the last lines of boxes 203 and 305), are considered satisfied exactly when either they are satisfied as written or when they would be satisfied were one comparand to (i.e. thing to be compared) be multiplied by -1.
  • Yet another preferred exemplary embodiment works with a group which has arbitrary structure. Unlike the groups of public and prime order already described, these groups may have an arbitrary group structure, and may even include many subgroups of small order. The group structure need not be known to any participant, and all or part of it might even secretly or openly be known to some participants. Multiparty security is still achievable in such a setting. But since there may be subgroups of order 2, the protocols of Fig. 3 in particular might have to be repeated j times to yield certainty of 1- j -2 , since it is believed that each iteration would yield at least certainty of one-half. Naturally the 2 in the previous remark could be replaced by any known lower bound on the order of nontrivial subgroups.
  • the operations performed are collected together into flowchart boxes.
  • the column that such a box is in indicates which party performs the operation defined in that box.
  • the columns are labeled by party name across the top.
  • Some operations show how messages are formed on the right of the equal sign with the message number (shown in square brackets) on the left of the equal sign.
  • the operation of a party saving a value under a symbolic name is denoted in the same way as that of forming a message, except that the symbolic name appears on the left instead of a message number.
  • the final kind of operation is that of sending a message.
  • the function f is preferably a publicly-agreed one-way function, such functions being well know in the art.
  • Fig. 1 the first flowchart for part of the preferred embodiment will now be described in detail.
  • This part shows public key creating and issuing, which need only be carried out once by the signer party S, and also the forming of a single undeniable signature for party V.
  • Flowchart box 101 shows S choosing x uniformly and at random from the interval 1 to p -1, such random selection as already mentioned. Then S raises g to the x 'th power modulo p , such exponentiation already having been described and well known in the art. The resulting residue is then called message [10]. As per the definition of the notation already described, message [10] is then shown as being sent from S to V. This completes the creating and issuing of a public key by S.
  • Box 102 indicates that, after receiving the public key as message [10], V sends an original message m for signing to S as message [11].
  • V sends an original message m for signing to S as message [11].
  • the nature or source of m is not essential and it may be regarded as any suitable message (or blinded message, as has already been mentioned and will be mentioned in detail later).
  • Box 103 shows how, after receiving message [11], S first forms a signature from it by raising it to the secret power x .
  • the exponentiation is done in this particular exemplary embodiment, as already mentioned, in the group of order p .
  • the signature denoted as message [12] is shown being sent by S to V, who would ordinarily receive it and retain it for possible later use in one of the other protocol parts.
  • FIG. 2 shows a first exemplary arrangement for the checking of an undeniable signature, the issuing of which has just been shown in detail in Fig. 1.
  • Box 201 shows how V prepares the initial challenge and sends it to S.
  • First a and b are chosen substantially independently and uniformly at random from 1 to p (or in some other suitable way when the order of the group is not known to V, as has already been mentioned).
  • message [21] is formed as the product (in the group, as already mentioned) of message [12] raised to the power a and message [10] raised to the power b .
  • This message is then sent by V to S, and should have the form shown in the last line of this box. (But since V does not know x , this is an example of the comment made earlier that neither party acting alone need be able to determine the value of all variables of such expressions.)
  • Box 202 is the formation and return of S's response to the challenge received from V.
  • the multiplicative inverse of x modulo the order of the group is shown in the usual way in the exponent of message [21], to produce message [22].
  • message [22] is shown as being obtained by applying the inverse of the signing function to the message [21]. (A protocol not requiring that the order be known is shown in Fig. 3, to be described in detail.)
  • the resulting message [22] should be of the form shown, m a g b , and is shown as being supplied to V.
  • Box 203 shows the checking of the response [22] received from S by V.
