EP0214609A2 - Méthode et système de transaction électronique - Google Patents

Méthode et système de transaction électronique Download PDF

Info

Publication number
EP0214609A2
EP0214609A2 EP86112177A EP86112177A EP0214609A2 EP 0214609 A2 EP0214609 A2 EP 0214609A2 EP 86112177 A EP86112177 A EP 86112177A EP 86112177 A EP86112177 A EP 86112177A EP 0214609 A2 EP0214609 A2 EP 0214609A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
message
transaction
transacting
party
data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP86112177A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP0214609A3 (en
EP0214609B1 (fr
Inventor
Kazuo Takaragi
Ryoichi Sasaki
Takayoshi Shiraishi
Nobuhiro Kurashiki
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Hitachi Ltd
Original Assignee
Hitachi Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Hitachi Ltd filed Critical Hitachi Ltd
Publication of EP0214609A2 publication Critical patent/EP0214609A2/fr
Publication of EP0214609A3 publication Critical patent/EP0214609A3/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0214609B1 publication Critical patent/EP0214609B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3823—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/389—Keeping log of transactions for guaranteeing non-repudiation of a transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/30—Compression, e.g. Merkle-Damgard construction
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an electronic transaction and more particularly to an electronic transaction system which electronically effects commercial transactions by computer documents instead of conventional documents.
  • contracts are authenticated or validated by signatures or seals.
  • data are transmitted through a communication like electronic transaction between two parties having interests to each other, even if the signature and seal data are converted to digital signals for transmission, they may be easily copied and hence they cannot be used for authenticity. Accordingly, the authenticity of the message by digital signature which corresponds to the normal signature and seal is required.
  • the message authenticity In order for the message authenticity to be effective as formal transaction in place of the signature or seal, the following four conditions should be met.
  • the digital signature can be relatively easily attained by using the public key cryptograph system represented by an RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Ald- leman) algorithm.
  • Fig. 1 shows a chart of a prior art digital signature by the public key cryptograph.
  • a message M from a sender A is inputted.
  • a decoded message D (M, SK A ) is produced by decoding (deciphering) the message M by a secret key SK A of the sender A.
  • a step 104 the data L is received by the receiver B is decoded by the secret key SK B of the receiver B to produce D (M, SK A ).
  • a step 105 the decoded message D (M, SK A ) is endoded by the public key PK A of the sender A to produce the original message M.
  • a step 106 the message M is supplied to the receiver B as an output data.
  • the cryptograph message M cannot be decoded in the step 104 unless the secret key StC B is known. Only the receiver B knows SK e . In the step 102; only the sender A who knows the secret key SK " can produce D (M, SK A ).
  • This system utilizes the advantages of the DES cryptograph system and the RSA cryptograph system in a well-mixed manner.
  • Fig. 2A shows a process therefor. In Fig. 2-(a), the following steps are carried out.
  • the 64 bits of an input message subsequent to first 64(i-1) bits are defined as I i .
  • condition (c) is not met so long as the signatures are made by only the two persons, the sender and the receiver.
  • Fig. 3 illustrates a principle thereof.
  • a sender 34 sends a data consisting of message and signature to an authentication organization 31.
  • the authentication organization 31 adds date information to the received data 35 to prepare data 32, which is sent to a receiver 33 and also recorded in a log 37.
  • the sender 34 cannot later deny his message because the record is logged in the log 37 of the authentication organization 31. In this case, the sender may insist that the secret key has been stolen and someone has forged the message. Such insistence can be prevented by sending the same data 36 as the data 32 back to the sender 34 for confirmation.
  • Step 210
  • Step 202
  • Step 203
  • I(j-1) is encoded by using Kj as a cryptograph key, and the encoded result and 1(j-1) are exclusively ORed to produce I(j).
  • Step 204
  • a sender 301 calculates a short character string H(M) from a message M 302 by the data compression encoding, produces a digital signature E (H(M) , S k ) 306 by an encoder 305 by using a secret key S k 304 and sends it to a receiver 307.
  • the receiver 307 decodes the digital signature E (H(M) , S k ) 306 by a decoder 309 to produce the original character string H(M) ' 310, and calculates a character string H(M) " 311 from the message 302 in the same manner as the sender 301 did. Both are compared by a comparator 312 and if they are equal, the message 302 is true and valid so long as the receiver believes that the sender 301 is a sole owner of the secret key S k 304.
  • the digital signature to a long message can be processed in a short time, but this method does not meet the condition (d) (the receiver cannot later deny the fact of reception). If the receiver later denies the fact of reception, the sender has no evidence to deny it.
  • one feature of the present invention includes the. following steps.
  • the sender of the transaction message is referred to as a signer and the receiver is referred to as a certifier.
  • Two sets of public key and secret key in the public key cryptograph system are prepared. They are (public key, secret key) : (PK S , SK s ) and (PK R , SK R ), where SK s is owned only by the signer and SK R is owned only by the cert i bomb, and PK s and PK R are copied to all concerned.