  • V uses the values of m, g, a ,and b known to V to construct the value that should have been returned by S in case the signature was valid. This is done by raising m to the power a and multiplying the result by g raised to the power b . Then V simply compares the value constructed with that received from S in message [22]. If they are equal, then V stops the protocol, as called for by the definition of the symbol ? ⁇ ? given above. In this case, V knows that [12] is with high certainty the signature of m corresponding to public key [10]. In the remaining case, that the inequality holds, V continues the protocol with the knowledge that either (a) [12] is not the proper signature or (b) S is trying to improperly deny the signature. The rest of this flowchart allows V to distinguish between these two subcases.
  • Box 204 is similar to 201 except that c and d are used instead of a and b .
  • First c and d are created by the random expression already described so that they are suitable secret exponents.
  • message [24] is formed as the product of message [12] raised to the c power times message [10] raised to the d power.
  • message [24] is sent by V to S.
  • Box 205 is again similar to its predecessor, box 202, and in fact the operations performed by S are the same. The only difference is that the input is message [24] instead of [21] and the output is [25] instead of [22]. One consequence of this is that S need not know which of these two steps in the protocol is being performed.
  • Box 206 shows the final test made by V based on the messages [22] and [25] received from S.
  • the test shown is made by comparing the equality of two essentially similarly constructed quantities. The first is the product of message [22] and g raised to the - b power, all raised to the c power; the second is message [25] times g to the - d power all to the a power. Notice that the negative exponents on g need not mean that V must compute multiplicative inverses, since the multiplicative inverse of g could have been made public by some other party. As should be obvious to those of skill in the art, however, the comparison can be made in practice without needing multiplicative inverses.
  • FIG. 3 the third flowchart for part of a preferred embodiment will now be described in detail.
  • This part shows a second alternate arrangement for the checking of an undeniable signature, the issuing of which has already been shown in detail in Fig. 1.
  • Box 301 is similar to box 201 in that a first challenge is created based on two randomly generated exponents, called again here a and b .
  • V chooses these two exponents substantially independently and uniformly, and keeps them secret.
  • What V sends to S in message [31] is the product of m raised to the a and g raised to the b . Notice that since all of these values are known to V, the explicit construction of the message is omitted from the flowchart and its value is shown in the line for the sending of the message only.
  • Box 302 entails S raising the received message [31] to the x power and then applying the one-way function f to the result. This image under the one-way function is what is returned to V by S in message [32].
  • Box 303 merely indicates that after receiving message [32] from S, V forwards m, a , and b individually to S in messages [33.1], [33.2], and [33.3], respectively.
  • Box 304 first shows how S tests that all the messages received from V during this part of the protocol ⁇ [31], [33.1], [33.2], and [33.3] ⁇ are mutually consistent. This is accomplished by testing the equality of [31] with the result of reconstructing its value from the others. The reconstruction is accomplished by forming the product of [33.1] raised to the [33.2] with g raised to the [33.3]. If the equality is not satisfied, S stops the protocol, as per the definition of the notation, and knows that V has been supplying improper messages. If the equality is satisfied, S returns to V message [31] raised to the secret power x in the form of message [34].
  • Box 305 shows two tests by V. The first checks that [34] really is the inverse image of [32] under f . If this test fails, then V stops the protocol knowing that S was supplying improper messages. Otherwise V makes a test similar in intention and form to that of box 203. Message [34] is tested for inequality with the product of message [12] raised to the power a and message [10] raised to the power b. If they are equal, then V stops the protocol and knows that with high probability [12] is indeed the signature of m corresponding to public key [10]. In case the inequality does hold, V continues the protocol but with the knowledge that either (a) [12] is not the proper signature or (b) S has tried to improperly deny the signature. And as with Fig. 2, the remaining part of this flowchart allows V to distinguish between these two subcases.
  • Box 306 is similar to box 204 in that a second challenge is created based on two randomly generated exponents, called again here c and d, but they are combined into the challenge in the style of 301. That is [36] is formed as the product of m raised to the c times g raised to the d, and it is supplied by V to S.
  • Box 307 shows S raising the received message [36] to the x power and then applying the one-way function f to the result This image under the one-way function is what is returned to V by S in message [37].
  • Box 308 denotes that after receiving message [37] from S, V sends c and d individually to S in messages [38.1] and [38.2], respectively.
  • Box 309 first shows how S tests the mutual consistency of messages [36], [33.1], [38.1], and [38.2] received from V. This is accomplished by testing the equality of [36] and the product of [33.1] raised to the [38.1] times g raised to the [38.2]. If the equality is not satisfied, S stops the protocol knowing that V has been supplying improper messages. If the equality is satisfied, S supplies V with message [36] raised to the power x called message [39].
  • Box 310 shows two tests by V.
  • the test shown compares the equality of two values. The first value is the product of message [34] and [10] raised to the -b power, all raised to the c power; the second is message [39] times [10] to the - d power all to the a power.
  • Fig. 4 shows one kind of blinding, called “exponential blinding,” of a message by party V, raising the result to a secret power by S, and unblinding of the returned message by V.
  • exposure blinding of a message by party V
  • S secret power
  • unblinding of the returned message by V.
  • these operations are generic: blinding could be performed by V on any message before it is raised to a secret power by S, and the result returned by S could be unblinded. In particular, it could be applied to all three blindings and unblindings shown in Fig. 6, i.e. 606 and 608; 609 alone; or 614 and 616.
  • Box 401 shows how V blinds message u and sends it to S. First V chooses r independently and uniformly from 1 to p -1. Then V raises u to the power r to form message [41], which V sends to S.
  • Box 402 shows receipt of message [41] by S and its transformation and subsequent return to V.
  • S raises message [41] to the secret power y ; the result is supplied to V as message [42].
  • Box 403 shows the unblinding of the blinded message received by V.
  • the multiplicative inverse of r modulo the order of the group is applied as an exponent to the message [42] received from S, and the result is shown as message [43].
  • the last line of box 403 shows parenthetically that the value of message [43] should be u raised to the y power.
  • Box 404 shows the optional creation of another secret blinding key t , and its use in reblinding the message of u .
  • First t is created at random as r was.
  • message [44] is formed as u raised to the power t .
  • Message [45] is shown as being created by raising message [43] to the t power.
  • the last line of box 404 again shows parenthetically that the value of message [45] should be u raised to the power yt .
  • message [31] could also be blinded before being sent to S in the testing of Fig.
  • re-blinding was disclosed for the unanticipated blind signature system already referenced in the description of the prior art.
  • a kind of re-blinding is also possible.
  • the result of re-blinding is a pair comprising a blinded message and a blinded signature of that message. These could then be used in the protocol of Fig. 2 as just described.
  • Fig. 5 the fifth flowchart for part of the preferred embodiment will now be described in detail.
  • This part shows another kind of blinding, related to the "blinding for unanticipated signatures" already referenced in the background of the invention, in which a message is blinded by V, the result is raised by S to a secret power y , and the returned message is unblinded by V.
  • Box 501 shows how V blinds message m and sends it to S.
  • V chooses r independently and uniformly from 1 to p -1.
  • V raises g to the power r and multiplies the result with m to form message [51], which V sends to S.
  • Box 502 shows receipt of message [51] by S and its signing and subsequent return to V.
  • S raises message [51] to the secret power y ; the result is supplied to V as message [52].
  • Box 503 shows the unblinding of the signed blinded message received by V.
  • the multiplicative inverse of message [10] raised to the r is first formed. Then this is multiplied with message [52] received from S, and the result is shown as message [53]. Again for clarity, the last line of box 503 shows parenthetically that message [53] should have the value m raised to the y power.
  • Box 504 shows the optional creation of another secret blinding key t , and its use in re-blinding the message m .
  • First t is created at random as r was.
  • message [54] is formed as m times g to the power t .
  • Message [55] is shown as being created by raising message [10] to the t power and multiplying the result by message [53].