  • D ( * , K) is a message decoded from a message by a key K
  • E ( * , K) is a cryptograph encoded from the message by the key K.
  • D (M, SK s ) and D (M, SK R ) are disclosed to the persons concerned, who encode D (M, SK s ) and D (M, SK R ) by using the signer's and certifier's public keys PK s and PK R which the persons concerned possess.
  • the persons concerned can confirm that the formula (1) is met if the signer and the cert i bomb properly used their secret keys. If the formula (1) is not met, the persons concerned may determine that the secret key of the signer or the certifier is not valid.
  • the persons concerned may determine that the secret key used by the signer or the certifier is an unauthorized one.
  • D (M, K) D (M, K').
  • the D (M, K) thus prepared is hereinafter referred to as an electronic seal by the owner of the secret key K, and the message M for certifying the validity or authenticity of the electronic seal is referred to as certificate data. If a person who received the electronic seal has a corresponding public key, he/she can detect who prepared the electronic seal and the content of the message. However, other person than the owner of the secret key K cannot produce the electronic seal D (M, K) based on the certificate data M.
  • the same certificate data is decoded by the signer and certifier by their respective secret keys and the decoded results D (M, SK s ) and D (M, SK R ) are exchanged between both.
  • the certifier can confirm that the sender of D (M, SK s ) is the signer himself if the certifier can get M in accordance with the formula - (1) by encoding D (M, SK s ) by the public key PK s of the signer.
  • the signer can also confirm that the sender pf D (M, SK R ) is the cert i bomb himself if the signer can get M in accordance with the formula - (1) by encoding D (M, SK R ) by the public key PK R of the certifier.
  • D (M, SK s ) and D (M, SK R ) from the signer or certifier they encode D (M, SK s ) and D - (M, SK R ) by using the public key PK s of the signer and the public key PK R of the certifier.
  • the persons concerned can determine whether the secret key used is authorized one or not by checking if the formula (1) is met or not.
  • a message I is data compression encoded (Fig. 2) by using the key K.
  • High order m bits of the finally produced block O n is used as a Hash total (I, K) for the message I.
  • the signer When the signer sends a message, he/she data-compression-encodes it and opens the Hash total (data compression encoded message) to the persons concerned.
  • the signer and certifier keep the originals of the message. Thus, if an issue later occurs on the original, the original may be again data-compression-encoded to check whether it matches to the initial original.
  • the message I may be used as an encoding key in an encoding system for certifying the content.
  • a predetermined input data 10 is encoded by the encoding key to produce a Hash total C (10, I).
  • the C (10, I) is inserted in the certificate data at a predetermined position so that C (10, I) is reproduced from the certificate data.
  • certifier or person concerned gets the message I' and C (10, I)
  • he/she first encodes the data 10 by using the message I' as a key, and then compares the encoded result or Hash total C (10, I') with C (10, I). If they are equal, it means that the given message I' is equal to the original message I, and if they are not equal, it means that the given message I' is not equal to the original data I.
  • the transaction procedure is established such that the signer and certifier respond to the call from the partner before they inputs their own secret keys.
  • the secret key is stolen by a third person, who intends to involve in the electronic transaction, at least one call is made by the signer or certifier before the transaction is executed. Accordingly, the signer or certifier can detect the third person's involvement.
  • the signer and certifier When the signer and certifier make their electronic seals and tally impressions, they add dates which indicate the effective period of the electronic seals and tally impressions. This indicates to the transaction partner who received the electronic seal and tally impression a due date to respond, and declares that the transaction will be terminated and the electronic seal and tally impression so far exchanged will become ineffective unless response is received by the due date. If the signer or certifier does not receive the response to the electronic seal and tally impression he/she sent, he/she informs it to the authentication organization together with the electronic seal and tally impression so that the electronic seal and tally impression are invalidated.
  • the authentication organization authenticates that the electronic seal and tally impression so far exchanged are invalid and the transaction has been terminated. Accordingly, safety in the transaction procedure is assured.
  • a grace period date for the electronic seal and tally impression at a predetermined position on the certificate data. This means to indicate to the partner of transaction who received the electronic seal and tally impression a grace period during which the partner is permitted to terminate the transaction. Before or during the grace period, the partner can terminate the transaction and declare that the electronic seal and tally impression so far exchanged are invalid.
  • the signer or certifier finds any defect in the transaction or finds that the electronic seal or tally impression received from the partner is unauthorized one, after the signer or certifier has sent the electronic seal and tally impression, he/she informs it to the authentication organization together with the electronic seal and tally impression so that the electronic seal and tally impression are invalidated.