  • the last line of box 504 again shows parenthetically that the value of message [55] should be m raised to the power t times g raised to the power yt .
  • the signing operation of Fig. 1 might be performed so as to yield V an undeniable signature unlinkable by S. That is, if a plurality of such signatures are obtained with independent r 's, then S should be unable to determine anything about which signature corresponds with which instance of the signing process.
  • the pair comprising a blinded message and a blinded signature of that message used in re-blindning has already been shown in box 504, and the comments already made for box 404 could apply to this box as well.
  • message [31] could also be blinded before being sent to S in the testing of Fig.
  • Ordinary digital sigantures could again be used to allow a third party to check a transaction that is blinded in the way shown in Fig. 5.
  • the exponent r must also be provided to the third party to allow checking. Then the third party performs the checks as already described, except that the blinding factor g r must be included in the expression corresponding to the input to S and [10] - r must be included in the expression for the output of S.
  • the signature would consist of the product of each such message part raised to a different power.
  • the challenge would contain a separate message corresponding to each part of a signature.
  • the response would be the product of all such messages of a challenge, each having the exponent corresponding to the corresponding message part.
  • a further and not necessarily mutually exclusive use anticipated would be to include more than two terms in a challenge message. With such an arrangement the mutual consistency of more than two message/signature pairs could be tested while keeping some of the message and processing costs the same. Different random exponents could be used on each term, but if there were sufficiently many terms, it is anticipated that various possibly randomly chosen combinations of possibly smaller exponents might be used.

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Claims (20)

  1. Procédé de cryptographie pour former et vérifier des signatures indéniables basé sur l'émission d'une clé publique par une partie qui signe dans lequel les signatures sont qualifiées de "indéniables" parce qu'elles peuvent être vérifiées dans un protocole entre une partie qui vérifie (611) et la partie qui signe (601) dans lequel la partie qui signe est incapable de mener le protocole de manière non convenable de façon à "nier" la validité d'une signature valide sans qu'il y ait au moins une probabilité sensiblement élevée que la partie qui vérifie apprendra que la partie qui signe est en train de mener le protocole de manière non convenable, le procédé comprenant les étapes pour :
    créer une clé publique (604) et une clé privée correspondante (604) par une partie qui signe et fournir la clé publique au moins à une partie qui vérifie ;
    fournir un message non signé par une partie qui fournit (605) à ladite partie qui signe ;
    former une signature indéniable (602) sur ledit message non signé reçu par ladite partie qui signe, au moins en réponse à ladite clé privée correspondant à ladite clé publique, et renvoyer le message signé de manière indéniable qui en résulte à ladite partie qui fournit ;
    former au moins une interrogation (612) par une partie qui vérifie, en réponse à une clé d'interrogation 613 sensiblement inconnue au moins de manière temporaire de ladite partie qui signe et en réponse à au moins un élément de la paire comprenant ledit message signé de manière indéniable et ledit message non signé, et fournir ladite interrogation à ladite partie qui signe ;
    transformer (603) au moins une dite interrogation reçue de la part ladite partie qui signe au moins de manière partielle en réponse à ladite clé privée et en renvoyant le résultant comme une réponse à ladite partie qui vérifie ; et
    vérifier (617) au moins une dite réponse reçue par ladite partie qui vérifie en réponse à la fois à ladite clé d'interrogation et à au moins l'autre élément de ladite paire comprenant ledit message signé de manière indéniable et ledit message non signé, de manière à donner une certitude sensiblement élevée en distinguant entre les trois possibilités (a) que le message prétendu signé de manière indéniable est une signature indéniable valide correspondant à la fois à ladite clé publique et audit message non signé, (b) que le message prétendu signé de manière indéniable n'est pas une signature indéniable valide correspondant à la fois à ladite clé publique et audit message non signé, et (c) que la réponse de la part de la partie qui signe est une réponse non convenable.
  2. Procédé de la revendication 1, dans lequel ladite étape de signature (103) inclut une élévation dudit message non signé ([11]) à une puissance ssecrète de signature (X) dérivée de ladite clé privée, une telle élévation à la puissance étant effectuée dans une structure finie dans laquelle elle est définie.
  3. Procédé de la revendication 2, dans lequel :
    au moins une partie de ladite interrogation ([21]) est formée en réponse au moins deux messages signés de manière indéniable ([12] , [10]) en les élevant à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation ;
    au moins une partie de ladite réponse ([22]) est formée en élevant au moins une partie de ladite interrogation à une puissance (1/X) agissant comme un inverse de ladite puissance secrète de signature; et
    ladite vérification (203) est effectuée au moins en partie en élevant les au moins deux messages non signés (m, g) correspondant auxdits au moins ceux messages signés de manière indéniable à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation.
  4. Procédé de la revendication 2, dans lequel :
    au moins une partie de ladite interrogation ([31]) est formée en réponse à au moins deux messages non signés (m, g) en les élevant à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation ;
    au moins une partie de ladite réponse ([32]) est formée en élevant au moins une partie de ladite interrogation à ladite puissance secrète de signature (X), et
    ladite vérification (305) est effectuée au moins en partie en élevant les au moins deux messages signés de manière indéniable ([12], [10]) correspondant auxdits au moins deux messages non signés à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation secrète.
  5. Procédé comme dans la revendication 1, comprenant en outre les étapes pour :
    occulter (606) ledit message non signé en réponse à une clé d'occultation (607) avant de fournir le message non signé occulté résultant à la dite partie qui signe (601) à la place du dudit message non signé ; et
    ôter l'occulation (608) dudit message signé de manière indéniable renvoyé par ladite partie qui signe en réponse à la clé d'occultation (607).
  6. Procédé comme dans la revendication 1, comprenant en outre les étapes pour :
    occulter (609) en réponse à une clé d'occultation (610) ledit message signé de manière indéniable et également ledit message non signé correspondant ; et
    utiliser lesdits message occulté signé de manière indéniable et message occulté non signé à la place desdits message signé de manière indéniable et message non signé, respectivement, par ladite partie qui vérifie (611) en formant ladite interrogation (612) et en vérifiant ladite réponse.
  7. Procédé comme dans la revendication 1, comprenant en outre les étapes pour :
    occulter (614) en réponse à une clé d'occultation (615) au moins une partie de l'une de ladite interrogation et de ladite réponse ; et
    ôter l'occultation (616) en réponse à ladite clé d'occultation (615) au moins une partie de l'autre de ladite interrogation et de ladite réponse.
  8. Procédé des revendications 5, 6 ou 7, dans lequel :
    ladite étape de signature (402) inclut une élévation dudit message non signé ([41]) à une puissance secrète de signature (Y) dérivée de ladite clé privée, une telle élévation à la puissance étant effectuée dans une structure finie dans laquelle elle est définie ;
    ladite étape pour occulter (401) inclut l'opération d'élévation du message (u) à occulter à une puissance (r) dérivée de ladite clé d'occultation ; et
    ladite étape pour ôter l'occultation (403) inclut une élévation du message dont on doit ôter l'occultation à une puissance (1/r) qui agit comme une opération inverse de celle de ladite opération d'occultation.
  9. Procédé des revendications 5, 6 ou 7 dans lequel :
    ladite étape pour signer (502) inclut une élévation dudit message non signé ([51]) à une puissance secrète de signature (Y) dérivée de ladite clé privée, une telle élévation à la puissance étant effectuée dans une structure finie où telle est définie ;
    ladite étape pour occulter (501) inclut la formation d'un produit de au moins un premier message (g) qui est élevé à une puissance d'occultation (r) dérivée de ladite clé d'occultation et de au moins un deuxième message (m) à occulter ; et
    ladite étape pour ôter l'occultation (503) inclut la formation d'un produit ([53]) de l'inverse multiplicatif de la forme signée de manière indéniable dudit premier message élévé à la puissance d'occultation par ledit deuxième message.