  • the authentication organization will authenticate that the electronic seal and tally impression so far exchanged are invalid and the transaction has been terminated.
  • the tally impression certificate data is decoded by the secret key SK R of the certifier to prepare an electronic tally impression D ((T, h,) , SK R ), which is sent to the signer as a response of agreement to the transaction by the message M.
  • the signer confirms the fact that the high order bit sequence h, of the Hash total of the message M is included in the electronic seal which can be prepared only by the certifier, and the signer may use it as a counterevidence when the certifier later denies the fact of transaction and does not send back the electronic seal of the certifier and escapes with the electronic seal of the signer.
  • Fig. 5 shows a configuration of an electronic transaction system to which the present invention applies.
  • Fig. 6 shows a flow chart of a procedure for embodying the present invention in the configuration of Fig. 5.
  • M is "14:35:14 February 19, 1985" and the decision (1) is made. If (2) is met, a message to terminate the transaction is sent to the certifier 409.
  • Step 610
  • the contract I has been recorded in the intermediation terminal 406 in the step 602 (a).
  • the V and W are opened to the persons concerned in the same manner as that in the step 608.
  • the encoding of the contract by a conventional cryptograph may be added.
  • a secret key X of the conventional cryptograph has been previously exchanged between the signer and the certifier, and the secret key X is also sent to the intermediation terminal 406.
  • the steps 602, 602 (a) and 603 are modified as follows.
  • the certifier secret key SK R or signer secret key SK s to be entered by the certifier or signer is long, a certain number of bits of the secret key may be recorded on a magnetic card and the remaining bits are memorized by the certifier 409 or signer 401 as a secret number.
  • the certifier 409 or signer 401 enters the secret key, he/she sets the magnetic card and enters the secret number, and the terminal synthesizes the secret key based on those input information.
  • a high creditability is not put on the intermediation terminal 406 of Fig. 5 but the joumal information is replaced by the electronic seal to eliminate the joumal management.
  • the operations of the elements in Fig. 5 are explained with reference to a flow chart of Fig; 7.
  • Step 501
  • Step 510
  • the encoded message O n is called a Hash total of the transaction message I and expressed by C (10, I). T and C (10, 1) are combined to prepare
  • Step 512
  • Step 520
  • the intermediation terminal 406 may record the electronic seals D (W, SK s ) and D (W, SK R ) instead of erasing them to keep them as an evidence of transaction.
  • a portion of information on the secret key may be recorded in a magnetic card or IC card and the signal/certifier memorizes the rest of the information on the secret key as a secret number.
  • the secret key SK R is to be entered, the secret key is synthesized from the readout of the information from the magnetic card or IC card and the key entry of the secret number.
  • a checking function of the person by voice pattern or fingerprint before input operation may be added to the terminal.
  • Fig. 8 shows a flow chart of a procedure for transacting by an electronic seal with a time limit for an effective period in accordance with a third embodiment of the configuration shown in Fig. 5.
  • Steps 711 -713 which are different from the flow chart of Fig. 7 are primarily -explained.
  • the time limit V is "17:30:00 April 11, 1985".
  • the content of V' is same as that of V, that is, "15:30:00 April 11, 1985".
  • the encoded message V of the certificate data can be prepared only by using the secret key SK S which is owned only by the signer. If the third person attempts to transact with V' other than V of the certificate data, the certifier can detect in the step 614 that the signer is a false one, and the persons concerned who have the public key PK s can detect that the transaction is not effective because the encoded results of T and V publicized by the intermediation terminal, by using the public key PK s of the certifier and signer do not match each other.
  • the party In order for the electronic transaction to be effective, the party must enter its secret key at least once and responds to the call from the other party. That is, the party is double-checked.
  • the party When the party responds to the call in the terminal, the person may be checked by the fact that he/she has the magnetic card as shown in the modification 2 of the embodiment, or the person may be checked by the voice pattern or fingerprint so that the personal check function is further enhanced.
  • Hash total W for assuring the content of the contract message I is once opened and then recorded and kept in the intermediation terminal. It is therefore difficult to deny the fact of transmission or reception by modifying or destroying the record.
  • the.content of communication is not disclosed when the data is opened . at the intermediation terminal. What is opened at the intermediation terminal is not the communication text itself but the Hash total which is prepared by data-compression-encoding the set of the communication text and the encoded message of the certificate data. It is impossible to estimate the communication text based on the Hash total.
  • the load for maintenance is lower than that when the entire contract message I is maintained.
  • the electronic seal D (W, SK s ) can be prepared only by using the secret key SK s which only the signer possesses. If the third person prepares the electronic seal D (W, SK s ) by the key SK s ' other than the secret key SK s , the certifier terminal detects that it is a false electronic seal in the step 513.
  • the third person who attempt to conduct an unauthorized transaction must depress the seal accept button in the step 509.