  10. Procédé des revendications 1, 2, 3 ou 4, incluant les étapes pour :
    émettre une signature numérique à clé publique par ladite partie qui signe en réponse à au moins une dite interrogation et une dite réponse ; et
    vérifier ladite signature numérique à clé publique.
  11. Dispositif pour former et vérifier des signatures indéniables basé sur l'émission d'une clé publique par une partie qui signe dans lequel les signatures sont qualifiées de "indéniables" parce qu'elles peuvent être vérifiées par un moyen pour former et transférer des messages entre une partie qui vérifie (611) et une partie qui signe (601) dans lequel la partie qui signe est incapable de mener les transferts de manière non convenable de manière à "nier" la validité d'une signature valide sans qu'il y ait au moins une probabilité sensiblement élevée que la partie qui vérifie détectera que la partie qui signe est en train de mener le protocole de manière non convenable, le dispositif comprenant :
    un moyen pour créer une clé publique (604) et une clé privée correspondante (604) par une partie qui signe et pour fournir la clé publique à au moins une partie qui vérifie ;
    un moyen pour fournir un message non signé par une partie qui fournit (605) à ladite partie qui signe ;
    un moyen pour former une signature indéniable (602) sur ledit message non signé reçu par ladite partie qui signe, au moins en réponse à ladite clé privé correspondant à ladite clé publique, et pour renvoyer le message signé de manière indéniable résultant à ladite partie qui fournit ;
    un moyen pour forme au moins une interrogation (612), par une partie qui vérifie, en réponse à une clé d'interrogation (613) sensiblement inconnue au moins d'une manière temporaire de ladite partie qui signe et en réponse à au moins un élément de la paire conprenant ledit message signé de manière indéniable et ledit message non signé, et pour fournir ladite interrogation à ladite partie qui signe ;
    un moyen pour transformer (603) au moins une dite interrogation reçue par ladite partie qui signe au moins de manière partielle en réponse à ladite clé privée et pour renvoyer le résultat comme une réponse à ladite partie qui signe ; et
    un moyen pour vérifier (617) au moins une dite réponse reçue par ladite partie qui vérifie en réponse à la fois à ladite clé d'interrogation, et à au moins l'autre élément de ladite paire comprenant ledit message signé de manière indéniable et ledit message non signé, de manière à donner une certitude sensiblement élevée dans la distinction entre les trois possibilités (a) que le message prétendu signé de manière indéniable est une signature valide indéniable correspondant à la fois à ladite clé publique et audit message non signé, (b) que le message prétendu signé de manière indéniable n'est pas une signature indéniable valide correspondant à la fois à ladite clé publique et audit message non signé, et (c) que la réponse fournie par la partie qui signe est une réponse non convenable.
  12. Dispositif comme dans la revendication 11, dans lequel ledit moyen pour signer inclut un moyen pour éléver ledit message non signé ([11]) à une puissance secrète de signature (X) dérivée de ladite clé privée, une telle élévation à la puissance étant effectuée dans une structure finie dans laquelle elle est définie.
  13. Dispositif comme dans la revendication 12, dans lequel :
    au moins une partie de ladite interrogation ([21]) est formée en réponse à au moins deux messages ([11], [10]) signés de manière indéniable par un moyen pour les élever à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation ;
    au moins une partie de ladite réponse ([22]) est formée par un moyen pour élever au moins une partie de ladite interrogation à une puissance (1/X) agissant comme un inverse de ladite puissance secrète de signature, et
    ladite vérification (203) est effectuée au moins en partie par un moyen pour élever les au moins deux messages non signés (m, g) correspondant auxdits au moins deux messages signés de manière indéniable à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation.