  • the certifier depresses the transaction accept button in the step 504 and the call is made to the signer in the step 508. Accordingly, it is hard for the third person to conduct the transaction unless he/she prevents the signer from responding to the call.
  • the electronic seal D (W, SK R ) can be prepared only by using the secret key SK R which is possessed only by the receiver. If the third person prepares the electronic seal D (W, SK R ) by the key SK R ' other than the secret key SK R , the signer terminal detects that it is a false electronic key in the step 517. The same is true for the decoded message D (T, SK R ) of the ID. A false message D - (T, SKR') is detected in the step 508. Accordingly, it is hard for the third person to conduct the transaction unless he/she knows the secret key of the third person.
  • the third person who attempts to conduct the unauthorized transaction must depress the transaction accept button and the seal accept button in the steps 504 and 514.
  • the call to the signer is first made, and then the call to the certifier is made in the certifier terminal. Accordingly, it is hard for the third person to conduct the transaction unless he/she prevents the certifier from responding to the call.
  • the certifier prepared a forged message I' of the transaction message I.
  • the certifier cannot prepare the electronic seal D (W, SK s ) which the signer should have prepared.
  • the evidences of the electronic seals D (W, SK s ) and D (W, SK R ) must have been left in the step 518.
  • the certifier who attempts to modify the transaction message must prepare the response to the call by the signer in the step 509 in order to leave the record. Accordingly, even if the certigier could know the secret key SK s of the signer, it is difficult for the certifier to modify the transaction message unless the certifier can issue the response in the step 509 without being noticed by the signer.
  • the content of communication is not disclosed in the intermediation terminal.
  • the information transmitted to the intermediation terminal is not the communication text itself but the Hash total derived by data-compression-encoding the communication text, and it is impossible to guess the original communication text from the Hash total.
  • the electronic seal D (W, SK s ) of the signer includes the time limit V for the electronic seal which the signer has prepared in the predetermined form.
  • the signer judges that the certifier has no intention to conduct the transaction and invalidates the electronic seal D (W, SK s ) by informing the electronic seal to the authentication organization.
  • the authenication organization has a function to assure the invalidation of the electronic seal and it is utilized only when the necessity to prove the invalidity of the electronic seal arises.
  • Fig. 9 shows another configuration of the electronic transaction system to which the present invention is applied
  • Fig. 10 shows a flow chart of a procedure in a fourth embodiment of the present invention in the configuration of Fig. 9.
  • the initial value 1(0) is a predeterminer one.
  • a portion of the information on the secret key is recorded in a magnetic card or IC card and the rest of the information of the secret key is memorized by the signer or certifier as a secret number.
  • the secret key SK s or SK R is to be entered, it is inputted by reading the information from the magnetic card or IC card and keying the secret number by the secret key SK s or SK R .
  • the terminal may confirm the person by the voice pattern or fingerprint before the signer or certifier enter the information.
  • the signer or certifier cannot escape with the electronic seal because of the tally impression check. If the certifier does not send the certifier's electronic seal D (W2, SK R ) and denies the transaction after the signer has sent the signer's electronic seal D (W2, SK R ) when the signer and the certifier electronically transact the transaction message M, the signer may prove that the certifier attempts to deny the fact of transaction and escape with the signer's electronic seal by decoding the tally impression by the public key PK R of the certifier and checking the content thereof.
  • Fig. 11 shows other configuration of the system of the present invention
  • Fig. 12 shows a flow chart of a procedure in a fifth embodiment of the present invention in the configuration of Fig. 11. Operations of elements in Fig. 11 are explained with reference to the flow chart of Fig. 12.
  • Step 205
  • Step 206
  • Step 207
  • Step 208
  • Step 210
  • Step 211
  • Step 212
  • Step 214
  • Step 216
  • Step 222
  • Step 224
  • Step 225
  • the grace period information indicating the period for permitting interruption of the transaction is included in the electronic seal and tally impression. If the party who received the electronic seal or tally impression lodges an opposition against the received electronic seal or tally impression within the grace period, he/she is ensured to invalidate the electronic seal or tally impression he/she already issued by reporting the termination of the transaction to the public organization by the third party. Thus, a dispute during and after the transaction can be prevented.
  • the transaction can be terminated by reporting it to the public organization within the designated grace period. Thus, a wrong transaction is prevented.
  • the grace period may be sent to any period by the sender of the electronic seal and tally impression while taking the time necessary for the receiver to confirm the content into consideration.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
EP86112177A 1985-09-04 1986-09-03 Méthode et système de transaction électronique Expired - Lifetime EP0214609B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP60193735A JPS6256043A (ja) 1985-09-04 1985-09-04 電子取引方式
JP193735/85 1985-09-04

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0214609A2 true EP0214609A2 (fr) 1987-03-18
EP0214609A3 EP0214609A3 (en) 1989-08-02
EP0214609B1 EP0214609B1 (fr) 1993-03-10

Family

ID=16312935

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP86112177A Expired - Lifetime EP0214609B1 (fr) 1985-09-04 1986-09-03 Méthode et système de transaction électronique

Country Status (3)

Country Link
EP (1) EP0214609B1 (fr)
JP (1) JPS6256043A (fr)
DE (1) DE3687934T2 (fr)

Cited By (21)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3841393A1 (de) * 1987-12-18 1989-06-29 Pitney Bowes Inc Zuverlaessiges system zur feststellung der dokumentenechtheit
GB2211644A (en) * 1987-12-18 1989-07-05 Pitney Bowes Inc Reliable document authentication system
DE3841389A1 (de) * 1987-12-31 1989-07-13 Pitney Bowes Inc Informationsuebermittlungssystem zur zuverlaessigen bestimmung der echtheit einer vielzahl von dokumenten
DE3922642A1 (de) * 1989-07-10 1991-01-24 Ant Nachrichtentech Verfahren zur verschluesselten datenuebertragung
US5142577A (en) * 1990-12-17 1992-08-25 Jose Pastor Method and apparatus for authenticating messages
WO1994014258A1 (fr) * 1992-12-14 1994-06-23 The Commonwealth Of Australia Securite de messages electroniques
EP0624971A1 (fr) * 1993-05-10 1994-11-17 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Réseau de télécommunication
DE4416253A1 (de) * 1994-05-07 1995-11-09 Deutsche Bundespost Telekom Verfahren zur datenschutzgerechten Verteilung von Schlüsselinformationen
EP0735719A2 (fr) † 1995-03-31 1996-10-02 Pitney Bowes Inc. Procédé pour fournir des boîtiers sécurisés dans un système de gestion de clés
WO1996031034A1 (fr) * 1995-03-27 1996-10-03 Stefanus Alfonsus Brands Systeme garantissant la dissimulation restreinte de certificats a cle secrete meme lorsque le protocole emetteur est execute en mode parallele
FR2742615A1 (fr) * 1995-12-14 1997-06-20 Cybercash Inc Procede et systeme de transfert electronique de fonds par des communications de securite
EP0791901A2 (fr) * 1996-02-21 1997-08-27 Card Call Service Co., Ltd. Système de transactions à réseau
GB2313272A (en) * 1996-05-15 1997-11-19 Certicom Corp Digital signature protocol with reduced bandwidth
GB2317790A (en) * 1996-09-26 1998-04-01 Richard Billingsley Electronic money transactions
WO1998052151A1 (fr) * 1997-05-15 1998-11-19 Access Security Sweden Ab Transaction electronique
US5926551A (en) * 1995-12-28 1999-07-20 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for certifying content of hard-copy documents
GB2337353A (en) * 1998-05-15 1999-11-17 Ibm Method of generating product survey information in an electronic payment system
US6081610A (en) * 1995-12-29 2000-06-27 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for verifying signatures on documents
ES2178937A1 (es) * 2000-10-31 2003-01-01 Serra Luis Ignacio Cortes Procedimiento de interconexion entre sitios para el intercambio de datos.
US6523014B1 (en) * 1998-03-18 2003-02-18 Francotyp-Postalia Ag & Co. Franking unit and method for generating valid data for franking imprints
EP1316168A1 (fr) * 2000-08-04 2003-06-04 First Data Corporation Procede et systeme d'utilisation de communications electroniques pour un contrat electronique