  14. Dispositif comme dans la revendication 12, dans lequel :
    au moins une partie de ladite interrogation ([31]) est formée en réponse à au moins deux messages non signés (m, g) par un moyen pour les élever à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé d'interrogation ;
    au moins une partie de ladite réponse ([32]) est formée par un moyen pour élever au moins une partie de ladite interrogation à ladite puissance secrète de signature (X) ; et
    ledit moyen pour vérifier (305) inclut au moins un moyen pour élever les au moins deux messages signés de manière indéniable ([12], [10]) correspondant auxdits au moins deux messages non signés à des puissances (a, b) dérivées de ladite clé secrète d'interrogation.
  15. Dispositif comme dans la revendication 1, comprenant en outre :
    un moyen pour occulter (606) ledit message non signé en réponse à une clé d'occultation (607) avant que le message non signé occulté résuluant ne soit fourni à ladite partie qui signe (601) à la place dudit message non signé ; et
    un moyen pour ôter l'occultation (608) dudit message signé de manière indéniable renvoyé par ladite partie qui signe en réponse à ladite clé d'occultation (607).
  16. Dispositif comme dans la revendication 11, comprenant en outre :
    un moyen pour occulter (609) en réponse à une clé d'occultation (610) ledit message signé de manière indéniable et également pour occulter ledit message non signé correspondant ; et
    un moyen pour utiliser lesdits message occulté signé de manière indéniable et message occulté non signé à la place desdits message signé de manière indéniable et message non signé, respectivement, par ladite partie qui signe (611) dans ledit moyen pour former ladite interrogation (612) et pour vérifier ladite réponse.
  17. Dispositif comme dans la revendication 11, comprenant en outre :
    un moyen d'occultation (614), en réponse à une clé d'occultation (615), au moins une partie de l'une de ladite interrogation et de ladite réponse ; et
    un moyen pour ôter l'occultation (616), en réponse à ladite clé d'occultation (615), au moins une partie de l'autre de ladite interrogation et de ladite réponse.
  18. Dispositif comme dans les revendications 15, 16 ou 17, dans lequel :
    ledit moyen pour signer (402) inclus un moyen pour élever ledit message non signé ([41]) à une puissance secrète de signature (Y) dérivée de ladite clé privée, une telle élévation à la puissance étant effectuée dans une structure finie où elle est définie ;
    ledit moyen d'occultation (401) comprend un moyen pour élever le message (u) à occulter à une puissance (r) dérivée de ladite clé d'occultation ; et
    ledit moyen pour ôter l'occultation (403) inclut un moyen pour élever le message dont on doit ôter l'occultation à une puissance (1/r) qui agit comme une opération inverse de celle de ladite opération d'occultation.
  19. Dispositif comme dans les revendications 15, 16 ou 17, dans lequel :
    ledit moyen pour signer (502) inclut un moyen pour élever ledit message ([51]) non signé à une puissance secrète de signature (Y) dérivée de ladite clé privée, une telle élévation à la puissance étant effectuée dans une structure finie où elle est définie ;
    ledit moyen d'occultation (501) inclut un moyen pour former un produit de au moins un premier message (g) élevé à une puissance d'occultation (r) qui est dérivée de ladite clé d'occultation et de au moins un deuxième message (m) à occulter ; et
    ledit moyen pour ôter l'occultation (503) inclut un moyen pour former un produit ([53]) de l'inverse multiplicatif de la forme signée de manière indéniable du premier message élevé à la puissance d'occultation et dudit deuxième message.
  20. Dispositif comme dans les revendications 11, 12, 13 ou 14 incluant :
    un moyen pour émettre une signature numérique à clé publique par ladite partie qui signe en réponse à au moins une dite interrogation et une dite réponse ; et
    un moyen pour vérifier ladite signature numérique à clé publique.
EP88202620A 1987-11-23 1988-11-22 Systèmes de signature indéniable Expired - Lifetime EP0318097B1 (fr)

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ATE164278T1 (de) 1998-04-15
US4947430A (en) 1990-08-07
EP0318097A1 (fr) 1989-05-31
DE3856149T2 (de) 1998-07-02

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