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP4554590B2 (ja) * 1996-10-30 2010-09-29 富士通株式会社 ネットワーク環境における取り引き証明装置および方法
US6470448B1 (en) * 1996-10-30 2002-10-22 Fujitsu Limited Apparatus and method for proving transaction between users in network environment

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0089087A1 (fr) * 1982-03-16 1983-09-21 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Système de communication, comprenant un ordinateur central, des stations d'accès et des stations extérieures, et incorporant un test cryptographique contre la falsification d'une station extérieure; et des stations extérieures utilisables dans un tel système
DE3303846A1 (de) * 1982-02-05 1983-11-10 Siemens AG, 1000 Berlin und 8000 München Verfahren zum "einschreiben" elektronischer post in einem elektronischen kommunikationssystem und anordnung zur durchfuehrung des verfahrens

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3303846A1 (de) * 1982-02-05 1983-11-10 Siemens AG, 1000 Berlin und 8000 München Verfahren zum "einschreiben" elektronischer post in einem elektronischen kommunikationssystem und anordnung zur durchfuehrung des verfahrens
EP0089087A1 (fr) * 1982-03-16 1983-09-21 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Système de communication, comprenant un ordinateur central, des stations d'accès et des stations extérieures, et incorporant un test cryptographique contre la falsification d'une station extérieure; et des stations extérieures utilisables dans un tel système

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, vol. 20, no. 12, May 1978, pages 5245-5247, New York, US; S.M. MATYAS: "Digital signature for identifying message and sender" *

Cited By (46)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3841393A1 (de) * 1987-12-18 1989-06-29 Pitney Bowes Inc Zuverlaessiges system zur feststellung der dokumentenechtheit
GB2211644A (en) * 1987-12-18 1989-07-05 Pitney Bowes Inc Reliable document authentication system
US4853961A (en) * 1987-12-18 1989-08-01 Pitney Bowes Inc. Reliable document authentication system
GB2211644B (en) * 1987-12-18 1992-06-03 Pitney Bowes Inc Document authentication system
DE3841393C2 (de) * 1987-12-18 1998-02-19 Pitney Bowes Inc Zuverlässiges System zur Feststellung der Dokumentenechtheit
DE3841389A1 (de) * 1987-12-31 1989-07-13 Pitney Bowes Inc Informationsuebermittlungssystem zur zuverlaessigen bestimmung der echtheit einer vielzahl von dokumenten
DE3922642A1 (de) * 1989-07-10 1991-01-24 Ant Nachrichtentech Verfahren zur verschluesselten datenuebertragung
US5142577A (en) * 1990-12-17 1992-08-25 Jose Pastor Method and apparatus for authenticating messages
WO1994014258A1 (fr) * 1992-12-14 1994-06-23 The Commonwealth Of Australia Securite de messages electroniques
US5832227A (en) * 1992-12-14 1998-11-03 The Commonwealth Of Australia Of Anzak Park Method for providing message document security by deleting predetermined header portions and attaching predetermined header portions when seal is validly associated with message or document
EP0624971A1 (fr) * 1993-05-10 1994-11-17 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Réseau de télécommunication
BE1007075A3 (nl) * 1993-05-10 1995-03-07 Philips Electronics Nv Telecommunicatienetwerk.
US6195177B1 (en) 1993-05-10 2001-02-27 U.S. Philips Corporation Telecommunication network having at least one facsimile machine, the network having an identification means for identifying and verifying an identity of a registered user and a content of a facsimile message
DE4416253A1 (de) * 1994-05-07 1995-11-09 Deutsche Bundespost Telekom Verfahren zur datenschutzgerechten Verteilung von Schlüsselinformationen
DE4416253B4 (de) * 1994-05-07 2005-09-22 Deutsche Telekom Ag Verfahren zur datenschutzgerechten Verteilung von Schlüsselinformationen
WO1996031034A1 (fr) * 1995-03-27 1996-10-03 Stefanus Alfonsus Brands Systeme garantissant la dissimulation restreinte de certificats a cle secrete meme lorsque le protocole emetteur est execute en mode parallele
US6052467A (en) * 1995-03-27 2000-04-18 Brands; Stefanus A. System for ensuring that the blinding of secret-key certificates is restricted, even if the issuing protocol is performed in parallel mode
EP0735719B2 (fr) † 1995-03-31 2010-07-28 Pitney Bowes Inc. Procédé pour fournir des boîtiers sécurisés dans un système de gestion de clés
EP0735719A2 (fr) † 1995-03-31 1996-10-02 Pitney Bowes Inc. Procédé pour fournir des boîtiers sécurisés dans un système de gestion de clés
EP0809903A1 (fr) * 1995-12-14 1997-12-03 Cybercash, Inc. Systeme et procede de transfert electronique
FR2742615A1 (fr) * 1995-12-14 1997-06-20 Cybercash Inc Procede et systeme de transfert electronique de fonds par des communications de securite
EP0809903A4 (fr) * 1995-12-14 2001-12-05 Cybercash Inc Systeme et procede de transfert electronique
US5926551A (en) * 1995-12-28 1999-07-20 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for certifying content of hard-copy documents
CN1095263C (zh) * 1995-12-29 2002-11-27 国际商业机器公司 验证文件签字的系统和方法
US6081610A (en) * 1995-12-29 2000-06-27 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for verifying signatures on documents
EP0791901A3 (fr) * 1996-02-21 1999-09-15 Card Call Service Co., Ltd. Système de transactions à réseau
EP0791901A2 (fr) * 1996-02-21 1997-08-27 Card Call Service Co., Ltd. Système de transactions à réseau
GB2313272B (en) * 1996-05-15 2000-12-13 Certicom Corp Digital signature protocol with reduced bandwidth
US6097813A (en) * 1996-05-15 2000-08-01 Certicom Corp. Digital signature protocol with reduced bandwidth
GB2313272A (en) * 1996-05-15 1997-11-19 Certicom Corp Digital signature protocol with reduced bandwidth
GB2317790B (en) * 1996-09-26 1998-08-26 Richard Billingsley Improvements relating to electronic transactions
GB2317790A (en) * 1996-09-26 1998-04-01 Richard Billingsley Electronic money transactions
AU741873C (en) * 1997-05-15 2004-07-08 Comex Electronics Ab Electronic transaction
AU741873B2 (en) * 1997-05-15 2001-12-13 Comex Electronics Ab Electronic transaction
WO1998052151A1 (fr) * 1997-05-15 1998-11-19 Access Security Sweden Ab Transaction electronique
NO337079B1 (no) * 1997-05-15 2016-01-18 Comex Electronics Ab Elektronisk transaksjon
US7254561B1 (en) 1997-05-15 2007-08-07 Comex Electronics Ab Method and device for performing electronic transactions
US6523014B1 (en) * 1998-03-18 2003-02-18 Francotyp-Postalia Ag & Co. Franking unit and method for generating valid data for franking imprints
GB2337353B (en) * 1998-05-15 2002-11-06 Ibm Method and apparatus for providing product survey information in an electronic payment system
GB2337353A (en) * 1998-05-15 1999-11-17 Ibm Method of generating product survey information in an electronic payment system
EP1316168A1 (fr) * 2000-08-04 2003-06-04 First Data Corporation Procede et systeme d'utilisation de communications electroniques pour un contrat electronique
EP1316168A4 (fr) * 2000-08-04 2006-05-10 First Data Corp Procede et systeme d'utilisation de communications electroniques pour un contrat electronique
US7784106B2 (en) 2000-08-04 2010-08-24 First Data Corporation Manufacturing unique devices that generate digital signatures
WO2003043297A3 (fr) * 2000-10-31 2003-08-28 Serra Luis Ignacio Cortes Procede d'interconnexion de sites pour l'echange de donnees
WO2003043297A2 (fr) * 2000-10-31 2003-05-22 Luis Ignacio Cortes Serra Procede d'interconnexion de sites pour l'echange de donnees
ES2178937A1 (es) * 2000-10-31 2003-01-01 Serra Luis Ignacio Cortes Procedimiento de interconexion entre sitios para el intercambio de datos.

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
DE3687934D1 (de) 1993-04-15
EP0214609A3 (en) 1989-08-02
JPS6256043A (ja) 1987-03-11
DE3687934T2 (de) 1993-06-17
EP0214609B1 (fr) 1993-03-10

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US4885777A (en) Electronic transaction system
EP0214609B1 (fr) Méthode et système de transaction électronique
US7181621B2 (en) Methods and device for digitally signing data
US4825050A (en) Security transaction system for financial data
CA1151741A (fr) Methode et appareil de securite pour la transmission de donnees
EP0043027B1 (fr) Procédé et système électronique de vérification d'une signature
EP0678836B1 (fr) Méthode et moyens pour combiner et diriger le chiffrage de la vérification des personnes et des messages d'authentification lors d'une transmission sur un réseau
US4862501A (en) Communications network using IC cards
US7552333B2 (en) Trusted authentication digital signature (tads) system
US5426700A (en) Method and apparatus for verification of classes of documents
US4849613A (en) Method and device for making an electronic authentication
US4981370A (en) Document authentication apparatus
US5031214A (en) Document authentication apparatus
US4969188A (en) Process and apparatus for the protection of secret elements in a network of encrypting devices with open key management
US20030101348A1 (en) Method and system for determining confidence in a digital transaction
US6430690B1 (en) Secure one-way authentication communication system
US20020016913A1 (en) Modifying message data and generating random number digital signature within computer chip
JPS619052A (ja) 通信ネツトワ−クシステム
JP2002543668A (ja) 公開鍵／プライベート鍵式暗号化対を利用する高安全生体測定認証
CN105162596A (zh) 在服务器凭证验证时生成一次性口令和签名的强认证令牌
JP2003521154A (ja) 電子識別情報を発行する方法
JPH0775032B2 (ja) 情報読取り検証方法
EP0855815B1 (fr) Certification de clés cryptographiques pour cartes à puce
JPS61205041A (ja) 通信ネツトワ−クシステム
JPH0827812B2 (ja) 電子取引方法

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PUAI Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): DE FR GB

PUAL Search report despatched

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009013

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: A3

Designated state(s): DE FR GB

17P Request for examination filed

Effective date: 19891221

17Q First examination report despatched

Effective date: 19910918

RTI1 Title (correction)
GRAA (expected) grant

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210

AK Designated contracting states

Kind code of ref document: B1

Designated state(s): DE FR GB

REF Corresponds to:

Ref document number: 3687934

Country of ref document: DE

Date of ref document: 19930415

ET Fr: translation filed
PLBE No opposition filed within time limit

Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261

STAA Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent

Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT

26N No opposition filed
REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: IF02

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: FR

Payment date: 20050825

Year of fee payment: 20

Ref country code: GB

Payment date: 20050825

Year of fee payment: 20

REG Reference to a national code

Ref country code: GB

Ref legal event code: PE20

PGFP Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: DE

Payment date: 20051012

Year of fee payment: 20

PG25 Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo]

Ref country code: GB

Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF EXPIRATION OF PROTECTION

Effective date: 20060902